

**James D. Hodgson, Sano Yoshihiro, and John L. Graham, *Doing Business with the New Japan: Succeeding in America's Richest International Market*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008. 238 pp. ISBN 978-0742555334 (paperback), \$29.95.**

*Reviewed by Don R. McCreary*

This helpful guide for American businessmen answers many of their usual questions, such as the following: Why don't they respond to my offer immediately? Why is this taking so long? Why do they keep asking the same questions over and over? Should I lower my price right away? How can I find out what they are really thinking? The co-authors are well equipped to answer these questions and many more. The three authors have accumulated nearly one hundred years of business experience among them. Hodgson was the ambassador to Japan in the 1970s; Sano is the president of an investment banking and consulting firm, and Graham is a professor of marketing, specializing in international negotiations.

The first section, "Cultural Differences," containing the first four chapters (9–54), considers points that many American businessmen may not understand very well, such as differences in time horizons, levels of politeness, and differing ideas on the value of the *aisatsu*, the initial meeting. Hodgson, the former ambassador, weaves together several worthwhile anecdotes that illustrate the long term perspective, importance of form, and the strategies regarding direct and indirect refusals. This section includes chapters on "The American Negotiation Style" and "The Japanese Negotiation Style." An explanation of the American style, illustrated with specific points from case studies, is essential, since more than a few Americans are unaware that an identifiable style even exists. Some of the points addressed are: "get to the point; lay your cards on the table; don't just sit there, speak up; don't take 'no' for an answer; and a deal is a deal" (33–36).

The chapter on the Japanese negotiating style examines *tateshakai* (the vertical society), *ringi kessai* (the internal decision-making process), and cultural features, such as *tatemaehonne*, *amae*, *ishin-denshin*, *nemawashi*, "banana sale" tactics, and multiple ways to avoid saying "no" (43–52). These features are well illustrated with vignettes and anecdotes from actual cases. This chapter includes, "The Special Problem for American Sellers" (52–53), which occurs when the seller with a lower status (often from an unknown company in the U.S.) maintains his usual

negotiation tactics with “hard sell” persuasion. “Japanese buyers are likely to view this rather brash behavior in lower status sellers as inappropriate and disrespectful. Japanese buyers are made to feel uncomfortable and thus, without explanation, politely shut the door to trade” (53). They recommend employing a *shokaisha*, a respected go-between, who knows executives in the Japanese company that will be the buyer of the American product.

The second section, “The Business of Face-to-Face Negotiation,” comprising five chapters (55–132), addresses contrasting issues that can affect American perceptions of the amount of progress in negotiations, such as individual–group, justice–harmony, adversary–consensus, and substance–form. Many valuable points related to the negotiation process, such as the selection of the team members, essential personal qualities of the lead negotiator (self-confidence and social competence, among others), training and preparation, manipulating the situation (the location, number of people, and physical arrangements) are covered with sound recommendations. The authors also go into detail about the four stages of negotiation: non-task sounding, exchanging task-related information, persuasion, and making concessions, recommending several techniques that have worked in past case studies. A few recommendations include: “an informal channel of communication” (115), asking questions, making self-disclosures, and managing “positive influence tactics” (117). In addition to Graham and Sano’s reporting of actual case studies, Hodgson contributes several valuable anecdotes based on his diplomatic and business experiences.

The third section, “Other Crucial Topics,” which is five chapters long (133–202), revisits cultural and personality issues, such as the dangers of stereotyping, homogeneity in Japan, and sexism in business settings. This section includes accounts of well-known negotiations, such as the GM–Toyota joint venture, the Japan–U.S. rice and beef negotiations, which were conducted between the two governments. The final chapters examine the slowdown in the Japanese economy from the 1990’s up to 2008, which updates Graham and Sano’s first edition of this book. In the final chapter, “The Future of U.S.–Japan Relations,” the authors believe “a ‘good news’ future exists for Japan” (202); however, they warn that although the Japanese business community benefits from substantial knowledge about the US, “knowledge *about* is not understanding *of*. Knowledge may lead to understanding, but it is insufficient by itself” (202).

The fourth section, “Appendix: Research Reports” (203–222) is well worth a close read, especially by academics interested in negotiations

and communication styles. Graham and Sano have compiled the results of their research articles over the past thirty years and have explained the condensed results via ten “focal points,” including maintaining the rhythm of the conversation, using silence as a strategy, and addressing misunderstandings. The book’s final pages include an adequate bibliography and a thorough index. This textbook and detailed guide to cross-cultural negotiations, filled with abundant case studies and anecdotes, should be a mandatory text for every American businessman who would like to begin a relationship with a Japanese company.

**Takeo Iguchi, *Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New Japanese Perspective*, trans. David Noble. Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2010. 343 pp. ISBN 978-4924971295 (hardcover), \$23.96.**

*Reviewed by Daniel A. Métraux*

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is one of the seminal events of American history. It forced America’s entry into World War II and marked its emergence as a world power and dominant actor on the world scene. Unfortunately, many aspects of the attack remain shrouded in mystery. Just why the Japanese decided to strike the major U.S. naval base in the Pacific (and who bears greater responsibility for this egregious act of aggression) will be debated by American and Japanese scholars and historians for decades to come. Many Americans have condemned Japan for what they regard as a naked act of aggression, while more than a few Japanese apologists have labeled the attack as an act of justified self-defense.

There are enough books on Pearl Harbor to fill a small library, but one of the very best and most conclusive tomes is Takeo Iguchi’s recent study, *Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New Perspective from Japan*. Iguchi, who hails from a distinguished family of diplomats and who himself was a Japanese ambassador before embarking on an academic career in Japan and the United States, has written a clear and elegant book that should appeal to a wide audience interested in this critical period of American, Japanese, and world history. This work would be especially useful as a case study for any course that touches on World War II. What makes the book even more interesting is the author’s own personal involvement in and reaction to the

Pearl Harbor crisis. Iguchi, born in 1930, was living in Washington with his father, a diplomat at the Japanese Embassy, when his country attacked Hawaii.

### **The Long Road to Pearl Harbor**

Iguchi commences his study with a careful historical analysis of Japan's emergence as a world power in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries and the gradual spread of Japanese influence and military power on the East Asian mainland through the late 1930s. He examines in detail the growing diplomatic crisis between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan that led to the December 1941 military showdown. Iguchi's very objective and neutral approach considers the merits and demerits of the policies and actions of all the principal actors.

The key to the book, however, is Iguchi's focus on the Japanese transmission of what in effect was their declaration of war. American officials angrily alleged that the Japanese delayed their declaration of war until after the actual attack began. Iguchi examines in great depth the Japanese framing of Japan's final memorandum to the U.S. and its delayed transmission to the Japanese embassy, and thus to the U.S. Department of State. Iguchi reaches the important conclusion that ranking Japanese military officials and possibly the Foreign Ministry colluded to delay the transmission of the full declaration to Washington in order to protect the surprising nature of the forthcoming attacks on Pearl Harbor and in Southeast Asia. Iguchi also alleges that Japanese military officials intercepted an urgent telegram from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Emperor of Japan that arrived just before the Pearl Harbor attack was set to begin. The telegram, which called for a peaceful resolution to the crisis, was only delivered after the fighting began.

Iguchi also argues, convincingly, that after Japan's defeat in 1945, government officials covered up the collusion of military and Foreign Ministry officials before Pearl Harbor to give them an air of innocence at the postwar Tokyo War Crimes trials. Japan claims, to this day, that the fault for the transmission delay lay with the Embassy, Iguchi notes, are a ruse to absolve Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori of any responsibility for the attack.

### **The Failure of Diplomacy**

Iguchi's early discussion of the failure of diplomacy and the road to war is critical for an understanding of what happened later. He alleges

that war between the United States and Japan was not inevitable and that it could have been avoided, even at the last moment. The author's careful analysis of Japanese diplomacy shows a government often at cross purposes with itself. There was apparent confusion in the Japanese government and military as to the true nature of Japan's goals. Should Japan confront the Soviet Union over northern China? Would it be better to seek greater accommodation with the British and Americans, or should Japan gamble on war? Iguchi outlines in great detail the intricate struggle for power as different factions within the nation's political and military hierarchy struggled to gain ascendancy. Iguchi notes, "In a nutshell, the foreign policy pursued by Japan in 1940 and 1941 was inconsistent, unsteady, and a bit haphazard" (51). There was even a time when the U.S. and Japan came "tantalizingly close to a provisional agreement" only to see a further breakdown of discussions. The Japanese military was more concerned with its war in China and a potential threat from the Soviet Union until well into 1941.

Although Iguchi is a bona fide Japanese scholar, his conclusions are wholly objective and he is far more critical of the Japanese than the Americans. He totally rejects the oft-quoted thesis that the Roosevelt administration deliberately provoked Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor as a backdoor method of entering the European theatre to rescue Britain. Iguchi also challenges the notion that American economic sanctions and its demands for a complete Japanese withdrawal from Indochina and China, as well as a termination of the tripartite pact with Italy and Germany, directly forced Japan to attack the United States and Britain. However, he does note that Prime Minister Tojo "asserted that if Japan were to withdraw from China, four years of blood and sacrifice" on the part of the Japanese military "would be for naught" and that such a withdrawal would have disastrous consequences for Japan's control over Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan. Only in late November did Japan conclude any chance of an agreement with the U.S. and U.K., that U.S. global strategy was designed to continue American "world hegemony" and that Japan had no clear path but war. A Japanese document composed on November 29 concludes, "America as yet making no preparations for war. We are truly on the verge of achieving a blitzkrieg against the U.S. that will outdo even the German blitzkrieg against the Germans" (67).

Iguchi effectively counters the frequently claim that the negotiations between Ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were not serious. Many parties in Japan and the United

States genuinely hoped for a last minute settlement. "The American approach was to create a *modus vivendi*," and the intent of Hull's sharp note of late November was a further attempt for a comprehensive settlement. By then, major military powerbrokers in Japan had decided on war, but failed to inform anybody in their embassy in Washington of the impending attacks.

Iguchi, a highly trained legal scholar, builds a case that while both sides must share some of the blame for the Pearl Harbor tragedy, the preponderance of guilt lies with Tokyo. There may never be a definitive book that solves all the Pearl Harbor mysteries, but Iguchi's masterpiece comes close. This work deserves wide circulation in schools, colleges, and universities and is "must-read" for any student or teacher wanting to know why December 7, 1941 is a day which, as President Roosevelt noted, will "live in infamy."

**Robin M. LeBlanc, *The Art of the Gut: Manhood, Power, and Ethics in Japanese Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010. 229 pp. ISBN 978-0-520-25917-1 (paperback), \$24.95.**

*Reviewed by Daniel A. Métraux*

Japanese politics has experienced revolutionary change in the past decade. The traditionally stable postwar system, where the dominant conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) held power, but where a cluster of progressive political parties obtained enough seats in both houses of the Diet to prevent the LDP from amending the nation's constitution, has disappeared. A prolonged recession, voter fatigue with one-party rule, and corruption and weakness among LDP leaders led to the overwhelming victory of the Democratic Party of Japan in the 2009 elections. The inherent weakness of the new government, however, leaves Japan's political future very much in doubt.

Japan's current political instability will provide ample grist for political scientists for years to come. Unfortunately, however, many of these writers are only witnessing the very tip of the Japanese political iceberg. Beneath the surface, on the local, prefectural, and regional levels, there are also immense changes occurring. Traditionally, power in Japan was concentrated in the hands of a powerful central government, and the

role of local government was to implement policies set forth in Tokyo. Robin LeBlanc, a professor of political science at Washington & Lee University, states clearly in her most recent book, *The Art of the Gut: Manhood, Power and Ethics in Japanese Politics*, which these tendencies are changing. Local governments, in recent years, have demonstrated fresh ideas and approaches to dealing with a variety of issues that directly affect the lives of the average Japanese. In recent decades, progressive approaches that challenge conservative policy, from polluter regulation to public provision of health care for the elderly, have originated in local governments and later been reworked and adopted by the LDP at the national level” (10).

Popular participation in national politics by the general public is minimal when compared with some Western democracies. Japanese very dutifully participate in national elections at the ballot box, but otherwise eschew political activity. However, especially in recent years, highly motivated individuals and citizen’s groups have become active at the local level. Local government provides “a greater number of access points for citizen participation,” and the large number of seats in local assemblies provide well-organized small groups to win one or more seats that will guarantee that their voice will be heard (11).

Another change has been the role of women in politics. While a few women have made their mark in national politics, it is at the local level, often in citizen’s movements, where they have had a greater impact. LeBlanc notes that “Japanese female politicians are using their experiences as housewives and mothers to justify themselves as spokespersons for ordinary citizens on issues such as care for the aged, consumer and environmental protection, and freedom of information” (42). Japanese politics is still male-dominated, but female activity, particularly at the local level, is indeed bringing about change.

Robin LeBlanc’s *The Art of the Gut* deals with a variety of related themes including the role of men in Japanese politics, but her case study of a citizen’s movement against the construction of a nuclear power plant in their town provides a fascinating example of how a small group of determined citizens can take on huge national corporations and the national power structure and ultimately prevail. LeBlanc’s study supports anthropologist Margaret Mead’s famous statement that, “Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed people can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has,” is as true for Japan as the United States.

The great earthquake of March 2011 and the subsequent meltdown of nuclear power plants at Fukushima have made many Japanese opposed to the reopening of these plants and the construction of new ones. When I visited Tokyo in November of 2011 and May of 2012, I witnessed large public demonstrations against the use of nuclear power in Japan, but such opposition is hardly new. LeBlanc includes a study of an anti-nuclear power plant movement in a small rural city that dates back many years to the 1990s and beyond.

Using superb ethnographic techniques, LeBlanc settled in rural Takeno-machi (a pseudonym) where she studies the activities of local activists who oppose the construction of a nuclear power plant in their town. The leader of the two protagonists, a small sake merchant, "Baba-san," is infuriated when he and other townsmen hear that a large national utility company has bribed local political leaders to accept the plant with the hope that these bribes and the fact that construction will create many new jobs for the locality will cause them to ignore the inherent dangers of having such a facility in their neighborhood. Baba-san initially supports the idea as being good for the local economy, but when he and his neighbors actually have a chance to weigh the merits and demerits of the project, they begin to have doubts. Their worries and disgust with the corruption brought in by outside money cause them to take a leading role in an anti-plant movement known as the Referendum Association.

The power company had bought enough land to build its plant and had gotten the go-ahead from local politicians, but within this land was a small parcel still owned by the town. Construction could not take place until the company had bought that parcel from the town and sale of that piece of land required the consent of the local town assembly. The strategy of the Referendum Association was to run candidates in local elections to prevent the sale. They ran several candidates, several of which including a couple of local women were victorious. Eventually after several years of struggle the Referendum Association succeeded in preventing construction of the plant.

While the more interesting sections of the book focus on Baba-san and local doings in Takeno-machi, LeBlanc also introduces us to another local politician, Takada-san, the son of a long-time LDP assemblyman in Tokyo's very densely populated Shirakawa Ward. LeBlanc describes the tradition in Japanese politics of powerful political elders who pass on their seats of power to their sons and grandsons. The Takada family is certainly a good example of this tradition. When the father retires from political life, his son runs to take his father's place. We see in detail how the son inherits



his father's support base as well as a web of accumulated family obligations.

Throughout LeBlanc's *The Art of the Gut*, the reader gets to see the inner workings of Japanese politics on the local level. Her approach is a bit unorthodox—she rents a room in the Baba home and sits in on many of their strategy sessions. One sees political activity including tight meetings, campaign speeches and election-organizing in both rural and urban Japan. LeBlanc is a wonderful writer who moves away from scholarly jargon to provide the reader with a lively “you are here” look at the inner fabric of Japanese politics.

This book is also about the role of men in Japanese politics. She writes: “Because I had studied women in politics as a young researcher, I was at first surprised by the extent to which the men I observed in Shirakawa and Takeno felt and described themselves as constrained in their choices *simply because they were men*. Even Baba, whom his fellow activists viewed as powerful, felt this way. Most of the time these men... [felt] they were just doing what they thought was necessary to avoid trouble. They considered avoiding unnecessary trouble to be a fundamental requirement for being a grown man; one who could meet his primary responsibilities, which were usually characterized as those of a breadwinner and head of household” (21).

Robin LeBlanc's *The Art of the Gut* provides a very broad analysis of the rapidly changing dynamics of Japanese politics. She devoted approximately eight years to this study (1999–2007), which enabled her to chart the long term evolutionary changes that occurred in Japan even before the revolutionary election of 2009. LeBlanc is a splendid ethnologist and student of politics and this work certainly will remain one of the true classics of modern Japanese studies.

**Ken C. Kawashima, *The Proletarian Gamble: Korean Workers in Interwar Japan*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009. 297. ISBN 978-0-8223-4417-9 (paperback), \$23.95.**

*Reviewed by Bernice J. deGannes Scott*

*The Proletarian Gamble* is an important, informative, and commendable work. In my view, this book is an indictment, and justifiably

so, of the Japanese—the government, private citizens, and public and private institutions—for the mistreatment of Korean workers in Japan during the interwar years. Also censured are Japan-based Korean social-welfare organizations that were complicit in a system that facilitated ethnic discrimination, particularly in the labor and housing markets.

In keeping with the title of the work, Kawashima situates *The Proletarian Gamble* within a Marxist theoretical framework. In his words:

...[the] historical conjuncture, between agrarian immiseration in Korea in the 1920s and 1930s, and industrial recession in Japan during the same decades [was]...the historical origin of both Korean poverty and organized Korean working class movements in Japan (47).

In choosing to use the term “agrarian immiseration,” Kawashima is implying that the tradeoff between rising capitalist profits and the worsening condition of the worker, as predicted in Marxist theory, had occurred in the Korean agricultural sector. Throughout the book, Kawashima deftly incorporates the works of Marx and other theorists, such as Louis Althusser, Friedrich Engels, Jacques Ranciere, and John Charles-Leonard de Sismondi, and he references Grace Chang and Martin Kopple as he explains how capitalist production has diminished labor to a contingency status. He consistently draws upon historical events in Korea and Japan, and places these events within the framework of the capitalism–communism discourse.

The plight of the Korean worker is epitomized in the story of migrant worker, Koh Joon-sok, whom Kawashima introduces in the first pages of the book. Koh resides in a single room in a Korean-managed rooming house for day workers. He is unemployed, but had previously worked at three different establishments. In those jobs, he had been forced to endure verbal abuse from his Japanese employers, who paid him wages that were lower than those of his Japanese co-workers. His only prospect for employment is a temporary job in the public works programs, for unlike the boom years of World War I when Koreans had been recruited to work in factories and coalmines, these jobs are now reserved for Japanese workers. If Koh does find a factory job, it will be in a small family-owned that is labor-intensive, and needs his unskilled labor power.

Kawashima informs us that the majority of Korean workers in interwar Japan were not employed in manufacturing. Rather, they were chronically unemployed immigrant day-workers in the public works industry—an industry created by the Japanese government to address shortfalls in urban and trans-urban amenities. Still, he categorizes the Korean workers as proletariats. While students of Marx may question the rationale, Kawashima identifies two characteristics of the Korean workers he believes justify their inclusion in the proletarian class, namely, their labor power was commodified, and they existed as a surplus population (11). He explains that the labor market transaction of Korean workers (that is, the sale and purchase of their labor power) was never completed. Instead, the process was constantly interrupted because of exploitation and ethnic discrimination against them. They had difficulty finding work, and when they did, they were paid wages that were 30 percent to 60 percent lower than those of Japanese workers. Many lived in substandard housing because of eviction or the refusal of Japanese landlords to rent to them. Kawashima describes the workers, in Marxist terms, as “virtual paupers” (66).

The Japanese society that emerges from this work is one fraught with discrimination and collusion against a group of workers because of their ethnicity. Kawashima chronicles the complicity of the Japanese government and public institutions, private citizens, and Japan-based Korean institutions in their actions against the Korean workers—the (sometimes violent) eviction of Koreans from housing, and the subsequent vindication of landlords in the courts (118); the “intermediary exploitation” (151) by Korean-managed, state-funded private welfare organizations, and the social stratification by the police into “good-natured and virtuous” and “radical” Koreans (155). At times, the workers did put up resistance—they became involved in Korean and Japanese communist labor unions (132), they went on strike, and they defended themselves against violent attacks by the *Soaikai* (a Korean social-welfare organization), or by landlords (120). They also adopted Japanese names to increase their chances of obtaining decent housing.

The events recorded in this book raise issues of xenophobia, citizenship, institutional discrimination, workers’ rights, and basic human rights. First, there was the inherent oppressiveness of the colonial relationship that began in 1910 with Japan’s annexation of Korea (Japan’s colonization of Korea ended in 1945). Next, the Korean workers were immigrants in Japan, and the Japanese asserted their citizenship by

discriminating against the immigrants, consequently depriving them of basic human and workers' rights. The segmentation of the labor force by the Japanese state and employers placed the Korean workers in a subordinate position to their Japanese counterparts. This division, though not created by the workers themselves, brought to mind the sentiment expressed by Marx and Engels:

...organization of the proletarians into a class, and, consequently, into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves.<sup>1</sup>

Kawashima states that he wrote this book to record the history of Korean workers in interwar Japan, and to fill the void in the body of work dedicated to studies of labor in modern Japan. He has done a superb job, and the high quality of the work speaks for itself. As I noted earlier, I regard this work as an indictment. The details presented are serious enough to draw criticism from those who would hope that this moment of history be forgotten. Fortunately, anyone attempting to challenge the authenticity of this work would encounter great difficulty. Kawashima's references are many, and he strongly supports his research with theory-based references, and with evidence from primary source documents consisting of archival material from public and private collections.

This text is a valuable classroom tool for use in diverse areas of study. Students of Asian Studies, Area Studies, Economics, Political Science, Labor Studies, International Studies, and History would benefit from the information. All told, though, the book belongs in every library.

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998), pp. 18–19.