Toward a History Beyond Borders

Contentious Issues in Sino-Japanese Relations

Daqing Yang, Jie Liu, Hiroshi Mitani, and Andrew Gordon, editors

This volume brings to English-language readers the results of an important long-term project of historians from China and Japan addressing contentious issues in their shared modern histories. Originally published simultaneously in Chinese and Japanese in 2006, the thirteen essays in this collection focus renewed attention on a set of political and historiographical controversies that have steered and stymied Sino-Japanese relations from the mid-nineteenth century, through World War II, to the present. These in-depth contributions explore a range of themes, from prewar diplomatic relations and conflicts, to wartime collaboration and atrocity, to postwar commemorations and textbook debates—all while grappling with the core issue of how history has been researched, written, taught, and understood in both countries.

In the context of a wider trend toward cross-national dialogues over historical issues, this volume can be read as both a progress report and a case study of the effort to overcome contentious problems of history in East Asia.
Acknowledgments

In preparing and publishing this book, we received generous support from many institutions and individuals. First, we would like to express our gratitude to the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. Through the Sasakawa Japan-China Friendship Fund, the foundation has supported our study group over the years and the publication of this book with the aim of promoting mutual understanding and developing a relationship of trust between Japan and China. Its staff members, Yu Zhan, Kobayashi Yoshiyuki, and Hu Yipin, deserve the credit for providing competent assistance and creating a harmonious atmosphere for frank, scholarly discussions without any interference.

We are grateful to the University of Tokyo Press in Japan and the Chinese Social Science Academic Press in China for publishing our book in Japanese and Chinese, respectively. We thank Takenaka Hide-toshi, Satō Kazue, Abe Jun’ichi, and Yang Qun for their careful attention and diligent work. We also would like to thank the Harvard University Asia Center publications program, its director William Hammell, as well as two anonymous reviewers for helping us to bring out the present English edition.

Finally, we thank our translators—Erik Esselstrom, Joshua Fogel, Matthew Fraleigh, Timothy George, Konrad Lawson, and Louisa Rubinfiel—for their painstaking efforts have made it possible for these chapters to reach a wider readership outside East Asia.
# Contents

*Chronologies, Tables, Documents, and Figures*  
ix

*Contributors*  
xiii

Introduction to the English Edition  
Daqing Yang and Andrew Gordon  
1

Introduction to the Japanese Edition  
Lin Jie  
9

1 Modes of Narrating the History of Sino-Japanese Relations: The Latter Half of the Nineteenth Century  
Moteji Toshio  
20

2 A Prototype of Close Relations and Antagonism: From the First Sino-Japanese War to the Twenty-One Demands  
Kawashima Shin  
53

3 Sino-Japanese Diplomacy during Cycles of Mutual Antagonism: On the Eve of the Manchurian Incident  
Lin Jie  
81

4 Controversies over the Tanaka Memorial  
Hattori Ryōji  
121

5 Issues in the History of Manzhouguo: Contemporary and Succeeding Perspectives  
Higuchi Hidemi  
148
Contents

6 The Nanjing Atrocity: Is Constructive Dialogue Possible? 178
Daqing Yang

7 Wang Jingwei and the "Nanjing Nationalist Government": Between Collaboration and Resistance 205
Liu Jie

8 Japan's History Textbook System and Its Controversies 240
Mitani Hiroshi

9 Sino-Japanese Mutual Understanding as Seen in History Textbooks 267
Ibaraki Satoshi

10 Historical Perceptions of Taiwan's Japan Era 299
Asano Toyomi

11 Politics and Commemoration in Postwar Japan 340
Murai Ryota

12 From War Reparation to Postwar Reparation 372
Yang Zhihui

13 Historical Dialogue and Documentary Research 411
Kawashima Shin

Postscript to the Japanese Edition 434
Mitani Hiroshi

Reference Matter

Index 443

Chronologies, Tables, Documents, and Figures

Chronologies

2.1 Sino-Japanese relations from the latter half of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century 79

4.1 The Tanaka Memorial 146
5.1 Manzhouguo 171
6.1 The Nanjing Atrocity 198
7.1 The Nanjing Nationalist government 234
8.1 Japan's history textbooks 264
9.1 Japanese and Chinese history textbooks 288
10.1 Taiwan from the era of Japanese rule to the present 335
11.1 Postwar Japanese politics and commemoration 370

Tables

8.1 Adoption rates for Atarashii rekishi kyokasho, 2002 265
9.1 Chinese history in Japanese middle-school social studies history textbooks 289
9.2 Chinese historical figures in Japanese high-school history textbooks 290
9.3 Chinese historical figures in Japanese high-school world history textbooks 291
6 The Nanjing Atrocity: Is Constructive Dialogue Possible?

Daqing Yang

Translated by the author

On December 13, 1937, Japanese forces from the Central China Area Army overcame the last pockets of Chinese resistance and stormed into the walled city of Nanjing. Only a few days later, the world began to learn through foreign newspaper reports about the horrific conditions in the fallen city. In 1938, eyewitness reports compiled by a dozen or so Westerners who remained in the city were smuggled out and published, showing widespread Japanese atrocities of rape, killing, and looting. Though publicly denied by the Japanese authorities, these reports shook a few reasonable-minded Japanese, including some government officials, who urged action. The Chinese government, facing a superior adversary and having suffered major defeats in the battlefield, understandably tried to publicize such information in an effort to win international sympathy.

In early 1938, foreign diplomats returning to the city also sent back reports, especially about the extensive damage to foreign properties in Nanjing at the hands of the Japanese. These reports about Japanese atrocities in Nanjing, together with other news about Japanese behavior in the conflict, contributed to the already deteriorating reputation of Japan as a threat to law and order in the world.

After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the atrocities known as the Rape of Nanjing (C. Nanjing datsuba; literally, “The Great Nanjing Massacre”) were publicized in Japan for the first time. Several Japanese officers were tried in relation to the incident at military tribunals in Tokyo and Nanjing respectively. Despite their pleas of innocence, all were found guilty and sentenced to death. In Nanjing, Lt. Gen. Tani Hisao, commander of the 6th Division, as well as several junior officers who reportedly had killed numerous Chinese with Japanese swords, were shot in 1947. Gen. Matsui Iwane, commander of Japan’s Central China Expedition Army, and Hirota Koki, then Foreign Minister, were hanged in Tokyo a year later. Having gathered evidence consisting largely of witness testimonies and burial records, these war crimes trials handed down verdicts that remained standard accounts of the incident for many years to come.

Since the early 1970s, what became commonly known as the Great Nanjing Massacre emerged as a subject of open dispute in Japan. By the early 1980s, in the wake of the textbook controversy, the issue came to life in China, where the first museum dedicated to Chinese victims in Nanjing was built in 1985. According to a poll conducted in China in late 1996, when asked what they would associate with Japan, nearly 84 percent of some 100,000 Chinese surveyed chose the “Nanjing Massacre,” surpassing all other answers. Since the late 1990s, the subject has gained worldwide recognition. Since the 1990s, it is probably not an exaggeration to say that no single event has garnered as much controversy as well as publicity as the 1937 Nanjing Atrocity.

Why has the Nanjing Atrocity been subject to so many controversial and discrepant representations? What are the major points of contention? Have historians gained a better understanding of what happened in Nanjing over the years and after discoveries of new evidence? Or is the truth about Nanjing never to be known? Can Chinese and Japanese ever reach a common understanding over this issue? These questions are as much about the 1937 events in Nanjing as about the nature of historical inquiry, and they are the questions this chapter attempts to address.

Why Has the Nanjing Atrocity Become the “Focus of Sino-Japanese Controversy”?

CONFLICT OF COLLECTIVE SYMBOLS

To many, the intensity and longevity of the debate over the Nanjing Atrocity is to be understood in terms of politics. Indeed, for many people, the 1937 event is important primarily because of the political symbolism it carries, of which there are several aspects.

Ever since World War II, the Nanjing Atrocity has been a symbol of Japanese militarism and its brutality, a view formalized at the postwar military tribunals in Nanjing and Tokyo. The Communist Party of China has embraced this view to this day, separating the Japanese people from those militarists and claiming the former to be victims as well. Outside the official realm, however, the Nanjing Atrocity is also a symbol simply of Japanese brutality, a tendency gaining currency with the demise of official, orthodox, class-based analysis.

The other side of the coin is Chinese suffering. Though the huge loss of Chinese lives in Nanjing was once attributed to the incompetence of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist troops, it now symbolizes the immense suffering that all Chinese endured during the war. In this regard, Nanjing is but one on a long list of Japanese wartime atrocities that includes forced labor, military comfort women, the brutal “three all” (“kill all, burn all, loot all”) anti-guerrilla campaign, and chemical and biological warfare. As a major humiliation of the Chinese nation, the Nanjing Massacre now serves as a basis for patriotic education in China: namely, “Backward countries are bound to be beaten” (houhuan jinyao aida).

Whereas Nanjing often serves as a symbol of common suffering and unity in China, in postwar Japan, the Nanjing Atrocity has nearly always been subject to conflicting political interpretations, a reflection of the general lack of consensus within Japan toward the war. Whereas the Nanjing Atrocity has been associated with Japanese militarism and the emperor system, it is also seen, especially by veterans, as an unfortunate but inherent by-product of warfare. Ever since the war crimes trials, for quite a few Japanese the Nanjing Atrocity has also become a symbol of the “victor’s justice” of these trials, a view that has gained considerable currency in recent years. For them, research on the subject has become synonymous with disproving Chinese claims or the verdicts of the trials rather than establishing what Japanese atrocities did take place.

Collective symbols are often sustained by their own ideology and are reinforced by current politics; they can be resistant to change over the short run. Whether we like it or not, political symbols have been and shall remain part of our world as long as nation-states and nationalism exist.

As the historian Charles Maier points out in his analysis of the “Historikerstreit” in Germany in the 1980s, politics is not a factor that is outside historical inquiry but is instead inherent in it. As he puts it, “Historical interpretations must simultaneously be political interpretations in that they support some beliefs about how power works and dismiss others. But they need not be politicized interpretations; they need not be weapons forged for a current ideological contest.”

FACT, MEMORY, AND TRUTH

However useful it is, political explanation alone is not enough to account for the lack of consensus on the Nanjing Atrocity, as the ongoing debate is more than just a reflection of conflicting political views.

The debate must also be understood in relation to the nature of historical inquiry, or, ultimately, “truth in history.” Only a casual glance at the voluminous Japanese and Chinese writings on the Nanjing Massacre reveals how frequently such terms as “historical facts” or “truth” are cited as one’s own objective, while the accusation of politically motivated distortion is often hurled at one’s adversary. As E. H. Carr pointed out long ago, “no sane historian pretends to do anything so fantastic as to embrace ‘the whole of experience.’ The historian’s world is not a photographic copy of the real world but a working model that enables us to understand it.” Historians distill from the experience of the past, or from so much of the experience of the past as is accessible to them, that part that they recognize as amenable to rational explanation and interpretation.

One should bear in mind that the events in Nanjing were experienced by real human beings—hundreds of thousands of Chinese, tens of thousands of Japanese, and a few dozen Westerners. To countless Chinese,

181

their experiences were deadly, and consequently it is nearly impossible to give them voice. For those who came out alive, nearly eight years would pass before they had the first opportunity to speak out. In this way their voices found their way into collective memory—through testimonies. However, as the survivors pass from the scene, personal experience has had to be incorporated into public memory and history.

More third-party records have become available in recent years. Official records, including reports sent by diplomats concerning the conditions in Nanjing, were found in the archives. The richest Western source remains the American missionary papers in the Yale Divinity School. More recently, the discovery of John Rabe’s diary nearly completes the observation of third-party nationals who helped to rescue the Chinese refugees in the city.3

In a sense, the Japanese source is the most important of the three categories, and perhaps the most important development since the end of the war crimes trials. It is known that many military records had been systematically destroyed immediately following the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945.4 According to Japanese historians familiar with military records, official battle journals [senbō yōkō] of less than one-third of the 57 Imperial Japanese Army battalions involved in the Nanjing battle have been found.5 Private records of officers and soldiers close some of these gaps: wartime diaries of top Japanese commanders like Gen. Matsui Iwane, Lt. Gen. Nakajima Kesago, and others have been published.6


narrative and the contingent truths of the victims’ memory, both deep and common.” In this way, he argues, “no single, overarching meaning emerges unchallenged; instead, narrative and counter-narrative generate a frisson of meaning in their exchange, in the working through process they now mutually reinforce.”

Approaches to the Nanjing Atrocity

THE BIG PICTURE

Recent work by historians on the basis of fresh evidence has greatly advanced our knowledge of the Nanjing atrocities and why they took place. What do we know about the alleged atrocities in Nanjing? And what remains unresolved and contentious?

As the first foreign news reports indicated, Japanese execution of Chinese captives sent the first shock wave around the world. What was known at the time to foreign journalists and residents in the Safety Zone was only the tip of the iceberg. Newly available Japanese records show that mass execution of as many as tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers who had surrendered in Nanjing had been ordered by the army or divisional command and was carried out in the first few days. Screening of suspected Chinese soldiers from the Safety Zone in the following weeks was done in such a way that many innocent civilians were taken to be executed with soldiers. In addition, there were also numerous cases of random shooting of Chinese civilians in the street or in their homes, a fact documented in reports compiled by Westerners in the city. The term used in China—the Nanjing Massacre—can be understood partly as a result of the evidence-gathering and prosecution process immediately after the war.

Rape was another major part of the Japanese atrocities that was known early, contributing to the name it is known by in the West: “The Rape of Nanjing.” Evidence came mainly from Westerners who remained in the fallen city as well as from a few Chinese victims. An “able German colleague” estimated 20,000, as John Rabe put it in his diary.

8. In English the term “rape” also means “sack” or “loot,” as in the “rape of Europa.”

However, postwar investigation in Nanjing by the KMT government turned up surprisingly few cases of rape. Many victims were reluctant to come forward. Japanese sources are of little help; historians have noted that whereas Japanese soldiers were likely to admit to murder or other acts of brutality, they were much less likely to admit to rape.

How can the truth be ascertained? What can be determined is that rape reached a peak after the victorious entry ceremony, and continued for much longer. Second, Chinese victims were often subject to gang rape, and many Japanese committed this crime. Third, victims were often killed after the act(s), and their bodies mutilated, suggesting sadism.

Property crimes such as looting and arson were widely recorded by Westerners, especially when they involved Western-owned properties. Objects looted included those for survival or military value, such as food and automobiles, but they also apparently extended to anything of value: pianos, pens, and watches. Nor was looting limited to individual soldiers. Officers as well as their civilian counterparts took part as well. Arson, too, was carried out for a number of purposes—from keeping warm to destroying evidence of looting, even for fun.

To be sure, not all damage to property or human lives in Nanjing was at the hands of the Japanese. Foreign witnesses recorded instances of Chinese troops destroying buildings (to deny cover to Japanese forces) and engaging in some looting in the chaos shortly before the city fell. Not a few Chinese died at the hands of their own compatriots—either shot by Chinese units preventing retreat or in stampede. How one looks at these losses will depend on one’s vantage point.

When one looks at the event as a whole with regard to both quantity and quality, currently most historians can agree that the Nanjing Atrocity refers to the totality of the following: during the two months after the fall of Nanjing in December 1937, there occurred an organized large-scale massacre of Chinese captives, numerous rapes, murders, and looting committed against Chinese non-combatants, as well as other types of destruction. Tens of thousands of Chinese were killed, and thousands of women were raped.

Unfortunately, such convergence about the big picture tends to be obscured by the continued use by almost all parties in the debate of the designations such as the “(Great) Massacre Faction” (daigakusuatsu-ha) and the “Small Number Faction” (shōshū-ha) in Japan (and consequently
in China), which were based almost solely on their different estimates of the Chinese death tolls.

THE NUMBER ISSUE IN PERSPECTIVE

The total number of Chinese victims killed by the Japanese troops in Nanjing is the most controversial point. Both the Chinese government and academics continue to insist on the figure of 300,000 Chinese dead, a conclusion first reached at the postwar military tribunals in Nanjing. On the other hand, outside China and especially among Japanese researchers, many believe at least tens of thousands and perhaps even more than 100,000 Chinese had been killed by the Japanese troops.

Perhaps the more important reason that this issue is so prominently featured is that it has been invested with much collective symbolism, and has well served some of the protagonists on opposite sides in the debate. For some Japanese, the 300,000 figure typifies a “Chinese-style exaggeration,” a result of Chinese myth-making and propaganda, and a symbol of the “Tokyo Trial view of history.” On the other hand, for the overwhelming majority of Chinese, the 300,000 figure is an inseparable part of the historical verdict on the Japanese aggression rendered at the postwar trials. The number, engraved on the walls of the Massacre Memorial in Nanjing, is all the more worth defending given that it has been invested with much collective symbolism, and has well served some of the protagonists on opposite sides in the debate. For some Japanese, the 300,000 figure typifies a “Chinese-style exaggeration,” a result of Chinese myth-making and propaganda, and a symbol of the “Tokyo Trial view of history.” On the other hand, for the overwhelming majority of Chinese, the 300,000 figure is an inseparable part of the historical verdict on the Japanese aggression rendered at the postwar trials. The number, engraved on the walls of the Massacre Memorial in Nanjing, is all the more worth defending given the much publicized attempts by those Japanese to reject the postwar trials altogether. Such a dynamic serves to keep the number issue always in the limelight.

Although a definite figure provides some certainty to an event in the past that is often opaque, it should be remembered that the death toll is only part of the atrocities in Nanjing, which included rape and property crimes as well. Moreover, obsession with the aggregate number overlooks the fact that these are the deaths of one by one, as Japanese writer Hotta Yoshie noted in his 1953 novel, Jikan (Time). Indeed, for survivors of the trauma in Nanjing, their pain has little to do with the total number of the dead. Over-emphasis on abstract numbers can lead to a senseless ranking of human suffering based on these numbers.

Even if we only consider the killings, we must take into consideration both quality and quantity, or character and scale. It is true that when the scale changes, the character of a historical event, including designating various acts as war crimes, may also change. In the case of Nanjing, however, even within the range agreed upon by most historians, it is possible to characterize it as a “major atrocity.” In other words, there is little doubt that the crimes committed by the Japanese army in and around Nanjing amount to a major atrocity against POWs and civilians in the Second World War.

Whether historians like it or not, they cannot completely avoid the number issue. Here, definitional issues such as space/time (location/duration) as well as who counts as a victim become even more important, as they no doubt affect the scale of estimates. Inevitably, assessing the duration and location of an event like Nanjing is largely subjective. It is usually agreed that the atrocities lasted some six weeks. Whatever criteria one adopts, it is now known that Japanese atrocities in the Nanjing area began much earlier than indicated in the Tokyo Trial. Although the pattern of Japanese atrocities—killing soldiers who had surrendered, raping and killing civilians—was already visible in the wake of the Shanghai battle, the Nanjing Atrocity as a distinctive event should perhaps begin with the battle of Nanjing in early December, and with the final attack on the city on December 10. The ending date is more difficult to establish. Although large-scale massacres came to a conclusion with the departure of most Japanese units from Nanjing in late December, rape and looting lasted longer than wholesale massacre and continued unabated until late January or early February.

What constitutes “Nanjing” is also open to debate. Administratively speaking, the municipality of Nanjing as of 1937 encompassed eight districts within the city’s walls and three others in the vicinity. There were five counties, including one on the northern bank of the Yangtze River, that were affiliated with the city. Apparently, different measurements adopted have a direct influence on estimates, such as those of damages and casualties. Thanks to the meticulous records compiled by many Westerners in Nanjing, we know quite a bit about the conditions in the International Safety Zone, which was only a fraction of the walled city. At the same time, however, it is now known that Japanese atrocities took place over an area broader than previously acknowledged. Yet, no systematic information is available about other areas or about another

---

refugee zone in Qixia shan (Qixia hill), to the northeast of the city. University of Nanking sociology professor Lewis S. C. Smythe's well-known sample survey of early 1938, for instance, revealed that damage to the civilian population in the rural areas was more severe than that in the walled city.

How many Chinese died in Nanjing and its vicinity? The answer may not be simple. None of the current evidence—burial records, testimonies, Japanese records, survey sampling—provides an absolutely indisputable estimate. Each type of evidence has its strengths and limits. It is known in both Japanese and Chinese sources that many Chinese were killed or drowned while crossing the river, and many Chinese corpses were thrown into the Yangtze River, but nobody has come up with even an estimate as to how many. Questions have been raised about some of the burial figures provided by Chinese fraternal organizations. In particular, the estimate of Cong Shan Tang, which claimed to have buried nearly 110,000 bodies, as well as the observation by a single Chinese witness, have been called into question. Although not yet disavowing the records from such sources, Chinese historians have admitted the problem of duplication among them.

Moreover, even if there is a definitive figure of the dead, the crucial question of who should be counted as a victim remains. The dead, obviously, cannot speak. Until recently, Chinese historians did not feel the need to separate those who died in combat (or sheer chaos) from other deaths, as they considered all of them to be victims of Japanese aggression. This has begun to change, as historians have separated the combat deaths from the victims of the Japanese massacre. The differences among the Japanese estimates are due primarily to interpretation as to who qualified for consideration as a victim. There is relatively little dispute over soldiers who had surrendered. Some Japanese insist on the exclusion of those defeated Chinese soldiers [bainquanbei] who were killed in battle before they had a chance to surrender. Most controversial are those defeated Chinese soldiers who had put on civilian clothes. Some classify them as "plainclothes soldiers" [ben'ihet] and argue they were not entitled to POW treatment. This may well be a gray area that will be further debated.

Having devoted considerable time to the death toll perhaps more than anyone else, historian Hata Ikuhiko in 1986 put the combined figure of civilians and soldiers killed at around 40,000 (30,000 soldiers and 12,000 civilians), although he indicated that it may rise if new evidence is found. If Hata's can be considered a more restrictive estimate, a more inclusive though ambiguous estimate is given by Kasahara Toku­shi, who puts it in his recent book as "more than 100,000, or nearly 200,000 or even more Chinese soldiers and civilians became victims in Nanjing." Estimates by others who adopted an even more restrictive definition range from "very few" to several thousand.

Chinese historians generally insist on the figure of "greater than 300,000," derived from the same evidence presented at the postwar trials. However, there are indications that their understanding of the death toll is evolving. Sun Zhaiwei, the leading Chinese historian of the subject, recently warned his Chinese colleagues against three misguided objectives when conducting research on this issue: a permanently fixed figure, a figure as high as possible, and a figure as precise as possible. Sun indicates that even the sensitive subject of whether the Chinese death toll in Nanjing needs to be modified can be discussed as long as "one respects and recognizes the historical fact that the invading Japanese troops wantonly slaughtered the Chinese people on a large scale." Here lies a common conflict between history and memory that is by no means unique to the Nanjing Atrocity: the former seeks new interpretations whereas the latter depends on stable symbols.

UNDERSTANDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES

If we understand the "truth of Nanjing" not simply as "what really happened," but also "why it happened," then historians cannot avoid the even more subjective task of offering explanations. Here the question is not simply to reconstruct the chain of direct causation, but also to probe deeper causes that are not always immediately obvious even to

---

10. For a brief reference, see Rabe, Lahe riji, entry of February 3, 1938.
11. Sun Zhaiwei, Nanjing jaskweihan.
12. Hata, Nanjin jiken, 187-205. Indeed, he has suggested the possibility of 50,000 to 60,000 after the publication of the Rabe Diary. Kasahara, Nanjin jiken, 224.
participants. Although historical explanations of the Nanjing atrocities necessarily rely on certain assumptions that often vary, the dynamics of historical inquiry have deepened understanding of the causes of this terrible event.

At one extreme are the historical explanations focusing on circumstances. First, battlefield psychology was an important factor affecting troop behavior, among both Japanese and others. Newly available diaries of Japanese soldiers who fought in China provide ample testimony to support such a conclusion. The road to Nanjing was particularly bloody in part because the Japanese troops considered the area to be the heartland of anti-Japanese sentiment in China. The ferocious fighting in the Shanghai area, where the Japanese suffered unexpectedly heavy casualties, intensified the Japanese soldiers’ resolve to exact revenge for lost comrades. Regiment commander Major Gen. Sasaki Tōichi described after the war how agitated Japanese soldiers shot many Chinese soldiers who came to surrender, despite their superiors’ efforts to restrain them. Some also emphasize battlefield psychology as the cause of the partial breakdown of discipline—still the most important cause for some of the atrocities in Nanjing.

Rapid expansion of an armed force in a relatively short period often brings about problems in the quality of recruits. As Japan embarked on continental expansion in the 1930s, its army swelled from 278,000 in 1931 to 593,000 in 1937. Historian Fujiwara Akira, author of many critical works on Japanese aggression, has shown in a recent study that many of the soldiers sent to fight in China in 1937 were reservists (yabibe) called to active duty. The arrival of reinforcements to make up for the heavy losses in Japanese units weakened the cohesion among the units and consequently undermined discipline.

The situation of the Nanjing battle aggravated the confrontation. The reckless Japanese attack on Nanjing, pushed by commanders in the field and made without adequate logistical preparation, not only made the mental and physical conditions of the soldiers worse; it also increased the need to requisition supplies, which in turn led to widespread looting and other crimes. Moreover, such practices also gave rise to other types of atrocities. As soldiers entered villages and homes looking for food and other supplies, often by force, the encounters triggered many more cases of brutality against the Chinese civilian population. Those who dared to resist were often shot, while Japanese soldiers raped the women they found in helpless situations.

The chaos that characterized the first few days in areas around the city also blurred the boundary between combat killings and atrocities. In a few instances, small pockets of Chinese stragglers occasionally engaged Japanese troops around Nanjing, and were often annihilated completely. These instances of resistance, however small, at least gave the Japanese troops the pretext—to some, justification—to conduct harsh “mopping-up” operations in and around the city, which apparently included taking away many suspected civilians from the Safety Zone and executing them en masse. The extremely large number of Chinese POWs, at a time when Japanese troops’ own supplies were already inadequate, became justification for Japanese commanders to issue orders to “dispose of Chinese POWs.”

UNDERSTANDING STRUCTURAL FACTORS

As shown in much of the new evidence, a pattern of committing atrocities had been present in the Japanese army even before the battle of Nanjing started in early December. For example, Japanese army records showed instances of the execution of Chinese POWs near Shanghai, and diaries of Japanese soldiers and memoirs made reference to rape and other brutalities against civilians in the time leading up to Nanjing. Not all commanders would order the execution of POWs even when faced with food shortages. Apparently, historians must therefore go beyond simply the circumstances of the battle in order to understand the causes.

The gradual but serious erosion of Japanese army discipline since the Meiji era had been observed by many contemporaries, including some Japanese officers like Gen. Matsui. It is apparent that by the time of the
Sino-Japanese War the discipline was decidedly worse due to a number of factors. Army leaders' effort to tighten discipline by demanding absolute submission through indoctrination as members of the Imperial Army actually failed to stem the deterioration. A perhaps more serious aspect of the institutional change in the Japanese military was the rise of radical lower- and middle-level officers. Typically they had been educated in military schools from an early age, and had developed an often total disregard of civilian dignity and a lack of respect for international rules.18

Perhaps one of the most important factors at work in Nanjing was the prewar Japanese military's treatment of POWs. In the Meiji era the Japanese military made much of its “civilized treatment” of captured enemy soldiers, even if applied mainly to a European adversary. Mal-treatment of enemy prisoners started well before Nanjing and would become a recurrent practice throughout the war years. Although maltreatment of captured enemies was sometimes just as bad on the Allied side during the Second World War, the prewar Japanese military had institutionalized the practice of maltreatment. By the 1930s, a Japanese soldier captured alive was supposed to have dishonored the nation. In Nanjing, the Thirteenth Division issued its own directive concerning captives if they were numerous. To some historians this implied that if the captives were few, they could be disposed of accordingly after necessary interrogations. The 116th Regiment of the Thirteenth Division even recorded the execution of POWs in its battle journal, indicating how prevalent such an attitude must have been in the entire army.19

In addition, perhaps more than in other institutions in prewar Japan, the Imperial Japanese Army embodied the racial superiority of the Japanese and contempt for the Chinese and other Asians. Such an attitude served to lessen psychological resistance to massacres and other atrocities against the Chinese population in Nanjing.20 A study issued by the Japanese Army Infantry School in 1933, for example, suggested it would not become a problem even if Chinese captives were killed or released elsewhere since they lacked a proper registry system.21 Such a disregard for Chinese lives made it easier for officers to disregard proper combat rules in China, a fact that some attribute to the absence of a formal declaration of war. To be sure, these were probably extreme cases. The lack of respect also made it easier to violate Chinese lives and dignity. There is no reason to believe all Japanese officers and men acted in such a manner; indeed, exceptions seemed to prove the rule.

Structural causes like these have received renewed attention in light of some of the new evidence, though in more specific terms rather than in all-encompassing Japanese militarism or abstract cultural explanations. Indeed, these factors were not only responsible for widespread Japanese atrocities before the fall of Nanjing, they remained largely in force more or less throughout the entire war, in China and in the rest of the Pacific theater. For instance, discrimination against those who surrendered and disrespect for POWs led to numerous atrocities against enemy POWs during the Pacific War. Examples include the Bataan Death March and inhumane treatment of Allied POWs and native laborers on the Thai-Burma Railway as well as in many other POW labor camps. Neglect of logistics and supply, which contributed to the atrocities in Nanjing, also became a major factor in the starvation of a large number of Japanese troops in the South Pacific during the war.

UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY

A battlefield is an extraordinary place. It requires commanding officers to exercise judgment to rein in soldiers who otherwise would run amok. Gen. Matsui himself regarded divisional commanders to be directly responsible and singled out Lt. Gen. Nakajima as particularly negligent. Few Japanese Military Police were present in Nanjing to maintain army discipline, however, suggesting at the very least a command oversight.22 There was indeed a breakdown of discipline, insofar as the Japanese army's own rules of engagement and discipline vis-à-vis civilians were
violated. However, records show only a small number of Japanese were court-martialed for such violations. There was a permissive atmosphere in the entire army that regarded atrocities as a necessary evil.

Some writers attributed the order to execute Chinese POWs to one renegade officer in the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant Chō Isamu. The rebellious staff officer in the headquarters allegedly issued the orders on his own, as he boasted to another Japanese officer sometime later during the war. But a careful reading of newly published wartime records suggests that the execution of Chinese prisoners was more than the work of a single officer. Even if Chō had issued the orders, neither Inumura and Uemura—Chō’s direct superiors—were the least troubled by the execution of a large number of prisoners, but instead were disturbed only by the “mishandling” of the executions (betan koto o yaita) at the hands of the Yamada Brigade. This strongly suggests that they at least acquiesced to Chō’s request, if they did not issue the orders themselves. Moreover, existing records show that units belonging to the Tenth Army, unrelated to Chō and the Yamada Brigade but under the separate command of Gen. Yanagawa Heisuke, also carried out executions under orders; one such unit is the 66th Battalion. It is almost certain that Japanese commanders at the division level and above accepted that first massacre was a Japanese army that regarded atrocities as a necessary evil.

Mass execution as a method to dispose of the large numbers of surrendered Chinese soldiers, although other alternative measures might have been at least contemplated by some Japanese officials. Since nobody has found the single smoking gun in the form of a written order, a die-hard empiricist may insist that massacres were therefore not ordered by the Yamada Brigade. This strongly suggests that they at least acquiesced to Chō’s request, if they did not issue the orders themselves. Moreover, existing records show that units belonging to the Tenth Army, unrelated to Chō and the Yamada Brigade but under the separate command of Gen. Yanagawa Heisuke, also carried out executions under orders; one such unit is the 66th Battalion. It is almost certain that Japanese commanders at the division level and above accepted mass execution as a method to dispose of the large numbers of surrendered Chinese soldiers, although other alternative measures might have been at least contemplated by some Japanese officials. Since nobody has found the single smoking gun in the form of a written order, a die-hard empiricist may insist that massacres were therefore not ordered from above, as claimed by Chinese historians.

Passing judgment on personal responsibility is not always easy, as it involves issues of history and ethics. Yamada’s case raises the question of what Maruyama Masao wryly called the “system of irresponsibility,” where “the locus of responsibility remained as nebulous as ever.” Was it possible to disobey? If someone in Yamada’s position was simply following orders, such orders may well ultimately be traced all the way upward but would disappear before reaching the Emperor. In the

25. See Rabe, Lahu ri fii, Inumura diary, Uemura diary in Naikin senki shiryoshibi.

script to Soldiers and Sailors in Imperial Japan, every man was told to “obey the orders of your superiors as if they were Our orders.” The question is somewhat different for ordinary soldiers. International law scholar Onuma Yasuaki’s discussion of the question whether individuals should have practiced the “disobedience of the extraordinary” is relevant here. He argues that “it is inappropriate to demand all soldiers to be heroes who disobey their superior’s unlawful orders,” since absolute obedience in the battlefield is required in all military forces. In this sense, individual responsibility disappears in a society that does not allow disobedience to unlawful state orders.

The newly published evidence from Chinese and third-party observers confirms initial foreign news reports about the Chinese side as well and adds new insights. Some Chinese apparently were prepared to sacrifice not only themselves, but also the entire civilian population. According to John Rabe, some Chinese officers were of such an opinion. The rapid disintegration of the Chinese defenses in Nanjing created a situation not anticipated by commanders on either side. Most historians, including those in China, have accepted the failure at least on the part of Gen. Tang to mount a successful retreat. Out of desperation, many Chinese officers and soldiers filtered into the International Safety Zone, a few still carrying weapons. In particular, the fact that a few Chinese officers including generals abandoned their troops and hid inside the Safety Zone raises a difficult moral question. This does not diminish the fact that first and foremost the massacre was a Japanese atrocity. Given the pattern of destruction and atrocities by the advancing Japanese forces after their landing near Shanghai—which included the execution of captured Chinese soldiers—even if the Chinese troops had left Nanjing undefended, it is doubtful that such atrocities could have been avoided.

From Conflicting Views to Joint Research

In a recent book, historian of modern China Paul Cohen proposed an approach toward history in “three keys,” namely, the past as a historical

event, as experience, and as myth. As Cohen notes, even a historical event that has become clear academically is often intertwined with other factors in complicated ways. As he concedes, "indeed the very notion that the truth about the past—what historians seek to attain—is necessarily and always of greater value than what people want to believe is true about the past may itself be little more than a myth." This is because, as he notes, there are several kinds of value—moral, intellectual, emotional, aesthetic—which makes it impossible to rank one assertion about the past absolutely higher than others.28

The event known as the Nanjing Atrocity cannot be reduced to a body of "facts" beyond all contention. Given the subjective nature of historical inquiry and the fragmentary evidence that is available, it is unlikely that the remaining differences over particular aspects, as well as interpretations of the Nanjing Atrocity, will disappear anytime soon. They may never disappear. Inevitably, different historians with different values and viewpoints, at different times, looking at the same phenomena, draw different conclusions even from the same body of evidence.

As a result, the death toll estimates by Japanese researchers still vary considerably from one another, and differ from verdicts reached at the postwar trials or from the official figure embraced by most Chinese. On the question of causes, Chinese historians tend to emphasize Japanese atrocities as inevitable and the execution of Chinese POWs as pre-planned. Although some in Japan still consider the instances of atrocities entirely normal in war, most historians recognize both long-term and short-term factors. Almost all historians recognize the failure of the Chinese defense, although they differ in how they connect it with the atrocities in Nanjing.

Can some of the differences be further narrowed? Indeed, a common historical perception of war crimes such as the Nanjing Atrocity is possible, if by that we do not mean imposing one unified version of history across nations, but rather a framework of historical inquiry. This framework recognizes a common starting point; it is historical-empirical while recognizing the limits of the historian's craft; it is also sensitive to moral-political implications, namely, that the Nanjing Atrocity took place

within Japan's invasion of China but also shares certain commonalities with all warfare and organized violence in human history. It is important to consider both the particularities as well as the commonalities of war and violence in the case of the Nanjing Atrocity. In other words, while fully cognizant of Japan's war crimes in China as epitomized by the Nanjing Atrocity, it is necessary to go beyond the Japan vs. China equation to examine the event in a broader perspective, at the level of humanity in war and violence. In this way, the sharing of historical perceptions between nations is closely linked to a shared value in common humanity.

As a starting point, it is essential for historians to recognize that regardless of the name, evidence makes clear that Japanese troops did commit a variety of atrocities—both organized and random—on a large scale in Nanjing in 1937. Accepting such an "interim truth" as a starting point does not mean abandoning efforts to understand better what happened in Nanjing through a relentless quest for evidence as well as critical assessment of it (including official records as well as oral testimonies). Nor does it mean that historians will stop reassessment of previous interpretations in a responsible manner. Recognizing this is all the more necessary as it helps reduce the psychological barrier among historians in China and bring about a genuine dialogue among historians across national boundaries.

Although political influences are likely to continue to polarize the debate over the Nanjing Atrocity, it is also necessary, to the extent possible, to discuss a historical interpretation on its own merits. A few developments may help narrow the gaps among historians. First, the continued search for and publication of evidence pertaining to the event in Nanjing is extremely important. As historians come to share the same body of evidence, especially that from third-party sources such as John Rabe's diary, it becomes increasingly possible to assess the truthfulness of any argument on the basis of evidence. Second, the increasing internationalization of research is also helpful. Although research on the Nanjing Atrocity has so far been limited largely to those in Japan and China, this has begun to change. As historians from other countries publish their research, certain interpretations that had previously been dismissed as purely political must now be viewed in an academic light as well. With these developments, perhaps even though historians cannot put an end to debates over past events, they can at least help to place them on better historical ground.

Chronology and Documents

Chronology 6.1: The Nanjing Atrocity

1937
July: Marco Polo Bridge Incident, outbreak of (Second) Sino-Japanese War
August: Formation of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army
November: Formation of the Central China Area Army (CCAA), establishment of the General Headquarters (GHQ)

December 1: GHQ orders attack on Nanjing
7: Chiang Kai-shek and Madam Chiang flee Nanjing
10: General attack on Nanjing begins
12: Japanese planes sink USS Panay (Panay Incident)
13: Nanjing falls
17: Entry ceremony held in Nanjing

1938
January 1: Nanjing Self-governing Committee established
26: Japanese officer slaps US Embassy staff John Allison, causing a diplomatic incident

February: Gen. Matsui Iwane relieved of CCAA commander’s post
March: Republic of China Reform Government established in Nanjing

Document 6.1: A brief account of the assistance by the Nanjing Provisional Municipal Council in investigating the massacre in Nanjing (November 1946)

When Director Chen Yuguang, Deputy Director Chen Yaodong, and Secretary General Xiao Ruoxu paid a visit to Chairman (Chiang Kai-shek) on June 11, they reported on the founding of our association, the First General Meeting, and important resolutions. The chairman ordered them to assist in the investigation of the Nanjing Massacre incident. This is how our association began assisting the investigation.

After receiving the order, our Association convened several meetings of Permanent Members and Council members, and held discussions with shifu (local administrators), in order to gather recommendations from a wide circle to help the investigation. After these meetings, we established a (Nanjing) Massacre Investigation Committee as an organization within our Association.

The membership of the Committee consists of

1) all Council members;
2) Heads of concerned agencies;
3) Individuals who were involved in international refugee and charity work and did not betray [China] till the end.

Second, here are the key issues in the investigation:

The investigation chart published by the London War Crimes Committee listed 33 types of atrocity. Since it lists them one by one, it records in great detail, without omission, crimes against general individual freedom or crimes against civilization. It is clear that the chart does not suit the investigation of the massacre. Consequently, we have made up an investigation chart for the massacre, listing subcategories of the means of massacre. This helps the personnel involved in the investigation, and serves as reference for residents inside the city and the suburbs to recall the event. The result of this effort is not only convenient for the investigation, its contents also meet the strict definitions of war crimes created by the United Nations when we consider the objective and the nature of our task. The enemy's massacre of Nanjing residents fits the "crimes against humanity" defined in war crimes. Thus it fits "crimes against peace" and "crimes against humanity." This is why our Council devoted considerable time to making up a new chart.

Next, the method of investigation is as follows:

Although a number of agencies have already investigated this matter, because eight years have already passed, due to the death or movement of the victims, even individuals to serve as plaintiffs in trials have disappeared. Or, with the passage of time anger gradually became weaker, or people no longer wanted to touch old wounds. Representative are cases of women who had been killed after being raped. Moreover, some ignore the visits by investigation personnel because they do not know the names of enemy units that perpetrated the crime; others do so because assisting the investigation does not lead to improving their hard lives.


Document 6.2: "Fight to the Death"

My name is Li Xiuying. In early December airplanes of the Japanese invaders bombed Nanjing every day. Houses were destroyed, people were killed or wounded. Everyone was scared! In the afternoon of December 13, Japanese soldiers entered the city from Guanghua Gate and Zhonghua Gate. Once the Japanese devils [soldiers] got inside the city, they killed anyone in sight, burned homes, and looted goods. Almost everyone in the streets was killed. My husband and my younger brother had already escaped to the north of the river. I was seven months into my pregnancy, and couldn’t move freely. So I stayed behind in the city together with my dad. After Japanese devils entered the city, we and a few other refugees hid ourselves in the basement of an elementary school in Wutaishan that was run by Americans. The basement was small and damp. Some twenty people crowded inside like canned sardines. During the day we dared not to go out or make a noise. We couldn’t breathe freely and got irritated.

On December 19, a calamity fell upon us. That day it was raining, the wind from the northwest was blowing hard. We felt so cold hiding in the basement. About 9 o’clock in the morning, six Japanese soldiers came down to the basement with rifles in their hands. They took away ten young women. I was one of them. At that time, I thought, even if I had to die, I wouldn’t be humiliated. I was determined to resist by dying. I hit my own head against the wall till my forehead started bleeding. I fainted and fell to the ground. When I gradually came to, the Japanese devils had left. My dad and other refugees took me back to the basement and lay me down on a bed made of khaki .... At
eleven o'clock that same day, three Japanese soldiers came again. They drove seven or eight remaining refugees outside, and two Japanese devils drove six or seven women into two rooms. I lay in the bed and didn't move, and watched the Japanese devils. One devil came to me, holding a rifle, saying “Chinese girl, there is nothing to be afraid of.” At this time I was so angry that I could barely control myself. At that time I was wearing a one-piece Chinese dress. This devil tried to unbutton me. I saw the devil was carrying a knife around his waist. I had seen my uncle carrying this kind of knife. It was inside a sheath, and you cannot pull it out so easily. Because I knew something about it, I quickly opened the sheath, held the knife's handle and pulled it out, and jumped out of bed, and fought the devil! The devil was greatly shocked, and tried to break my hand tightly holding the knife. At the same time he pressed my hand and the knife against me, and fought me for the handle of the knife. We fought a life-and-death battle. At this time I didn't care about anything, kicked with my feet, thrust with my head, and bit with my teeth. The devil cried aloud after being bitten. When they heard the cry two women seized the opportunity and ran away. I alone fought three devils and wouldn't let go of the handle of the knife. The devil tried to take it away from me, and we fought on the floor. Two other devils stabbed me with knives at random all over the place. I was stabbed all over and blood gushed out, but I didn't feel the pain. My face was also stabbed and blood gushed out and my clothes became red. I was still fighting tooth and nail. Finally, a devil stabbed me in the belly. My belly contracted a bit, and in an instant I blacked out. I didn't know anything after that.

The devils thought I was dead and left. After they left my dad came back and also thought I was dead. He was so sad but he didn't care to bury me during the daytime and waited till dusk when devil soldiers were not around. My dad and other refugees dug a big hole near Wutaishan and went to bury me there. When the enemy engaged in night attacks on our artillery and cavalry units near Xianhe Gate and Yaohua Gate on the night of the 12th, causing great damage, they were still determined to fight. However, after that they gradually lost their will and surrendered.

It is reported that guard units of the Army headquarters and Guard Company that fought enemy stragglers near Tangshuizhen on the night of the 12th asked for retribution of ammunition when the division's supply unit was en route to fight.

As there is the need to protect His Highness [Lt. Gen., Asaka, Commander of the Shanghai Expedition Army—translator] the Chief of Staff discussed with the Army Chief of Staff sending reinforcements of one or two companies. I heard a regiment from the 9th Division has been dispatched.

Although it is not in their area of operations the 9th Division is dispatching an infantry regiment for the purpose of fighting stragglers in areas closer to the 16th Division. One can't really sympathize with them. As a result, we have our hands clean.

Today mopping up in the city is mostly left to the Sasaki Unit. Two battalions from the Kusaba Unit in charge of guarding city gates in the area of operations are deployed, to move from the old city in the direction of Xiangtan.

However, hardly any enemy soldiers have been met, but there is a refugee zone in the area of the 9th Division. Although most are old and young and women, it is easy to imagine many stragglers in civilian clothes.

There are what seem to be Chinese army hospitals in the buildings in the Central University, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Army Ministry. Chinese doctors and nurses have all fled, but some foreigners are trying hard to look after [patients]. Since no entry or departure is allowed and there is shortage of materials, how can soldiers not die naturally?

It is probably after negotiating with Chinese government senior officials that these (several) foreigners are using the buildings. Therefore, our Division will ask them to leave if we have our own use for them.

Moreover, because we have many wounded as well, Japanese army cannot take up the task of looking after [these hospitals].

This way most of the defeated enemy are in the wooded village areas within the areas of operation of the 16th Division. At the same time those who fled from the Zhenjiang Fortress have been captured. Dealing with them is almost beyond our capacity.

If we follow the policy of not taking captives, even if we don't take care of them one by one, we can't even disarm such big masses of some 15,000 or 10,000. However, they have completely lost the will to fight, coming to us in droves. While it is safe, if there is a disturbance, it will cause a big problem. So we dispatched troops by trucks to keep surveillance and guidance.

In the evening of 13th many trucks are needed for a great operation. Moreover, immediately after a battle victory it is difficult to implement swiftly. Such disposal exceeds our expectations, causing the staff to be utterly preoccupied.

According to information obtained later, Sasaki Unit disposed of about 15,000 captives; a company commander garrisoning Taiping Gate disposed of 1,300; about

---

Document 6.3: Diary of Lt. General Nakajima Kessago, Commander of the 16th Division, Shanghai Expedition Army

December 13—clear weather

---

seven or eight thousand captives are gathered near Xianhe Gate, and more continue to come to surrender.

- To dispose of these seven or eight thousand, large ditches are necessary. It was possible to find them. One suggestion was to divide them into groups of 100 or 200, and then induce them to appropriate locations so they could be disposed of.
- The task of disposing of these stragglers fell mostly on the 16th Division. As a result, the Division has little time to enter the city and find accommodation, and has been running around.
- Along with the mopping up operations, we have to find and dispose of dangerous land mines and gather abandoned weapons. It seems there is considerable amount of weaponry and ammunition.

To complete all this a few extra days are necessary.


Document 6.4: Diary of James H. McCallum, December 29, 1937

Every day or two I have gone out for an inspection of our mission property. I have found visitors in our house at Peh Haia Rd. every time I have gone there. Every foreign house is a sight to behold; untouched until the Japanese army arrived, nothing untouched since. Every lock has been broken; every trunk ransacked. Their search for money and valuables has led them to the flues and inside pianos.

Our phonograph records are all broken; the dishes are a broken mass on the floor along with everything else that was discarded after each looting. The front of the piano was removed and all the hammers struck with something heavy.

Our house being outside the Safety Zone, this was not to be unexpected but houses within the Zone have shared a similar fate. Two of our boys' school buildings were set fire to, one a complete loss. Nanking presents a dismal appearance. At the time the Japanese army entered the city little harm had been done to buildings. Since then the stores have been stripped of their wares and most of them burned. Taiping, Chung Hwa, and practically every other main business road in the city is a mass of ruins. In south city much of the area back of the main street was also burned. We see new fires every day and wonder when such beastly destruction will cease.

But far worse is what has been happening to the people. They have been in terror and no wonder. Many of them have nothing left now but a single garment around their shoulders. Helpless and unarmed, they have been at the mercy of the soldiers, who have been permitted to roam about at will wherever they pleased. There is no discipline whatever and many of them are drunk. By day they go into the buildings in our Safety Zone centers, looking for desirable women, then at night they return to get them. If they have been hidden away, the responsible men are bayoneted on the spot. Girls of eleven and twelve and women of fifty have not escaped. Resistance is fatal. The worst cases come to the hospital. A woman six months pregnant, who resisted, came to us with sixteen knife wounds in her face and body, one piercing the abdomen. She lost her baby but her life will be spared. Men who gave themselves up to the mercy of the Japanese when they were promised their lives would be spared—a very few of them returned to the Safety Zone in a sad way. One of them declared they were used for bayo-

net practice and his body certainly looked it. Another group was taken out near Ku-ling Sze; one who somehow returned, lived long enough to tell the fate of that group. He claimed they threw gasoline over their heads, and then set fire to them. This man bore no other wounds but was burned so terribly around the neck and head that one could scarcely believe he was a human being. The same day another, whose body had been half burned over, came into the hospital. He had also been shot. It is altogether likely that the bunch of them had been machine-gunned, their bodies then piled together and burned. We could not get the details, but he evidently crawled out and managed to get to the hospital for help. Both of these died. And so I could relate such horrible stories that you would have no appetite for days. It is absolutely unbelievable but thousands have been butchered in cold blood—how many it is hard to guess—some believe it would approach the 10,000 mark.

We have met some very pleasant Japanese who have treated us with courtesy and respect. Others have been very fierce and threatened us, striking or slapping some. Mr. Riggs has suffered most at their hands. Occasionally have I seen a Japanese help some Chinese or pick up a Chinese baby and play with it. More than one Japanese soldier told me he did not like war and wished he were back home. Altoth the Japanese Embassy staff has been cordial and tried to help us out, they have been helpless. But soldiers with a conscience are few and far between.

Now it is time to make rounds of the hospital. There are a hundred on the staff. When we have water and lights again it will be much easier, for the lamps to look after and water to pump each day increases our labor considerably.


Document 6.5: Unit Record Battle Report, 1st Battalion, 66th Regiment, 14th Division

December 12, approx. 1900 hours
When the first captives were captured, Battalion Commander dispatched three of them with the message that if the enemies stopped resisting and surrendered, their lives would be saved. It had a great impact. As a result we reduced losses to our lives. Captives were assembled on the railway tracks, and their uniforms were searched. Those with wounds were taken care of. We showed to everyone the generous treatment by the Japanese army. Afterwards additional messengers were dispatched to urge the remaining enemy to surrender.

December 12, night
Captives were assembled in a Western-style house in the surveillance area of the 14th Company, and guards were posted around it. Twenty captives were deployed to feed them [all] with cooked rice that had been requisitioned. It was after 2200 hours that food was ready. They were so hungry that they fought over it.

December 13, 1400 hours
Received following order from Regiment commander: according to an order to the regiment, all captives were to be killed. The suggested method was to tie captives together in groups of a few dozen each and kill them with bayonets.
Assembled company commanders exchanged views concerning the disposal of captives. As a result, equal numbers were assigned to each company. From the house 50 were taken out, to be killed with bayonets. The First Company was assigned the lower area to the south of the camp, the Second Company to the lower area to the southwest, the Fourth Company to the lower area to the southeast. Each company was ready by 1700 hours and the killing began. On the whole killing was completed by 1930 hours. The First changed plans and tried to burn the detention house in one swoop but failed.

Captives did realize and seemed unfazed. Some stuck their heads in front of the sword, some calmly in front of the bayonet. Some captives cried and begged to be spared their lives; they were especially loud when the Commander showed up for supervision.

SOURCE: Nankin senshi shiryōshū 1 (Kakusha, 1993), 567-68.
Introduction

In early twenty-first century Japan, how are the textbooks used in public education compiled, and how do they reach the classroom? In addition, what sorts of debates are taking place over their contents? In this chapter, I wish to briefly explore these questions.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, the history textbook issue became part of domestic political contention in postwar Japan. It was treated as one element in of the conflict between left and right during the Cold War. However, at present with the Cold War ended, and with the Empire of Japan now part of a distant past, the structure of this opposition has changed significantly. It is unfortunate that history textbooks are still treated as targets for political struggles, but that being the case, in looking at the ways this issue is framed not only in neighboring countries but also within Japan, it is important to recognize how the situation has changed. This chapter outlines the structure of the issue at the start of the twenty-first century, focusing mainly on the debates over the 2001 history textbooks.

The Current Situation

Let us begin with an overall view. The first characteristic of historical awareness in Japan today is that the role played by school textbooks is not very large. This is quite a different situation from that in China and South Korea. History textbooks in those two countries are generally state-sponsored, and although some locally published textbooks have begun to appear, they do not seem to vary greatly in content. Moreover, the accounts in them are extremely detailed and concrete, and are easily memorized. In contrast, strict limits are imposed on the length of the narratives in Japan's middle-school and high-school textbooks, so they tend to be rather dull and difficult to memorize. In addition, television period dramas, historical novels, and manga actually have a greater influence on the Japanese people's images of history than do textbooks. It is fair to say that Japan's history textbooks do not in fact have the power to impart a shared "story of the nation" to all citizens.

Second is the fact that quite a variety of history textbooks are used in schools. This stems from the fact that Japan's textbook system is framed by a liberal democratic political system. In the latter half of the era of imperial Japan, textbooks were state-sponsored, but postwar Japan adopted a system of state authorization. Based on guidelines put out by the government, numerous private companies produce textbooks. Then, from among those that have gained state authorization, the principals of national and private schools, and local government officials in the case of public schools, choose their texts independently of the government. This system combining authorization and adoption, having become a political issue in recent years, has become more clearly defined. Specifically, in the government's authorization process, more objective and transparent procedures have been emphasized, and in the adoption process, local citizen's opinions have come to be more strongly reflected. The central government exercises more self-restraint than before in its intervention into the contents of textbooks.

Compared to systems such as Australia's, in which publication and selection of middle-school textbooks is entrusted entirely to the public, and those such as obtain in many American states, where textbooks are approved after publication, government regulation in this system is stronger. However, compared to the earlier system, which tended toward arbitrariness and lack of transparency, it is fair to say that the
current system has become freer and more democratic. Of course, this means that to the extent that the role of the local residents in determining which textbooks are adopted has expanded, the responsibility of citizens has become greater vis-à-vis that of the government.

Third, current history textbook disputes are shifting to different issues from those of the late twentieth century. As represented by the Ienaga textbook court cases, for quite a long time after the Second World War the history textbook issue was a point of political struggle in the opposition between left and right. That structure is crumbling now that Japan has become a wealthy society, the Soviet Union has collapsed, and Japan's relations with neighboring countries such as China and South Korea have deepened. With the decline of the left, the dichotomy of "progressive" intellectuals and "conservatives" in the government and financial world has faded, whereas the divisions and antagonisms between "internationalists" and "unilateralists," categories that bridge the worlds of government and business, intellectuals, and common people, have become more important.

History Education in the Schools

In Japan today, history education in school begins in sixth grade, the final year of elementary school. Next, it is taught in middle school (three grades) as the "historical field," which, along with the "geographical field" and the "citizenship field," is part of "social studies." All of these are required subjects. Elementary schools teach history with a focus on figures in Japanese history, and in middle school the teaching also focuses on Japanese history, although it is taught in the context of world history. In contrast, in high school (three grades; high school itself is not compulsory, but 97 percent of students continue to this level), history is divided into the two subjects of "world history" and "Japanese history," and although "world history" is compulsory, "Japanese history" is only one of the electives. So while the stress for elementary- and middle-school students is on the history of their own country, in high school the history of foreign countries is emphasized.

This current situation gives rise to significant problems for education in the universities (attended by roughly 50 percent of the college-age population). Since only a portion of students choose to take Japanese history in high school, and it is not a required element in university entrance examinations, university students tend to avoid courses related to Japanese history, and even if they do choose to take such courses, their lack of basic knowledge makes it increasingly difficult for them to understand the subject. The present education system may strike a balance between the history of Japan in elementary and middle school and the history of foreign countries in high school, but in fact it is not effective. Since very few university students remember what they learned in middle school, and since few students study Japanese history in college, even college graduates, as with those who did not attend college, enter society knowing almost nothing about the history of the society in which they were born and raised.

However, this chapter is not a discussion of all history education in Japanese schools, but will be limited to the compulsory education experienced by all citizens at the middle-school level. Moreover, in primary- and middle-school education, since both law and actual practice stress the study of textbooks, it is very important to discuss the role of textbooks in education at this level.

The Current Textbook System

In the framework set up by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT), the history textbooks used in Japanese public education are first compiled by private companies, and after the authorization process by MEXT, those that will be used in the schools are selected from among the ten or so books that have been authorized. The choices of which books to adopt are made by each school's principal in the case of high schools and national and private middle schools (national and private middle schools respectively account for 1 percent and 6 percent of all middle-school students). In the case of prefectoral middle schools, which the great majority of students attend, the choices are made by means of a very complex system. Boards of education established by each prefecture and city, town, and village set educational policies. For purposes of textbook selection, two or three cities or counties are combined into decision-making units (there were 583 total such units in Japan as of April 2005). Below I shall explain concretely how this process works.  

1. This description of the system is based mainly on Monbu kagakushô shôtô chūtō kyôikuhyoku [Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Primary
AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES

In the system in place as of 2005, textbooks are revised once every four years. The announcement of whether they have been approved is made in April of the year before they are to be first used in the schools, and by the end of August the adoption districts and schools decide which textbooks they will use. The review by MEXT is carried out in the previous year. This is done for the books submitted by each publisher, requiring more than six months. Since each publisher does its editing for six months prior to this, they must begin editing work on the next revision the year after a new textbook is first used in the schools.

In determining the specific content of the books, the most important role is played by the publishers’ committees of editors and authors. The authors are scholars of history from universities, as well as educators who have taught history in middle school and high school. Editorial policy is decided based on the “School Course Guidelines” established by MEXT, but these are no more than rough guidelines, and the specific content is decided by these editorial committees. These committees take into account factors such as experience with using previous versions and shifts in public concerns and opinions that accompany social changes. Changes in emphasis are discussed, and matters such as ease of learning and appropriateness for students’ mental development are considered.

The manuscripts produced by the publishers through this process (in fact they are in the form of page proofs at this stage) are submitted to MEXT and examined by the Ministry. Its procedures and standards are made public, and are based on the “Regulations for Authorization of Texts for Educational Use” and the “School Course Guidelines.” According to these, the Textbook Authorization and Research Council is responsible for inspecting textbooks, and the Minister of Education, and Secondary Education Bureau, Kyōkasho sōtō no gaiyō [Outline of the Textbook System], March 2004. For the texts of laws and ordinances, see http://www.mext.go.jp/english/ (accessed January 31, 2011).

2. For the courses of study in effect as of 2004, see Monbu kagakushō [Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology], Chigokakō gakushū ichidō yōgo (Haissei 10-nen 12 gatsu) kaisei: shakai ben [An Explanation of the School Course Guidelines for Middle School (December 1998); Social Studies] (Osaka: Osaka shoseki, 1999).


Breadth and depth. This means that the contents of the School Course Guidelines must be covered completely, without leaving anything uncompleted.

(2) Selection, treatment and organization, and quantity. These include the following items:
   a. Not presenting contents that are inappropriate for the Guidelines, and not ignoring the development stages of the students
   b. Absence of political or religious bias or partisanship
   c. Providing an overall synthesis in addition to specific facts, events, and topics
   d. Avoiding one-sided interpretations or incomplete consideration
   e. Offering appropriate total volume of material and distribution and connections between topics

The final item, because textbooks must be purchased by the school boards and distributed free of charge, is the price of the textbooks (the average for middle-school textbooks used in 2005 is ¥481), and this price limit in turn imposes strict limits on length.

(3) Accuracy and style. As noted above, this is in fact the most common sticking point in the authorization process.

The authorization standards in social studies (other than geography) include the following key elements. Common to elementary and middle school are:

(3) Not presenting definitive conclusions on unsettled current issues

(4) In dealing with events in the modern and contemporary history of relations with neighboring countries of Asia, giving appropriate consideration to viewing them from the standpoint of international understanding and international cooperation.

(5) When quoting published materials and historical sources, using materials whose value is accepted and that are highly trustworthy. Also, when quoting the text of laws, the original text must be respected.

(6) In giving dates for important events in Japanese history, giving the year according to both the Western calendar and the Japanese imperial era system.

Overall, these authorization standards require that textbooks present descriptions that are as objective and balanced as possible. As for content, among the requirements for social studies, the stipulations, except for those regarding neighboring countries in (4) and those regarding the dating system in (6), may all be said to derive from the School Course Guidelines. On the one hand, such prudent regulations, together with limits on length, undoubtedly make Japan’s textbooks uninteresting as reading material, but on the other hand, these regulations would seem to be rather carefully thought out and implemented with an eye toward the fairness of the procedures. This appears to be the case when one looks at the actual implementation of the authorization system and application of the standards.5

THE PROCESS OF ADOPTION IN THE LOCALITIES

Next, we come to the adoption stage, through which textbooks first arrive in classrooms and in the hands of students. This procedure was first established as part of the system set up in the early 1960s to provide textbooks used in compulsory education to students free of charge. One can certainly make a case that each school ought to be able to freely choose its textbooks from those on the authorized list, but at present, except for private schools (attended by about 6 percent of all students) and national schools (about 1 percent), public middle schools use the following complicated procedures for collective decisions by which all the middle schools in each of 583 textbook adoption districts adopt a common textbook.

As noted above, these districts are established at a level midway between prefectural and municipal boards of education; an adoption district typically encompasses about three cities or counties. It goes about its work in the following way. First, at the level of each prefecture an advisory commission for the adoption of textbooks is established, made up of school principals and teachers, members of boards of education, and others with experience in education. The members of the advisory commission draw up a list of materials to be considered for each subject area based on research done by teams of several teachers, and then they offer guidance and advice to those who make the textbook choices. For the schools directly administered by prefectures (which include schools for the handicapped and unified middle and high schools), these sug-

gestions directly determine the selections. In the adoption districts to which most middle schools belong, however, an adoption conference is held, and here again investigation teams of teachers and others carry out joint investigation and research, and selections are made after considering this. These represent the final decisions.

This adoption process, in contrast to MEXT's authorization process, is a system in which opinions such as those of the students' parents are strongly reflected. Teachers and others with actual experience in education are members, and their opinions carry great weight, but that is not all. It is clear that great emphasis is placed on procedural transparency in the authorization process and on reflecting the desires of the residents in the adoption process. In short, Japan's current textbook system provides for a transparent and decentralized decision-making process. In that sense, it is faithful to the liberal democratic system stipulated by the constitution.6

THE OBJECTIVES OF HISTORY EDUCATION
ACCORDING TO THE COURSES OF STUDY

MEXT regulates the content of middle-school history textbooks based on Middle School Course Guidelines, which are revised approximately once every ten years. The goal stated at the very beginning of each edition speaks directly about what the government expects from public education, so let us quote the 1998 edition, which was in place at the time of the textbook controversies of the first decade of the new century. Regarding middle-school "social studies," it states the following goals.7

To take a broad outlook, to increase concern for society, to consider matters from a multifaceted, diverse perspective based on a range of materials, to deepen understanding and love for our nation's land and history, to foster the development of the basic understanding required of citizens, to cultivate the necessary qualities of citizenship for members of a democratic, peaceful nation living in international society.

It speaks of cultivating various qualities, but if we focus on the political aspects, we see the stress on fostering of "qualities of citizenship" and on nurturing a form of Japanese patriotism that will work in harmony with international society. Under the umbrella of these overall goals, for the "field of history" one finds four points listed as objectives (as seen in Document 8.1). We will examine debates concerning these, but the most fundamental point, as seen in item (1) of the Guidelines, is that in middle school, history centers on the history of our own country. According to the explanation of "Dealing with Content," world history is used only as background. Descriptions of world history are to be confined as far as possible to aspects that are deeply related to Japanese history. In the "field of geography" and the "field of civics" as well, the deepening of understanding of Japan is stressed, but in the "field of history" the need to "deepen love for our nation's history, and to develop awareness as its citizens" is especially emphasized. Also, the call for "respect" for "historical personages" and "cultural inheritance" in item (2), in addition to reflecting a view of appropriate subject matter for students of this age, seems to be based on the same desire. At the same time, item (3) explicitly calls for the development of "a spirit of international cooperation." The world order is regarded as being comprised of nation-states; it is within this framework that both patriotism and contributions to international peace are called for.

The Domestic Debates over History Textbooks

MEXT's textbook system has come under the general framework of the authorization system since the School Education Law was passed in 1947, but its specifics have changed a great deal as the result of political debates. The courses of study and the authorization and adoption systems described above actually took shape in the wake of the debates over the 2001 textbook-adoption process, so they are quite new.

POSTWAR LEFT-RIGHT CONFRONTATION

In the early postwar period, the Ministry of Education itself was a principal actor in the textbook debates. In postwar Japan during the Cold War, the conservative camp, which valued capitalism and order, and the progressive camp, pointing toward socialism and revolution, clashed repeatedly. All political issues tended to be understood and dealt with
within this left-right opposition. But in an ironic twist, the camp that believed in Marxism stressed "freedom," and the camp that supported capitalism tended to have a narrow view that ignored "freedom" of thought. On the left, university intellectuals, progressive journalists, and elementary- and middle-school teachers (in the Japan Teachers' Union) allied with one another to criticize the Ministry of Education's authorization system itself as an improper intrusion by the authorities into education. The three textbook lawsuits filed beginning in 1965 by Ienaga Saburō were prompted by the Ministry's rejection of textbooks he had written, but the suits went beyond questioning the authorization criteria to claim that the state's textbook authorization system itself constituted censorship prohibited by the constitution. The left, noting that the postwar Japanese constitution guaranteed the independence of the courts from the administration, attempted to use the courts to secure for the world of education rights that were independent from government action.

The response of the courts, on the one hand, was to recognize the right of the Ministry of Education to approve textbooks for use in public education, but on the other hand they strongly criticized the arbitrary nature of authorization judgments. Behind the Ministry of Education was the governing Liberal Democratic Party. Some elements in the LDP consisted of truly right-wing forces who sought continuity with the era of Imperial Japan. They frequently intervened in the authorization process through unofficial channels, giving the impression that the authorization process was arbitrary, but over time court decisions and monitoring by journalists came to significantly restrict their reach. In September 1977 the Regulations for Authorization of Texts for Educational Use were completely revised, and both the right to protest conditional authorization and the right to request reconsideration of unofficial rejection were stipulated. As a result, despite the continued existence of the

authorization system, it was possible for textbook authors and publishers to retain a pronounced Marxist tone in middle-school history textbooks. For the historians who were the main authors of textbooks, and for the elementary-school and middle-school teachers unions, virtually no alternatives to a sharp left-right dichotomy in historical understanding existed at the time.

In sum, history textbooks in the postwar period were created and adopted under a constitutional order that provided for liberal democracy, and in the context of open ideological warfare between the forces of the left and the right.

But during this era of left-right opposition and the Ienaga lawsuits, important changes were taking place in society and the economy: a movement from recovery to rapid economic growth, the overcoming of the two oil shocks, a dramatic development into a wealthy society, and the shrinking of income disparities within that society. With these developments, the attraction of the left wing, with its predictions and hopes for the collapse of capitalism, diminished. At the same time, people's interest in history lessened.

Also during these years, as Japan moved beyond the postwar era, relations with neighboring countries, which had been extremely limited after the end of the "Greater East Asia War," were rebuilt. This added a new dimension to the textbook issue, especially beginning with the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea and the 1972 Joint Communiqué between Japan and the People's Republic of China, which reestablished diplomatic relations with these neighboring countries. At first the impact of these agreements was limited to the restoration of government-to-government relations, but later, as the economies of South Korea and China came to grow dramatically under new policies of openness, citizens began to travel back and forth frequently. East Asian nations developed interdependencies that were unprecedented in their long history. One result was a new situation in which governments and citizens had to pay attention to images of each


other. Thus, in 1982 South Korea and China protested revisions to Japan's high-school history textbooks, and with acute awareness of the changed environment, the Japanese government responded directly.10

At the time, the governments of South Korea and China protested that Japan's Ministry of Education had directed that the word "invasion" be changed to "advance" in the galley-proof textbooks submitted for authorization. A closer look at the documentary record shows that in fact, in the case of textbooks on Japanese history, no such change was actually requested, but that this change was definitely requested in the case of some of the high-school-level world history texts.11 In any case, in the face of fierce protests from abroad, the government decided to reform the authorization process. For example, it added a clause to the authorization standards: "In dealing with events in the modern and contemporary history of relations with neighboring countries of Asia, appropriate consideration should be given to viewing these events from the standpoint of international understanding and international cooperation."12 The intention of the Japanese government was not to require specific narratives of history but to demand that publishers take neighboring countries' concerns into account on their own. The Japanese government with this declaration reaffirmed the promises it had made when it reestablished diplomatic relations with South Korea and China, and the subsequent hopes it held for deepening friendly relations. It made very clear its understanding that although these were textbooks for the education of its own citizens, from the point of view of international relations the feelings of foreign countries could not be ignored (see Document 8.2).

Spurred by the Ienaga lawsuits and the protests from foreign countries, in these ways the history textbook authorization system was made much more transparent. Later, in 1998, the government accepted the report of the Special Commission on Education and made procedural changes including simplifying the authorization system and making public the contents of manuscripts submitted for authorization.13 Although one might argue that these changes were occasioned by the hypersensitivity of Japanese journalists and of neighboring countries, they resulted in a textbook system in Japan that took foreign relations into consideration, was more appropriate for a democratic society, and was more transparent.

THE DEBATES OF 2001

Despite these reforms, from around the mid-1990s the textbooks created under this system came under intense criticism, this time mainly from within Japan.14 The controversy was sparked by the fact that all of the high-school textbooks whose authorization was announced in 1993—nine texts from seven publishers—included discussion of the "military comfort women" (jūgun ina).15 The context for this developmen...
opment included, on the one hand, the fact that the cabinet at the time in response to such developments as democratization in South Korea, was seeking to strengthen friendly relations with neighboring countries by repeatedly expressing regret for Japan's invasions and domination of its neighbors in the first half of the twentieth century. On the other hand, some historians and intellectuals in the countries involved were forcefully raising the issue of the comfort women as an extreme example of Japan's violations of human rights. As a result, in addition to their inclusion in the 1993 high-school texts, the comfort women were also mentioned in all seven middle-school textbooks approved in 1996.

It is no surprise that ultranationalist "right-wing" groups raised intense opposition, but dissenting voices were raised by other groups as well. They asked whether it was possible to teach the history of the comfort women as established fact when their actual situation had not yet been fully clarified. They also questioned whether it was educationally appropriate to mention them in textbooks for middle-school students who had not yet been offered sufficient sex education. It was against this background that a group of people separate from the traditional right wing formed the "Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho o tsukuru kai" (hereafter "Tsukuru kai," though the group called itself in English the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform; Nishio Kanji was the first chairman) the next year and began planning to enter the textbook market.

The backdrop for these developments was Japan's first long-term recession of the postwar era. People had lost confidence and hope, unemployment had risen, an increase in shocking crimes had spread fear, and a sense of uncertainty pervaded society. Also, in the Gulf Crisis/War of 1990 and the following year, Japan contributed funds totaling $13 billion, but rather than being appreciated internationally, it was criticized for engaging in "checkbook diplomacy." Many Japanese politicians felt this to be a national humiliation, and they were looking for ways to restore the nation's honor. In such an atmosphere, people clung to a faith that Japanese society was a trustworthy place of good order. People extended this faith into the past, longing for an image of a Japan with an unclouded history, a Japan that had always been and would always be a respectable nation.

The claims of the Tsukuru kai were intended to meet such psychological needs. The organization's leaders criticized the newly released textbooks for making children "no longer take pride in being Japanese." They claimed this was "particularly evident in the teaching of modern and Japanese history," which depicted the Japanese "as criminals on whose shoulders fate has placed the burden of atoning for their sins for generations to come." They blasted these history texts as "masochistic." They declared that to replace them they would create and distribute a textbook that would enable children to "take pride in being Japanese, and develop a sense of responsibility that will motivate them to contribute selflessly toward world peace and prosperity."16

The Tsukuru kai put forth such a view of history in Nishio Kanji's narrative of Japan's history from ancient times to the present, Kokumin no rekishi (The Nation's History), aimed at a general reading public.17 It also began to compile a textbook. At the same time it broadened its network of supporters by expanding the seminars on history education for elementary- and middle-school teachers that the educator Fujioka Nobukatsu had been conducting on a trial basis, and the group established branches in every prefecture.

The authorization process for eight textbooks, including the offering of the Tsukuru kai, began in April 2000. The results were announced in April 2001, and the adoption process began. The process of authorization and adoption differed from the past in a number of ways because of new tactics adopted by the Tsukuru kai. Past nationalistic groups had generally lobbied influential Liberal Democratic Party Diet members and attempted to exert pressure on the Ministry of Education's authorization process behind the scenes, but the Tsukuru kai chose to carry out mainly a citizen's movement in the public sphere. They applied the methods that had been used for the Ienaga trials and elsewhere,

though without involving labor unions, gathering support from young and old in a loosely structured organization whose membership soon exceeded 10,000. The Tsukuru kai also worked to influence not only national Diet members and the traditional right wing, but also members of local assemblies who were concerned with education. This was essential, because even if it passed the authorization process, a published textbook would be useless if it were not adopted by regional adoption districts. The group announced its goal as a 10 percent share of all textbooks and distributed Kokumin no rekishi as part of its expanded publicity efforts. Until this time, it had been the authorization process that had drawn public attention, and the adoption process had been virtually ignored, but the Tsukuru kai’s grassroots movement of conservative citizens changed this dramatically.

There were other unique aspects to the 2000–2001 authorization process as well. The submitted manuscripts, which were assumed to be secret, were leaked to the public. This led to critical reports on the contents of the Tsukuru kai text in the newspapers and to the dismissal of a member of the Textbook Authorization and Research Council. However, what drew intense public attention to the textbook issue was something that happened in late February 2001, just before the adoption process began. The Asahi newspaper reported that the Tsukuru kai’s textbook was expected to be approved and expressed its concern that this meant they had retreated a good deal from their original political assertions, but they saw the adoption itself as a victory, and issued the following announcement. "We affirm that we have now reached a new historical stage in which we can break free from the vicious circle of outside pressure from South Korea and China followed by ingratiating responses, a pattern that has repeated itself since 1982 and has hindered the development of sound relations with these countries."

At this stage in the debate, the Tsukuru kai continued its criticism of the textbooks from the other seven publishers, and South Korea and China sent demands for revisions to all of the textbooks to the Japanese government, but the domestic debate centered on the merits of the Tsukuru kai’s Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho (New History Textbook). MEXT requested revisions to 137 points in the submitted manuscript of this textbook, and whereas most of them could be classified as simple factual errors, there were some that could be considered politically motivated demands based on the School Course Guidelines or the Regulations for Authorization. The Tsukuru kai accepted all of these, and therefore succeeded in winning authorization. This meant they had retreated a good deal from their original political assertions, but they saw the authorization itself as a victory, and issued the following announcement. "We affirm that we have now reached a new historical stage in which we can break free from the vicious circle of outside pressure from South Korea and China followed by ingratiating responses, a pattern that has repeated itself since 1982 and has hindered the development of sound relations with these countries."


20. Komori Yōichi, Sakamoto Yoshikazu, and Yamasu Yōshio, eds., Rekishi Kyōkasho: nani ga mondai ka—tettei kenbō Q&As (History Textbooks: What Are the Issues: A Thorough Examination and Q&A); and books comparing the various textbooks.

between our country and those two countries.” Nevertheless, picturing the debate in terms of left versus right does not accurately reflect public opinion. This became clear as the controversy entered its final stages in July. Iokibe Makoto contributed an essay titled “On the Reading of the Tsukuru kai’s Atarashii rekishi kyokasho: The Poverty of Narrating History as Only the Fate of the State” in the Asahi shinbun’s monthly magazine Ronza. Iokibe, a scholar of Japanese political and diplomatic history at Kōbe University, was considered a conservative scholar by the left, and he had in fact frequently worked with the Foreign Ministry. Yet he severely criticized descriptions in the Tsukuru kai’s textbook, such as the sidebar on the Special Attack Corps (kamikaze) pilots: “By not raising any doubts about the government’s decision to wage a thoughtless, suicidal war against the world and to send so many young people to such deaths, they are attempting to inspire in today’s middle-school students the same spirit of willingness to die for the state.”

This criticism by Iokibe Makoto showed that there were many conservatives in Japan who found the path Japan had followed to war repugnant, and believed that Japan’s national interest required international cooperation, including with its neighboring countries. In fact, not only those in the financial world, but people engaged in the international business world undoubtedly felt the same way. In particular, people with experience in developing business relations with China and South Korea understood very well that the persistent memories of the trauma Japan had caused for these countries did not resurface only as a result of temporary policies by their government, but were continually recreated by ceaseless retelling to relatives, by movies, and other media. Precisely because they were not from the left, but from the business community, these people were aware of the weight and depth of such collective memory in neighboring countries. They warned of the danger that this could collide with Japanese nationalism to create a vicious circle of mutual images. Nevertheless, Iokibe Makoto’s essay was the first to represent the opinions of such people, who worked at the center of the Japanese economy and comprised the mainstay of society.

After this essay appeared, and around the time the adoption results were announced, a leading monthly opinion magazine, Chiio koron, published a two-part special series on “Dissecting the History Textbook Debate” in its August and September issues. The contributors’ opinions varied, but they expressed a frank sense of discomfort with the fact that, even though the historical circumstances differed so much, a debate like that of the early postwar era over the merits of state authority was being repeated. As the textbook controversy of 2001 drew to a close, a new definition of the issues finally came to the fore.

In the end, the Tsukuru kai’s textbook, the focus of the debate, gained only a 0.039 percent share (eleven schools) of all adoptions. Not a single city, town, or village public school adopted it; it was adopted by only a handful of directly administered prefectural schools in Ehime and in Tokyo, and by a few private schools. Later, as the number of schools directly administered by prefectures increased, it was adopted in a larger number of schools, but overall there was no great change. This result fell far short of what the Tsukuru kai and its citizen supporters had hoped for. A direct cause was the fact that they lacked experience in producing textbooks and were therefore unable to create a textbook that would be rated more highly than those from other publishers by the prefectural and other selection committees. Furthermore, even education officials who shared the Tsukuru kai’s ideology had little reason to risk being the target of so much mass-media coverage by choosing their textbook, since there were textbooks from other publishers that had deleted references to the comfort women and eliminated Marxist-based narratives. In any case, the 2001 middle-school history textbook decisions ended up being resolved by the people in this fashion.


23. Iokibe Makoto, “Tsukuru kai no Atarashii rekishi kyokasho o yomu kokka no sonbō dake de rekishi o kataru mazushira” [On Reading the Tsukuru kai’s Atarashii rekishi kyokasho: The Poverty of Narrating History as Only the Fate of the State], Ronza (July 2001): 24.


25. See Table 8.1 for adoption rates during 2002, the second year the new textbooks were used.

As we have seen, the 2001 history textbook controversy displayed unprecedented aspects, and brought a new structure to the struggles. A chauvinistic, nationalistic movement took the form of a citizens' movement, and unlike earlier right-wing movements, it did not shy away from confronting MEXT. In the end, it went beyond the left-right struggle that had long dominated in postwar Japan, and reframed the issues. MEXT took stronger steps to establish objective procedures for its own role and to limit itself to the role of a fair arbiter based on those standards. Textbook selection was increasingly determined by popular debate and decisions by local governments. The rules of political debate and competition that are the foundation of this democratic and open process were respected by nearly all parties involved. The rules for authorization and selection that have been in place since 2004, described in the previous section, resulted from this process. All sides in the textbook controversy occasionally seemed to be tempted to circumvent the rules. However, these democratic rules are a valuable achievement, and their observance depends on careful monitoring by the public.

THE EVENTS OF 2005

In 2005 it was time once again for the quadrennial textbook adoptions. The results showed no great changes from the 2001 adoptions. A school in Tokyo's Suginami ward became the first public middle school to adopt the Tsukuru kai's history textbook, but this book's overall share was less than 0.5 percent nationwide, so the Japanese people's choices seemed quite stable. Also, the framework of debate, a division between internationalist and chauvinist groups that crossed occupational and gender boundaries, remained the same.

Some changes did appear, however. The largest was the fact that the history textbook issue retreated to the background because the political confrontation between the Japanese government and neighboring countries had increased in size and intensity. A combination of raw issues focusing on the present and the future, such as whether Japan should have a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, cooperation between the Japanese and United States militaries, and territorial issues, as well as the media's focus on street demonstrations in China and South Korea, meant that the mass media reported on the textbook issue hardly at all. Issues of historical awareness were by no means ignored, but they were treated entirely in the context of the prime minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine and as purely political issues.

Still, there were some major changes regarding textbooks in 2005. The first was that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made public the sections of eight approved middle-school textbooks dealing with modern international relations, both in the original Japanese and translated into English, Chinese, and Korean. Until then foreigners, including those in neighboring countries, had been suspicious of Japan's history textbooks without knowing much at all about their contents. They had frequently tended to focus only on the Tsukuru kai's textbook while ignoring Japan's other textbooks, which had a market share of more than 99 percent. Now, however, even in their own countries, they can see the actual text and judge for themselves. This is a simple step that will certainly have great meaning in the long run.

The second change was that Japanese, Chinese, and South Korean civic groups developed supplementary teaching materials so that the same materials can be used in two or three countries; one example went on sale in all three countries simultaneously. Two or three collections of supplementary materials are expected to follow this. According to those involved in the writing, not only did interpreting and translation during the drafting process require a great deal of effort, but also many differences of opinion arose regarding the overall structure and the contents. Nevertheless, because East Asian educators were able to become acquainted with one another and establish relationships, and became

29. For example, Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo [Educational Curriculum Research Institute] and Zonghe chuancheng de wenming [History and Society: The Civilization We Inherit], eighth grade, vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003), 115.
aware of the existence of problems, this should be considered a major step forward.

Third, criticisms of Chinese and South Korean history textbooks began to appear in Japan. Until this time, there had only been criticism of Japanese textbooks by the Chinese and South Korean governments and public, but as Japan's political tensions with these countries intensified, criticism of neighboring countries' textbooks, which had long been taboo in postwar Japan, began. Depending on how it is handled, this could give rise to a vicious circle of mutual criticism and counter-criticism. But these new circumstances are with us, and we cannot return to the past, so peoples in all the countries involved must handle this very carefully.

Conclusion

Judging from our experience so far, disputes over historical awareness, both between Japan and its neighboring countries and within Japan, seem certain to continue. I deal in the Postscript to this volume with the specifics of what the Japanese people as well as the Chinese and South Korean people should keep in mind in dealing with this situation. Here I shall give my views only on the history textbook issue.

First, the issue should be removed from the sphere of political contestation. What the Japanese people did to their neighbors in the first half of the twentieth century, and the memories of the suffering Japan caused, cannot be easily forgotten by the Chinese and Korean people; they are traumas that cannot be easily overcome. On the other hand, these are events of over 60 years ago. The vast majority of Japanese alive today were born after the war and are not the direct perpetrators of this violence. Therefore, it is both inappropriate and dangerous to use this history as a political trump card. The problem of historical perception must not be a weapon in political power struggles; rather, from the view of universal morality, and the practical issue of what sort of East Asia we will create for the future, I believe it would be wise to let the past be the past, and to allow ourselves some psychological distance from it.


In addition, historical perception is not merely a question of textbooks. Today's controversies were not brought about by children but by adults; more specifically they originated with political leaders. Taking a long-term view, we must teach children the facts of history, and for this purpose it is important to provide them with good textbooks. However, an even more important question is how the adults who are responsible for today's world understand history. Only if they do so responsibly is it possible to educate the next generation. The problem of historical perception has to this point been debated as a textbook issue, but I believe this is an unfortunate and mistaken approach. Despite our history of having dealt with this issue in this way until now, I believe we must seize the moment and discuss this as an issue for the adults who bear the responsibility of bequeathing a better future to our children.
Chronology, Table, and Documents

Chronology 8.1: Japan's history textbooks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>School Education Law. Textbooks subject to authorization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Professor Ienaga Saburō files suit in Tokyo District Court, claiming that the review of his high-school history textbook was censorship prohibited by the constitution. (First Lawsuit. A 1974 decision partially accepted his demand for compensation. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court decided in 1993 against the plaintiff.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Tokyo High Court rules in favor of the plaintiff in the Second Ienaga Lawsuit, stressing the abuse of power by the Ministry of Education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>&quot;Regulations for Authorization of Texts for Educational Use&quot; completely revised. Procedures for protesting conditional authorization and for requesting reconsideration of unofficial notices of rejection specified. (As a result, there was no further benefit in continuing to contest the Second Ienaga Lawsuit, so it was withdrawn.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Governments of China and South Korea protest what appeared to be a government imposed change of the term &quot;invasion&quot; to &quot;advance&quot; as a requirement for authorization of Japan's high-school textbooks. Japanese government issues statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi, and the next year revises the &quot;Standards for Authorization of Texts for Use in Compulsory Education,&quot; adding such things as the so-called &quot;neighbor clause.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Gulf War breaks out. Japanese government contributes US$13 billion but its contribution is not recognized by the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>All approved high-school history textbooks include descriptions of the &quot;comfort women.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform established. Third Ienaga Lawsuit ends in victory for plaintiff when Supreme Court rules that reasonable limits to discretionary review powers were exceeded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>&quot;Regulations for Authorization of Texts for Educational Use&quot; and other regulations revised; authorization system simplified and submitted manuscripts made public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>&quot;Tsukuru kai&quot; middle-school history textbook authorized. Domestic and international debate over its contents and whether it should be adopted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Governmental and public opinion conflicts between Japan, China, and South Korea over issues such as Japan becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and the prime minister worshiping at Yasukuni Shrine. History textbook issue fades into background.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.1: Adoption rates for Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th># of books</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tōkyō shoseki</td>
<td>676,434</td>
<td>51.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ōsaka shoseki</td>
<td>185,397</td>
<td>14.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyōiku shuppan</td>
<td>171,533</td>
<td>12.994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teikoku shoin</td>
<td>144,215</td>
<td>10.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nihon shoseki</td>
<td>77,598</td>
<td>5.878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinzui shoin</td>
<td>33,346</td>
<td>2.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nihon bunkyō</td>
<td>30,968</td>
<td>2.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fusōsha</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1,320,092</td>
<td>100.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Nihon kyōkasho hanbai; provided to author by publisher Shinzui shoin.

Document 8.1: Courses of study for junior middle school; Chapter 2: subjects; Section 2: social studies (field of history)

I. Goals

1. To increase interest in historical phenomena, to understand the main flow of our nation's history and the characteristics of its various periods against the background of world history, and through this to consider from a broad viewpoint the characteristics of our nation's culture and traditions, to deepen love for our nation's history, and to develop awareness as its citizens.

2. To increase interest in historical phenomena, to understand the main flow of our nation's history and the characteristics of its various periods against the background of world history, and through this to consider from a broad viewpoint the characteristics of our nation's culture and traditions, to deepen love for our nation's history, and to develop awareness as its citizens.

3. To develop an attitude of respect for historical personages who strove to develop state, society, and culture and to improve people's living standards, as well as for the cultural inheritance that has been passed down to the present, and to understand these in connection to each era and region.

4. To foster a general understanding of international relations and cultural exchange in history, and while making students aware of how deeply intertwined the histories of our country and other countries and cultures are, to develop an awareness of the cultures and lifestyles of other peoples and to foster a spirit of international cooperation.

5. To create a general understanding of international relations and cultural exchange in history, and while making students aware of how deeply intertwined the histories of our country and other countries and cultures are, to develop an awareness of the cultures and lifestyles of other peoples and to foster a spirit of international cooperation.

(1) The Japanese Government and the Japanese people are deeply aware of the fact that acts by our country in the past caused tremendous suffering and damage to the peoples of Asian countries, including the Republic of Korea (ROK) and China, and we have followed the path of a pacifist state with remorse and determination that such acts must never be repeated. Japan has recognized, in the Japan-ROK Joint Communiqué of 1965, that the “past relations are regrettable, and Japan feels deep remorse,” and in the Japan-China Joint Communiqué, that Japan is “keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself.” These statements confirm Japan’s remorse and determination which I stated above and this recognition has not changed at all to this day.

(2) This spirit in the Japan-ROK Joint Communiqué and the Japan-China Joint Communiqué naturally should also be respected in Japan’s school education and textbook authorization. Recently, however, the Republic of Korea, China, and others have been criticizing some descriptions in Japanese textbooks. From the perspective of building friendship and goodwill with neighboring countries, Japan will pay due attention to these criticisms and make corrections as the Government’s responsibility.

(3) To this end, in relation to future authorization of textbooks, the Government will revise the Guidelines for Textbook Authorization after discussions in the Textbook Authorization and Research Council and give due consideration to the effect mentioned above. Regarding textbooks that have already been authorized, the Government will take steps quickly to the same effect. As measures until then, the Minister of Education, Sports, Science, and Culture will express his views and make sure that the idea mentioned in (2) above is duly reflected in the places of education.

(4) Japan intends to continue to make efforts to promote mutual understanding and develop friendly and cooperative relations with neighboring countries and to contribute to the peace and stability of Asia and, in turn, of the world.

SOURCE: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa on History Textbooks,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/state0820r.html (accessed November 18, 2010). This is the official English translation from the ministry.

9 Sino-Japanese Mutual Understanding as Seen in History Textbooks

Ibaraki Satoshi

Translated by Timothy George

Introduction

When gaps in historical perception between Japan and China become a problem, history textbooks serve as the stage. Repeated controversies over the accounts in these textbooks have arisen, and the textbooks at issue have mostly been each country’s textbooks about its own history (Japanese history for Japan; Chinese history for China). Specifically, the main point at issue has been one part of these books: their accounts of wars. Certainly, in modern relations between Japan and China, historical perception of wars is of great significance. But in both Japan and China, history education covers more than just wars; each country teaches its own history and the history of the world from ancient times to the present. In this history education, how is Chinese history taught in Japan, and how is Japanese history taught in China, and what are the problems with this?

To answer these questions, in this chapter I shall focus on how Japan’s and China’s textbooks of their own national history and of world history describe each other’s history from ancient times to the present,
and what significance they attribute to these histories. I shall also consider the differences in mutual understanding of this common foundation and what type of history education would resolve them. I have used the history textbooks in use as of 2004, and from them have chosen as representative those textbooks with the largest market share; I provide a number of tables for reference. One problem is just what should be considered Chinese history, so for convenience I will take as Chinese history those things currently considered in China to constitute Chinese history.

The Meaning of Chinese History in Japan’s History Textbooks

AN OUTLINE OF JAPAN’S HISTORY EDUCATION

History education, which has been carried out in history classes since the Education Order of 1872, has been part of social studies since 1947, when the postwar education system was implemented. Social studies education was at first conducted mainly as a problem-solving discipline combining geography and history, but since about 1955 the separation and systematization of contents have been encouraged. In elementary school, Japanese history is taught in the first half of sixth grade as part of social studies, mainly emphasizing historical personages and cultural heritage. In middle school, social studies is divided into the three fields of geography, history, and civics, and history is normally taught in the first and second years. In high school, Japanese history and world history are taught as part of social studies (now called geography and history), as has been the case ever since high schools were first established. Since 1994, world history has been a required subject.

The textbook authorization system was adopted under the new postwar education system. When the system first began it was intended that there would be authorization at the prefectural level as well, but in fact, up to the present, authorization has been only by the Minister of Education (now the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology). The standards for educational content are described in the Courses of Study. This document was at first treated as a set of guidelines from the Ministry of Education, and it was thought that these might be issued by each prefecture, but in fact it has become a legally binding document issued by the Ministry of Education. Approved textbooks are expected to adhere to the stipulations of the Courses of Study, but in fact, no textbook is written exactly in conformity with it. Rather than “teach the textbook,” teachers are expected “teach with the textbook.” In recent years, textbooks for the early grades have tended to be more like guidebooks. Moreover, postwar history textbooks, as a reaction to the fact that prewar textbooks conveyed certain judgments about history, have generally tended to be written with a strict focus on explaining facts. Because of this, the higher the grade level, the more the textbooks are criticized as dull and uninteresting recitations of facts.

CHINESE HISTORY IN JAPAN’S JAPANESE HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

For elementary social studies there are five textbooks from five publishers, for the middle-school history field within social studies there are eight textbooks from eight publishers, and for high-school Japanese history textbooks, for the four-credit Japanese history B course there are eleven textbooks from seven publishers, and for the two-credit Japanese history A course there are seven textbooks from six publishers. Based on these, Table 9.1 shows the Chinese history covered in middle-school textbooks, and Table 9.2 shows the figures from Chinese history mentioned in high-school textbooks.

The form of elementary-school textbooks has changed greatly in recent years, with the greater part of every page taken up by photographs and illustrations, so that the focus is on things that bring history alive visually. Narratives have therefore become more concise, but except in the sections on Edo-period culture and the Meiji Restoration, relations with China are always mentioned. For the premodern period, the embassies to China, Ganjin (C. Jianzhen), and the Mongol invasions are discussed at some length. Ganjin is the only Chinese person among the 42 listed in the Courses of Study. During the war, the Mongol invasions were the most important material for promoting national pride, as symbolized by their appearance in the accounts of the “divine wind” (kamikaze) that saved Japan from the invasions, but in the postwar era they have normally been used to explain the world situation at the time, or how paintings depict the circumstances of the battles, or the decline of the Kamakura shogunate. The Yuan dynasty’s rule over China is also introduced. Explanations of Japanese history for every period deal with cultural exchange and wars and other incidents with China and Korea, countries with which relations were historically deep. Such treatment of
In contrast, the accounts of China in modern history have changed a great deal. The Courses of Study describes Japan’s Meiji period as a period in which its “international standing was raised.”2 Ever since publication of the Courses of Study in the Official Gazette began in 1958, this “rise in international standing” has had a place in elementary- and middle-school social studies.3 Possibly reflecting the Courses of Study, a textbook from roughly 40 years ago from Tōkyō shōsēki used the concept of “Japan’s rise in status” to explain the Western powers’ colonization of Asia, the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, treaty revisions, the growth of modern industry, and the progress of culture.4 In the accounts of the process by which Japan achieved the same rank as the Western powers through treaty revision, there are only simple descriptions of Qing China losing the Sino-Japanese War and having territory and an indemnity taken by Japan, and of Korea being annexed by Japan. However, most teachers have made increasing efforts to incorporate into their instruction more of the aspects of modern Japan that are left out of the story of this “rise in international standing,” and these have been reflected in recent textbooks. For example, passages such as: “Because of these two wars [the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars], the Korean and Chinese people, whose countries became battlefields, suffered greatly, with many losing their lives or having their homes destroyed”;4 questions such as “As Japan extended its power, what do you think happened to the countries of Asia?”,5 as well as descriptions of the growth of Japanese prejudice against China and Korea, and related to this the murders of Koreans and Chinese at the time of the Great Kantō Earthquake, are noted.

With regard to descriptions of the period from the Manchurian Incident to the end of the war, the textbooks of roughly 40 years ago focused on explanations of state-level events, with the main point being criticism of militarism; only brief descriptions of wartime life on the home front were added to this. Today’s textbooks generally focus on the specifics of the expansion of the war, and also take up the lives of elementary-school students during the war, wartime destruction in Japan, and destruction in China and other Asian countries. How history education should treat the war, from the Manchurian Incident to the surrender, has become a major issue. Teaching the value of peace to children born after the war has been an objective throughout the postwar period not only in history classes, but throughout the social studies. At first only Japan’s suffering was covered, as symbolized by the atomic bombs, and teaching the misery of war emphasized the importance of never repeating such a horrible war. Since then, there has been encouragement of more teaching covering the realities of the damages perpetrated by Japan by looking at the suffering of Asian countries, including those colonized by Japan, and considering issues of war and peace in the history of modern Japan. The results of this have come to be reflected in textbooks. Movements such as the Tsukuru kai (Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform) began as responses to such activities.

History education in middle school presents Japanese history in the context of world history. In social studies, divided into the three fields of geography, history, and civics (civics was at first called government, economy, and society), textbooks of the mid-1950s, even though they focused on Japanese history, included a great deal of content related to world history, as the term “historical field” would suggest. But with revisions of the Courses of Study, the focus narrowed increasingly toward Japanese history, and particularly since the reduction in teaching hours in recent years has required careful selection of topics, the world history content has been greatly reduced. Even so, topics related to Chinese history have not been cut much. This shows how important Chinese history is considered to be as compared to other world history topics, due to the deep connections between Japanese and Chinese history.

For the premodern period, in middle school compared to elementary school there are more detailed and specific examples of political, cultural, and economic interaction, and brief descriptions of Chinese history are given as background to Japan’s systems and culture. Table 9.1

2. For middle schools it was temporarily eliminated, but it reappeared in the 1977 textbooks.
3. Shintō aramishi shakai 6 jō [Revised New Social Studies 6], vol. 1 (Tokyo: Tōkyō shōsēki, 1968). This text is aimed at elementary-school students.
5. Ibid., 71.
shows that the intent is to give a general outline of Chinese history. However, in a textbook of roughly 30 years ago, the political, cultural, and diplomatic relations of China's dynasties, even those not directly related to Japan, were included as part of the world history content. For modern history, on the other hand, it is the current textbooks that cover a greater number of topics. They now include, for example, the Taiwan expedition, the mistaken superiority complex toward Asia, the murders of Koreans and Chinese after the Great Kantō Earthquake, and the Rape of Nanjing. Looking at specifics, the section titled "advance to the continent" has become the "invasion of China," and the damage caused by Japan to China and other Asian countries, as well as the various actions and movements against Japan in Asian countries, have come to be included. As in the elementary schools, these represent the incorporation of the fruits of classroom practices, and such accounts are now given prominent places in most textbooks. However, some have noted that during the time when the Tsukuru Kai's textbook won authorization, and during the struggles over its adoption, the organization's attacks on other publishers' textbooks have had some influence on diminishing the prominence of such critical accounts.  

High-school Japanese history places most emphasis on the study of the characteristics and culture of each era. Of course, the accounts of Chinese history in high-school Japanese history textbooks are more detailed than those in elementary- and middle-school textbooks. However, because in high school world history is a separate subject, these accounts tend to be limited to the aspects of Chinese history that are related to Japanese history. On the other hand, this also means that there are facts and historical personages from Chinese history mentioned in Japanese history textbooks that do not appear in world history textbooks. In Table 9.2 we see names of people from the history of Sino-Japanese relations, including those involved in cultural and economic exchange as well as warfare and occupation, as well as names of people used in explanations of Japanese history. In this way, then, high-school Japanese history textbooks basically give a general description of Chinese history as related to Japanese history from ancient times to the present. The accounts of postwar or contemporary history cover events from the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists and the establishment of the People's Republic of China to economic liberalization policies. In contrast, the elementary- and middle-school textbooks cover only up to the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China. The reality in the classroom is that not enough time is available for the study of postwar history.

CHINESE HISTORY IN JAPAN'S WORLD HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

After the Education Order of 1872, Western and Chinese history were studied in earnest, but ever since 1881, when elementary-school history education was limited to Japanese history, world history (the history of foreign countries) has been taught in middle schools to the present. In 1894, Asian history (日本史, or "Eastern history") was proposed as a subject to correspond to Western history, and middle-school history education in the old (prewar) system was basically divided into Japanese, Asian, and Western history. Western history surveyed cultural origins in the ancient Orient and ancient Greece and Rome, medieval Europe, the opening of new sea routes, the Renaissance and Reformation, and concluded with the establishment and development of nation-states in Europe and the United States from the nineteenth century to the present. Asian history consisted of the history of China's dynasties, with the history of related areas in Asia added, and for modern times the activities of the Western powers and Japan in Asia are included. This approach—seeing the world as divided into Japan, Asia, and the West—left deep influences that have still not been completely overcome. High-school history education under the new postwar education system began as electives in social studies with the two subjects of Asian history and Western history. Two years later, in 1949, this was hurriedly changed to Japanese history and world history, an arrangement that continues to the present. Because the new subject of world history was not put in place as a result of sufficient consideration of concepts and content, it began as a combination of Asian history and Western history.

High-school world history today is taught in two required courses, world history I (four credits) and world history II (two credits). For this new curriculum, there
are eleven textbooks from seven publishers for world history B, and eleven textbooks from nine publishers for world history A. World history educators in Japan have made efforts to consider the true meaning of world history and how best to present it. As a result of this process, problems such as Eurocentrism, leaving Japan out of the story, the place of the Islamic world, the historical position of Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Pacific, and so on have been incorporated. For example, there is a long history, going back to the beginning of the new education system in early Meiji, of calls for breaking away from the old pattern of presenting Chinese history as the history of successive dynasties. There have also been concerns over dealing with various countries and peoples as peripheral parts of Chinese history. How to relativize the very framework of Chinese history has become an issue in world history education. As a result, world history textbooks have generally come to present Chinese history as part of East Asian history. Furthermore, even within the framework of East Asian history, a great deal of attention has come to be given to interaction within and outside of regions, and the processes by which the world’s regions became more closely tied to one another over time have come to be stressed. Many history textbooks now stress networks linking regions together and incorporate a modern, world-systems approach.

Nevertheless, Chinese history is alive and well. Table 9.3, which lists historical personages related to Chinese history who appear in world history textbooks, shows that nearly all of the leading rulers, from the founders of the main dynasties to the present, are covered. The accounts enable an understanding of Chinese political history from ancient times to the present. Not including Westerners, this table lists 158 people. Not including rulers, there are 57 people, or one-third of the total, related to cultural history. Japan’s world history textbooks mention names of people from various regions of the world, not just those from Western or Chinese history, and if we leave aside the rulers, we can see what these textbooks say about Western and Chinese culture. Chinese history is presented not just as political history, but also as cultural history including thought and religion, society, and the arts. However, 53 of the 57 names in cultural history are from the premodern period, and 37 of these are from the Tang dynasty and earlier, which shows the classicist approach that Japan’s world history textbooks take toward Chinese cultural history. Moreover, questions on Chinese history comprise some 25 percent of the world history questions on the national university entrance examinations. Chinese history has been studied in Japan from ancient times to the present. Since the beginning of the modern period, efforts to reform the study of Chinese history since antiquity have occasionally come to the fore in response to current issues, and this pattern continues. Chinese history is a relatively large part of the teaching of world history today.

The Meaning of Japanese History in China’s History Textbooks

AN OUTLINE OF CHINA’S HISTORY EDUCATION

Since the establishment of a modern school system in the late Qing, history education has continued to have an important place despite great changes in the political system. In elementary school, history began to be covered as part of social studies in the 1990s. As for middle-school history education, looking at the textbooks published by Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe (People’s Education Press), for three-year junior high schools there are four books on “Chinese history” for the first two years and two on “world history” for the third year, and for three-year senior high schools there are two books on “modern and contemporary Chinese history” (a required subject, covering from the Opium War to the present), two books on “modern and contemporary world history” (an elective subject, covering from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries), and one book on “ancient Chinese history” (an elective subject, covering premodern Chinese history). As this structure shows, the emphasis is on modern and contemporary history.

After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the same textbooks based on the Education Syllabus were used nationwide, but in the 1990s the use of regional versions of textbooks began. Therefore, the trend in the textbook system is from “one curriculum, one book” (one type of textbook based on a single education curriculum) to “one curriculum, many books” (multiple textbooks based on a single education curriculum), and from there to “many curricula, many books”

Moreover, in recent years, with the progress of the "reform of national basic-level education," history textbooks based on curriculum standards have been used on an experimental basis. Among these is History and Society, a textbook for three-year middle schools that includes geography and other subjects. There is now a history textbook being used in Shanghai senior high schools that combines modern and contemporary Chinese and world history. In addition, since China is a multiethnic nation, translations of history textbooks written originally in Chinese (Mandarin) into the languages of various ethnic groups are used. The current situation in China, then, is that there is a great variety of history textbooks. With the introduction of the system of nine years of compulsory education, the amount of material taught is rapidly being reduced, and with each revision of textbooks the trend is to reduce the number of topics and the length of explanations.

JAPANESE HISTORY IN CHINA’S CHINESE HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

Chinese history education in China today begins with China in its ideal form. This means it reflects the ideals of today’s China to present a China that is geographically unified, with a developed culture and society, in which the 56 ethnic groups including the Han are unified as the Chinese people and are working together for a common cause; China is one of the major developed countries, steadily progressing under the leadership of the Communist Party, and is constantly improving its friendly relations with the nations of the world. Therefore history textbooks have retreated from describing domestic class struggles and tend to completely avoid any accounts of ethnic discord. They explain that friendly international relations are a fundamental principle for China as one of the leading developed nations, and that in foreign relations, exchanges are most important. They also explain that when foreign countries have invaded, the people have united to repel them. The textbooks therefore tend to have virtually no accounts of the occasions in history in which China has initiated military action against foreign countries.

Here I shall consider the meaning of Japanese history as presented in the textbook for junior high schools published by Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe and described in Table 9.4, with occasional reference to other textbooks. I have also listed the Japanese names appearing in senior-high-school Chinese modern and contemporary history textbooks in Table 9.5, and those appearing in a history textbook for Shanghai senior high schools in Table 9.6. Accounts of Japanese history appear in Chinese history education in China in the coverage of the premodern (ancient), modern, and contemporary periods.

Premodern history includes accounts of friendly relations with Japan in Qin and Han; of exchanges with Japan in the Tang dynasty; of Japan as trade partner in the Song, Liao, and Jin periods; and of the wakō pirates in the Ming dynasty. Japan’s role in the foreign relations of the Tang dynasty is most emphasized in premodern history. The close relations created by the envoys to Sui and Tang China are explained through accounts of Abe no Nakamaro and of Ganjin, who went to Japan. Excavated artifacts such as kaichin (a type of Japanese coin) and wado kaichin (a type of Japanese coin) are used to explain the vigorous trade, and the point that cultural influences on Japan were very great, and that some of them have continued to today, is made through explanations of such things as the architecture of Heijōkyō (Kyoto); the popularity of Tang poetry and calligraphy; and the making of tea, which was later developed into the tea ceremony in Japan. The fact that during the time of flourishing trade between Japan and Song, Japanese swords and fans were in demand in China was mentioned in the textbooks used before the revisions, but this has been removed from the textbooks currently in use. Also, the accounts of Yuan dynasty foreign relations stress Africa and Europe, and there is no mention of Japan, not even of the Mongol invasions. Ming foreign relations are usually described in Japan as deal-


11. The teacher’s guide notes that the westward conquests by Genghis Khan and his descendants, their attacks on and occupations of Goryeo (Korea) and Annam (Vietnam), and their attacks on Japan and Java were all unjust wars of invasion against foreign nations (Jiu nián yuán jiaoyu su nian qi zhi chuji zhonggguo jiaokeshu Zhanzheng lishi, di er zi jiaocue zhonggguo yong shu [Textbook for Three- and Four-Year System Middle Schools in the Nine-Year Compulsory Education System: Chinese History, Teacher’s and Students’ Books], vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 1998), 107.

Sino-Japanese Mutual Understanding

Ibaraki Satoshi
ing with “barbarians (Mongols) in the north and pirates (wakō, or Japanese pirates) in the south,” but the fact that the “barbarians in the north” were Mongols, who are now considered part of the “people of China” and as such are supposed to live in friendship and harmony within China, leads to the emphasis being placed on the wakō and on Qi Jiguang, who is treated as a “national hero” for repelling them. This is described in the teacher’s guide as the first battle in history against an invasion of China by foreigners.12

The period in which Chinese history textbooks deal the most with Japan is that of modern history. This is to be expected in light of the wartime damage China suffered from Japan. In the accounts of modern Chinese history, Japan is first and foremost presented as carrying out repeated wars of invasion against China; Japan also appears repeatedly as one of the foreign powers that invaded China, and there are also occasional descriptions of Japan as a base for revolutionary movements. Japan’s wars of invasion are described as beginning with the Taiwan Expedition of 1874, and continuing through the First Sino-Japanese War and Manchurian Incident to China’s victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War. In these accounts the Chinese people’s fighting spirit is illustrated by placing the battles of the “people’s heroes” at center stage. The most important of these figures are described in detail, with pictures, brief biographies, and quotations. This is in great contrast with the style of Japanese history textbooks, which in their accounts of Japan as a base for revolutionary movements, Japan’s wars of invasion are described as beginning with the Taiwan Expedition of 1874, and continuing through the First Sino-Japanese War and Manchurian Incident to China’s victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War. In these accounts the Chinese people’s fighting spirit is illustrated by placing the battles of the “people’s heroes” at center stage. The most important of these figures are described in detail, with pictures, brief biographies, and quotations. This is in great contrast with the style of Japan’s history textbooks, which in their accounts of the war say little about the actual fighting. Particular stress is given to the idea that from around the time of the formation of the People’s United Front of Resistance against Japan, the Chinese Communist Party played the leading role and brought victory in the war. In this story, concrete details are given about how hard it fought against the Japanese military, which invaded and carried out the Nanjing Massacre and savage colonial rule.

Here Japan is depicted as a cruel and savage invader that must be annihilated. In the Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe introductory middle-school textbook, in addition to the Nanjing Massacre, there are: the story of eleven-year-old Huang Jixian who said “Japan is our enemy” and was killed by a Japanese soldier; the story of the Ishii unit, which killed some 3,000 people in its human experiments; the story of Liu Liann, who spent thirteen years in the mountains of Hokkaido after escaping from forced labor and returned to China in 1958; and the story of Pan Jiyuan, where 1,230 people out of the village’s population of 1,537 were killed by the Japanese army in a “search-and-destroy operation.”13 Enough incidents are described to make Japanese want to cover their eyes. In the Shanghai senior high-school “history” textbook, modern Japan’s invasions of China are described in great detail, including specific names of individuals (see Table 9.6). Descriptions of Japan’s wartime invasions have been consistently included in history textbooks since the establishment of the Republic of China, but it has been noted that these have become quite harsh since the 1990s.14 It would seem that in the background to these changes are the strengthening of ideological education carried out in response to the Tian’ anmen Incident of 1989, as well as the problem of historical perception of Japan.

On the one hand, educational materials have begun to incorporate as a current issue that of historical perception of the wars between Japan and China. In particular, pilot textbooks based on curriculum standards have often taken up historical perception in Japan as a theme for student activities. In the activity section of the pilot junior high-school textbook from Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, based on curriculum standards is the following: “Let’s write letters to Japanese middle-school students—the

Nanjing Massacre cannot be forgotten." The content of this activity includes exposing the crimes of Japanese militarism and explaining that the Chinese people resisted the invasions and that they fervently desire peace. The point of the exercises is not only to enhance patriotism, as in the past, but also to improve the students' ability to use sources. In addition to documents from the time and from the war crimes trials, they envision the use of a broad range of sources such as "distortions by Japanese right-wing elements of historical documents of the Nanjing Massacre," and "results of Japanese government authorization of history textbooks." In the Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe senior high-school textbook based on curriculum standards is an exercise called "reading and thinking." The text describes an August 2003 incident in Qiqihar in which more than 40 people were poisoned, and some even killed, due to chemical weapons abandoned by the Japanese military. The task is to collect facts about how the Chinese people were harmed by the chemical weapons left behind by the Japanese military, using the Internet, newspapers, magazines, or visits with victims, and to analyze the long-term harm brought by the wars of invasion. The same book asks students to give their individual opinions of the interpretation of the Nanjing Massacre by "Japanese right-wing forces." A grade-level standards textbook by East China Normal University Press links earlier lessons with current Sino-Japanese relations, explaining the truth of the saying that "we cannot forget history, nor can we allow it to be falsified." As the above examples show, the Sino-Japanese wars and the brutal acts of the Japanese military are actually coming to be dealt with as contemporary issues. At the same time, some textbooks introduce the story of the Japanese girl who lost her parents in the war and was cared for by General Nie Rongzhen, who sent her back to the Japanese side with a letter; the two of them met again in 1980.

The People's Republic of China from the time of its founding after the Nationalist-Communist civil war (war of liberation) is treated as part of contemporary history. As shown in Table 9.4, the introductory middle-school Chinese history textbook by the Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe explains that the Japanese prime minister visited China in 1972, and diplomatic relations were established. Here the series of events of the early 1970s—normalization of formerly antagonistic Sino-U.S. relations, admission to the United Nations, and normalization of Sino-Japanese relations—are explained as foreign policy successes of the People's Republic of China. In the presentation of Japan in Chinese history education, the long history of Sino-Japanese relations from the Qin and Han dynasties to the present is covered. Relations with no other country are taken up in such depth. In the premodern period, Japan is portrayed mainly as a friendly nation actively learning about Chinese culture, but added to this is a view of Japan as the origin of the wako who were repelled by China. For the modern period there are detailed descriptions of Japan as a savage enemy nation that perpetrated cruel acts against China, beginning with the Taiwan Expedition and the First Sino-Japanese War, involving itself in every aspect of Chinese history, dividing China in the Manchurian Incident, and after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident carrying out a full-scale war of invasion. After its loss in the war, Japan disappears from Chinese history until the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations is introduced as an important component of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. There is beginning to be a shift from seeing Japan's brutal actions as historical events in the past to taking up the issue of contemporary Japan's refusal to admit them.

JAPANESE HISTORY IN CHINA'S WORLD HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the rudiments of the major aspects of world history have been taught in elementary school in "history" (now "social studies"). Middle-school history educa-
tion covering events since the late Qing is normally divided into “our country’s history” and “the history of foreign countries.” This “history of foreign countries,” as symbolized by the “history of various East Asian countries” and “Western history” written into the 1913 “middle-school curriculum standards,” was structured to incorporate the history of the various Asian countries into a general Western history. Since 1956, the name “world history” has been used.

Table 9.7 describes the junior high-school world history textbook published by Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe. It narrates world history from human origins to contemporary culture. A look at the table of contents clearly shows one characteristic of China’s world history education, the incorporation of the history of various other Asian nations into the history of the Western world. This also means that the history of foreign countries is in fact taught without including the history of China. In the past, the origins and importance of socialist society based on class struggle were foregrounded, and special attention was given to popular struggles and national independence, but compared to the past, such views are now on the decline. In recent years, with China assumed to be one of today’s major nations, the tendency has been to look at world history as the history of the world other than China. For this reason, the approach that described the history of the entire world in order to create solidarity with Asia, Africa, and Latin America has also been in decline. In contrast to Japan, where world history education has finally begun to see attempts to incorporate the study of ancient Africa reflected in textbooks, China’s world history education dealt with ancient Africa very early, but later eliminated it, which remains the case today.

Let us look at this presentation of Japanese history in world history education, focusing on the introductory world history textbook published by Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe. For the premodern period, it introduces Japan as an East Asian feudal state and particularly emphasizes the Taika Reforms as a turning point from a slave state to a feudal state. The textbook explains that the Taika Reforms were carried out in imitation of the systems of Sui and Tang China, that students sent to learn from China played important roles in them, that Japan after this point aggressively absorbed Chinese culture and was greatly influenced by China in fields such as education, religion, architecture, art, and literature, and that after this the warrior class was formed, and Japan entered an era of bakufu rule in the late twelfth century.

As for modern history, a great deal of space is given to the Meiji Restoration. The textbook first introduces Edo-period rule by the bakufu, isolation policies, and economy, and then describes the progress through the crisis situation after the opening of the country to the military overthrow of the bakufu, and finally the reforms after the Meiji Restoration. It describes Japan as having escaped, through the Meiji Restoration, from the crisis of semi-colonization to become a capitalist state. It also explains that in this process, the incomplete nature of the reforms led to the retention of many “feudal remnants” and Japan’s embarking on the path of foreign invasions. It is notable that the interpretation in the Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe pilot grade-standards-based world history textbook stresses the content of the reforms, and that a reading selection deals with Itō Hirobumi.

In world history, the textbook marks the Russian Revolution as the beginning of contemporary history. For the period through the end of the Second World War, it describes Japan’s actions as those of one of the capitalist nations. In particular, the invasions by Japan as a fascist state created in response to the capitalist economic crisis of 1929–33 are described along with those of Germany and Italy.

For postwar history, the explanation of the “rise of Japan” includes economic destruction due to the war, the reforms under American military occupation and the American military’s policy changes in response to the victory of the Chinese revolution, the Korean War as background to economic recovery, and later economic development and Japan’s becoming a major economic power. The textbook especially emphasizes Japan’s high-speed economic growth. Here the reasons for economic growth are explained, and according to the teacher’s manual the lessons to be noted are the introduction of advanced technology from foreign


countries and the emphasis on developing human resources.\textsuperscript{23} The Renmin jaoyou chubanshe senior high-school modern and contemporary world history textbook asserts that, because of the fact that Japan aims at being a major political power, it is increasing its military expenditures, and that in the name of "international cooperation" it sends its military overseas, caution is called for on the part of the peoples of the countries of Asia.\textsuperscript{24} Also, the explanation in the same book of the "contradictions and problems" of the capitalist countries mentions the extreme right-wing forces in Germany and Japan, and discusses the issues of visits by cabinet members to worship at Yasukuni Shrine, where Class A war criminals are enshrined, as well as the history-textbook issues.\textsuperscript{25} Quite interestingly, the final chapter on "Contemporary Culture" discusses the proletarian writer Kobayashi Takiji in the section on literature of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

\textbf{The Gaps in Sino-Japanese Mutual Understanding and Their Background}

Up to this point I have discussed how Japan and China now portray each other in their history textbooks. Japan's Japanese history textbooks, Japan's world history textbooks, China's Chinese history textbooks, and China's world history textbooks all present their own, different histories of China and of Japan. Based on this, I would like to consider what sort of gaps in historical understanding exist between Japan's and China's history education and what lies behind such gaps.

Japan's Japanese history textbooks deal with China as necessary for understanding Japanese history. Here, understanding China as a source of culture, as a partner in exchange, and as an object of invasion is necessary for understanding Japanese history. Likewise, China's Chinese history textbooks deal with Japanese history as necessary for understanding Chinese history. Here, understanding Japan's history as a partner in exchange, as a student of the greatness of Chinese culture, and as the model of the brutal invader required for understanding the significance of the victory in the War of Resistance against Japan, is necessary for understanding Chinese history.

China's world history textbooks strongly emphasize the Taika Reforms modeled on China, the Meiji Restoration as an example of successful modernization, the development of the fascist state as background to the invasion of China, and postwar high economic growth as a model of economic development. On the other hand, Japan's world history textbooks, in the detailed narrative of China's history, deal with modern times superficially and describe ancient times in depth in a style that seems antiquarian. Each country tends to take up as world history the topics necessary for understanding its own history.

In other words, in Japan, Chinese history is taught in order to serve the needs of today's Japan, and in China, Japanese history is taught in order to serve the needs of today's China. What shows this difference most clearly is the "gap" between the personal names taken up in the two countries' textbooks. Risking oversimplification, Japan focuses on the great figures of China's ancient history, whereas China focuses on modern Japanese invaders.

Therefore, historical understanding differs greatly between Japan and China, but many similarities between the backgrounds perpetuate this gap. First, we might note traditional ways of understanding history education and history textbooks, which are apparent in the emphasis on history education. In history education, the idea that teachers teach the truth to students; using history textbooks in which the truth is written, and that students are to learn this perfectly, is quite strong. In both countries, although education that deviates from this framework is somewhat valued, the view of history education deriving from long-established views of history and the traditional culture of education remains strong.\textsuperscript{26} Second, we may note the existence of political regulation of education and textbooks. The situations are different, but in


\textsuperscript{24} Chuandi zhi putong gaoji zhongxue jiexue yong zhuan (Elective) for Full-Day System Regular Senior High Schools: Modern and Contemporary World History, Teacher's Reference Books), vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin jaoyou chubanshe, 2004), 71-72.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 74.

\textsuperscript{26} On the Eastern idea of seeking norms in history, on which the Chinese view of history is based, and on issues in contemporary history education, see Satō Masaaki, Rekishi ninshiki no jikō [Space and Time in Historical Perception] (Tokyo: Chisen shokan, 2004).
both countries, history education is used to deal with the weakening of national identity. Furthermore, systems have been established that bring to history education the influence of political demands arising for various reasons. Third, we might note in history education the separation of domestic history and world history. Moving from history that teaches the history of foreign countries separately from domestic history to a viewpoint that integrates domestic history into world history, or even sees them as one, is now an issue in both countries’ education systems.

Efforts Needed in History Education in Japan and China: In Place of a Conclusion

In these ways, Japan and China have selected different aspects from each other’s histories on which to deliberately focus in their history education. Moreover, it is difficult to deny that their common approaches to history education and the fact that both have similar types of controls have led to gaps in mutual understanding. In order to rectify this situation, historical research, along with attempts to make improvements at the classroom level, is essential.

First, it is necessary to incorporate various aspects of the history of Sino-Japanese relations into the teaching materials. In doing so, the example of how the results of the examination of the history of relations between Japan and Korea have been incorporated in teaching will be of use. Given the reality that lessons that simply “expose and indict” the harshness of modern Japan’s colonial rule of Korea will not convey the teacher’s intent to the students, efforts have been mounted to promote the study of the minority of Japanese who understood Korea at the time and who were sympathetic to Korea, and to study the Korean ambassadors to Japan (during the Edo era) who served as symbols of the age of neighborly friendship in the early modern period. Likewise, in teaching the history of Sino-Japanese relations, in addition to the facts of such events as the Manchurian Incident and the Sino-Japanese War, lessons in both Japan and China need to cover examples of friendly Sino-Japanese relations and exchanges in the modern period, and the people and accomplishments that promoted friendship.

Second, each country must attempt to place its own history within world history and East Asian history. In this regard, they should continue to examine each other’s world history education. Moreover, it is essential that they link the awareness of their past tendency to separate their domestic histories from world history to a reassessment of their understanding of each other.

Third, they must make thinking about history a part of their lessons. In both countries, along with changes in approaches to history education and to history textbooks, there are moves in history teaching to see students as in charge of their own learning, and to foster the ability to think. In both countries, against a background of students’ “loss of interest in history,” it is becoming impossible to have lessons aimed solely at helping students more easily understand the “correct answer.” Lessons must be reconstructed, not as lessons in knowing the “correct answer,” but as lessons in thinking about Sino-Japanese relations, based on the materials described above.

I have described the gap between Japan and China in historical perception that is evident in textbooks, along with its background, as well as the course that history education in Japan and China should take. In closing, I would like to stress that students are surrounded by huge amounts of information in their daily lives, but it is only in history classes that the knowledge and understanding that serve as the basis for future Sino-Japanese relations can be fostered.
### Table 9.1: Textbooks

**Chapter 2: Japan to Ancient Times**
- Chinese civilization. Shang (Yin), Zhou, Qin, and Han dynasties, Emperor Shi Huang Di.
- Embassies to Latter Han. “The Treatise of Wa” (in the Chronicle of the Kingdom of Wei).
- Saichö and Kūkai travel with embassies to China and introduce new Buddhist sects to Japan.
- Embassies to Tang discontinued. Song unification. Imports of Chinese products by merchants.

**Chapter 3: Medieval Japan**
- Mongol empire and Yuan, Chinggis Khan, Khubilai Khan. Mongol invasions, [southern Chinese resistance to Yuan]. Song coins, porcelain, Marco Polo. [Sidebar: “The Birth of Eurasian World History.”]
- Establishment of Ming, *wakō* (C. *wokon*) pirates, Japan-Ming trade (licensed trade). Trade with China and elsewhere through Ryukyu kingdom.
- Japan and Ming trade goods.
- Introduction of teahouses and development of tea ceremony. Popularity of brush-and-ink paintings from Song and Yuan.

**Chapter 4: Early Modern Japan**
- Landing of Chinese ship carrying Portuguese at Tanegashima.
- Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s desire to attack Ming (China). Ming assistance to Korea.
- Import of Chinese raw silk and silk goods through “southern barbarian” (European) traders.
- Licensed trade in Nagasaki only by Chinese and Dutch ships.
- Trade goods and reports on current events brought by Dutch and Chinese ships. Trade with China through Ryukyö. Trade by Ainu with northeast China and elsewhere through Sakhalin.
- Encouragement of Confucian learning, particularly Neo-Confucianism.

**Chapter 5: The Opening of the Country and the Course of Modern Japan**
- British smuggling of opium into China (Qing). Opium War and unequal treaties. Taiping Rebellion. Russia’s advance into Siberia and maritime provinces.
Table 9.2: Chinese historical figures in Japanese high-school Japanese history textbooks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emperor Wu of Former Han</th>
<th>Wang Wei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emperor Guangwu of Latter Han</td>
<td>Li Hongzhang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emperor An of Latter Han</td>
<td>Sun Yat-sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Shou</td>
<td>Yuan Shi Kai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emperor Yang of Han</td>
<td>Zhang Zuolin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhu Yuanzhang—also known as Emperor Taizu and Hongwu Emperor</td>
<td>Zhang Xueliang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhuo</td>
<td>Puyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Heqing (Chin Wakei)</td>
<td>Wang Zhaoming—also known as Wang Jingwei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Yat-sen, Yuan Shikai</td>
<td>Mao Zedong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.3: Chinese historical figures in Japanese high-school world history textbooks

| [Yao] | Liu Xiu (Emperor Guangwu of Han) |
| [Shun] | Zhang Jiao |
| [Yu] | Dong Zhongshu |
| Duke Huo of Qi | Sima Qian |
| Duke Wen of Jin | Ban Gu |
| Confucius | Ban Chao |
| Mencius | Cao Cao |
| Xunzi | Zhao Pi (Emperor Wen of Wei) |
| Mozi | Sun Quan (Emperor Da of Eastern Wu) |
| Laozi | Liu Bei |
| Zhuangzi | Sima Yan (Emperor Wu of Jin) |
| Shang Yang | Sima Rui (Emperor Yuan of Jin) |
| Han Fei | Emperor Taiwu of Northern Wei |
| Gongsun Long | Emperor Xiaowen of Northern Wei |
| Sunzi | Liu Yu (Emperor Wu of Liu Song) |
| Su Qin | Tao Qian |
| Zhang Yi | Fu Tucheng |
| Zou Yan | Kumagaijima |
| Qu Yuan | Paxian |
| King Zheng of Qin (Shi Huang Di) | Kou Qianzhi |
| Liu Bang (Han Gaodu) | Xie Lingyun |
| Xiang Yu | Crown Prince Zhaoming |
| [Chen Sheng] | Gu Kaizhi |
| [Wu Guang] | Wang Xizhi |
| Emperor Wu of Han | Emperor Wen of Sui (Yang Jian) |
| Zhang Qian | Emperor Yang of Sui |
| Wang Mang | Li Yuan (Emperor Gaodu of Tang) |
Emperor Taizong of Tang (Li Shimin)
Emperor Gaozong of Tang
Xuanzang
Yi Jing
Kong Yingda
Du Fu
Li Bai
Bai Juyi
Han Yu
Wu Daoxuan
Yi Jing
Kong Yingda
Du Fu
Li Bai
Bai Juyi
Han Yu
Wu Daoxuan
Yi Jing
Kong Yingda
Guo Shoujing
John of Montecorvino
Dragan Chogyal Phagpa
Zhu Yuanzhang (Emperor Taizu or Hongwu Emperor of Ming)
Jianwen Emperor of Ming
Yongle Emperor of Ming
Zheng He
Esen Tayisi
Zhengtong Emperor of Ming
Altan Khan
Dong Qichang
Wang Shuren (Wang Yangming)
Li Shizhen
Xu Guangqi
Song Yingxing
Matteo Ricci
Nurhaci
Hong Taiji
Zhang Juzheng
Wu Sangui
Zheng Chenggong
[Zheng Zhihong]
Kangxi Emperor of Qing
Yongzheng Emperor of Qing
Qianlong Emperor of Qing
[Tsongkhapa]
Gu Yanwu
Huang Zongxi
Qian Daxin
Adam Schall (Tang Ruowang)
Ferdinand Verbiest (Nam Huaren)
Joaquim Bouvet (Bai Jin)
Giuseppe Castiglione
(Lang Shining)
Macartney
Lin Zexu
Nikolay Muravyov
Hong Xiuquan
Zeng Guofan
Li Hongzhang
Frederick Townsend Ward
Charles George Gordon
Zuo Zongtang
Kang Youwei
Guangxu Emperor of Qing

NOTE: Persons listed are those who appear in the accounts of Chinese history or who are generally considered in China to be part of Chinese history; names in square brackets appear in footnotes.


Table 9.4: Japanese history in China’s junior high-school Chinese history textbooks

Book 1
Chapter 16: Management of the Western Regions by the Former and Latter Han; Foreign Relations of Qin and Han friendly relations between Han and Japan; the Xu Fu legend
Chapter 19: The Flowering of Qin and Han Culture (1) paper making transmitted to Japan in the seventh century (map)

Book 2
Chapter 5: “Friends Throughout the World” envoys to the Sui and Tang dynasties bring close and extensive Japan-China embassies; Abe no Nakamaro and Ganjin (Jianzhen); flourishing trade; Tang influence on architecture, poetry, literature, and customs in Heijokyo.
Chapter 12: Economy and Society of the Five Dynasties, Liao, Song, Xia, and Jin Japan as trade partner in Song, Liao, and Jin dynasties
Chapter 19: Foreign Relations and the Development of Ethnic Groups on the Borders wokk and Qi Jiguang’s attacks on them in the Ming dynasty

Book 3
Chapter 11: Crises on China’s Borders and War between Qing China and France Japan’s invasion of Taiwan and resistance by the Taiwanese (Taiwan Expedition)
Chapter 12: The Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and Deepening National Crisis outbreak of war; fierce battle in Pyongyang, serious battle on the Yellow Sea; resistance and atrocities at Lushun; negotiations and conclusion of a treaty at Shimonoseki with Ito Hirobumi; economic invasion and division of China by imperialist nations including Japan
Chapter 13: The Rapid Development of Restoration and Reform Movements
Chapter 3: The Establishment of Red Government

Chapter 5: Japan Invades China in the September 18th Incident [Manchurian Incident]

Chapter 2: Initial

Chapter I: Establishment of the Nationalist Government in Nanjing

Chapter 26: The Formation of the Revolutionary United Front

Chapter 24: The New Culture Movement and the May Fourth Patriotic Movement

Chapter 23: Brief Development of National Industry and Territorial Struggles by the Warlords

Chapter 22: Struggle against Rule by the Beiyang Warlords

Chapter 16: The Rise of the Bourgeois Democratic Revolutionary Movement

Kang Youwei and others point to the success of Russia and Japan in strengthening themselves through reform; resistance by the Gongche Shangshu movement to the peace treaty with Japan

Chapter 15: The Boxer Rebellion

battle with the Eight-Power Expeditionary Force (including Japan) and the Xinhua Treaty (Boxer Protocol)

Chapter 16: The Rise of the Bourgeois Democratic Revolutionary Movement

dissemination of revolutionary propaganda from Tokyo; publication of magazines in Tokyo; suicide by drowning at Tokyo's Omori beach of Chen Tianhua, in opposition to Japanese government control of Chinese exchange students; formation by Sun Yat-sen of Chinese Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui) in Tokyo

Chapter 20: Qing Culture (2)

influence of Wei Yuan’s Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms (Haiguo tuzhi) on Japan

Chapter 22: Struggle against Rule by the Beiyang Warlords

Yuan Shikai signs agreement with five-nation banking consortium including Japan

Chapter 23: Brief Development of National Industry and Territorial Struggles by the Warlords

increasing volume of investment from Japan; attempts by Japan to use loans to control the Chinese government; Japanese support for warfare between warlords; Japan sends troops to Shandong Province during World War I; the Twenty-One Demands

Chapter 24: The New Culture Movement and the May Fourth Patriotic Movement

Li Dazhao and Lu Xun study in Japan; poses the transfer to Japan of German interests in Shandong; demands from Japan that this be suppressed

Chapter 26: The Formation of the Revolutionary United Front

worker members of the Communist Party shot to death in a Japanese cotton mill in Shanghai (May 30th Movement)

Book 4

Chapter 1: Establishment of the Nationalist Government in Nanjing

Japan’s “Jinan Massacre”; the “Huangguutun Incident” [Zhang Zuolin Assassination Incident], the Japanese threat, and “Changing Flags in the Northeast” [Chinese reunification]

Chapter 2: Initial Period of Rule by the Nationalist Government

Japan’s support for Yan Xishan’s opposition to investment from France in construction of the Datong Railway

Chapter 3: The Establishment of Red Government

Zhou Enlai studies in Japan

Chapter 5: Japan Invades China in the September 18th Incident [Manchurian Incident]

Japan’s fabrication of the incident and occupation of the Northeast; (documents on the railway explosion: Lieutenant Kawamoto, Company Commander Kawashima, Captain Iizuna, Itagaki Seishiro, Hanaya Tadashi); January 28th Incident [Shanghai Incident]; Manzhougou

Chapter 6: The Patriotic Movement of Resisting Japan

Umezu [Yoshijirō]-He Yingjin Agreement. “August First Declaration”; “December Ninth” Movement, Xian Incident

Chapter 7: The Beginning of the Holy War of Resistance

Marco Polo Bridge Incident; Anti-Japanese People’s United Front; “August 13th” Incident [Second Shanghai Incident]; “Battle of Songhu”; the “Great Victory of Pingshingguan” and the Battle of Tai’erzhuang

Chapter 8: “Go to the Enemy’s Rear”

the Nanjing Massacre; the Hundred-Man Killing Contest of Second Lieutenant Mukai and Second Lieutenant Noda; guerrilla war; Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (Jin-Cha-Ji) and other anti-Japanese bases

Chapter 9: The Brutal Rule of the Japanese Invaders

Konoe Fumimaro’s statement and the establishment of the puppet National Government; brutal rule, the Ishii [Shirō] unit; savage plunder of resources and manpower

Chapter 10: The Nationalist Party’s Passivity toward the Japanese and Its Aggressiveness against the Communists

the Japanese army’s use of poison gas; the activities of the Chinese expeditionary force in Burma

Chapter 11: The Chinese Communist Party’s Determined Resistance in the Enemy’s Rear

the Hundred Regiments Offensive; the Three Alls Policy and the anti-pacification policy; the difficulties and strengthening of the anti-Japanese bases

Chapter 12: Victory in the War of Resistance

counterattacks from the anti-Japanese bases; Japan’s surrender (Okamura Yasuji)

Chapter 16: The Culture of the Nationalist Era (1)

Li Siguang’s studies in Japan

Chapter 14: A New Era of Socialist Construction

equipment and technology imported from Japan in the first stage of construction of the Shanghai Baoshan iron and steel complex


the 1972 establishment of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations

NOTES: Terms in square brackets appear in footnotes.


Table 9.5: Japanese names in a Chinese high-school Chinese history textbook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English (author of document)</th>
<th>Japanese (author of document)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ebin (author of document)</td>
<td>Major General Yamane Nobunari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibi no Makibi</td>
<td>(killed in battle in Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutsu Munemitsu (author of document)</td>
<td>Hioki Ei (Twenty-One Demands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itō Hirobumi</td>
<td>Terüchi Masatake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa</td>
<td>Tamaka Giichi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9.6: Japanese names in a Shanghai senior high-school Chinese history (modern and contemporary history) textbook

| Oda Nobunaga | Doiha Kenji |
| Ashikaga Yoshiaki | Itagaki Seishirō |
| Toyotomi Hideyoshi | Honjō Sligeru |
| Toyotomi Hideyori | Tōjō Hideki |
| Tokugawa Hidetsada | Nakamura Shintarō |
| Oshio Heihachirō | Shiozawa Kōichi |
| Takasugi Shinsaku | Nomura Kichisaburō |
| Meiji Emperor (Mutsuhito) | Ueda Kenkichi |
| Tokugawa Keiki | Shirakawa Yoshinori |
| Kido Takayoshi | Shigemitsu Mamoru |
| Ōkubo Toshimichi | Umezō Yoshijirō |
| Saigō Takamori | Matsui Iwane |
| Itō Hirobumi | Tani Hisao |
| Tōgō Heihachirō | Abe Norihide |
| Sugiyama Akira | Sugiyama Gen |
| Hikori Eki | Konoe Fumimaro |
| Ishii Kikugirō | Hata Shunroku |
| Nishihiara Kamezō | Yoshida Zengo |
| Makino Nobuaki | Arita Hachirō |
| Obata Yūkichi | Shōwa Emperor (Hirohito) |
| Ōkawa Shūmei | Yamamoto Isoroku |
| Okamura Yasuji | Nagumo Chuichi |
| Inukai Tsuyoshi | Naganō Osami |
| Ishihara Kanji | Ushijima Mitsuru |
| Okada Keisuke | Suzuki Kantaō |
| Hirota Kōki | Murō Akira |
| Tanaka Gōchi | Kimura Heitarō |

SOURCE: Gaoji zhongxue keben lishi (shiyong ben), ji xiaji [Senior High School Textbook: History (Pilot Textbook), First Grade], vols. 1–2 (Shanghai: Shanghai jiayou chubanshe, 2002).

Table 9.7: Japan in a Chinese middle-school world history textbook

Volume 1
Chapter 1: The Beginning of Human History
Chapter 2: Ancient River Basin Civilizations (1)
Chapter 3: Ancient River Valley Civilizations (2) transmission of Buddhism to Japan (in table)
Chapter 4: The Brilliance and Splendor of Ancient Asian and African Culture
Chapter 5: The Origins of Western Civilization: Ancient Greece
Chapter 6: Hegemon of the Mediterranean World: Ancient Rome
Chapter 7: Classical Western Culture
Chapter 8: Early European Feudal States
Chapter 9: The Byzantine Empire and Christianity
Chapter 10: East Asian Feudal States (Korea and Japan) the Taika Reforms (Emperor Kōtoku) and later Sino-Japanese cultural exchanges (Kūkai), formation of the bushi class
Chapter 11: West Asian Feudal States
Chapter 12: The Opening of New Sea Routes
Chapter 13: The Renaissance (1): The Italian Renaissance
Chapter 14: The Renaissance (2): The Spread and Development of the Renaissance
Chapter 15: The Bourgeois Revolution in England
Chapter 16: European Colonial Expansion
Chapter 17: America's War of Independence
Chapter 18: The Bourgeois Revolution in France
Chapter 19: Revolution and Independence in Latin America
Chapter 20: The Industrial Revolution
Chapter 21: The Birth of Scientific Socialism
Chapter 22: The Revolutions of 1848 in Europe
Chapter 23: The American Civil War
Chapter 24: Reform in Russia
Chapter 25: Japan's Meiji Restoration Tokugawa rule, military overthrow of the shogunate, the Meiji Restoration
Chapter 26: German and Italian Unification
Chapter 27: Modern Science and Culture (1): The Revolution in Natural Science
Chapter 28: Modern Science and Culture (2): The Development of Literature and Art
Chapter 29: The Transformation of Modern Social Life transformation of social life in Japan after the Meiji Restoration

Volume 2
Chapter 1: The First International and the Paris Commune
Chapter 2: Capitalism Enters the Stage of Imperialism Japan's late-developing capitalist economy; the acquisition of resources, capital, and market through the Sino-Japanese War
Chapter 3: The Development of the International Workers Movement and the Birth of Leninism
Chapter 4: Nationalist Movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America
Chapter 5: The First World War
Chapter 6: Russia's October Revolution and Socialist Construction in the Soviet Union
Chapter 7: The Establishment of the Postwar World Order and the Relative Stability of the 1920s
   Japan's demands and their realization at the Paris Peace Conference
Chapter 8: The 1929-1933 Crisis of Capitalist Economy and Roosevelt's New Deal
Chapter 9: The Formation of the Fascist States and the Anti-Fascist Struggle
   growth of fascism under the military and the invasion of China; the formation of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis
Chapter 10: The Second World War (1)
   outbreak of the Pacific War
Chapter 11: The Second World War (2)
   atrocities by fascist states; Japan's surrender
Chapter 12: Socialist Nations after the Second World War
Chapter 13: The Economic Recovery and Development of Europe and Japan
   Japan's high economic growth and contradictions within its development:
Chapter 14: America's Policies of Hegemony and United States-Soviet Antagonism
Chapter 15: Nationalist Independence Movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America
Chapter 16: The Rise of the Third World and Asian Economic Development
   Japan as a nation whose economy began developing in the 1950s-1960s (in map)
Chapter 17: New Changes in the Global Order
Chapter 18: The Development of the Global Economy
Chapter 19: The Third Industrial and Technological Revolution
Chapter 20: Contemporary Culture

Kobayashi Takiji

NOTE: Chapters in italics are those dealing particularly with Japan.

Table 9.8: Japanese names in a Chinese high-school modern and contemporary world history textbook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minamoto Yoritomo</th>
<th>Itō Hirobumi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tokugawa Ieyasu</td>
<td>(as Resident-General of Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyotomi Hideyoshi</td>
<td>Tanaka Giichi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(as invader of Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoshida Shōin</td>
<td>Shigemitsu Mamo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takasu Shin'akuro</td>
<td>(as author of document)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji Emperor</td>
<td>Hirota Kōki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ōkubo Toshimichi</td>
<td>Asahara Shōkō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kido Takayoshi</td>
<td>(in relation to the problem of terrorism common to all mankind)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Chunjì qí jì jìngyì zhòngguó jiàokè [Taiwán]: shì jì láishi [Textbook (Elective) for Full-Day System Regular Senior High Schools: Modern and Contemporary World History], vols. 1-2 (Beijing: Renmin jiàoyu chubanshe, 2004).

10 Historical Perceptions of Taiwan's Japan Era

Asano Toyomi

Translated by Louisa Rubinfien

Introduction: Taiwan's Democratization and Its Historical Background

Japan exercised sovereignty over Taiwan and its people for more than 50 years, from the implementation of the Shimonoseki Treaty in June, 1895, until the transfer of authority over Taiwan to the Chinese Nationalist government in October 1945. The experience of the residents of Taiwan during this time was distinctive in that it penetrated deeply into ordinary daily life and brought about social change in peacetime. Thus Taiwan's experience differed significantly, in degree and in character, from that of the Chinese mainland, which endured invasion and the pressing severity of war. Does this constitute an essential difference or is it just an immaterial difference in degree? This question underlies the issues that remain between Japan and China in their understanding of Taiwan's history.

This chapter discusses the issue of perceptions of Taiwan's history. It addresses the question first in terms of contemporary political issues, and second in terms of the understanding that Japan and China each