

JAPAN STUDIES REVIEW

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Steven Heine

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the twelfth volume of the *Japan Studies Review* (JSR), an annual peer-reviewed journal sponsored by the joint efforts of the Institute for Asian Studies at Florida International University and the Southern Japan Seminar. JSR continues to be both an outlet for publications related to Southern Japan Seminar events and a journal that encourages submissions from a wide range of scholars in the field.

Appearing in this issue are four articles dealing with a variety of topics on Japan, including the acceptance of tattoos in Japanese culture and identity, xenophobic literature of a nineteenth century treaty port, the political implications of an explicitly anti-Chinese manga book, and the cultural impact of the U.S. presence in Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands.

The first article, "Meanings of Tattoos in the Context of Identity-Construction: A Study of Japanese Students in Canada" by Mieko Yamada, looks at the social acceptance of tattoos in youth culture and Japanese identity. It explores the polarity of perspectives on tattoos against the backdrop of Japanese cultural values and Western influences.

Following this, "Curiosities of the Five Nations: Nansōan Shōhaku's *Yokohama Tales*" by Todd S. Munson, explores the political interpretation of a nineteenth century travel guide written in Japan's first treaty port of Yokohama. Munson argues that the work represents a popular voice of xenophobic resentment in an era of Western imperialism in Asia.

The third article, "China in Japanese Manga: A Not So Funny Controversy?" by Kinko Ito and Charles Musgrove, looks at a 2005 bestselling book of *kyōyō*, or academic, manga that portrays the Chinese government and people as immoral and scheming. Ito and Musgrove examine the implications of the book in the political context of contemporary Sino-Japanese relations.

The fourth article, "American Cultural Policy toward Okinawa 1945-1950s" by Chizuru Saeki looks at the cultural impact of the American occupation of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands. Through an analysis of various U.S. government publications, Saeki presents the many reasons why a military presence remained in Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands long after the end of the U.S. Occupation of the Japanese mainland.

This issue also features four essays. The first essay, "The Fine Art of Imperialism: Japan's Participation in International Expositions of the Nineteenth Century" is written by Martha Chaiklin. This piece examines the changing role of Japanese exhibitions at World's Fairs and other

expositions to prove Japan's importance in the international community. This essay argues that Japan used domestic and overseas exhibitions to demonstrate its economic development and cultural refinement as equal to that of the Western nations.

The second essay, "U.S.-Japan Collegiate Student Exchanges: Challenges and Opportunities" written by Kiyoshi Kawahito, explores the underdevelopment of study abroad programs for foreign students in Japan and the United States. On the Japanese side, factors limiting growth include the bias of institutional bureaucracy, insufficiency of courses offered in English, and the incompatibility of the academic calendar. In the United States, the issues include the lack of on-campus English as a Second Language programs, inadequate financial aid, and an under-emphasis on non-Western language and culture courses.

The third essay, "Bounded Thought: Area Studies and the Fluidity of Academic Disciplines" by Robin Kietlinski, discusses the disciplinary changes and challenges to area studies. Kietlinski argues that area studies programs historically have overemphasized geographic boundaries, while paying less attention to disciplinary limits and concerns. Kietlinski presents an analysis of Masao Miyoshi and H.D. Harootunian's edited volume, *Learning Places: The Afterlives of Area Studies* to explore the debate surrounding the nature and future of area studies programs.

The final essay is a research note written by Marilyn Helms, Ray Jones, and Margaret Takeda, entitled "Learning from Hurricane Katrina: Complexity and Urgency in the Holistic Management Model." The essay examines the American government's mistakes and miscommunication following Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The authors compare the lessons from the Katrina aftermath with the Kobe earthquake in 1995, the subject of their previous research published in *Japan Studies Review*, vol. 11. This essay uses the reference citations style, rather than footnotes.

Additionally, the volume contains seven book reviews of recent publications on Japanese studies. Susan L. Burns' work on the intellectual trend known as *kokugaku* in the early years of the Meiji era is reviewed by Daniel A. Métraux of Mary Baldwin College. Mark Driscoll's translation of two short novels by Yuasa Katsuei that reflect upon life in Korea during Japanese colonialism is reviewed by Leslie Williams of Clemson University. Jilly Traganou's analysis of the Tōkaidō Road of the Tokugawa and Meiji eras is reviewed by Laura Nenzi of Florida International University. Two perspectives on Sawa Kurotani's anthropological fieldwork on Japanese-American housewives are offered by Don R.

McCreary of the University of Georgia and Patricia Pringle of Japan-America Communications, LLC. Finally, Cathy N. Davidson's travel reflections upon nature and the thirty-six famous woodblock prints of Mount Fuji is reviewed by Patricia D. Winfield of Meredith College.

Please note: Japanese names are cited with surname first except for citations of works published in English.

Steven Heine

Re: Submissions, Subscriptions, and Comments

Submissions for publication, whether articles, essays, or book reviews, should be made in both hard copy and electronic formats, preferably Word for Windows on a disk or CD (please inquire about other formats). The editor and members of the editorial board will referee all submissions.

Annual subscriptions are \$25.00 (US). Please send a check or money order payable to *Florida International University* to:

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Visit our website at http://asianstudies.fiu.edu/page.php?c=eg_jsr. PDF versions of past volumes are available online.

All comments and feedback on the publications appearing in *Japan Studies Review* are welcome.

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Articles

**MEANINGS OF TATTOOS IN THE
CONTEXT OF IDENTITY-CONSTRUCTION:
A STUDY OF JAPANESE STUDENTS IN CANADA**

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Introduction

Tattoo culture in Japan has been practiced for many reasons: body decoration, social status, religious practice, tribal custom, and punishment. While tattooing has been acknowledged as art, it has its negative connotations. In Japan, tattooed people tend to be stigmatized and frequently conceal their tattoos. Public places such as pools, baths, or saunas prohibit tattooed people on their premises.¹ In contrast to these negative views about tattooing, however, its growing popularity has been noticeable. With the popularity of body arts, some Japanese are accepting tattoos as fashionable or as an art form.²

What accounts for these polarized attitudes? It is often said that Japanese cultural values emphasize collectivistic views such as conformity and uniformity. A number of scholars in the field of Japanese studies argue that Japanese views of individuality stress interdependency of the self.³

¹ Stephen Mansfield, "The Indelible Art of the Tattoo," *Japan Quarterly* 1/1 (1999): 30-41.

² Stephen Mansfield, "Tattoos, body piercing gaining popularity," *Daily Yomiuri*, October 5, 1994, p. 3; and Yasuo Saito, "Karada de shucho? Body Art [Self-expression with the body? Body Art]," *Asahi Shinbun*, August 26, 1997, p. 13.

³ Harumi Befu, ed., *Cultural Nationalism in East Asia* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1993); Shinobu Kitayama, Hazel Rose Markus, Hisaya Matsumoto, and Vinai Norsakkunkit, "Individual and Collective Processes in the Construction of the Self: Self-Enhancement in the United States and Self-Criticism in Japan," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 72/6 (1997): 1245-1267; Takie Sugiyama Lebra, *Japanese Patterns of Behavior* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1979); and Yoshio Sugimoto, *An Introduction to Japanese Society*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

From this perspective, Japanese culture assumes a view of “interdependent” individuality rather than “independent” individuality. The pursuit of the Western value of individuality would appear to be at the opposite pole from social expectations in Japan.

Examination of Japanese popular culture also points out changing conceptions of individuality. Marilyn Ivy suggests that new feelings and sensibilities based on individual specific desires emerge in postwar Japan.⁴ The influence of Western values may liberate individuals from the intense social constraints imposed by traditional Japanese structures. More recent studies of Japanese popular culture find conflicts, tension, and vacillation between Japanese tradition and Western cultures.⁵ Thus, this recent trend in Japan does not necessarily suggest that Japanese traditional values are being replaced by Western ones, but rather, it may be a reflection of pluralistic realities that various values and individual desires coexist. Given these arguments, Japanese tattoos may express complex issues created by social currents reflected in the polarized attitudes.

This study explores the meanings of tattoos among Japanese students living in Canada to understand the complexity of cultural self-expression in the context of identity-construction. The major issues in this study are how Japanese international students in Canada commit to being tattooed while living abroad, and how they construct their identities through these experiences. Given results based on survey questionnaires and interviews with Japanese international students studying in Canada, this study identifies the historical, social, and cultural shifts and multi-layered meanings of tattooing practices. The tattoos of the Japanese students are a hybrid cultural form of Western influence and Japanese tradition. Their experiences are significant evidence of Western cultural consciousness but

⁴ Marilyn Ivy, “Formations of Mass Culture,” in Andrew Gould, ed., *Postwar Japan as History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 239-259.

⁵ For example, please see Mary Grigsby, “*Sailormoon: Manga (Comics) and Anime (Cartoon) Superheroine Meets Barbie: Global Entertainment Commodity Comes to the United States*,” *Journal of Popular Culture* 32/1 (1998): 59-80; and Michael L. Maynard, “‘Slice-of-Life:’ A Persuasive Mini Drama in Japanese Television Advertising,” *Journal of Popular Culture* 31/2 (1997): 131-142.

also may reveal a cultural tension between Japanese traditional views and the Western concept of individuality.

Japanese Tattooing from the Past to the Present

The tradition of tattooing is often characterized as unique in Japan,⁶ where a long history of tattooing exists.⁷ The Japanese-style tattooing, so-called “full body suits,” was developed during the eighteenth century. This is a style that covers the entire body, from the neckline, back, and chest to the ankle, and the design is based on *ukiyo-e* pictures or Japanese traditional woodblock prints. Its traditional examples were dragons, carp, peonies, and Kannon, the Goddess of Mercy. Punitive tattooing was also widely employed to identify criminals and social outcasts during the same period. Criminals were tattooed on the arm or forehead with symbols designating the places where the crimes were committed.⁸ With the advent of modernization, all tattooing practices, including tribal customs, were regarded as a sign of barbarism and were prohibited between 1872 and 1948.

Because of its historical and socio-cultural background, tattooing in Japan is associated with dark and negative images in the minds of many people. It has been inclined to represent either a criminal aspect or a rebellious response to traditional cultural codes. There are notorious Japanese criminal syndicates, *yakuza*, represented by distinctive tattoos.⁹

⁶ Robert Brain, *The Decorated Body* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1979); Donald Richie, “The Japanese Art of Tattooing,” *National History* (1973): 50-59; Donald Richie and Ian Buruma, *Japanese Tattoo* (New York: Weatherhill, 1980); Donald McCallum, “Historical and Cultural Dimensions of the Tattoo in Japan,” in Arnold Rubin, ed., *Marks of Civilization: Artistic Transformations of the Human Body* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 109-134; and W.R. Van Gulik, *Irezumi: The Pattern of Dermatography in Japan* (Netherlands: Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1982).

⁷ W. D. Hambly, *The History of Tattooing and Its Significance* (London: H.F.G. Witherby, 1925); and Haruo Tamabayashi, *Bunshin Hyakushi* [A Hundred of Tattooed Appearances] (Tokyo: Bunsendō Shobō, 1956).

⁸ Tamabayashi, *Bunshin Hyakushi*.

⁹ David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, *Yakuza: Japan's Criminal Underworld, Expanded Edition* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California

Kaplan and Dubro report that approximately sixty-eight percent of the *yakuza* have tattoos. Recently, however, a number of *yakuza* members have tried to remove their tattoos and replace missing fingers in order to return to mainstream society.¹⁰ Japanese cultural codes, influenced by Confucian doctrine, claim that bodies are given to people by their parents and that intentionally hurting bodies is contrary to the Confucian concept of filial piety.¹¹ Hence, tattooing would be considered a rebellion against or rejection of parents or authority. Although tattooing is now legal, some tattoo studios are still housed in unmarked buildings.

Despite the fact that these negative views of tattooing remain, its growing popularity has been noticeable. The popularity of body arts such as body piercing, henna painting, nail-decorating, tattooing, and temporary tattoos among young Japanese is ensuring that the practice will continue.¹² Once defined as symbols of social outcasts, tattoos are beginning to be considered trendy and fashionable.

Tattooing Practices as Subculture and Identity-Construction

Tattooing practices are part of a subculture, which represents a different way of handling social relations. The experience encoded in subcultures is shaped in a variety of locales.¹³ The phenomenon strongly reflects circumstances at school, work, or home, and all environments surrounding us are bound to each other. There is a power struggle between dominant and subordinate cultures, teachers and students, or parents and

Press, 2003); and Florence Rome, *The Tattooed Men* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1975).

¹⁰ "Moto kumiin shakaifukki ni kenmei [Ex-yakuza members try hard to come back to mainstream]," *Asahi Shinbun*, February 28, 1997, p. 19.

¹¹ Robert O. Ballu, *Shinto: The Unconquered Enemy* (New York: The Viking Press, 1945), p. 131.

¹² "Tattoos, Body Piercing Gaining Popularity," *Daily Yomiuri*, October 5, 1994, p. 3; Ken Mori, "Tattoo Mania: 'yōbori' yori 'wabori' ga erai [Tattoo Mania: Japanese style tattooing is greater than Western style]," *Shūkan Asahi*, May 21, 1999, p. 73; and Saito, "Karada de shucho? Body Art," p. 13.

¹³ Dick Hebdige, *Subculture: The Meaning of Style* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 84-87.

children. This process produces marginal discourses within the broad confines of experience.

The concept of identity emerges from interactions between individuals and society. Identity is an ongoing phenomenon constructed by interactions among people, institutions, and practices.¹⁴ Tattooing is a way of using coded meanings in the everyday life of social interaction. Why does the practice of tattooing gain popularity in Japan regardless of the negative cultural attitudes toward tattooing? This study suggests that the acceptance of being tattooed is an essential experience for the Japanese participants to express and manifest themselves.

A physical body is decorated with images, symbols, or signs. Symbols and signs are used to convey messages to others. The images of tattoos are significant symbols representing not only the self, but also one's interactions with others and society. Clinton Sanders sees a tattoo as a product which extends a social life.¹⁵ While tattoos are symbols of disassociation from conventional society, they are also seen as a connection to alternative social groups which appreciate this type of body decoration.¹⁶ Self-expression is a response to a set of circumstances, particular problems, and contradictions.

In this study, tattoos are seen as socially and culturally meaningful signs to reflect specific events in ongoing life histories. Meanings, norms, and values are intertwiningly shaped by external as well as internal worlds. By accepting to be tattooed, the Japanese students learn, understand, and reproduce cultural norms and values through symbols on their bodies. Being tattooed becomes an event in the process of actual becoming, that is, part of constructing identities.

¹⁴ Johan Fornäs, *Cultural Theory and Late Modernity* (London: SAGE Publications, 1995); Michael Holquist, *Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990); and Madan Sarup, *Identity, Culture and the Postmodern World* (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1996).

¹⁵ Clinton R. Sanders, "Tattoo You: Tattoos as Self-Extensions and Identity Markers," in Mary Lorenz Dietz, Robert Prus, and William Shaffir, eds., *Doing Everyday Life: Ethnography as Human Lived Experience* (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman Ltd., 1994), pp. 203-212.

¹⁶ Clinton R. Sanders, *Customizing the Body: The Art and Culture of Tattooing* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); and Sanders, "Tattoo You."

Tattoos as Cultural Tensions

Today's society may contain elements of both modernity and postmodernity. Due to the different uses of time and space, "[g]lobalization divides as much as it unites; it divides as it unites – the causes of division being identical with those which promote the uniformity of the globe."¹⁷ Various dimensions of polarity in the globalized society can be observed: assimilation, uniformity, and inclusion, as well as segregation, separation, and exclusion. This is not a shift from traditional to modern society; rather, these dimensions represent conflicts and contradictions between modern and postmodern phenomena.

Identity discourse reflects the state of society. Our individuality is socially and culturally produced. The shape of our society depends "on the way in which the task of 'individualization' is framed and responded to."¹⁸ Individualization refers to the emancipation of the individual from the ascribed and inherited determination of one's social character. The idea of individualism exists in terms of responsibility and autonomy. Actors are charged to take responsibility for performing a task and for its consequences. Although the concept of individualism gives us a wider range of choices, it also gives us a new challenge to overcome our conflicts, contradictions, and constraints. Searching for identity is the by-product of the combination of globalizing and individualizing pressures and tensions that the globalization processes raise.¹⁹

This study helps to ascertain whether cultural conflicts and contradictions exist in self-expression. The conflicts and contradictions emerging from their tattoo experiences serve as valuable information to provide a more complete understanding of the complexity of Japanese culture. Why did Japanese students studying abroad want to get tattooed, given that tattoos are still viewed as negative by large segments of Japanese society? What is expressed by tattoos? How do the students understand their home country and a new culture through being tattooed? Examining attitudes among the Japanese students in Canada, this study intends to answer these questions.

¹⁷ Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 2.

¹⁸ Zygmunt Bauman, *The Individualized Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p. 144.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

Research Setting and Data Collection

This research was conducted in Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, and Tokyo, Japan from 1998 to 2001. A questionnaire and interviews were conducted at the University of Victoria, Canada. The questionnaire was intended to identify general attitudes toward tattooing practices among Japanese students. A total of thirty Japanese students (ten males, twenty females) participated in the survey. In the questionnaire, social and personal attitudes toward tattooing practices were asked along with impressions about tattoos.

Face-to-face interviews with tattooed Japanese students were conducted in order to explore a deeper understanding of the cultural complexity that appeared in their tattoo experiences. Interviewees were recruited by word of mouth or by an advertisement posted on campus and in Japanese supermarkets in Victoria. The survey participants were also asked if they were tattooed and if they would be willing to participate in the interviews.

Attitudes toward Tattooing Practices

Impressions about tattooing practices among survey participants had both negative and positive elements. Although approximately seventy percent of Japanese participants had never seen tattooed people in Japan, the others reported that the tattooed people they had seen in Japan were either the *yakuzas* or young Japanese who accept tattoos as a form of fashion. The *yakuzas* have a very negative image and tend to be associated with tattoos, and as such, their tattoos are negative and stigmatized in Japanese society. On the other hand, the popularity of tattoos among young Japanese was frequently mentioned.

The most common knowledge about tattooed people is that they are not allowed to go to public places such as pools, saunas, and baths. Half of the participants reported that tattooed people in Japan are treated differently, depending on the tattooing styles. If people have traditional Japanese tattoos, they are regarded as members of the *yakuza*. If they have Western tattoos, they are considered to be ordinary people or non-*yakuza*.

The majority of the survey respondents denied having any tattoos. They indicated that there are three major obstacles: the permanency of tattoos, the pain during the operation, and getting permission from parents. Even though tattoos are technically erasable by laser surgery, it is impossible to get the original skin back. Because of the permanency, it could be “regretful” and cause one to be permanently “stigmatized” in

Japanese society. In addition, there were physical concerns about the physical pain associated with a tattoo. Many frequently mentioned the pain during the drawing operation. Finally, the participants were concerned not only with the permanency and pain, but also with the filial impiety that tattooing might reflect.

The conflict between filial piety and individuality was clear. In Japan, filial piety is a key criterion for decision-making. Even though individuals want to pursue their own freedom, they are particularly concerned with their family, especially their parents' reactions and opinions. These Japanese students clearly struggled with the traditional code of ethics and a new cultural theme of the role of individuals in contemporary Japan.

Meanings of Tattoos in the Context of Identity-Construction

My questions were why Japanese students decide to be tattooed, given that tattoos are still viewed as negative by large segments of Japanese society; how the students legitimate their tattoo experiences as well as other cultural practices in a new environment. Five Japanese students, two males and three females, ranging in age from nineteen to twenty-seven years old, agreed to participate in unstructured interviews. By analyzing the tattoo narratives by the five Japanese international students,²⁰ I explore how they construct the meanings of tattoos and how they learn and understand the concept of individuality in the context of identity-construction.

Dream for the Future

"I wanted something related to the sea," said Sachi, a nineteen-year-old female college student who had been in Canada for about two years. Sachi has a tattoo of Orca, a killer whale, on her right ankle. The only color is black. "It was not until I came to Canada that I met a person with a tattoo. Tattoos were not my style till then," Sachi said. In Canada, it became common for her to see people with tattoos in daily life. "One of my Canadian friends has a tattoo on her ankle, and I thought it was cute. This might be the first time I had seen a tattoo." Sachi got her tattoo in Canada when she was seventeen. There are several reasons why she chose the ankle for her tattoo:

²⁰ Interviewees' names are pseudonyms.

I didn't want it on the arm, but I don't know why...I didn't choose the arm because I imagined that my tattoo on the arm might change when I lost more weight [She laughed]...And it would look awful when I became older. I heard that a tattoo on the arm was for men. A tattoo on the ankle is for women. I heard it looked feminine.

In Sachi's case, her tattoo is connected with her major, biology, and her dream for a future career as a marine biologist. Sachi had visited an aquarium in her childhood and this impacted her for life. "I still remember the Orca at the first sight in my childhood. It was huge and beautiful. It just fascinated me."

Ultimate Beauty

The traditional Japanese style of tattooing is based on *ukiyo-e*, where the whole body is considered a canvas. Shoko, a twenty-seven-year-old Japanese woman, was first attracted by tattooed Japanese women. "In a certain scene on TV, a tattooed woman wearing a kimono showed up. I saw the tattoos on her back when she took off the kimono. I thought, 'Wow! How beautiful she is!' Since then, I had wanted to wear tattoos, but couldn't find a tattooist. I wondered how I could find such people." Shoko asked many people if they knew anyone who could tattoo. Finally, one of her friends introduced a tattooist to her, and eventually she had a chance to get tattooed.

Shoko has two butterflies: one on her left earlobe and the other on her right breast. They were done on the same day in Japan, at the age of twenty. The butterfly on her earlobe is only black, and the other is colored black and blue. Shoko also has a cosmetic tattoo on her eyebrows. The cosmetic tattoo is permanent make-up, replacing eyeliner, eyebrow pencils, lip liner, full lip tinting, and beauty marks. Her eyebrows were tattooed at age twenty-six in Japan.

Shoko described her tattoos as two different types: "real" tattoos (the butterflies) and "cosmetic" ones. Shoko liked butterflies with big black wings. Blue is her favorite color and she also used that for her butterfly tattoo on her breast. Shoko explained why she chose the image of the butterfly:

I was often told that I did not settle in a certain place like a butterfly flies from a flower to a flower. Actually, I moved from

place to place very often. I thought the butterfly was me. Then, I decided to have the image for my tattoos.

Shoko is fashion conscious and wears many earrings, rings, and bracelets. In reference to her other tattoos, she used the Japanese term, *aato meiku*, which means “artistic make-up.” She said that *aato meiku* or cosmetic tattoos are used on the eyebrows, eye lines, or lips and that it was popular among women at her workplace in Japan. Shoko had *aato meiku* because she was not satisfied with her own eyebrows; she wanted to look prettier. Shoko also said that getting *aato meiku* was more painful than for her other tattoos. The tattoos on the eyebrows were done by hand, not by machine: “When the tattooers puncture the skin on the eyebrows, they tattoo with the needles by hand as many times as the number of pores.” Shoko continued, “Women are likely to care about the eyebrows when they make up. To draw eyebrows are important for women who don’t have rich eyebrows.”

Creativity

Risako is a twenty-one-year-old female college student in Victoria, majoring in art. She spent most of her high school years in England and then moved to Canada. Risako had been in Canada for five years. Besides her three tattoos, which were done in Canada, she got her ears and tongue pierced. Risako described how she first met tattooed people and revealed her bias about being tattooed:

I saw a tattoo for the first time when I was in England. All members of my host family were tattooed. I had negative images about tattooing before I had met the host family. I had thought tattooed people were scary and that only the *yakuzas* had tattoos. But, I found the host family nice even though they had tattoos. I shouldn’t think that they were bad people, judging from their tattoos. I saw many people who were engaged in the church in England. They were serious Christians, and working with charity activities. They were very kind and compassionate. My bias toward tattooed people that I had had gone. This was the first time that I met tattooed people, but I didn’t think I would be tattooed at that time.

Risako’s experiences in England and later in Canada had a great impact on her attitude toward tattoos, and prompted her to get tattooed: “Some of my

teachers and friends in Canadian high school had tattoos. Two out of three acquaintances were tattooed. When I went to the concert, for instance, I saw many young people with tattoo. It became a natural scene to me.”

Her first tattoo, which she received at the age of seventeen, is on her right upper forearm. It is an abstract image that she designed and looks like a cross:

I don't like a certain image that everyone can easily tell what it is. The first design was similar to a cross. One of my friends has asked me, “Is this image from England?” This image probably came from my experience in England. I am not a Christian, but I still remember all the hymns and phrases in the Bible that I learned. Because the people I met my first time in England happened to be Christians, I was influenced by them.

At nineteen, she had a second tattoo done on her stomach. The second tattoo is a Sanskrit letter, a symbol of the god of snakes, which came from an amulet her grandmother had given her. When she saw the god of snakes on the amulet, she wanted to have it for her tattoo: “I was born in the year of the snake. I thought, ‘This is my god! It might protect me.’” She wanted to place it on the center of her body because she respects the sacredness it represents, the spiritual connection, and life-affirming support. No one can see the tattoo on her stomach:

It makes my tattoo more mysterious, and I feel it actually protects me. I wondered whether I should choose the back or front. It didn't look cool if I had it on the back. So I chose the front. I wanted this god on the center of my body.

Risako never showed her god of snakes tattoo to me, although she openly showed the rest of her tattoos. She said she does not want to display the god of snakes tattoo because of its sacredness. Risako feels she is protected by the sacredness of the amulet but also connected to her grandmother, family, and ancestors.

The last one, on her back, was also designed by her. It is an abstract design but looks like a pair of seahorses. “When I tried to design my third tattoo, I came up with something symmetrical. I did not intend to draw a pair of seahorses, but yeah, it looks like it.” She wanted to get this tattoo to celebrate her twenty-first birthday.

Attachment to Others

While tattoos express uniqueness and independence, they also represent a sign of attachment or connection to other people. Hiro is a twenty-three-year-old male student who learned English as a second language. He has a red and black tattoo of the sun in Haida style (native Canadian art) on his right calf. Hiro had his tattoo for only a few months before the interview. He chose the design of the sun in the Haida style and had it tattooed on his right calf because:

The sun is the source of the universe and symbolizes the center of power. I am also playing an important role as a leader among our cohort. So I wanted to get this design as a symbol of myself.

He found several different images of the sun while searching for his favorite tattoo design, but did not like most of them. That was the work of native Canadian art. "This design that I chose is not too showy, but not too simple. It just fits me."

Hiro also has some Japanese friends with tattoos. Although he enjoyed seeing other people's tattoos while he was in Japan, he had never considered that he would actually be tattooed. "I wouldn't have been interested in having a tattoo if I had been only in Japan, because I rarely saw people with tattoos in daily life," Hiro said.

When Hiro was a child, his parents were divorced, and he was forced to live away from his mother. His father had to work hard to support the family, and Hiro normally stayed with his grandparents. He missed his mother very much. Because of his cheerful nature, however, Hiro has many friends and is always the center of attention among them. "I'm not a religious person, but I think that God didn't give me a happy family, but my positive character instead." His tattoo is a symbol for himself. He also mentioned that his tattoo was for others. Hiro's tattoo is proof to himself that he overcame his loneliness in the past, and is a magnet that attracts other people.

Affirming Sexuality

Toshi, twenty-two-years old, is a male college student in Victoria and has been in Canada for over five years. Toshi has two tattoos, but has been tattooed three times, all in Canada. His first tattoo was a devil because it came from his nickname, "Devil." He did not like the image, so he covered it up with a chrysanthemum. "I liked my nickname when I got my

first tattoo, but didn't care for it later." As for the design of the chrysanthemum, he said, "It is a symbol of Japan."

The other tattoo is tribal, which is composed of thick lines. Toshi did not speak of a particular reason for getting the tribal tattoo. He just liked it. When he chose this design, he thought it looked cool: "Whenever I felt I wanted a tattoo, I got one." But he is not perfectly satisfied with his tribal tattoo anymore. Now he is more interested in Japanese art and design, and has found that he wants tattoos related to Japanese tradition and culture. Toshi revealed his next project: "I want to have one more tattoo next to the chrysanthemum. I am thinking of getting our family crest for a new one. It will be the last one."

Toshi discovered he was homosexual when he was about twelve years old. He was shocked and struggled with his sexuality while he lived in Japan. He wanted to drop out of the high school, but his parents forced him to continue. He stayed until he was eighteen, but then ran away. Because he did not have any money, Toshi became a male prostitute for several weeks. "It was fun to meet other gay people. Looking back now, however, I think I did some stupid things." He went home after several weeks of prostitution. Toshi and his parents discussed his situation at great length. His parents suggested that Toshi study abroad and he agreed with them. It was after Toshi came to Canada that he saw tattoos on many people. He has been attracted to tattoos since this introduction.

Body Locations and Designs of Tattoos

In all interviews, the participants carefully considered getting a tattoo, and it was a serious decision for them. They were particularly concerned about how tattooed people are treated in Japan. Even though they all openly show their tattoos in Canada, they reported that they would hide the tattoos when they go back to Japan. Sachi even considered the possibility of going back to school in Japan before she decided to have a tattoo. Choosing body locations and designs for tattoos is a significant decision and perhaps depends on where these tattooees' personal interactions take place.

The choice of body locations appears to correspond to the reasons the participants have given for their tattoos. Risako has a tattoo on the upper arm. She chose the location because of the tattoo design she created: "I thought that the shape of my tattoo design would fit on the arm." She first elaborates her ideas to design tattoos and then thinks about where on the body to place it. In Shoko's case, inferior feelings about her body were a

major reason: “I had a little bit of inferiority with regard to my breasts. By getting tattooed, I can cover the inferiority that I have.” Her butterfly tattoo on the right breast is small enough to be covered by a bra, and it is a way of overcoming her sense of inferiority, but allows her to maintain her beauty consciousness. As for the tattoo on her earlobe, Shoko thought the location was unique:

I started with getting ears pierced. I’ve worn a couple of earrings. I am too lazy to change them every day. I was also thinking how I could be outstanding by getting tattoos. I like to be outstanding. I wanted to be tattooed on a unique location that people rarely chose. That’s on the ear! It’s hardly seen on the ear, right? Nobody’s been tattooed on the earlobe except for me.

While female informants tend to be tattooed for cosmetic reasons, Hiro considers his tattoo as a public symbol. Hiro decided to be tattooed on his calf because he wants attention when he is in public. “I usually wear short pants, and people can see my tattoo. I thought I could get more attention from others. I like to be the center of attention.” He wishes to receive interactions with others because of the tattoo. Unlike Hiro’s intention, Toshi does not want to show off his tattoos in public. His tattoos are strictly private. Toshi chose to have tattoos on his back and ankle. He indicated that he consciously thought about the easiest parts of the body to hide his tattoos. He thought it was common to be tattooed on the back and that it looked cool. Besides, nobody can see tattoos on the back under his clothes.

The designs that all the interviewees chose are Western in style. Even though they appreciate the traditional Japanese style of tattooing, all the interviewees hesitate to have it. Hiro said, “Of course, I think Japanese tattoos are great, but they don’t fit my character. So, the Japanese design is not my style, but this Haida tattoo that I chose perfectly fits me.”

Risako wanted abstract designs, which are only black. She did not like colorful tattoos, because she was afraid that the colors of tattoos would fade and change, depending on her skin color and condition. The colorful tattoos also reminded her of the *yakuza* style. Shoko also saw the Japanese traditional style of tattooing as *yakuza* culture. In contrast, Toshi expressed his interest in Japanese tattoos although he hesitates to have one. “It would be more expensive to get it.” Although he likes Japanese style, realistically, he does not think that he will have it done.

The number of tattoos also reflects the reasons the participants have for their tattoos. Sachi and Hiro said, "One is enough for me." Risako said, "I haven't found which location on my body, nor do I have any reason to get a new one." Shoko stated that she would do something else, instead of having tattoos. Toshi wanted to get one more tattoo and insisted it would be the last one.

Public Reactions

All the interviewees experienced different public reactions in Japan and Canada. Although they define their tattoos as important marks of uniqueness, independence, and self-alteration, they anticipate that they would either hide their tattoos from the public or would pretend that these were temporary tattoos when they go back to Japan. The act of being tattooed is associated with tattooees' social event experiences as well as personal identities.²¹ Body locations and designs may reveal the tattooees' social locations (i.e., forms of communication and distance). Sachi explained that a tattoo on the ankle looked sexy, but also that it was easy to hide by wearing pants and socks.

I would not hesitate to go to a public pool in Japan. Many people with temporary tattoos (stickers) are seen there lately. My tattoo might be acceptable, but I wouldn't go to the pool where my mother used to go. She wouldn't want me to go there with her because of my tattoo.

Hiro also anticipates that he would hide his tattoo in Japan, depending on the workplace or other situations, although he seeks attention from many people in Canada:

Thinking about Japanese society, it would be easier to hide the tattoo on the calf than on the arm. A tattoo on the arm could be more easily seen by others. They can still see the tattoo through shirts. A tattoo on the calf, however, will be hardly seen if I wear trousers.

Many Japanese that Hiro has encountered had negative images about being tattooed. He talked about one of his tattooed friends living in Japan. The

²¹ Sanders, "Tattoo You."

friend has a tattoo on his shoulder. Though his tattoo was only outlined, he was not allowed to enter a public bath. Hiro also thinks the tattoo on his calf could be an obstacle when he seeks a job in Japan: "Suppose I go back to Japan, I will have to wear trousers at my workplace." In Canada, on the other hand, tattoos seem to be more acceptable than in Japan:

In Canada, even some policemen have tattoos. What they are doing is a good thing, for example, to keep cities safe. I think having a tattoo doesn't matter as far as they are normally working....We can freely go and enter tattoo studios in Canada as if we were shopping at a convenience store. Everybody said to me, "Great!" I was so happy to hear it. In Japan, however, people think they have to visit tattoo studios secretly.

Shoko was not allowed to donate blood because of the tattoo on her earlobe. They suspected people with tattoos might be possibly infected with HIV virus. She has also seen the sign, "*Irezumi okotowari* [No tattoos allowed]," in the fitness clubs. Meanwhile, the shift of images and feelings toward tattooing among Japanese people is found. Because of the popularity of temporary tattoos, many people cannot tell whether her tattoos are real or temporary. When Shoko was asked whether her tattoos were real or not, she replied, "Oh, this is temporary." No one was suspicious about what she said.

Tattooing and Filial Piety

The Japanese believe that hurting one's body goes against the cultural code of filial piety: "Don't intentionally hurt the body which has been given to you." Three of the participants knew of this lesson but claimed that being tattooed did not mean hurting the body. Nevertheless, even though they insisted that having a tattoo did not break cultural codes, they did consider what their parents would think about the tattoos. Sachi, the first-year biology major, said, "My mother cried on the phone when I told her that I got tattooed." Risako, the art major college student, had not told her parents yet. She was waiting for a good time to talk about her tattoos with them.

Well, I haven't told my parents yet, but am sure I will after I become independent. Now I am financially depending on my parents. Thanks to them, I can study in Canada. If I get a job, I will

tell them. But my parents already know I got the tattoo on the stomach. When I told them about this tattoo, they said, “We are relieved to hear the location. Nobody can see it.” I thought their comments were strange. Why is the tattoo on the stomach okay for them? It didn’t make any sense to me. But I couldn’t complain to my parents at that time, because they are my parents who raised me. I have *on*, or a debt of gratitude. For now, I am keeping my tattoos a secret, but will tell them when I become independent.

Shoko explained how her family and others saw her tattoos: “My mother was sort of disappointed with what I did. Although my family didn’t really blame me, I was scolded by other people.” Shoko also asserted that being tattooed did not go against filial piety. She showed me a burn scar on the back of her hand:

People often say, “Don’t hurt the given body on purpose.” But in my case, my parent was the first one that hurt my body. If parents hit their child, it means hurting the child, right? Although they are likely to verbally say, “Don’t hurt your body,” my parent was the first one that hurt my body.

There was an incident with her father. Shoko’s father placed a big moxa²² on her hand to chastise her when she was a little child:

My father used more moxa than usual on the back of my hand. I was a little child, and couldn’t stand it. My hand was shaking, and I wanted to drop it from my hand. When I dropped it, my father hit me and put the moxa on my hand again. I thought, “Is this man really my father? I am your daughter!”

Shoko’s childhood dream was to become an actress, but she gave it up because of the scar that her father left. “Somehow, I gave up protecting myself from ‘hurting my body.’ The scar was a big deal, compared with tattoos.” She continues:

²² Moxibustion is produced by placing on the skin and igniting a cone of moxa, a tuft of soft combustible substance popularly used in the Orient.

I may not have cared about “hurting my body” since the incident. Although I don’t mean to hurt myself on purpose, I am not particularly careful about hurting my body. I would have never felt sorry for my parents even though I had hurt my body.

Tattoos as Self-Confidence and Empowerment of Life

In his interview, Risako commented about the connection between his tattoos and self-esteem:

I feel more confident. I have what I want to do in the future. I can clearly explain my opinions or ideas to people. Besides, I have strong reasons for my tattoos. Without strong reasons for my tattoos, I cannot explain them to Japanese people who would ask me why I have tattoos. I am fully confident that I can persuade those people, because I have my own reasons.

At the beginning of the interviews, all of the participants said that their tattoos were a part of their fashion statements. As the interviews proceeded, however, I found that their reasons for tattoos were not simply to satisfy their fashion consciousness. By being tattooed, the participants tried to express and manifest their sense of self. They indicated that they felt more confident than before, and their tattoos represented a strong self-esteem and empowerment in their lives. The marks inscribed on their skin, therefore, became symbols that encouraged self-confidence.

“My tattoo is already a part of my body,” Sachi said. “I don’t think it’s an accessory like rings or earrings. It’s not a fashion, either.” She does not treat her tattoo as anything special. It is a part of her life: “Of course, I have taken care of it, but didn’t mean to have a particular wish or dream on my tattoo.” Shoko focused on the pursuit of beauty and said that her tattoos served a function, just like other parts of her body such as eyes, mouth, or nose. Moreover, the tattoos are a way of expressing herself: “I want to have my own style, which no one else has.”

Meanings of Tattoos in the Context of Identity-Construction

The tattoos of these Japanese interviewees express multi-faceted meanings that combine their Japanese and Canadian environments. They reflect historical, social, and culture-ideological manifestations. The interviews show that their tattoos are not only a form of art or fashion, but also an urge for self-definition. In each instance, their tattoo experiences are

part of the process of identity-construction. For these Japanese tattooees, their tattoos are significant signs to convey their messages to others and to society.

Their tattoos reflect the presence of Western cultural consciousness. The acceptance of being tattooed may liberate the Japanese international students, but also creates new conflicts and tensions. The Western value of individuality is strongly expressed: self-esteem, respect, and independence. The Japanese tattooees also reveal their resistance, vacillating between Japan's traditional views and new values of the West. Their vacillation refers to conflicts and contradictions that result from cultural resistance and acceptance. This is an important indicator to tease out the complexity hidden in a form of self-expression and to explain the tension created by the process of globalization.

The study suggests that the Japanese students value their experiences of being tattooed, in addition to their experiences of being abroad. Being tattooed makes sense to the Japanese tattooees as a means to articulate the clusters of their experiences and social practices. "In order to communicate disorder, the appropriate language must first be selected, even if it is to be subverted."²³ Tattoos are their language, symbols, and signs of self-expression and self-determination, expressing a hybrid sense of the self, combining their home cultural identities and their Western cultural experiences. Each participant interprets social currents, experiences conflicts and contradictions, and creates his/her own understanding about the culture and society where he/she is living. While their tattoos might symbolize rebellion or resistance against authority or the norms of society, their tattoos also express an understanding, respect for, and acceptance of their home culture.

Symbolic self-expression of immigrant students is a complex phenomenon emerging at the intersection of cultural meanings. Self-expression among international and immigrant students may be misleading. Such symbols may signify deeper cultural meanings and reflect clashes of conflicting meanings. In terms of cross-cultural issues, researchers should be able to examine this complexity of self-expression among international students even if it takes on deceptively familiar cultural forms. This study contributes to exploring a new sense of cultural hybridism among international students from where they are actually located in the course of everyday interaction.

²³ Hebdige, *Subculture*, p. 88.

CURIOSITIES OF THE FIVE NATIONS: NANSŌAN SHŌHAKU'S YOKOHAMA TALES

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Because Japan's initial contacts with foreigners in the *bakumatsu* and Meiji periods were crucial in shaping the country's future course, scholars of Japan have produced considerable scholarship on the subject of nineteenth-century international relations. One focus of this literature has been the ports established by Western powers via the "unequal treaties" of the mid-century; the first of these, Yokohama, opened in the summer of 1859 [Ansei 安政 6]. Within a few short years, the port was home to hundreds of foreign residents hailing from China, France, Great Britain, Holland, the United States, and the West Indies, among other locations. Like many treaty ports throughout Asia, Yokohama quickly became a magnet for Japanese thirsting for foreign knowledge, or else seeking a glimpse of the exotic; as resident Francis Hall recorded in the February 10, 1862 entry to his journal, "our streets are daily thronged with [Japanese] travelers. Curiosity to see how we *tōjins* live has brought them in such numbers to Yokohama."¹

Given the trail of letters, diaries, newspapers, and business records left behind by men such as Francis Hall, historians have an excellent understanding of how foreigners experienced Yokohama – but it remains difficult to arrive at a comparable understanding of how Japanese sightseers understood this unusual locality so close to the shogun's great city of Edo. While woodblock prints from the era which took Yokohama as their subject (categorized *ex post facto* as Yokohama-e, or "Yokohama pictures") provide one valuable avenue for exploration into this area, the fact remains that Yokohama-e as often as not portrayed fanciful themes unbound by the constraints of actual observation and experience.²

¹ F. G. Notehelfer, *Japan Through American Eyes: The Journal of Francis Hall of Kanagawa and Yokohama, 1859-1866* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 398. The term *tōjin* 唐人 literally means "Chinese," but was also used to mean foreigners in general.

² Readers interested in Yokohama-e may turn to Anne Yonemura, *Yokohama: Prints from Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Washington, D.C.

Fortunately, there exist native materials about Yokohama beyond the woodblock print. Though rarely studied in Western language scholarship, there were a small number of travel accounts and “tourist guides” of Yokohama published in the 1860s. In the course of this short essay we will explore one such account, a travel guide to Yokohama written by Nansōan Shōhaku 南草庵松伯 entitled *Chinji gokakkoku Yokohama hanashi* 珍事五ヶ國横濱はなし, or *Curiosities of the Five Nations: Yokohama Tales*.³ As we shall see in the pages that follow, Nansōan’s *Yokohama Tales* is a remarkable document in the fact that it is relentlessly and unapologetically xenophobic. As such, it provides a unique window into the anti-foreign rhetoric that swirled around the issue of Japanese foreign policy in the mid-nineteenth century, and demonstrates that not all Japanese visiting Yokohama were necessarily impressed with their new guests from beyond the seas.

Written in 1862 (Bunkyū 文久 2), Nansōan’s work appeared at the height of public interest in Yokohama, but the author informs us in the preface that he wrote *Yokohama Tales* specifically for those who were unable to make the journey:

I have composed this humble pamphlet entitled *Curiosities of the Five Nations: Yokohama Tales* as a souvenir for women and children of distant provinces; therefore I have used simple children’s words while settling down my account of the actual things I have witnessed. In order to cater to the well-to-do, I have made it a rather large volume; and it is with this balance in mind that I wrote.⁴

Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990), or Todd S. Munson, “A Tempestuous Tea-port: Socio-political Commentary in Yokohama-e, 1859-1862,” *East Asian History* 24 (2002): 67-92.

³ “Five nations” refers to those countries with which Japan had entered formal commercial relations: France, Great Britain, Holland, Russia, and the United States.

⁴ Nansōan Shōhaku, *Chinji gokakkoku Yokohama hanashi* (Yokohama: Kineya Yonehachi 杵屋米八, Bunkyū 文久 2 [1862]); reprinted in *Mikan Yokohama kaikō shiryō* 未刊横浜開港資料, ed. Kanagawa-ken toshokan kyōkai 神奈川県図書館協会 and Kyōdo shiryō shūsei hensan iinkai 郷土資料集成編纂委員会 (Kanagawa: Kanagawa-ken Toshokan Kyōkai,

Yokohama Tales is indeed a “large volume,” running forty-two *chō* 丁 in the original edition and nearly forty pages in the modern reprinted version.

Perhaps to sate those “women and children” looking for specifics on the settlement, a great deal of the text is given over to simple recitation of place-names, shops, and religious institutions that crowded Yokohama’s streets. We learn the names and addresses of shrines, temples, soba restaurants, dye-shops, book sellers, snack houses, import shops, bathhouses, barber shops, wooden sandal shops, ironworkers, rice-cracker manufacturers, tea sellers, medicine shops, butchers, guard houses, official’s residences, churches, silk dealers, sumo wrestlers, fried eel restaurants, exotic animal dealers, couriers, and so forth, in addition to detailed information about the flora and fauna indigenous to the area. As such, the text is an invaluable repository of information otherwise lost to the historical record.

Of greater interest than such lists are longer passages which seek to analyze and interpret Yokohama and its foreign residents, because it is here that the author’s anti-foreign perspective comes into focus. Through such passages we find that Yokohama is notable not *for* its foreign presence, but rather, *despite* it. In the first half of the text, Nansōan argues that Yokohama is indeed remarkable, but as a distinctly Japanese locale, rather than a half-foreign hybrid like the treaty ports of Shanghai or Canton; in the especially vitriolic second half, he denigrates foreign technology, culture, and religion as lagging far behind that of his native Japan. Though certainly not alone in his feelings of xenophobia or nationalist fervor, Nansōan nonetheless expressed his views in the context of Japan’s first “treaty port,” and as such his work is worthy of serious consideration.

Bustle and Prosperity on Yokohama’s Streets

Before embarking on his critique of foreign residents of Yokohama, Nansōan paints a picture of the area’s natural beauty – though even this description hints at his particular point of view. Yokohama’s foremost quality, the author tells us, is the sheer visual spectacle it presents to the visitor: “for generations, prosperous places, famous sights, and historic spots have existed, and many of these have been praised by the various famous masters of poetic verse; however, not one of them can

1960), pp. 266-305. This quote is located in *Ibid.*, p. 267; subsequent references will also refer to this reprinted edition.

compare to present-day Yokohama.”⁵ Yokohama’s incomparability, we learn, stems from its unique combination of financial prosperity and aesthetic beauty. Nansōan was surely neither the first nor the only person to comment on Yokohama’s remarkable affluence, but his vivid depiction of the area’s “financial scenery” is wonderfully detailed and well worth presenting *in extenso*:

[On Benten Dōri] there is a large shop selling rarities of foreign and domestic origin, various things that shock the eyes. In front there is a large foreign [style] residence. Here too there is a wide path; day and night, an unusual number of peepshows, mechanical contraptions, magic tricks, street comics all ply their trades. This area is called Imon-zaka, and it is a steeply ascending slope. There is an herbal drugstore, a wooden sandal shop called Kuzumi, a medicine shop called Kame no yu, an eel shop called Owari, a restaurant called Atsukawa and another called Yanagawa. There is an iron seller called Nakaya and a iron wholesaler called Itsumiya. Also there is spectacular bird shop with foreign birds and animal shows, and in addition there are all manner of other large shops, selling foreign, Japanese, and Chinese goods: gold, silver, ruby agate, coral, and wood inlay. No trouble is spared, and these shops are believed to be superior to any shop in Kyoto or Edo, to say nothing of those of foreign lands. Truly they are beautiful and spacious merchant [houses].⁶

It is significant to note there that whereas artists of Yokohama-e, for example, were quick to draw comparisons between the port of Yokohama and European cities such as London and Paris, Nansōan’s points of reference are Kyoto and Edo.

In addition to its commercial bustle, Yokohama boasts of a natural and scenic beauty. Though the port was founded as a place for foreigners to live and do business, much of Nansōan’s description is given over to elements of the landscape where no foreign imprint is to be found, as this representative passage indicates:

⁵ Ibid., p. 267.

⁶ Ibid., p. 281.

On one side of the New Yokohama Road there is the ocean; on the other, the Kabeya and Shōya reclaimed rice fields. In this area there are pine groves and a salt-beach. The smoke of the salt shops thinly weaves into the blowing small pines – this is a place that would move the hearts of poets. In the distance one can see from Suruga and Mt. Fuji, from Ōyama and the mountains of Chichibu to Hakone and Atami. Of such scenery my poor pen cannot express.⁷

And while some descriptive passages do demonstrate an appreciation of beauty that recognizes Yokohama's hybrid structure, the foreign elements are inevitably absorbed into the native landscape, rather than dominating it:

First of all, there is a ferry from Miya no Kaigan in Kanagawa to Yokohama-machi 1-chōme. The distance is one *ri*, more or less, and costs fifty copper coins. The ferry is an usually good bargain, and is the preferable method to make the journey. Around the shore are several marvelous locations; as for the sweeping scenery that greets one upon disembarkation, my unskillful pen cannot describe the scene. Facing me was the Dutch Consulate, its red, white, and blue flag waving. Next I saw the barracks of the Kanagawa security officers. Within, among the pines of Benten, lay the residences of the high officials. In front is the eastern wharf and the inspection station; in back is the famous merchant house of Kesekki, located at English No. 1. Each country's foreign residence flies national flags, which wave high in the wind. From the original village are visible the flowers of the Juniten shrine; beyond, the greenery of Awa, Shimōsa and Kazusa are faintly visible.⁸

⁷ Ibid., p. 270.

⁸ Ibid., p. 267. One *ri* 里 was roughly equivalent to 3.9 kilometers. By “coppers” (J. *tō* 銅) is meant the small copper coin known to the foreigners as the “tempo.” “Kesekki” refers to William Keswick, who established the Yokohama branch of the Hong Kong trading firm Jardine Matheson Holdings Ltd. in 1859.

A similar view from the Bluff (a steep bank to the immediate West of the settlement) further demonstrates that Nansōan did not define Yokohama's scenery as Japanese versus "barbarian," but rather saw the area as composed of different elements that worked together to produce a multinational montage:

The scenery visible from here is as follows: one looks down on all the foreign residences; from there, the Customs House and officials' residences, then to Hon-chō, Benten dōri, Ōta-chō, all as though they could fit in the palm of one's hand. Ahead, one can see everything from the residences of the officials in Tobe, and the rooms of the inns at the Kanagawa post station, to the girls in the rooms of the Daimachi tea house. On the left, one follows the three Buddhist laws of Sōtokuin; on the right, one thinks that they are gallivanting in the splendid houses of Miyozaki (the licensed prostitution district). At sea, ships of the five nations enter [the harbor]. As everything within two *ri* in all directions is in one's purview, this is surely the number one scenic spot in the area.⁹

Without overstating the point, we should note that the Nansōan's Yokohama – despite the presence of foreigners – is first and foremost a native locality, like Edo, rather than a place dominated wholly by the non-Japanese element. Moreover, it is a pleasant and attractive place, in large part due to the distinctively Japanese natural scenery.

Finally, the author lavishes praise upon an area that combines Yokohama's best features of beauty and prosperity: the licensed district of Miyozaki, which was located in the rear of the settlement. "In the evenings," Nansōan tells us:

Lamps are lit at every house, so that it is as bright as midday. Among the establishments, the tallest to be seen is the Gankirō; it is composed of two houses, one for foreigners and one for Japanese. Both are very spacious, and there are many young

⁹ Ibid., pp. 284-285. Miyozaki, of course, was the licensed prostitution district, while Sōtokuin was a Buddhist temple located on the Bluff. The "three laws" are those of Buddhism: *anicca* (impermanence), *dukkha* (unsatisfactoriness) and *anatta* (no soul).

women and servants in attendance. At right I have listed those highest-ranking courtesans (J. *oshoku jorō* お職女郎).¹⁰

Following a list of brothels and their highest-ranking employees, Nansōan continues: “Upon entering the great gate there is the town (of Miyozaki). There are flowers blooming throughout the four seasons. In the spring, cherry blossoms and roses bloom in a riot of color; in the summer, flowering calamus; in the fall, chrysanthemum, bush clover, and bellflower; and in the winter many varieties of narcissus are in bloom.”¹¹



From *Chinji gokakkoku Yokohama hanashi*.¹²

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 271. It may also be of interest to readers to note that male prostitutes were included in this section (though in a separate list). If trucking with courtesans was a taboo subject for Victorian-era Europeans and Americans, homosexual relations would have been doubly so; needless to say, there are no accounts, images, or records of any such relationships to be found in any existing historical record.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 277.

¹² Ibid., p. 266.

The author's Miyozaki is indeed a colorful and prosperous place, and the subject of sexual relations with foreigners is also depicted in detail:

At right [is a listing of] several courtesans, but the mistresses (J. *rashamen* ラシャメン) of the foreigners are listed separately. When foreigners so choose, [a woman] is sent to their place of residence for three pieces of silver a night. This includes everything, down to the palanquin fare to and from the Gankirō. Also there are concubines (J. *mekake* 妾) who live in foreign residences, and also those women who are kept in town.¹³

In the pages immediately following, Nansōan lists all the foreign residents of Yokohama and the Japanese persons in their employ – including live-in mistresses. Dutch Vice-Consul D. De Graeff van Palsbroek, for example, lived with a woman named Chō, and a significant percentage of the merchant houses also listed young women among their native employment rolls. No doubt these foreigners would have been horrified to learn that their sexual habits had been recorded for posterity, but language barriers would have meant that few of these men would have been aware of the list's publication.

While some of the customers may have been foreign, the author's description of the area shows us this was a place readily understood on Japanese terms – like licensed districts in Edo and elsewhere, Yokohama's Miyozaki was a feast for the eye and the flesh. It was an attraction not because it catered to non-Japanese, but because it was the most lavish licensed district in all of Japan. Built in part for foreigners, but constructed according to native tastes, Nansōan's Miyozaki was a synecdoche for Yokohama's own international foundation and financial prosperity.

Foreign Devils

While Nansōan's nativist reading of Yokohama's scenery might hint at his opinion of foreigners, the modern reader may still be taken aback by the xenophobic invective that predominates in the later pages of *Yokohama Tales*. Foreign officials bear the initial brunt of his attacks:

¹³ Ibid., pp. 279-280.

The American consulate is located at Honkakuji 本覚寺. Truly it is a venerable temple. Nonetheless, in Ansei 6 (1859), ogres (*onidomo* 鬼共) from the underworld forced their way in pushing their way into such temples, they removed the sacred images outside the gates, set up the Buddhist altar rooms as their bedrooms, and there they gather together [with] beautiful young women. Their lechery, day and night, is something I cannot begin to speak of.¹⁴

The lechery of foreign ministers, Nansōan adds, is not confined to their own residences, but extends into the Japanese quarter: “Foreign officials called ‘ministers’ are comparable to our elders (老中 *rōjū*), but these men peep into the women’s baths, or else go into the baths to have a look. On these occasions they are accompanied by a crowd of onlookers.”¹⁵ From the very top, it seems, the foreigners are led by lecherous subhumans bent on besmirching the Land of the Gods.

Japanese “Firsts”

Our author, it becomes very clear, has a very low opinion of foreigners, their culture and achievements, and the remainder of *Yokohama Tales* is given over to an extended critique of the various technological advances that foreigners have brought to Japan. Historical comparison is a conceit Nansōan employs to denigrate foreign customs and technology; the barbarians might have religion or fast ships, he suggests, but Japan had these things centuries earlier. Foreigners, the author informs us, have come to Japan seeking products like fabric and tea, products with such an extended lineage in Japan that they are at once superior in quality and quotidian in usage – for foreigners to have crossed the sea for such items did not indicate their superiority, but precisely the opposite. By selectively calling on the traditional historical record, Nansōan was able to neatly invert the argument for native inferiority in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The author’s first comparison comes with regard to foreign hairstyle: foreigners “do not tie up their hair. They do not use combs or hairpins, but rather stick bird feathers or flowers in their

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 288. The reference is to E.M. Dorr, who opened the American Consulate at Honkakuji Temple near Yokohama in 1859.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 288.

headgear.” The significance? “In our Imperial Land, hair has been tied up since the tenth year of the fortieth Heavenly Sovereign Temmu Tennō. Until that time hair was worn in the style of the foreigner. It has been 1140 years since that time.”¹⁶ In other words, the foreigner persists in habits that the Japanese themselves rejected over a millennium ago.

Christianity and Buddhism

This brief criticism may not carry much impact, but Nansōan carries the argument further in his discussion of foreign religion. One structure that caught the author’s eye was the French Catholic church located at No. 80 in the foreign settlement, the first Catholic church in Japan at the time of its opening in 1862:

Up ahead from this location are foreign residences exclusively. Amidst them an oval *koban*-shaped temple has been built by the French, called the Tenshudō 天主堂. On the roof’s central pillar stands a column in the shape of the number ten 十. It is modeled after a crucifix. A venerable image of a holy man, made of exotic metals, hangs upon the crucifix. There are several stories [about him], but I will not describe what I have not seen; they say that plaques of his life from birth to death are hung within.¹⁷

Following his description of the Tenshudō’s religious iconography is a corresponding account of the introduction to Buddhist images to Japan:

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 269. Temmu Tennō 天武天皇 was the fortieth emperor according to traditional count who reigned from 672 to 686. For an English translation of the traditional historical account of this event, see *Nihongi: Chronicles of Japan from the Earliest Times to A.D. 697*, W.G. Aston, trans., vol. 2 (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1972), p. 355: “(11th year, 4th month), 23rd day. The Emperor made a decree, saying: ‘Henceforth all persons whatsoever, men or women, must tie up their hair. This is to be completed not later than the 30th day of the 12th month.’”

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 284. *Koban* 小判 was an oval-shaped coin in circulation during the Tokugawa period. Prudence Seraphin Barthelemy Girard (1821-1867) was a French missionary who came to Japan in 1859 as Japanese interpreter for French legation. Girard orchestrated the construction of the French Catholic church at No. 80 in the foreign settlement.

Now then, as for the origins of Buddhist teaching in our Imperial Land: beginning in the 13th year of the 30th Heavenly Sovereign Kimmei Tennō, Buddhist images and sutras were presented by the country of Paekche (in Korea). The Sovereign and his lords examined them, but put no faith in such things out of respect for the majesty of the native deities. Only Soga no Ōmi Iname swore allegiance to them; accordingly the Sovereign gave the objects to Iname. Greatly pleased, Iname worshipped the Buddha image day and night. This was the beginning of Buddhist images in Japan. It has been 1287 years since that time.¹⁸

Note that in the author's view, indigenous religious belief (viz., Shintō 神道) apparently does not count as "religion;" for purposes of comparison, Christianity and its attendant image worship match up with the veneration of the Buddhist images introduced from Korea. In this regard, religious image worship has a 1287-year "head start" in Japan, and is presumably superior on that basis. Temples enjoy a similar lineage, the author notes; again following the traditional account, Nansōan informs us that Iname's residence – home to the Korean Buddhist images – was the first temple established in Japan, 1286 years prior to the establishment of the Tenshūdo.¹⁹ Note that in Nansōan's view there is nothing evil about

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 284. See also *Nihongi*, vol. 2, pp. 64-65. Kimmei Tennō 欽明天皇 was the twenty-ninth (not thirtieth) emperor according to traditional count who reigned from 531 (or 539) until 571. According to traditional historical records, it was during Kimmei's reign that Buddhism was introduced from Korea, precipitating a conflict between the pro-Buddhist Soga family and the anti-Buddhist Mononobe family. Paekche 百濟 (J. Kudara) was one of three kingdoms in early Korean history. King Sòng (523-584) of Paekche is said to have sent the delegation that introduced Buddhism to Japan. Soga no Ōmi Iname 蘇我の大臣稻目 was the father-in-law of Kimmei and chief minister (*ōmi*) to the Imperial court. According to the *Nihongi* account, Iname was the sole member of the court to profess allegiance to Buddhism, and the images were given to him and enshrined in his home.

¹⁹ Ibid.; see *Nihongi*, vol. 2, pp. 66-67: "The Oho-omi (Iname) knelt down and received it with joy. He enthroned it in his house at Oharida, where he

Christianity per se; one might think that the centuries-old Tokugawa proscription against Christianity would inculcate fear and suspicion on the part of Japanese who were suddenly faced with a “Christian temple” (especially a Japanese who considered foreigners “devils” and “like monkeys”), but such expectations are not met here. Christian religion to Nansōan was just another foreign import inferior to the native brand, a late-comer to a country that needed nothing from the outside world.

Foreign technology and modern methods of transportation were more of the same. “In the harbor foreign and native ships intermingle; the sight of the great ships is surprising. Of late the French ogres (*Furansu no onidomo* 仏蘭西國の鬼ども) have built a ship of black steel, in length twelve *ken* 間 and with sails of two *ken*. It is built entirely of steel, without a single beam of wood, as a passenger steam ship. The hull is painted in red, white, and blue, and the ship is used to convey the mail. In speed it is faster than an arrow’s flight.”²⁰ An all-steel ship that floated, to say nothing of sailing at an arrow’s speed, was a supreme feat of technology – but Nansōan reminds us once again that the Japanese were there first. “As for the beginning of ships in our Imperial Land: shipbuilding began in the province of Izu during the fifth year of the sixteenth Heavenly Sovereign, Ōjin Tennō; in length approximately ten *sun*, the ships were built of camphor wood from Higanyama. This was 1610 years ago.”

Furthermore, we learn that with regard to horsemanship, the “ogres” may enjoy an advantage in technology – but not in skill or history:

Foreigners when riding horses put metal [on horse’s hooves] rather than straw sandals. They use reins of six to eight ropes. Foreigners have no riding skills, but just ride entirely roughshod. When they need to stop the horse they pull on the rope, raising the metal bit, and the horse stops. Also there are horse-carts, [upon which] two persons ride and a horse is hitched. The sound on the road is like thunder.”²¹

diligently carried out the rites of retirement from the world, and on that score purified his house at Muku-hara and made it a temple.”

²⁰ Ibid., p. 286. A *ken* was roughly 1.8 meters.

²¹ Ibid., p. 286.

Once again, the Japanese prove superior: “The origin of horses dates back to the fifteenth year of the sixteenth Heavenly Sovereign, Ōjin Tennō. It was at that time Adokiyo came from Paechke to raise [horses] at the slopes of Karu in the province of Yamato. It has been 1618 years since that time.”²²

Finally, there is the matter of trade. The products “of foremost significance in trade, from the earliest times to the present, are tea and raw silk,” the author informs us. “To what extent it will extend [in the future] is immeasurable and unknowable.” The increasingly familiar conceit of the ‘history lesson’ follows this pronouncement:

In our Imperial Land the origin of tea dates back to the eighty-second Heavenly Sovereign, Go-toba. In the ninth year of his reign, the Zen priest Eisai brought back three tea seeds from China. Fine cloth comes from the province of Go [in China], during the fourteenth year of the reign of the sixteenth Heavenly Sovereign, Ōjin Tennō. It has been 1571 years since that time.²³

This passage follows a pattern which should now be clear: foreigners have come seeking products from Japan; these products have a long history in Japan; the foreigners, therefore, seek items that are rare to them but ordinary in the eyes of native Japanese.

Nansōan’s “history lessons” have a deep significance for our understanding of nineteenth century Japanese relations with the outside

²² Ōjin Tennō 応神天皇 was the fifteenth emperor according to traditional count who reigned from the late fourth to early fifth century. His reign was notable for the significant influx of Chinese and Korean immigrants [J. *kikajin* 帰化人] who introduced new technology and information to Japan (among them the art of horse-breeding). See *Nihongi*, vol. 1, p. 261ff, for account described in this passage.

²³ Go-toba 後鳥羽 was the eighty-second emperor according to traditional count who reigned from 1183 until 1198. Eisai 栄西 was the founder of Rinzaï sect of Zen Buddhism in Japan who lived from 1141 until 1215. According to the accepted tradition, Eisai brought back tea seeds from his second trip to China and planted them in 1191. For a reference to “fine cloth” [*gofuku* 呉服], see *Nihongi*, vol. 1, pp. 261, 269-270.

world in general, and our understanding of Yokohama in particular. In nearly every instance, a Western custom, habit, or device is described for the reader who presumably has not been to Yokohama; in this sense such a catalogue of exotica is nothing out of the ordinary. Foreigners ride horses; they have ships; they trade for tea and silk; they profess faith in a religion and worship in a temple. And yet none of these are new to Japan; for thousands of years, the author reminds us time and again, Japanese have done the same. Denizens of the Imperial Land have ridden horses, have cultivated tea and silk, have venerated images of sacred figures, and built temples in their honor. Note, however, that all of these examples are the result of foreign intercourse – horses, shipbuilders, and religion from Korea; tea and silk from China. Thus Nansōan puts forward a version of Japanese history that freely acknowledges the advantages of trade and exchange with other countries; in the context of a tourist guide to Japan's foreign community, the condemnation of Westerners proves even more damning.

Thus *Yokohama Tales* draws to a close. In conclusion, what can we say about this fascinating text? Let us return to Nansōan's statement in his introduction that *Curiosities of the Five Nations: Yokohama Tales* was written for people unable to make the trip to Yokohama personally. What would such a person have learned from this guide? First, I believe, s/he would have understood that Yokohama was a repository of natural beauty, as well as a bustling center of commercial activity; in these respects, it was similar to Kyoto and Edo. Second, there is the unmistakable fact that Yokohama thrived not because of the presence of foreigners, but rather *despite* them. The foreigners, one would have discovered, were pitiable in their attempts to meet Japanese standards of religion, technology, and culture. In the final account, Nansōan's diatribes and disingenuous history lessons veer far from the reality of treaty port imperialism, but offer an intriguing counter-narrative of Japanese exceptionalism lacking in other sources from the period.

CHINA IN JAPANESE MANGA: A NOT SO FUNNY CONTROVERSY?

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Introduction

Manga Chūgoku nyūmon [Manga Introduction to China]¹ is a comic book drawn by George Akiyama and Bunyu Ko. It became a runaway bestseller in Japan in 2005, a time when government statistics indicated that more than seventy percent of Japanese people considered the Japan-China relationship as unfavorable. The percentage of Japanese who felt closeness to the Chinese dropped to 32.4 percent, which may reflect tensions in recent relations. For example, the Chinese government has angrily objected to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines many Japanese war criminals; and Chinese authorities allowed, if not encouraged, general anti-Japanese sentiment in China that led to demonstrations and violence against Japanese in China in the spring of 2005.²

The subtitle of *Manga Chūgoku nyūmon* – “Research on the Troublesome Neighbor” – reveals much about the comic book's orientation. The book has 317 pages, consisting of six chapters and sixty-three episodes. On the surface, it depicts China – its history, culture, society, and people – in a matter-of-fact fashion; but the graphic portrayal of the nation is rather unattractive and xenophobic. The Chinese people, especially members of the government, are depicted as cunning, manipulative, and abhorrent. Some of the pictures are rather grotesque and sexist as well. The images linger extensively on gross activities such as cannibalism, widespread prostitution, AIDS, environmental destruction (that affects other neighboring nations), and military aggressiveness; and the authors claim these represent China's “culture” and general lack of morality. This paper describes how China and its people are depicted in *Manga Chūgoku*

¹ George Akiyama and Ko Bunyu, *Manga Chūgoku nyūmon* [Manga Introduction to China] (Tokyo: Asuka Shinsha, 2005).

² “Chugoku, Kankoku heno Shinkinkan Kyukako: Naikakufu Yoron Chosa [The (Japanese) Sense of Intimacy with China and Korea Suddenly Drops: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Public Opinion Poll],” *Asahi Shinbun*, December 25, 2005.

nyūmon and discusses the social and intellectual implications of this manga in the new millennium.

The Background of the Authors of *Manga Chūgoku nyūmon*

George Akiyama was born in Tochigi prefecture in Japan in 1943. He debuted as a manga artist in 1966, and in 1970 he started *Zenigeba* and *Ashura*. He has attracted much attention thanks to his depiction of human nature in a stark-naked manner. In 1973 Akiyama started *Haguregumo*, and he is still drawing the long-lived manga. Hanazono University in Kyoto adopted *Haguregumo* as part of an entrance examination question in 1977. The manga also won the 24th Shogakukan Manga Award. Akiyama's manga have been quite popular, and they have often been made into TV dramas and movies.³

Bunyu Ko was born in Taiwan in 1938. He graduated from Waseda University in Tokyo and he also went to graduate school at Meiji University. He is a critic in such fields as East Asian politics, economy, history, and society. His books include *Minikui Chūgokujin* [The Ugly Chinese] (1994) and *Chūgokukoso Nihonni shazaisubeki kokonotsuno riyū* [Nine Reasons Why China Should Apologize to Japan] (2004).

***Manga Chūgoku nyūmon* – the Book**

Manga Chūgoku nyūmon belongs to a genre of manga called *kyōyō manga*, or “academic” or “educational” manga. *Kyōyō* literally means “culture,” “education,” and “refinement.” Many find the term *kyōyō manga* contradictory, because it is commonly assumed that manga is for entertainment and for children only, and that refined adults should not read such material. It was in the 1970s when this new category of manga emerged in Japan. The genre is also referred to as “information manga,” “expository manga,” or “textbook manga.” *Kyōyō manga* are comparable to the “Beginners” series published in the United States and include many witty and comical drawings as well as technical explanations.⁴ *Manga Chūgoku nyūmon* is entertaining, and it contains information and statistics on China that makes it read almost like a textbook. There are many pages where little or no manga art appears, replaced instead by photographs and

³ See <http://www.george-akiyama.com/profile.html> for George Akiyama's official website.

⁴ Kinko Ito, “The Manga Culture in Japan,” *Japan Studies Review* 4 (2000): 1-16.

straight text offered in the form of erudite verbal explanations by the characters in the story.

Jintaro Dokugusuri, whose surname literally means “poison medicine,” is the book’s protagonist. He is Japanese, tall, well-built, ugly, rough, clever, and outspoken. Dokugusuri is quite knowledgeable about Chinese culture, history, and politics; and he is a representative of an association called *Nicchū yūkō shinzen jingikai*, or the Japan-China Friendship, Goodwill, Humanity, and Justice Association. His business is located in the Kabuki-chō district of Tokyo where some Chinese mafias have recently advanced. These gangs are invading his territories and intimidating the Japanese businesses. Dokugusuri definitely feels a sense of urgent threat by the Chinese not only to his business and well-being, but also to Japan as a nation.

Throughout the book he meets and talks with various politicians who have different ideas about China, its military potential, and its aggressive foreign agenda. The politicians include Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, American President George W. Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and North Korean President Kim Jong Il, among other international leaders. Dokugusuri engages in debate with these politicians, and he often ends up lecturing them about the threat of China using facts, data, and statistics found in Chinese mass media and other sources. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi is often depicted as indifferent, powerless, or clueless in regard to the very urgent Chinese threat. Dokugusuri points out that the Japanese politicians try to ignore the nature of this “Chinese problem.” Many famous and powerful Chinese politicians who are the historical figures in international politics also appear in the episodes: Chairman Mao Zedong, Chiang Kai-Shek, Sun Yat-sen, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, etc. Dokugusuri introduces their strategies as politicians, their defeats, victories, social policies, how they affected the masses, and their significance in Chinese history.

Dokugusuri is perturbed by many aspects of Chinese history, society, culture, and people, and he is especially concerned with the military advancement and threats that China is already making in many areas of East Asia today. The book begins with an episode of the appearances of the Chinese vessels that performed research illegally in the territorial waters of Japan in July 2004. Dokugusuri’s diary also records that China carried out investigations in the same areas in February 2002 and October 2003. George W. Bush explains that China needs to conduct this

kind of investigation in order to prepare for the American military intervention, if China ever invaded Taiwan.

The first chapter covers many territorial issues surrounding China. The Chinese traditionally assume that all lands belong to China. The name of the country itself is rather ethnocentric. China is written with two Chinese characters that are “center” and “country,” meaning that it is a nation in “the center of the universe.” Bush explains that China needs to secure food and energy for the future and to prepare for its invasion of Taiwan. China also wants to challenge the American hegemony.

According to Dokugusuri, China has been trying to change history by redefining or “inventing” it, even as the Chinese continuously accuse Japan of causing all their problems. The episodes in the book portray the Chinese people as despising and looking down upon the Japanese. One even gets the impression that the Chinese hate the Japanese so much that they are ready to destroy the entire island nation. Dokugusuri ominously mentions a Chinese newspaper report, which notes that with the concentration of Japanese industries in urban areas, it would be possible for China to dispatch Japan entirely with the use of only twenty atomic bombs.⁵

Most of the book, then, is devoted to revealing disturbing recent trends and historical precedents that belie Chinese claims to moral superiority. Most salaciously, Dokugusuri begins with a notorious prostitution scandal involving Japanese tourists in September 2003. At the time, the Chinese press in Hong Kong reported that a large-scale orgy involving 380 Japanese tourists and more than 500 Chinese “hostesses” had occurred at a Canton hotel. Reportedly, organizers paid approximately ¥17,000 for each prostitute.⁶ Such seemingly outrageous behavior elicited an immediate angry protest from the Chinese government and general anti-Japanese sentiment grew until it even became a diplomatic problem.

In the manga, Dokugusuri helpfully explains that there was more to the story than the Chinese press kept under wraps. First of all, he notes, there was the nature of the location. Jukai is like the Kabuki-cho district of Tokyo, and it has been a place very well known for prostitution worldwide. In addition, Dokugusuri cites a World Health Organization estimate that there are six million Chinese prostitutes, as well as other nameless Chinese specialists who say that actual number of prostitutes exceeds fifteen

⁵ George Akiyama and Ko Bunyu, *Manga Chūgoku nyūmon*, p. 203.

⁶ Ibid., p. 44. With an exchange rate of about ¥117 per dollar, that would be just over \$145 each.

million.⁷ Furthermore, it is estimated that prostitution constitutes ten percent of the Chinese GDP. In light of the prevalent nature of seemingly acceptable prostitution in China, Dokugusuri goes on to argue that the real cause of the controversy was an effort to deflect attention away from and retaliate for recent reports in the Japanese media that Chinese criminals accounted for more than half of all crimes committed by foreigners in Japan.⁸ Meanwhile, there is the matter of possible Chinese complicity or even duplicity in the event. After all, Dokugusuri reminds readers, the effort to supply the hundreds of prostitutes in this successful “business transaction” reveals much planning and organization ahead of time on the Chinese part. In fact, it was so well-organized that Dokugusuri suggests in his conversation to the otherwise unknowing Prime Minister Koizumi that in all likelihood there was a concerted effort on the part of rival “service companies” – who had been left out of the action – to break the story to the media to embarrass those involved. The news report could have been a conspiracy after all.

It is hard to evaluate statistics on illegal activity in China, as elsewhere, and prostitution is illegal in China. In fact, the Communist Party in the 1950s took great pride in ridding the country of this social ill that was officially condemned as bourgeois and exploitative.⁹ But, in the reform era since 1979, open prostitution has indeed returned to China in dramatic fashion. From time to time the government will crack down on prostitution, arresting hundreds of thousands of prostitutes each year, but many escape the nets, and practitioners can still be found operating karaoke bars and dance clubs in every major city.¹⁰ The point of the manga portrayal, however, seems to be that the Chinese people, as a whole, are hypocrites for protesting angrily about the incident of 2003. After all, the manga implies, what harm did Japanese tourists do if prostitution is so openly practiced in

⁷ Ibid., p. 45.

⁸ Ibid., p. 46.

⁹ Recent studies have shown that forms of prostitution continued to exist in China during the height of the Maoist era, as some women traded sexual services for scarce resources. For example, see Gail Hershatter, *Dangerous Pleasures: Prostitution and Modernity in Twentieth-Century Shanghai* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 331-333.

¹⁰ For recent information on official policies, crackdowns, and public perceptions of prostitution in contemporary China see Elaine Jeffreys, *China, Sex and Prostitution* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).

China today? The subtext is that the Chinese themselves were complicit in the activities and, therefore, public outrage should be directed at the Chinese government that continues to be quite lax in eliminating what it claims is a major social problem.

Moving from recent sexual controversies, the manga's next two chapters depict a history of anti-Japanese sentiment in China; and in particular the authors single out Chinese coverage of the Nanjing Massacre in 1937 as an example of blatant Japan bashing. The book poses several questions about what it calls an "incident." For example, how could the Japanese military kill one million people in Nanjing, as claimed by some nationalist scholars in China, when the total population of the city at the time was only 200,000? Furthermore, what is one to make of the Communist Chinese government's official claims that "more than 300,000" people were killed?¹¹ Chinese scholars conventionally argue that the population swelled as people from the surrounding countryside fled to the walled city as the Japanese advanced. But, indicate the manga writers, what evidence is there? There seems to be a problem with the statistics. Meanwhile, the manga mentions a Japanese bestseller, *Nankin jiken "shōko shashin" o kenshōsuru* [Investigating the Evidence: Photographs of the Nanking Incident], which was written by Shudo Higashinakano, et al., and published by Soshisha in 2005. Higashinakano is the head of the Association of Nanjing Studies, and according to him, researchers analyzed more than 30,000 photographs over a period of three years and found that 143 photographs were either fabricated or were composite photographs.¹² Again, according to the manga's narrators there seems to be doubt about the evidence.

But, with whom are the manga's authors really sparring? No credible scholar claims that one million people died in the city of Nanjing, and most admit that the statistics used to establish various estimates are far from exact.¹³ It is true that the flows of people in and out of the city during

¹¹ George Akiyama and Ko Bunyu, *Manga Chūgoku nyūmon*, p. 74.

¹² Ibid., p. 76.

¹³ Estimates are also complicated by differing definitions of what constitutes a "civilian death," differing time frames, and different geographical areas defined as being within the scope of Nanjing. Most scholars outside China and Japan have settled on a range from between 100,000 to 200,000 dead, based on burial figures of charity organizations around Nanjing. Even Iris Chang's emotional treatise on the subject does

the war were tremendous and no one can offer clear numbers. Essentially, the manga plays a “numbers game” that is designed to deflect attention away from what scholars, both in Japan and China, generally agree on. Members of the Japanese army committed atrocities in the city, including large numbers of civilian deaths and numerous rapes and other abuses. To most, the numbers, whether in the thousands or tens of thousands, qualify as a “massacre,” not simply an “incident.” But the manga writers seem to want the reader to believe that the people of China are prone to exaggeration. The clear implication is that if the government (or “Chinese society”) can grossly inflate these figures and use a few falsified pictures to make their case, then why should we be expected to believe any of it? Of course, this would be a very appealing argument for people who have grown tired of being defensive about a war that they would like to believe was truly intended to combat Western imperialism in Asia. A conspiracy of communism and “victor’s justice,” it seems to the authors, clouds the judgment of world opinion, and the real audience for their argument, comic buyers in Japan who made this work a bestseller, seemed not to object.

Chapter Four shifts the focus away from atrocities committed between nations at war to inhuman behavior that took place in China alone. Cannibalism is the focus, and the narrator reveals that China’s own histories record at least 220 incidents of man-eating that took place during military sieges in China.¹⁴ Even more condemning to the authors, however, are the numerous cases of cannibalism that did not involve the desperate measures of a people trapped in a walled city. Chinese cannibalism, the reader learns, usually took place in the centers of politics, economy, and culture – in the great cities such as Xian, Kaifeng, Luoyang, Nanjing, Beijing, etc. In these urban areas cannibalism took place when the population exploded, and food, especially meat, became very scarce. At other times, usually during wars, expendable masses were apparently caught by the military, and they were made into “food,” a source of animal protein used to bolster the soldiers’ rations. For example, during the disorders that plagued the end of the Tang dynasty many were made into human “jerky” and “pickles” in

not reach one million. She seems to agree with the “more than 300,000” estimate. See Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking* (New York: Basic Books, 1997). For an excellent, balanced view of scholarship from China, Japan, and elsewhere, see Joshua Fogel, ed., *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

¹⁴ George Akiyama and Ko Bunyu, *Manga Chūgoku nyūmon*, p. 147.

order to be preserved for a long time and shipped to the fronts. Apparently, there were also “human cattle” that were bred for solely for consumption, or so claim the manga’s authors!¹⁵

Indeed, cannibalism occurred in China, just as it has appeared in virtually every part of the world, especially during times of duress. And Chinese annals do attest to cannibalism during times of war and famine. They also reveal symbolic forms of cannibalism, whereby one’s enemies would be consumed to eliminate them and to absorb their strength. More disturbingly, there are recorded accounts of people (usually filial women) cutting off body parts to serve to sick parents and in-laws in a curative stew.¹⁶ But these practices were never condoned by the authorities, and the isolated (and in the case of “human cattle,” uncorroborated) examples presented in the manga do not illustrate that Chinese people found cannibalism acceptable. In fact, most of the accounts in the Chinese histories (such as the *Han shu* or *Tang shu*) are presented to illustrate the immorality of those practicing the cannibalism. Rulers who ate their enemies, for example, are usually depicted as tyrants. In fact, the very definition of a tyrant would be one who treated his subjects like “birds, beasts, and fish.” Meanwhile, medicinal and filial cannibalism were greatly reviled by mainstream scholars in China as well as by the state.¹⁷

Naturally, the writers of the manga overlook the complexity of the issue of cannibalism, which is hardly surprising. The authors focus on examples that seem to prove their point and ignore evidence that contravenes it. What is the point? Once again, there seems to be a subtext that offers a counterattack to Chinese accusations of brutality during Japanese occupation. In the eyes of Chinese accusers, the great sin of the war was the abuse of innocent people, who were raped and killed. The manga authors imply that the accusers should look to their own past, where signs indicate that not only did Chinese kill their own, they ate them too –

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 149-158.

¹⁶ Donald Sutton describes these various forms of historical cannibalism in “Consuming Counterrevolution: The Ritual and Culture of Cannibalism in Wuxuan, Guangxi, China, May to July 1968,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37/1 (1995): 136-172. See also Key Ray Chong, *Cannibalism in China* (Wakefield, NH: Longwood Academic Press, 1990) and Zheng Yi, *Hongse jinian bei* [Scarlet Memorial] (Taipei: Huashi chubanshe, 1993).

¹⁷ Sutton, “Consuming Counterrevolution,” p. 151.

even during peacetime! So, the writers essentially ask their readers, which is really the immoral nation here?

The book then goes on to relate China's recent and historical aggressiveness in military and diplomatic matters. For example, the manga writers remind readers, Japan has not been the only nation that has had to handle China's expansionist claims regarding territorial waters. For example, South Korea must deal with China in regard to the continental shelf, the Philippines about the economic territorial waters, and several nations such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines all claim the South China Sea as their territorial waters as well. According to Dokugusuri, China is impudent and audacious. It is ready to use military force in order to expand its territorial waters. The population explosion, environmental destruction in the inland, drying up of resources and so on has led China to look for sea resources, especially for oil fields in the ocean.¹⁸ Meanwhile, China has historically exercised its muscle, and continues to do so, in maintaining an empire that includes Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and a good portion of Central Asia; and now it threatens to destabilize the region with its ambitions to attack democratic Taiwan. What is the Japanese government doing about this aggressive behavior? Dokugusuri actually says that the Japanese government is so weak that no one person or political party can make a difference when it comes to "the Chinese problem," and he calls the powers that be "chicken."

Discussion

Manga Chūgoku nyūmon is a comic book that belongs to a genre called *kyōyō manga*, or "academic" or "educational" manga. It can be used as a textbook, and one can certainly learn much about China because it presents much data and statistics from some reliable sources and explains important technical terms in history and politics. By referring to "experts" and statistics, the book effectively convinces the casual reader that it presents the reality of China. Readers, especially the young, may not be discrete enough to be able to judge the truth or falsity of selective historical facts and statistics, which often can, in fact, be used to depict two or more totally different versions of the same history. Nevertheless, one learns something about China. The reader may be perturbed by certain claims and start to think critically about the situation, or the book may never make any impact at all.

¹⁸ George Akiyama and Ko Bunyu, *Manga Chūgoku nyūmon*, pp. 196-199.

Different opinions abound in regard to educational manga. Many lament the decrease of intellectual activity when people read only manga while others say that manga provides very important information. The pictures make it easier to understand difficult concepts that are otherwise very hard to grasp, or in which people may not be interested. In spite of the negativity of some of the pictures, the reader is ready to learn when his or her interest is stirred.

Manga in Japan has a long history. During World War II, certain manga were drawn in the form of propaganda leaflets for the local populace or to be dropped along enemy lines. The propaganda manga was also intended to increase the morale and productivity of the Japanese workers.¹⁹ In a very popular manga series, *norakuro* [The Black Stray] by Suiho Tagawa, the Chinese soldiers were depicted as pigs fighting against the Japanese during World War II.²⁰ *Manga Chūgoku nyūmon* seems to be a form of propaganda because it presents the Japanese perspective, seemingly to the exclusion of others. Some say that the book belongs to a new and growing Japanese literary genre called “nationalist comics.”²¹

But this “nationalistic” perspective ignores some fundamental aspects of Japan’s own history, which has been intricately tied with that of China. From ancient times, the Japanese sent envoys to China to learn more about what at the time was the most advanced nation. Himiko, the queen of Yamataikoku, is said to have sent messengers to China in 239. Japan also sent an embassy to China in 413. The tumulus mounds from the fourth and fifth centuries definitely show a Chinese influence. At the beginning of the sixth century, Gokyō Hakase came from Korea and lectured to Japanese intellectuals about the books on Confucianism. Buddhism came to Japan from India to Central Asia and then through China and Korea in 552. Japan sent Imoko Ono to the Sui Dynasty (581-618) of China as an envoy in 607.²²

¹⁹ Kinko Ito, “A History of Manga in the Context of Japanese Culture and Society,” *Journal of Popular Culture* 38/3 (2005): 456-475.

²⁰ Paul Gravett, *Manga: Sixty Years of Japanese Comics* (London: Laurence King Publishing, 2004), p. 22.

²¹ Hiroko Tabuchi, “Racist Comics Gain Popularity in Japan,” *Goldsea Asian American Daily*, December 1, 2005 (<http://goldsea.com/Asiagate/512/01comics.html>).

²² Motohisa Yasuda, *Kisokarayokuwakaru nihonshi* (Tokyo: Obunsha, 1989).

During the seventh and eighth centuries, China was the most technologically advanced nation in the world. Japan sent embassies to the Tang emperors (618-907) and adopted the Chinese calendar, Chinese characters, their provincial system and bureaucratic patterns, and established permanent capitals imitating Chinese ones. Japan also imported technology from China: textiles, metal working, bridge building, architecture, etc. The Japanese also adopted Chinese literature, myths, and superstitions. In modern Japan the people still use “year periods” to count years according to the emperor’s rule. During the Kamakura period Buddhist monks (Rinzai in 1191 and Dōgen in 1227) brought Zen to Japan, and the samurai class adopted it. Many aspects of modern Japanese culture, art, architecture, garden, martial arts, etc. derive from or are related to Zen, which originally came from China.²³ China and the Chinese culture have been so much a part of Japanese history, culture, and society that it is self-defeating to agitate for negating or criticizing China and its culture, philosophy, etc. in its totality. Interestingly enough, the book itself is written with Chinese characters and Japanese characters!

Conclusion

Manga Chūgoku nyūmon is a bestseller that has sold more than 180,000 copies since its publication in August 2005.²⁴ With this audience, however, the manga has missed an opportunity to explore the complex layers of Sino-Japanese relations. For example, instead of simply accusing the Chinese public and media of hypocrisy in their outrage over the prostitution incident of 2003, it would have been more constructive to describe the reign of censorship that prevents a frustrated Chinese public from, in fact, criticizing its own government overly much for the laxity of enforcement regarding prostitution laws. In an environment where it is taboo to criticize one’s own government in print (though this is not true of the Hong Kong press, which fired the first salvo), it arguably makes public frustration run even higher, and perhaps encourages more exaggerated responses against “permissible” objects of moralistic anger – the Japanese foreigner.

But, of course, subtle analysis of the pressures and contradictions within Chinese public opinion do not seem to have been the original intent

²³ Edwin O. Reischauer, *Japan: The Story of a Nation*, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw, 1990).

²⁴ Tabuchi, “Racist Comics Gain Popularity in Japan.”

of the authors and publishers of *Manga Chūgoku nyūmon*. Overall, the work represents a more banal attempt to point the finger back at the incessant accusers from China and the rest of East Asia (another volume assassinates the character of Korean culture and history as well, with the protagonist in that one proclaiming, “There is nothing at all in Korean culture to be proud of”).²⁵ In doing so, and particularly in using such a simplistic manner that hides the real complexities of the issues raised, the manga writers ironically reveal as much about themselves as they do about their “poisonous medicine” concerning China. The manga effectively appeals to those who are tired of being labeled the “immoral aggressor” in events that happened more than sixty years ago. In other words, it represents a far more defensive reaction than the attacking style of its historical rhetoric would seem to indicate. The important issues raised in this work are the killing of innocents, exploitation of women, and military/diplomatic aggressiveness. These are the very same activities that the Japanese military has been condemned for perpetrating during the war. But this work does take the counterattack a step further, if only in adding the charge that the Chinese are worse, because supposedly they commit these atrocities upon themselves, and in peacetime no less.

One must certainly be careful not to inflate the revelations that a comic book might make about the people who buy it, especially when that work is a bestseller. People buy popular items for different reasons, of course. Many in Japan, with a society that values conformity, may have bought the book simply to find out what everyone else seems to be reading. Manga – even one that presents itself as educational as well – is mainly for entertainment. So are we in fact taking this work too seriously? One interesting aspect of this genre of informational manga is that it is the perfect media for conveying an overly simplistic message. Comics are not expected to portray “reality” like a photograph is assumed to do. They are, by nature, caricatures, which are expected to exaggerate to some degree. The genre, in fact, disarms the reader, who tends to suspend full rational judgment, even as the work presents the oversimplifications as “facts” supported by “research” and “experts.” Thus, without the rigors of anything approaching academic review, the writers are free to offer what the “gut” tells one is true about the subject.

²⁵ The manga in question – Sharin Yamano, *Ken Kanryū* [Hating the Korean Wave] (Tokyo: Fuyūsha, 2005) – can also be seen as a reaction to a recent Korean vogue in popular Japanese culture.

To those who agree with the gut “analysis” – perhaps because they are the targeted audience of social “insiders” – such a portrayal might be recognizable as an oversimplification. In many cases, even to the intelligent reader, the gross manipulations are not necessarily bothersome, because the work can more easily be dismissed by an insider as “simply a comic book.” But to those on the outside, the oversimplification is usually not amusing and the charges cannot simply be dismissed as representing the views of a simple comic book. Instead, to the outsider the comic book tends to be construed as representative of the “genuine feelings” of the writers and even the readers. Certainly, that is part of the story of why the now infamous cartoons of Muhammad (published in 2005) were not considered funny or excusable to many in the Muslim world despite protestations by Europeans that they were but an experiment in freedom of speech.

Comparing this comic to the Muhammad cartoons brings to mind one last interesting interpretation that might be drawn from this bestselling manga. Just as many Europeans seem bewildered by the response of Muslims in some parts of the world to the cartoons, Japanese people are often surprised by the “overreaction” in China and elsewhere to similar seemingly innocuous activities on the part of Japanese civilians. As far as we know, there have been no violent protests in China as a result of the publication of *Manga Chūgoku nyūmon*; but to many in Japan, the Chinese are all too prone to rock throwing and violent protests with little provocation. This is made all the more mysterious to many average Japanese by the fact that even when confronted with perturbing information and data (for example on China’s recent military aggressiveness), the Japanese usually do not act upon their disturbed emotions. Japanese people are unlikely to start stoning the Chinese embassy or consulates in Japan. They are not even likely to attack or verbally abuse Chinese residents in Japan. The Japanese people will continue to read and write Chinese characters and, they will continue to eat tremendous amounts of Chinese *ramen* noodles and pot stickers. Many will still observe traditional festivals according to the Chinese lunar calendar.

Is this difference in collective responses due to an inherent Japanese character that makes them more averse to confrontation, as the manga writers imply? More likely, the violent Chinese responses are an outgrowth of the repression of free dialogue over the issues that continue to strain Sino-Japanese relations. It has been widely commented that the places where Muslim reactions have been most violent against the Muhammad cartoons represent largely repressive regimes where rulers have

used these protests to bolster their claims to legitimacy when very little else endears them to their populace. The same can be said of contemporary China, where rampant corruption threatens to undermine popular support for the government whose most important virtue these days is the fact that it seems to have won international respect for the nation. The only hope for moving beyond these tit-for-tat accusations between nationalists on either side of this divide is if a genuine dialogue about the past is encouraged.

Regardless of the content, the reader will learn much about China from *Manga Chūgoku nyūmon*. As the History Channel always says, “We need to study history in order to better plan for the future.” Knowing about another country, society, and culture makes one more sensitive to one’s own situation, and it often gives one an opportunity to do some critical thinking. In this sense *Manga Chūgoku nyūmon* has much to offer the readers.

AMERICAN CULTURAL POLICY TOWARD OKINAWA 1945-1950s

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In John Patrick's play based on the Vern Schneider novel, *Teahouse of the August Moon*, Col. Wainright Purdy III declares, "My job is to teach these natives [Okinawans] the meaning of democracy, and they're going to learn democracy if I have to shoot every one of them."¹

Capt. Fisby's first order of business as military governor in the village of Tobiki was also to deliver an address to the Okinawan people, explaining democracy to them and that it was now in their hands. Everyone cheered. The captain was delighted until his interpreter, Sakini, explained that during 800 years of foreign occupation the Okinawans had learned to cheer for whoever was in charge, no matter what was said.

Col. Purdy and Capt. Fisby were to convert the Okinawans to the "American way of life." The American way consisted of organizing a Women's League for Democratic Action, establishing an education program, and setting up a local industry, like bicycle manufacturing. However, eventually both Col. Purdy and Capt. Fisby ended up being converted to the Okinawan way of life. The Okinawan method of living consisted of converting American target cloth into fancy pajamas, holding *sumo* wrestling matches, accomplishing industrialization through the construction of a sweet potato distillery, and, finally, building up a pentagon-shaped teahouse for *geisha*.

Capt. Fisby was so impressed with the idea that he gradually immersed himself in the Okinawan way of life. Attending official meetings in kimono and experiencing romance with a *geisha*, the captain came to realize that, in the long run, one could not tell who was the conqueror and who was the conquered. While the military occupation of Japan under Gen. MacArthur was one of the most successful in history, the U.S. military occupation of Okinawa was portrayed in the film version as poorly planned and executed.

¹ John Patrick, *Teahouse of the August Moon*, A Play by John Patrick (New York: Putnam, 1954), p. 23.

Introducing American democracy in mainland Japan and teaching American idealism in Okinawa had a particular meaning in U.S. national security policy and U.S.-Japan relations in the Cold War period. In fact, other than military utility, the United States gained nothing from ruling Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands; lacking economic benefits, they were nothing but a drain on American resources. Nevertheless, its important location, as well as the intensity of the Cold War in Asia, made Okinawa a strategic geographical space for U.S. national security.

American officials had long been interested in Japan's southernmost islands. American anthropologists were hired to study Ryukyuan society and culture as early as 1937.² During the late 1940s through the 1950s, the U.S. Military Government's cultural policy in Okinawa sought to indoctrinate Okinawans about U.S. foreign policy. American idealism was cultivated on the village scale through the person to person contact between natives and GI's.

The democratization of Okinawa via culture, however, was promoted very differently from that of mainland Japan. Until 1972, when the United States returned Okinawa to Japanese administration, the islands were under the control of the U.S. Military Government. The U.S. Occupation ended on the mainland of Japan with the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, while U.S. forces continued to be stationed on Okinawa. An important reason for the U.S. retention of Okinawa was that U.S. policymakers had doubts about the dependability of the Japanese and worried that the Japanese might adopt a policy of neutrality during the Cold War, abandoning the struggle against communism. Some viewed Japan as an uncertain ally. The United States needed to keep its bases in Okinawa in case Japan should fail to support the nation in a moment of crisis. The second reason was Okinawa's strategic location along Japan's southern flank. The U.S. Air Force could hit a number of important targets in the Eurasian theater from airfields in the Ryukyus. American planners believed that medium bombers in Okinawa gave an effective advantage in that they could reach all important target areas within an arc including all of Southeast Asia, China, the Lake Baikal area, Eastern Siberia, and the southern tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula in the USSR. U.S. bombers based

² From 1937 to 1941, Yale University conducted an extensive anthropological research on Ryukyu society and culture. The results were published as the *Civil Affairs Handbook* in 1944.

in Okinawa could also hit targets in the European region of the Soviet Union and land at Air Force bases in Western Europe. Okinawa also proved to be an important base during the Korean War. Three days after the North Korean Army crossed into South Korea, bombers stationed on the island began flying missions over the peninsula.³ The *New York Times* wrote, "Okinawa is for the Air Force what Pearl Harbor is for the Navy."⁴

The War in the Pacific ended on August 15, 1945 and signified the beginning of the American occupation in Okinawa. The "Administration of the Ryukyu Islands" was established by the U.S. Military Government. Its primary goal was civilian relief and rehabilitation. In postwar Japan, while General Douglas MacArthur served as chief policy enforcer at his SCAP headquarters (Supreme Commander of Allied Power) in Tokyo, his association with field personnel in Okinawa remained distant. In Okinawa, William E. Crist commanded the Civil Affairs Teams. As early as April 1946, the Central Okinawan Administration was established, and in August of that year, the Military Government initiated the establishment of the Okinawan Advisory Council. In December 1950 the Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands became the United States Civil Administration in the Ryukyus (USCAR).

The position of Civil Administrator was created for the purpose of the "supervision of domestic Okinawan activities and problems." The USCAR's mission was to stimulate and encourage Okinawans' participation in such public activities as health, education, safety, and information with the cooperation of the U.S. Military Government. *The Ryukyu Islands at a Glance*, a pamphlet published by the U.S. Military Government, clearly stated the objectives of the USCAR. The primary mission of the United States Forces was the prevention of disease and unrest in the land that had been devastated. The second objective was economic recovery up to the prewar level. The third objective was to bring democracy to the islands. Furthermore, the pamphlets viewed Okinawans as incapable of governing by themselves. Many cartoons describing Okinawan

³ Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), pp. 40-91.

⁴ George Barrett, "Report on Okinawa: A Rampart We Built; The strategic island off Asia's coast has been transformed into a bastion of the free world," *New York Times*, September 21, 1952, p. 9.

farmers, fishermen, and civilians showed how backward they were in terms of technology and modern political systems.⁵

The depiction of Okinawans as more primitive than the Japanese was common. Yale University anthropologists' *Civil Affairs Handbook* (1944) pointed out the strong tensions between Okinawans and Japanese. According to the handbook, the Japanese did not regard Okinawans as equals, and they had a strong racial prejudice against them. Because of these conflicts, the handbook stated that there was no enthusiastic patriotism toward Japan among Okinawans. As a conclusion, the handbook suggested that it would be a wise idea to use these tensions between Okinawans and Japanese in order to promote the U.S. political agenda. The handbook described the differences between Japanese and Okinawans in terms of personality, culture, lifestyle, education, language, and racial identity. For example:

In comparison with the Japanese, the Ryukyu natives are reported to be somewhat shorter, stockier, and darker, and to be characterized by more prominent nose, higher foreheads, and less noticeable cheekbones. Their hair is more often wavy. Despite the close ethnic relationship between Japanese and Ryukyu islanders, their linguistic kinship, the people of the archipelago are not regarded by the Japanese as their racial equals. They [are] looked upon, as it were, as poor cousins from the country, with peculiar rustic ways of their own, and are consequently discriminated against in various ways. The islanders on the other hand, have no sense of inferiority but rather take pride in their own traditions and in their longstanding cultural ties with China. Inherent in the relations between the Ryukyu people and the Japanese, therefore, are potential seeds of dissension out of which political capital might be made. It is almost certain that militarism and fanatical patriotism have been but slightly developed.⁶

⁵ United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, *The Ryukyu Islands at a Glance* (Naha, Okinawa, 1954), pp. 1, 14, 16, 19, 28, 33, 40.

⁶ Office of the Chief Naval Operations, Navy Department, *Civil Affairs Handbook: Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands* (1944), p. 43.

Immediately after the war, prisoners were used by the U.S. Military Government to complete necessary labor assignments. An August 1945 survey revealed that of the 119,839 Okinawans qualified for Military Government employment, only 337 were considered to be adequately skilled.⁷ In September 1946, 6,519 Okinawans were employed by the U.S. military units in Okinawa. By September 30, 1947, this number increased to 35,078.⁸ With the return home of American soldiers, many duties performed by the American military personnel were delegated to untrained Okinawans. One of the earliest needs was training track drivers, telephone operators, and typists. The Military Government also provided intensive English language training with the establishment of the Foreign Language School in Gushikawa in January 1946. One of the significant problems was a shortage of bilingual instructors. Many Americans who were proficient in Japanese were assigned to McArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. When the war ended, U.S. Military Police represented the enforcement of law to Okinawans. Early in the Occupation, "able-bodied native Okinawan men" were selected by the Military Government as civilian police. Less than twenty percent had any previous police training experience. The Military Government provided hats, motor vehicles, and weapons, and by recruiting some experienced Okinawans, established a training facility in Naha by late 1946.⁹

In the field of public services, the U.S. government began funding relief programs to meet the more immediate needs. First, the reconstruction of a water system was necessary, since the war had destroyed most of the water system in central and southern Okinawa. To meet its own urgent need, as well as that of municipalities, the Military Government began to work on repairing the Naha filtration plant. As early as March 1946, the Military Government organized the Departments of Agriculture, Industry, Fishers, Finance and Commerce under the direct supervision of the Economic Department and the Military Government. In 1946, the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) Fund was established. Total GARIOA appropriation for the Ryukus during the ten

⁷ United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, *The Ryukyu Islands Prewar and Postwar* (Naha, Okinawa, 1958), p. 69.

⁸ United States Military Government, *Ryukyu Islands, Military Government Activities, 1945-1951* (Naha, Okinawa, 1954).

⁹ United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, *The Ryukyu Islands Prewar and Postwar*, pp. 21-98.

years from 1947 to 1957 amounted to \$164.5 million.¹⁰ Congressional appropriations in 1946 to build barracks and military installations amounted to \$35 million. During the same year, approximately \$25 million was used for economic rehabilitation. In July 1949 Typhoon Gloria caused an estimated \$80 million in damage, with about fifty percent of military buildings, including dependent housing, destroyed.¹¹ The Ryukyuan Foreign Exchange Fund (RFEF) was established as a depository of revenue derived from sales to U.S. forces. An American style banking system succeeded the Central Bank of Okinawa in May 1948. With political cartoons in which rich Uncle Sam gives a bag full of U.S. dollars to a poor, short Okinawan, *The Ryukyu at a Glance* suggested that such huge economic assistance would be worth U.S. strategic interest in Okinawa.¹²

The cultural reconstruction of postwar Okinawa was started in November 1948 by the Department of Information and Education, abbreviated as Civil Information and Education (CI&E). Its first purpose was the reconstruction of such cultural facilities as libraries, theaters, radio broadcasting stations, and newspaper companies. The second aim was the promotion of democratic concepts and engendering Okinawan support for United States policies and programs through cultural propaganda.

During the first half of 1949, the CI&E began to print numerous posters. For example, one of the early posters was entitled "A Bridge to Democracy," and bore labels and a caption stating that the bridge from a Ryukyu under militarism to a democratic Ryukyu must be supported by pillars labeled freedom of thought, and respect for human rights. Nine thousand posters were produced during May 1949.¹³ In support of "Ryukyuan-American Education Week," held December 4-10, 1949, 390,000 leaflets were distributed to Okinawan students. The five subjects to be studied included "Democracy in the Home," "Democracy in the School,"

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 1.

¹¹ Frederick L. Shiels, "The American Experience in Okinawa: A Case Study for Foreign Policy and Decision-Making Theory" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1977).

¹² United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, *The Ryukyu Islands at a Glance*, p. 14.

¹³ James Tull, "The Ryukyu Islands: Japan's Oldest Colony-America's Newest: An Analysis of Policy and Propaganda" (M.A. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1953), p. 61.

“Foundations of Good Government,” “Rights of the Citizen in a Democracy,” and “Responsibilities of the Citizens in a Democracy.” Students were requested to take the leaflets home to their parents and asked to post them on the walls of their homes.¹⁴

The leaflets also exposed the danger of communism and encouraged civic pride and awareness of the best in Ryukyuan culture. Particular encouragement was given to promote Okinawan interest in traditional Ryukyuan arts, music, and dance.¹⁵ American art and music at the same time enhanced efforts to transmit the “American story.” In 1950, 300 color copies of American paintings were sent to the Ryukyus.¹⁶

For the information and educational programs in the Ryukyus, 16 millimeter documentary and news films with a Japanese soundtrack were considered to be a substantial part of the CI&E rehabilitation effort. Examples of the films shown during late 1949 and through 1950 include: *Ryukyuan Legal Chiefs Visit the U.S.*; *Corporal Cornel and Mrs. Cornel’s Welcome to America*; *Ryukyuan Government Leaders Visit Maryland*; *Ryukyuan Exchange Students*; and *Police Mission in the U.S.* The U.S. Military Government estimated that 20,000 people saw CI&E films each week. The films with Japanese language tracks were loaned through the CI&E Central Motion Picture Distribution Unit to cultural centers, health centers, native labor training sections, the signal center, commercial theaters, amusement parks, agricultural cooperatives, branches of the Education Department, youth clubs, and the University of the Ryukyus. Cultural centers, in turn, showed films through the use of mobile units to remote villages, prisons, and leper colonies.¹⁷ During 1953-1954, President Eisenhower’s “Atomic Power for Peace” statement before the United Nations Assembly on the Atomic Policy of the United States received favorable response as effective anti-communist rhetoric. The timely

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 110.

¹⁵ The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands*, 1952, p. 197.

¹⁶ Terry Trafton, “The Reality of Paradox: A Historical Study to Assess the Role of Adult Education in the Democratization Process Administered by Military Government in Okinawa” (Ph.D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 1992), p. 106.

¹⁷ The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands*, 1952, pp. 199-201.

production of locally produced films helped a great deal in encouraging anti-communist editorials in the Rykyuan newspapers as well. A Japanese film, *Prewar Okinawa* in 1937, was reproduced with the original Japanese soundtrack and with an English soundtrack, and it was extensively used by American military and civilian personnel in Okinawa with favorable comments.¹⁸

The United States Military Government and the USCAR made continuous efforts through the press release of the *Ryukyu Koho*, a Japanese language newspaper originated under the U.S. Military Government, to inform Ryukyuans about the story of America and the Free World, and the benefits for the Ryukyuans about rehabilitation programs, GARIOA imports, and security measures as a result of the U.S. Occupation. The *Ryukyu Koho* contained articles explaining American government and American educational ideologies. Begun in 1948 by the Okinawa Civilian Administration, their publication had a monthly circulation of 7,000.¹⁹ In 1950, an essay contest conducted by the *Ryukyu Koho* produced 1,253 entries on one of two topics: "How I Can Best Serve My People" and "What Democracy Means to Me." Winners had their essays published in this newspaper.²⁰

Paralleling the newspaper enterprise, exchange programs also promoted Okinawa's ties to the United States. The first National Leader Mission was sent to the U.S. in June 1950. From that time until January 1, 1953, ninety-four individuals made ninety-day tours to the U.S. with GARIOA funds. The aim of the program was to give some orientation to a few influential Okinawans who were to inspect American facilities and advanced technology in their particular fields. A specific purpose was to reorient the individuals who were critical or distrustful of the U.S. and to enhance the knowledge and the prestige of individuals who were pro-American. After their return from the United States, the mission leaders were utilized in various ways. They were expected to write articles for newspapers, make radio addresses, and conduct information programs at the cultural centers. In addition, between 1949 and 1952, 181 students were

¹⁸ United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands*, 1953, p. 60.

¹⁹ Terry Trafton, "The Reality of Paradox," p. 104.

²⁰ The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands*, 1952, pp. 187-189.

sent to the U.S. and sixty-nine who had completed their studies returned to the Ryukyus.²¹

During 1953-1954, the Ryukyuan-American Friendship Committee was created as a permanent activity of the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus. The chairman was a member of the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus, although all branches of the United States military units, as well as both Ryukyuan and American businessmen on Okinawa, were represented on the Committee. In order to enhance Ryukyuan-American friendship and reduce Okinawan hostility toward the U.S. military bases, the Ryukyuan-American Friendship Committee sponsored a number of friendship week competitions.²²

These competitions included a number of groups. For example, the Fishermen's Contest was held on October 13, 1953, during the annual Ryukyuan Fisheries Conference in Hirara City, Miyako. Awards were given to the fishermen who had made the largest catches during the year. Judging was done by the local fishing associations, the government of the Ryukyu Islands, and the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus. The U.S. Military Government estimated that 2,500 fishermen participated.²³

Ryukyu-American Friendship Week activities in 1955 were highlighted by a two-day bicycle race and performances of the "Symphony of the Air," as well as a rodeo and various "open house" events sponsored at the Information Centers, libraries, and service clubs. The huge Naha Air Base maintenance hanger was packed for each of the two performances of the "Symphony of the Air" with a total attendance estimated at 15,000 people. The week's activities were concluded with two rodeo performances witnessed by approximately 18,000 Ryukyuans and Americans. The "open house" events at the cultural centers featured speech contests, native songs and dances, athletic activities, and motion picture programs, with a total attendance estimated at 15,000 people.²⁴

The full use of radio as an information device was realized with the inauguration of the "USCAR Hour" over KSAR, the Japanese language

²¹ Ibid., pp. 205-207.

²² The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands*, 1954, p. 115.

²³ Ibid., pp. 116-117.

²⁴ The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands*, 1955, p. 103.

station of the Ryukyu Broadcasting Company. Since KSAR was the sole Japanese language outlet reaching the entire Ryukyus, the programs were assured of a wide audience. A Ryukyu-wide media survey taken in June and July 1956 by the Office of Public Information (OPI) showed that between thirty-five and thirty-seven percent of the population consistently listened to the radio. Programming for the “USCAR Hour” consisted of selected U.S. Information Service (USIS) and Psychological Warfare’s taped material that covered international and U.S. affairs. Local programming for the “USCAR Hour” included commentaries, special event programs produced on a fairly regular basis, and a continuing series of interviews with the personnel of the USCAR and the military command explaining the U.S. position on the local project in Okinawa.

Besides building a positive image of America and promoting U.S.-Okinawa friendship, American officials portrayed communism and totalitarianism. During 1956-57, some 130 pictorial displays were completed and circulated throughout the Ryukyus. These included photographs provided by the United States Information Services and other U.S. government agencies. Many of the exhibits drew attention to the world unrest caused by communism, such as the Hungarian Revolt. Other exhibits drew attention to the gains made through Free World cooperation, and to the U.S. scientific efforts in developing the peaceful use of atomic energy for the benefit of all mankind. In November 1957, around 3,000 people attended a photo exhibit in the Okinawa Teachers Association Hall in downtown Naha showing the communists’ record of imperialism, brutality, and duplicity in Russia, Hungary, and other parts of Eastern Europe. Photos used were from the files of USCAR’s Office of Public Information (OPI) and private sources. The press branch also distributed a mimeographed factual chronology of the events and the individuals playing leading roles in the Soviet sphere.²⁵

Konnichi-no Ryukyu [Ryukyus Today], a USCAR-sponsored magazine, which was initially published with the November 1957 issues, gained public acceptance because that its writers were mainly Ryukyuans and the cover and interior art work, as well as photographs, were also done by the Ryukyuans. In general, those writers warned against communist aggression, speaking effectively as former Russian prisoners of war, or

²⁵ United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, *Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands*, 1953, pp. 102-103.

warned that Ryukyuan communist groups often misused “democracy” to their advantage, agitating the people under the guise of “freedom of speech.”

One writer, a leading Okinawan novelist, urged the importance of teaching English to Okinawan children as early as primary school in order to enable them to make a better living as employees of the U.S. Forces. Another writer pointed out the economic decline of Amamians after the reversion of Amami Oshima to Japanese control, and warned that the reversion of Okinawa would lead to the inevitable change, which would not be beneficial to Ryukyans. Contributors expressed Ryukyuan desires for improvements, in such fields as agriculture, fishing, communications, education, public health, labor and trade. A member of an economic mission returning from Taiwan declared that the country’s economic development was made possible by large U.S. financial aid, and that Ryukyans should study how to make the best of U.S. aid to promote the development of the Ryukyu Islands.²⁶

As we have seen, by borrowing the power of culture, the U.S. Military Government in the Ryukyus tried numerous means to attract Okinawans’ attention and to build up their friendship with natives. Establishing cultural centers, importing and translating books, holding numerous contests and pictorial exhibitions, exchanging persons, showing films and musicals – all these cultural activities were promoted with the purpose of developing Okinawans’ understanding of U.S. foreign policy in Asia.

At the height of the Cold War, the United States was building a chain of military bases stretching from Korea and Japan through Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Greece in order to contain the Soviet Union and China. In Japan alone at the end of the Korean War, there were 600 U.S. installations and 200,000 troops. Then, in the 1960s, when Okinawa was directly administered by the Pentagon, there were 117 bases. The United States controlled twenty-nine areas of the surrounding seas and fifteen district air spaces over the Ryukyus. As a prefecture of Japan, Okinawa occupied only 0.6 percent of Japan’s total land area; however, about seventy-five percent of facilities

²⁶ United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, *Civil Affairs in the Ryukyu Islands*, 1958, pp. 118-120.

used by the American armed forces stationed in Japan were concentrated in Okinawa.²⁷

The position of Okinawa for the U.S. government was clear. During the Korean War, and later in the Vietnam War, the U.S. heavily depended on its military bases in Japanese territory. Okinawa, Thailand, Hong Kong, and the Philippines also offered places for the U.S. troops for “rest and recreation.”²⁸

Another important factor was to determine whether such attempts to indoctrinate Okinawans about the communist threat and America’s Free World policy were really successful or not. The *Scientific Investigation of the Ryukyu Islands* (SIRI) report by anthropologist Haring Douglas, investigated Okinawans’ understanding of communism and capitalism at that time and stated:

What ideas do Amamians discuss? The range of their knowledge is limited by sketchy, meager news service. The outside world is psychologically remote, even though Amami fishermen occasionally glimpse Russian submarines. But their interests transcend the tidbits of news that trickle over the cables; topics commonly discussed include communism, democracy, science, movies, Amami traditions, capitalism V.S. socialism and again communism. In general [they are] anti-communist, but communism presents the one vivid idea that has burst into their world since the war. They can no more to evade the topic than a New Yorker can ignore street traffic. Despite much discussion among Americans, both communism and capitalism continue to be understood vaguely and inaccurately. As long as communism [continues] its onward sweep in Asia, its ideology commands general interest and the issue cannot be avoided. Communism may be less prevalent in Amami Gunto than in Japan Proper, but it is understood better than capitalism is understood; the latter is presented most ineffectively. The opposition to communism on Amami Ohima, in my opinion, is not the spontaneous fruit of belief in democracy and free enterprise; it is a combination of

²⁷ Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Cost and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2002), p. 36.

²⁸ Ibid.

peasant indifference to politics and the persisting influence of the aristocratic-plutocratic minority that formerly dominated Amami society. Inept U.S. propaganda, abetted by American commercial movies, identifies democracy with material luxury and irresponsible license. In general democracy is presented in an alien tongue and appears to be something for rich America that could not work in poor Amami; communism, however, comes from fellow villages in their own language, in the guise of an extension of familiar patterns of living.²⁹

As this report showed, U.S. democracy was not voluntarily spread among the individual Amamians' daily lives; rather it was promoted artificially by the U.S. Military Government. Furthermore, few Amamians had deep knowledge about the ideology of democracy and communism. In addition, Haring pointed out that not even a dozen people in Amami Oshima could read English fluently and easily. There was a shortage of intellectually stimulating reading materials. Such magazines imported from Japan were of the cheap sensational type; *Women's Home Reading*, typically featuring articles such as "How to Make Love, by a Man Who Had Slept with Three Thousand Women," was one of the examples.³⁰

Anthropologist Clarence J. Glacken, who lived and studied in different villages on Okinawa, also wrote that, in reality, U.S. cultural propaganda was insufficient in such remote villages as Hanashiro, Minatogawa, and Matsuda:

There are virtually no radio sets in any of these villages, except in the schools and sometimes in a village office. In Hanashiro, which has no electricity, there were three radios, two of which did not work. There were four in Minatogawa, with one at least not working, and six in Matsuda, three of which were in the primary school, and one in the village office. Newspapers are more important media. But in late 1951 and early 1952, there were five

²⁹ Douglas G. Haring, "The Island of Amami Oshima in the Northern Ryukyus," *Scientific Investigations in the Ryukyu Island Report 2* (Pacific Science Board, National Research Council, Washington D.C., 1953), pp. 18-21

³⁰ Ibid.

newspaper subscriptions in Hanashiro, one going to the village office where it could be read by all, 14 in Minatogawa, and about 20 in Matsuda. [These] newspapers are read consistently only by the village officials, school teachers, and the regular subscribers.³¹

Other U.S. attempts to exchange Okinawan students also did not necessarily bring about positive results, as the U.S. government expected. As a matter of fact, many Okinawan students in America received unfavorable impressions of American life. One of the Okinawan exchange students, Ken Kiyuna, wrote about his honest skepticism regarding American society in his report:

To an Oriental like myself, the American civilization as a whole might be called a higher mechanical civilization. Many things mechanical have deeply impressed me here in America, but one of the most impressive things is the wonderful mechanization of the kitchen in the typical American house. It is a kitchen wonderful to me, because everything is operated by controls and switches. However, I must admit that I was concerned that under the oppression of keeping peace with power production, workers seemed to be forced to become machines also, and hence lose some of their inherent ability to act as humans who reason and feel. As a result of mechanical civilization, the American's point of view and way of thinking, as well as his solutions of problems, seem all to be influenced by the accustomed mechanization in his daily life. As an example, some Americans, in my opinion, seem to be like machines where their thinking is systemized and formal, and their feeling is to all appearances not sincere. They are machines of creatures of habit that fit into a mechanized life.³²

In addition, while CI&E was busy promoting the cultural program through KASAR radio, *Ryukyu Koho*, and cultural centers, Okinawans in

³¹ Clarence Glacken, "Studies of Okinawan Village Life," *Scientific Investigations in the Ryukyu Island Report 4* (Washington D.C.: Pacific Science Board, National Research Council, 1953).

³² Jane Kluckhohn and Edward G. Lurders, eds., *Through Okinawan Eyes* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1951), pp. 51-55.

1952 elected socialist Mayor Senega Kamejiro. Immediately, USCAR cut their support for the Okinawan civic administration and tried to pass a nonconfidence vote for Senega. As a result, the USCAR succeeded in depriving Senega of his eligibility, and the city council passed a nonconfidence vote for him. Such USCAR pressure on the Okinawan civic administration brought about great controversy, not only among Okinawans, but also in the international world itself. An article from *Weekly Sankei* called America's conduct equal to the assassination of Senega, and then strongly criticized the contradictory U.S. "democratic" foreign policy:

The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands changed a requirement for non-confidence in a mayor from two-thirds to a majority of the full number of the assemblymen. Because the full number of assemblymen of Okinawa City is thirty and also because the number of Naha City Mayor Senega's government control party is twelve, it was impossible to resolve non-confidence in the mayor on the condition that these twelve government-controlled party assembly will not attend. This is because the number of pro-American not of the governmental party assemblymen was seventeen, whereas more than twenty assemblymen in favor are required.

If the United States desires to purge Mayor Senega with whom it has found difficulty in dealing without resorting to such an illegal means like assassination, what it can do is to change the requirement for non-confidence from more than two thirds to a majority of the full number of the assemblymen, and if it does so, it can surely and legally purge Mayor Senega. This is because the number of pro-American and non-governmental party assemblymen is seventeen which is two more than the majority number of fifteen.

...The case this time becomes a very queer example when the American people explain the real nature of democracy which is always advocated by them. I cannot but worry about the benefit according to the great United States if this should be used as material for teaching what democracy is in Japanese primary and junior high schools. I believe that it will go more smoothly if the United States will abandon the administrative power. Furthermore,

it is understandable from the Hungarian case that it is impossible to oppress the real intention of the people forever.³³

Later in 1958, the election of Mayor Kanji Saichi, who succeeded in implementing Senega's political agenda, came as a big shock to the U.S. government again. In particular, in this election, two of the candidates were very critical of the U.S. Occupation and advocated reversion to mainland Japan. Moreover, the conservative power, which was friendly to the U.S. Occupation, could not even elect their own candidates.

Thus, examining the U.S. attitude toward Okinawans, as well as the foreign policy used to justify American behavior in the country-less land of Okinawa, which belonged neither to Japan nor to the U.S. at that time, illustrates the hypocritical and contradictory ideology of U.S. foreign policy in the world. Behind the Ryukyuan-American friendship cultural activities, the conflict between the U.S. military forces and Okinawans has a long history. More recently, sexual assault, environmental pollution, traffic accidents, and land property issues are some of the controversial problems. The protest movement against these issues began in 1952 and continues until today.

While SCAP and McArthur were praised for their democratization policy of Japan at home, among GI's in Okinawa, the word, "States Side" was commonly used in order to mean "like the United States." As the reconstruction program developed, several entertainment facilities for U.S. GI's, such as club houses, golf courses, bowling alleys, and pools were constructed. Within the military bases, "Little America" was born.³⁴ An article from *Time* magazine called the U.S. military base a "Levittown," referring to a new suburban town developed in New York, and designed by William Levitt. "Levittown" in Okinawa, facilitated theaters, backyard and park entertainment. Enjoying upper middle class life with Okinawan maids, American soldiers and their families tended to have leisure and enjoyed "racialized privilege" in southern Asian islands. Dance parties were also held every weekend at clubs.³⁵

³³ Yoshitaka Takahashi, "Deserted Land and People," *Weekly Sankei* December 15, 1957.

³⁴ George Barrett, "Report on Okinawa," p. SM9.

³⁵ "Okinawa: Levittown-on-the-Pacific," *Time*, August 15, 1955, pp. 18-20.

Although the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 formally ended the U.S. Occupation of Japan, it did not end the occupation by the U.S. Military Government of Okinawa. While mainland Japan was allowed to regain political autonomy, the situation in Okinawa was totally different. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty allowed the concentration of American military bases on a small southern island on Okinawa, located far off the mainland. Realistically, it was the beginning of the U.S. colonization of Okinawa.

Sexual assault was one of the most controversial issues, although it did not become a public issue until September 4, 1995, when two American marines and a sailor were arrested for raping a twelve-year-old Okinawan girl. According to an article from *Nation*, while the incidence of reported rape in the United States was forty-one for every 100,000 people, at the military bases in Okinawa, according to at least public official record, it was eighty-two per 100,000.³⁶ The article concluded that covering up sexual assault was Pentagon policy, and just the tip of the iceberg.³⁷

Besides rape problems, there were thousands of auto accidents each year in Okinawa involving U.S. service personnel, and it was typical that American drivers normally did not have insurance and have often left Japan by the time Okinawan victims could catch up to them in court. A third issue is environmental problems caused by American military forces. The constant noise of landing of U.S. military air planes, and the construction of highways caused great environmental damage, as well as economic damage to Okinawa. Additionally, the most spectacular documented environmental outrage was a barrage of some 1,520 depleted uranium shells fired in December 1995 and January 1996 into Torishima Island, located about 100 kilometers west of the main island of Okinawa.³⁸

Both the film and play of the *Teahouse of the August Moon* described the harmonious relations between GI's and Okinawans through the American military officials' policy of Okinawanization. Okinawans succeeded in teaching American military officials about the Okinawan way

³⁶ Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback*, pp. 34-65.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Bill Gertz, "U.S. Slow to Inform Japan of Accident; Hundreds of Radioactive Bullets Were Fired in Training Exercise Near Okinawa," *Washington Times*, February 10, 1997.

of democracy, not American democracy. In reality, however, Okinawans in the early 1950s struggled to find their cultural and political identities while remaining under the influence of the U.S. foreign policy in Asia.

Featured Essays

**THE FINE ART OF IMPERIALISM:
JAPAN'S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL
EXPOSITIONS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY¹**

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In Japanese history, the nineteenth century can be sharply and unequivocally divided almost exactly in half. American gunboat diplomacy led Japan, closed to all Western nations but the Dutch for 215 years, to sign the Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854 and commercial treaties with several European nations in 1858. This set Japan on a course of modernization that resulted in the collapse of the Tokugawa shogunate and the establishment of an imperial oligarchy. The top foreign policy goal of the new government was to renegotiate the unfair treaties that had granted foreigners extraterritoriality and took control of tariffs out of Japanese hands.

The Meiji government perceptively realized that to accomplish this, they would have to be taken as equals, and that formed the basis for many political acts. Defining these acts in the context of Westernization and modernization is one of the central questions about this period. The new government imposed changes that altered the social fabric of Japan, changing everything from the architectural style of official buildings to dress, diet, and timekeeping. In a more practical vein, the government also needed to find a way to obtain foreign currency and prevent the flood of cheap mass-produced imports from decimating the domestic economy.

Both economic issues and the effort to receive equal treatment could be addressed through active participation in World's Fairs and international expositions. By definition, these fairs served to promote commercial interests and display national pride. For Japan however, there was a dichotomy between what was occurring internally, with the external adaptation of Western ideas, and what was exhibited at the fairs, which although not necessarily purely traditional, presented a Japanese aesthetic. Despite immense external changes, the Japanese sought to maintain their sense of self, as exemplified in the phrase coined by novelist Mori Ōgai, *wakon yōsai*, or "Japanese spirit, Western technology." Expositions were therefore used to market Japanese civilization as equal to that of the West.

¹ Presented at the Nineteenth Century Studies Association Conference, St. Louis, March 13, 2004.

Because in the nineteenth century they could not compete with machinery, aesthetics became the battleground.

The earliest appearance of Japanese goods in an international exposition was in the Great Industrial Exposition in Dublin in 1853. Just a hodgepodge of objects that had been previously collected by Europeans, this continued to be the pattern of Japanese participation for fifteen years. Even the much larger London International Exhibition in 1862 was assembled by former Consul General to Japan, Rutherford Alcock, rather than the government. A Japanese delegation to Europe, the first since the sixteenth century, was not impressed, calling the exhibit “a jumble of sundries like a curiosity shop.”² But in regards to the Fair itself, the Japanese understood exactly what they were seeing. Fukuzawa Yukichi, a translator on the mission, wrote that, “Expositions are held for the purpose of teaching each other and learning about each other, mutually taking the other’s strengths for one’s own benefit.”³

It should be noted that the idea of exhibiting domestic and imported products was not entirely new to Japan. For example, Hiraga Gennai (1729-1779) organized four exhibitions of useful plants, animals and minerals in the 1750s and 60s, publishing the results of his studies in *Butsurui hinshitsu* [An Appraisal of Natural Products] (1763). In the Meiji period too, small expositions were held all over Japan from around 1870.⁴

The Paris Exposition Universelle of 1867, however, was the first government-sponsored participation in any event of this sort. Nevertheless, this exhibit was also arranged with the aid of French ambassador Leon de Roche and was indicative of the internal political trouble that made this the final year of the shogunate. Two domains, Satsuma and Saga, even sent exhibits independently. On the other hand, it was the first time a major exhibition of Japanese art had been held in France, and the modest exhibitions of prints and decorative arts provided by the Japanese government set off an explosion of Japanese influenced design known as Japonisme. Some weapons were also included but this was not really new technology, as guns had been produced in Japan since the sixteenth century.

² Fuchinabe Tokizō, quoted in Yoshimi Shunya, *Hakurankai no seijigaku* (Tokyo: Chukoronsha, 1992), p. 112.

³ Fukuzawa Yukichi, *Fukuzawa Yukichi chōsakushū I-seiyō jijō* (Tokyo: Keio Daigaku shuppankai, 2002), p. 50.

⁴ Yoshimi, *Hakurankai no seijigaku*, p. 122.

The 1867 Paris Exposition was also important because Sano Tsunetami (1822-1902), who was actually on his way to Holland to commission a battleship, was charged with managing the Japanese commission. This was fortuitous because although Sano would spend most of his government career in the Ministry of Military Affairs, he was also a moving force behind Meiji government involvement in expositions. He witnessed the intense interest in the Japanese sales floors, drawn perhaps by the teahouse staffed with geisha, and conversely the inability to sell all the merchandise because it had been poorly selected. Although he was only seventeen at the time, his experiences both at the Fair and abroad led him to be selected for the Imperial Commission for the next World's Fair.

Between Paris and the next World's Fair in 1873, the Welt Ausstelleng in Vienna, Japan underwent a revolution, and the new government was only five years old. It is natural then that advice was again sought from a foreigner, this time Gottfried Wagener, a German employed in Japan who was instrumental in the transformation of Japanese decorative arts, adding new techniques and advising on what might sell. Wagener was also employed as technical director for the Fair by the Austrian government. But Sano was also instrumental in ensuring that quality products that would sell were sent to Vienna. It was the stated purpose of the Meiji government to participate by gathering the best things from all over Japan to show the West the ingenuity of the Japanese people.⁵ Exhibits included a golden fish from the roof of Nagoya Castle and a paper mâché reproduction of the Kamakura Daibutsu, a thirty-seven foot bronze Buddha statue from the thirteenth century. Kido Takayoshi, who was traveling Europe on a fact-finding mission, was critical of these efforts. He wrote in his diary:

The people of our country are not yet able to distinguish between the purpose of an exposition and of a museum; therefore, they have tried to display a mountain of tiny and delicate Oriental objects without regard for the expense. This seems to invite contempt for dignity of our country on the part of others.⁶

⁵ Yoshimi, *Hakurankai no seijigaku*, p. 117.

⁶ Kido Takayoshi, *The Diary of Kido Takayoshi*, vol. 2, trans. Sidney DeVere Brown and Akiko Hirota (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1985), p. 322.

Nevertheless, Vienna was a greater economic success for the Japanese than Paris had been, not only in terms of sales, but also because, for the first time Japanese exhibits received prizes, a total of 264. While the best that any Japanese entry received was an honorable mention, rather than the lucrative medals, it was a first step to acceptance.⁷

The Philadelphia Centennial in 1876 was a landmark for Japan as much as it was for its host. Although America had been responsible for opening Japan to free trade, this was the first large exhibition of Japanese art in the United States. Perhaps even more significantly, it was the first exposition where separate pavilions were constructed rather than being housed under one large roof. And it was architecture where Japanese aesthetic had arguably the greatest impact.




Fig. 1. Japanese Mirror and Bronzes, Main Building, Philadelphia Exhibition, 1876⁸

Although it was common practice to use local labor, Japanese builders were sent to erect the Fair buildings and all the materials were imported, comprising fifty boxcar-loads. Despite their strange attire and methods, the carpenters attracted admiration, creating “a credible specimen

⁷ See Tōkyō kokuritsu bunkazai kenkyūsho, ed. *Meijioki bankoku hakurankai bijutsuhin shuppin mokuroku* (Tōkyō: Chūō kōron bijutsu shuppan, 1994), pp. 198-201.

⁸ Centennial Photo Co. Collection of the Library of Congress, 1876.

of most thorough workmanship.”⁹ The Japanese exhibit was comprised of two buildings. One was a typical beam construction, part of which the commissioners lived in. The other building served as a bazaar and teahouse set in a prime location near the entrance.

These efforts were not diminished at smaller events. At the New Orleans World’s Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition held from 1884-1885, for example, the Japanese exhibit was described as “much more nearly complete than any other Oriental and than most European displays.”¹⁰ Indeed, the efforts were thought to show the “enlightened and progressive spirit manifested by the Island Empire.”¹¹ In fact, few foreign nations participated in this Fair at all and yet Japan participated in several other international fairs this very same year: the London Sanitary Exposition, the St. Petersburg Horticultural Exposition and the Edinburgh Silver Exposition; and three the following year: the London International Exhibit of Inventions, the Nuremberg Metal Works Exposition, and the Barcelona World’s Fair.

Although even more awards were won at the Paris World’s Fair in 1889, it was really at the Columbus Exposition in Chicago in 1893 that Japan came into its own. Chicago was the biggest Fair in the nineteenth century, and the Japanese effort was the biggest and best yet. Japan was among the first foreign nations to accept and invested more than \$630,000, one of the largest expenditures of any country.¹² They managed to negotiate one of the best locations in the site, even overriding landscaper Frederick Law Olmstead’s objections to make use of the wooded island in the middle of the lagoon. The Japanese pavilion was some five times the size of the Philadelphia effort. A modified version of the Hō-ōden [Phoenix Hall], a temple near Kyoto was erected by Japanese carpenters.

⁹ “Japanese Carpenters’ Tools,” *The Manufacturer and Builder* 8/4 (1876), pp. 73-74.

¹⁰ Lafcadio Hearn, “The New Orleans Exposition: The Japanese Exhibit,” in Albert Mordell, ed., *Occidental Gleanings* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1925), p. 209.

¹¹ Herbert Fairall, *The World’s Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition, New Orleans, 1884-1885* (Iowa City: Republican Publishing Company, 1885), p. 395.

¹² Robert W. Rydell, *All the World’s a Fair* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 48

Not only was it much larger than the buildings erected in Philadelphia, this temple was a composite of several wings added to the original structure over a six-hundred year period, from the late Heian (980-1185) to the Tokugawa periods (1615-1867). The Japanese compound was regarded as “one of the most charming and idyllic spots of the whole exposition.”¹³ It was visited by architects such as Greene & Greene and Frank Lloyd Wright, and that influence has shaped modern architecture. In fact the Japanese buildings were among the few structures that survived the end of the Fair, and remained until being burned in a fire in the 1940s. The fine arts exhibits were specifically selected to “conform to the classification adopted in Japan,” representing “only the best and most truly representative specimens of Japanese art”¹⁴



Fig. 2. Construction of Hō-ōden Pavilion, Chicago, 1893¹⁵

¹³ Marion Shaw, *World's Fair Notes* (St. Paul: Pogo Press, 1992), p. 66.

¹⁴ Gozo Tateno, “Foreign Nations at the World’s Fair,” *North American Review* 156/434 (1893), p. 40.

¹⁵ Japanese carpenters and stone masons in distinctive native attire starting to construct the pavilion at World’s Columbian Exposition, Chicago, 1893. C.D. Arnold. “Three Men on Homemade Wooden ‘Pile Driver,’” Collection of the Library of Congress, 1892.




Fig.3. Interior of the Hō-ōden Pavilion, Chicago, 1893¹⁶




Fig 4. Illustration of two of the twelve bronze falcons, Chicago, 1893¹⁷

It was common practice for nations to publish fact books about their exhibits and conditions in their country but for Chicago, the Japanese

¹⁶ Hakuranki, *Kakuhin Sekai Hakurankai – Bijutsuhin gafū* (Tokyo: Okura Shoten, 1893). Collection of Seijo University.

¹⁷ Bronze figures designed by Hayashi Tadamasa and made by Suzuki Chōkichi. Originals in the National Museum for Modern Art, Tokyo. Hakuranki. *Kakuhin Sekai Hakurankai – Bijutsuhin gafū* (Tokyo: Okura Shoten, 1893). Collection of Seijo University

Fair Committee commissioned a special *History of the Empire of Japan*, written by top scholars under the Ministry of Education and translated into English by the well-known scholar Frank Brinkley for distribution at the fair. This work was copiously illustrated with traditional prints and expounded the glories of the empire.

Moreover, in order to improve efforts abroad and reap similar benefits domestically, a series of “Domestic Industrial Fairs” were staged. After all, as one scholar phrased it, “holding an exhibition...became one of the obligatory tasks for a country that had achieved world power status as well as for those countries aspiring to do so.”¹⁸ Sano Tsunetami was the impetus behind establishing these Fairs, and Gottfried Wagener was enlisted to serve as judge on the first three, prevented from any further participation by his death in 1892.¹⁹ Four domestic industrial fairs were held in the nineteenth century – 1877, 1881, 1890, and 1895 – all off years for World’s Fairs. The first Domestic Industrial Fair in 1877 was held despite the fact that civil war had ended only three months previously. It was closely patterned after the fairs that had been observed abroad.

The entrance had a large gate with turnstiles as had been used at the Centennial Exhibition the year before. Because these were industrial exhibitions, a much greater attempt was made to show industry and not just art, including silk reeling. There were also exhibits of mundane objects which, until a few years previous, had been imported, including “surveyors’ instruments, large trumpets; foreign clothing; beautiful dress; boots and shoes...; trunks; chairs and furniture of all kinds; soap; hats; caps; matches and some machinery, though not much.”²⁰ Although opened and closed by the emperor, the domestic fairs were much lower key than international expositions. They did however improve. One observer of the 1890 Fair called it a “capital, though not very extensive imitation of the annual Exhibitions that used to be held at South Kensington.”²¹

¹⁸ Ayako Hotta-Lister, *The Japan-British Exhibition of 1910* (Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 1999.), p. 4.

¹⁹ Yoshida Mitsukuni, *Oyatoigaikokujin-sangyō* (Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyujō, 1968).

²⁰ Edward S. Morse, *Japan Day by Day*, vol. 1 (Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing, 1990), pp. 254; and William Elliot Griffis, *The Mikado’s Empire*, vol. 2 (New York: Harper Brothers, 1903), p. 589.

²¹ Douglas Sladen, *The Japs at Home* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1892), p. 202.

The Meiji government made fairs a priority, funding them even when the domestic fiscal situation was shaky. For much of the early years of the Meiji period, in fact, currency exchange issues, trade imbalances, investments in infrastructure and limited ability of the government to collect taxes meant that government spending was consistently in the red. In 1873, for example, the year of the Fair in Vienna, there were riots all over Japan against government-imposed social changes, rice prices, the taxation method, and conscription.²² For the Chicago Fair, the Diet and the executive branch agreed to the large expenditures, despite considerable domestic budget cuts.²³

I have as yet been unable to come up with an accurate number of how many fairs and expositions the Japanese participated in during the nineteenth century, but there were at least twenty-seven Japanese exhibits during the thirty-three years between 1867 and 1900, in addition to the four Domestic Industrial Exhibitions. The government remained committed to the effort because it obtained positive benefits from those efforts.

This aggressive marketing of Japanese aesthetics ended with the nineteenth century. In 1894, Japan entered the Sino-Japanese War, well on the way to flexing her wings as a regional power. New treaty agreements were signed that year, although they did not take effect until 1899. Most forms of Western industrialization had been adopted, civil unrest was temporarily calmed, and the economy had recovered. Japan was ready to present a new, more confident image to the world and this was evident in the exhibits in the Paris World's Fair of 1900. While Japanese art was still esteemed, there for the first time, "tubular boilers, armour plate and guns" were not just shown, but appreciated.²⁴ Efforts to promote trade and the efforts to promote Japanese civilization went hand in hand because recognition of equality was as important as economic prosperity. World's Fairs were prioritized because they could achieve these goals with finesse.

²² Joseph Heco, *The Narrative of a Japanese*, ed. James Murdoch, vol. 2 (San Francisco: American-Japanese Publishing Association, 1980), pp. 178-180.

²³ Tateno, "Foreign Nations," p. 37.

²⁴ Richard Mandell, *Paris 1900* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), p. 84.

U.S.-JAPAN COLLEGIATE STUDENT EXCHANGES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

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Introduction

Japan and the United States are each other's principal partners in international trade and investment, economic policy coordination, technology development, military diplomacy, and many other areas. The eventual professional career of university students in Japan is likely to involve working with Americans, directly or indirectly.

Moreover, when Japanese nationals participate in an international conference, trade fair, music concert, sports tournament, dinner party, and the like in Brazil, China, Egypt, Italy, Russia, or any other country, they must communicate in English, regardless of whether they like the language. In addition, they must interact comfortably with people of a variety of ethnic and cultural backgrounds.

Aspiring university students in Japan are aware of these facts. They wish to develop and polish the necessary skills through the experience of living and studying in the U.S. The best way to realize their wish would be for universities in Japan to establish student exchange programs with their counterparts in the United States. Such programs would provide Japanese students with opportunities to study and interact with Americans, as well as other internationals, in an efficient and effective manner. In addition, they would reduce the paperwork and time required for processing application and admission requirements. They would also reduce the cost of participation through the common provision to waive tuition and fee payments for exchange students.

Unfortunately, the supply of such student exchange programs is relatively limited, compared to the demand. These exchanges between Japanese and American institutions are not developed as extensively and thoroughly as leaders in both countries, particularly in Japan, have envisioned for many years. Many aspiring students must choose alternative avenues for their personal and professional development, such as attending English-conversation schools in Japan and participating in short-term sightseeing or experiential trips to the U.S. This paper explores why student exchange programs between Japanese and American institutions of higher education are underdeveloped, and suggests remedial measures.

Background

In 2005, there were 726 institutions in Japan that offered at least four years of higher education. Of the total, 553 were private, eighty-seven were “national,” and eighty-six were “public” (meaning municipal or prefectural).¹ They are called “daigaku,” which is typically translated into English as “university” (instead of “college”). In a strict legal sense, “national universities” ceased to exist in 2004, as they became “dokuritsu gyosei hojin” [independent administration university corporations] and gained substantial autonomy from the central government, even though they remained heavily dependent on national financing. In this paper, we will continue the use of the term “national,” although “formerly national” would be more accurate.

If these 726 universities are ranked in terms of academic background of students and faculty (as measured by entrance examination scores and by research/publication records, respectively), two percent, or no more than fifteen, of the total may be classified as “Very Prestigious Institutions” (VPI’s). This group is led by national universities, such as Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka, but includes a few outstanding private institutions, such as Waseda, Keio, and Jochi. Their students and faculty are talented. The VPI’s have been distinguished since the pre-WWII period. They have few problems in developing student exchange programs with foreign institutions on their terms, because foreign students would be willing to accommodate any inconvenience for the opportunity to study at such name institutions.

The next thirty percent from the top, or about 220, may be classified as Superior Institutions (SI’s). All national universities which are not counted in the VPI group belong to this category; moreover, they all probably belong to the top 100. Most municipal and prefectural universities are in the SI group also. Approximately fifty private universities may be in the group.

A good proportion of the students at SI’s possess English language proficiency (as measured by TOEFL scores) that is sufficient or nearly sufficient for studying at universities in the U.S. A good proportion of their faculty members are also capable of offering courses in English. Therefore,

¹ Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, “Gakko Kihon Chosa, Shitei Touke 13,” 2007 (http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/toukei/001/08010901/002/001/001.htm).

SI's possess a solid potential to develop and sustain gainful student exchange partnerships with American institutions of higher education.

Some universities (no more than fifteen) in the SI group, exemplified by Kansai Gaidai University, have successfully developed excellent student exchange programs since the end of WWII, particularly over the last thirty years. They may be called "Super SI's" or "SSI's." More reference will be made to them shortly. Some others (no more than another thirty) have made plausible progress toward the goal over the last ten years.

Deplorably, a large majority of SI's still appear to be either very slow or stagnant in the development of viable student exchange programs. The situation is frustrating, because SI's, particularly national and public universities, are expected to produce eventual leaders in Japan and possess talented students and faculty, as well as substantial financial resources, for successful international exchange. Moreover, they are supposed to be a role model for other universities.

The next forty percent, or about 300 of the total, almost all private, may be classified as "Average Institutions" (AI's). They do have some talented students in the present context, but the proportion is rather small. These institutions have a long way to go for signing student exchange agreements with American institutions, primarily because their students' English language proficiency is low. They would probably be better off if they supported those talented students studying abroad individually and provide the rest with opportunities for short-term experience trips and language training in the U.S.

Causes and Solutions of the Underdevelopment: Japanese Side

The most fundamental cause of the underdevelopment of viable Japan-U.S. collegiate student exchange programs is institutional bureaucracy. The term in the present context refers to the rigidity, conservatism, and arrogance that is prevalent at superior institutions (SI's), particularly national universities that are pace-setters within the category.

These institutions tend to faithfully follow guidelines set by the central government for years, even after they become antiquated and unpractical. For example, they have a dichotomy between administrators and academics, with little interchange. They use a job rotation system for administrative personnel. They have independent and rival-minded "gakubu," namely "colleges" or "schools" in the United States and "faculties" in Europe. They are inward-looking and very slow to make changes.

These institutions have tended to regard their acceptance of international students as a favor to these students and a contribution to the world community. They are apt to consider international students as those who are eager to study at their proud institution. Accordingly, they reason that foreign students, when they apply for admission, must have acquired sufficient Japanese language proficiency to read rules and regulations, fill out application forms, understand class lectures, write reports, and take tests in Japanese.

As a corollary, these institutions do not feel pressured to make themselves accessible and attractive to potential exchange students from English-speaking countries. Specifically, they take a position, consciously or unconsciously, that they do not need to provide much admission information in languages other than Japanese, to staff the international student office with English-competent people, to be concerned with conflicts with foreign institutions in the academic calendar, and to offer courses in English. At such institutions, understandably, the number of students from the United States is negligible. An overwhelming majority are from East Asia, particularly China, as they have an advantage in acquiring Japanese language proficiency.²

It should be added that at such universities, various “gakubu” (i.e., colleges) tend to regard each other as rivals or competitors in the development of international education and exchanges. They tend to think of exchanging students in their own discipline with equivalent students at foreign institutions. Such a practice reduces the scope, and therefore the possibility, of exchange.

However, some private universities and a few national universities in the “superior” category have been very successful in developing international student exchange programs with universities all over the world, including the United States. For example, Kansai Gaidai University, a super-successful case, has fostered student exchange programs with nearly 100 colleges and universities in the U.S. alone. An analysis of their attitude and practice should provide hints and clues to other universities that are slow or stagnant in the development of student exchanges.

² Japan Student Services Organization, “Gaikoku-jin Ryugaku Gakusei Zaiseki Jokyō Chosa,” 2007 (http://www.jasso.go.jp/statistics/intl_student/data07.html).

Philosophically, SSI's regard international exchanges primarily as their service to their own (Japanese) students, instead of as a service to foreign students and as a contribution to the world community. Because they are concerned with their students' career training, these universities want to provide the students with opportunities to learn foreign languages and cultures through studying abroad. It follows that they would develop and promote student exchange partnerships with American and other institutions. In order to provide opportunities to as many of their qualified students as possible, they try to make themselves appealing to foreign institutions and attract as many good-quality incoming students as possible. Their main principles of operation include:

1. Integrated International Student Exchange Office with English-Competent Staff.

There must be an integrated international exchange office supported by all divisions of the institution, with one or more staff members versed in written and oral English. The office must be able to work closely with various departments and faculties within the university. It must be able to respond effectively to e-mail and telephone inquiries in English. There must be basic informational materials written in English regarding such matters as admission requirements, application procedures, academic calendars, and course descriptions. This list sounds like common sense that is not worth mentioning, yet many SI's, which have necessary human, financial, and other resources, cannot prepare the basics, as they are a prisoner of institutional bureaucracy.

2. Offering a Minimum Set of Courses in English.

Typical university students in the United States who are interested in studying in Japan have taken zero to two years of Japanese language courses. They do not have a sufficient language background to enroll in regular courses at Japanese universities intended for Japanese students and taught in Japanese. Moreover, they would like to study in Japan just for a semester. To make themselves attractive to American students who would come to their campus through the exchange program, Japanese institutions should offer beginning, intermediate, and advanced Japanese language courses. Such courses can be taught partly or mostly in Japanese as the instructor feels appropriate. In addition, they must offer at least several courses about Japan in English (e.g., history, arts, religion and philosophy, educational system, government

and politics, economic structure, and business management) to satisfy the exchange students' non-language interests.

3. Synchronization of Academic Calendar

The typical academic calendar of universities in the U.S. is such that their fall semester starts in late August or early September and ends in December, and their spring semester starts in January and ends in May. In addition, many summer session courses are offered from mid-May through mid-August. Not only classes, but also financial aid, housing, and other arrangements are based on these markers. On the other hand, the typical academic calendar of Japanese universities is such that the fall term ("Second Term," more precisely) starts in early October and ends in early March, and the spring term ("First Term") starts in April and ends in July/August. Unless they are specialized in a Japanese-focused field of study, most American students would prefer a semester's experience in Japan. If they attend a typical Japanese university for a term, they must give up two semesters of study at home. Moreover, they must face inconveniences in making arrangements for loans, grants, housing, and other arrangements. Other things being equal, American students favor those Japanese universities which have made their academic calendar, at least in the international division, comparable with North American standards. They would seek out a Japanese university with little calendar conflict (e.g., Kansai Gaidai, Nagoya Gakuin, Nanzan, and Tsukuba Universities). If they fail, they may elect to study elsewhere (e.g., Europe) or give up the plan of studying abroad altogether. It may be added that non-Japanese universities in Asia that are successful in developing student exchange programs with North American institutions, such as Yonsei University in South Korea, Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Bangkok University in Thailand, have compatible academic calendars.

Causes and Solutions of the Underdevelopment in the United States

The United States is, arguably, the center of the world for contemporary civilization, in terms of political, economic, educational, technological, military, and other developments. Moreover, American English is spoken everywhere as the international language. Furthermore, to Americans, Japan is just one of the ten or fifteen most important countries. Thus, there are few built-in incentives and pressure for average American college students to learn Japanese language and culture.

Nevertheless, given the above condition, it is also true that global education is gaining strength at all levels of education as a background needed for a well-rounded citizen, and that interest in studying abroad has become increasingly popular not only among university students but even among college-bound high school students. While there are not many collegiate students who seek professional competence in Japanese language and culture, there are many students who would like to have a fair knowledge and understanding of Japan.

It would be nice for such students to study at a Japanese university for a semester or two. Student exchange programs would be an excellent vehicle. To provide more opportunities to students, American universities need to make a stronger effort to receive more exchange students from Japan. From this perspective, the following considerations are important.

1. ESL Language Institute as an Internal Unit

As stated before, there are many students at Japanese SI's who wish to study in the U.S. for a year, but whose English proficiency is barely sufficient or slightly below the required level for enrolling in regular courses at American institutions. It follows that the most effective way for American universities to increase the number of incoming exchange students from Japan would be the establishment of an in-house ESL language school or the arrangement of a collaborative agreement with a nearby ESL school. Such measures would allow more Japanese collegiate students to come to the host American university as exchange students, take appropriate ESL courses at the language school, and enjoy the benefit of American collegiate life, with access to various facilities (e.g., library, theater, gymnasium, and swimming pools) and events (e.g., public lectures, concerts, sports, and exhibitions) and with opportunities to interact with American and international students. Since typical Japanese exchange students study for an academic year, the availability of ESL schools will increase the number of eligible outbound exchange students for U.S. universities.

2. Paucity of Financial Aid for Studying Abroad

Although the rewards may be plentiful, studying as an exchange student at Japanese universities handicaps U.S. students at least in two ways, as compared with staying at home. In the first place, they must pay for the transportation to and from the Japanese university, including the trans-Pacific flight. Secondly, officially, they cannot work

for income, part-time or full-time, to finance the cost of living and education, as they typically do at home.

In general, financial aid in the U.S. for studying abroad is very limited, as compared with financial aid for studying at home. A few scholarship programs do exist for American students studying in Japan, but they are hardly enough. From this perspective, it should be noted that the philanthropic policies of Japan-linked multi-national corporations located in the U.S. (e.g., Hitachi, Honda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Sony, Toshiba, Toyota, and the like) needs reassessment and redirection. They should strongly support international education and exchange, as domestic market-focused U.S. firms would give little for the cause.

3. Bias towards the Study of Western Civilization

By and large, international education at institutions of higher education (as well as elementary and secondary schools) in the U.S. has been slanted toward Western culture and civilization. For example, while European languages, such as French, German, Spanish, and Latin, are taught at most institutions, non-Western languages, such as Chinese, Japanese, and Arabic, are not. Similarly, while the history of Western civilization or the Atlantic Community is commonly taught, that of non-Western civilization is not. As a result, studying abroad tends to lean toward such countries as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. It is about time that American universities take “affirmative action” to promote the study of non-Western civilization and culture.

Conclusion

Probably more than ninety percent of collegiate students in Japan are acquainted with the Civil War in American history, while their U.S. counterparts are not acquainted with the Meiji Restoration in Japanese history. Most Japanese adults can probably cite the name of the current U.S. president, while their American counterparts cannot tell the name of the current Japanese prime minister. From such facts, we are tempted to argue that American universities should take more initiatives in establishing, promoting, and expanding U.S.-Japan collegiate student exchange programs.

To the contrary, it makes more sense to argue that more initiatives on the Japanese side are needed, while efforts on both sides are certainly

welcome. As mentioned earlier, English is the international language and the United States is the center of contemporary civilization and culture, whether one likes the situation or not. While American students can afford to be ignorant of Japanese language and naïve about Japanese culture, Japanese students need to become proficient in English and knowledgeable of American culture. It is hoped that Japanese universities, especially “SI’s” (Superior Institutions), will exert greater effort in the areas outlined in this paper.

BOUNDED THOUGHT: AREA STUDIES AND THE FLUIDITY OF ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES

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“One of the recent priorities for the Board and Program Committee has been to increase social sciences representation on the annual meeting program and, more generally, within the membership of AAS [Association for Asian Studies]...[T]o encourage the presentation of new social science scholarship at AAS annual meetings, the Board of Directors has created a special panel category, ‘Directions in the Social Sciences.’”

Asian Studies Newsletter, “Note from the Executive Director”¹

In a recent edition of the Asian Studies Newsletter, Executive Director Michael Paschal suggests that there is a recognized lack of attention to the social sciences within the rubric of “Asian Studies.” He goes on to talk more about the “directions in the social sciences,” discussing concrete measures being taken in order to incorporate those disciplines which have been underrepresented in the Association since its inception. This call for reform appeared in the fiftieth anniversary issue of the Asian Studies Newsletter, which begs the question: Why is it that now, fifty years after the Newsletter began its circulation (and sixty-four years after the founding of the AAS), does the organization believe that a broadening of disciplinary representation is in order?

Beyond the scope of the Association, this is an issue that seems to be nagging at the heels of area studies² departments nation-wide, which find

¹ Michael Paschal, “Note from the Executive Director,” *Asian Studies Newsletter* 50/1 (2005): 3-4.

² Throughout this article, “area studies” refers to those academic departments in which a geographical region is the main area of concentration. Whether the geographical area is broad (e.g., “Asian Studies”) or more narrowly defined (e.g., “Japanese Studies”), the general focus on the language and culture of a particular geographically bounded region is the defining characteristic of area studies departments. Those departments that tend to be structured on more theoretical foundations (over

themselves in a somewhat precarious situation – usually falling within the humanities, but often incorporating history classes and other social sciences among their course offerings. Often wanting to expand the reach of their research boundaries while still trying to maintain the integrity and coherence of the department can lead to a kind of identity crisis which does not affect the majority of other academic disciplines. The jackets of books produced from area studies departments have gone from being labeled as works of “Asian Studies” to being labeled as “Asian Studies/History” to “Asian Studies/History/Women’s Studies” and so forth, which reflects an increasing amount of disciplinary overlap and interaction that is taking place. The complicated and controversial issues of shifting roles and disciplinary overlap within area studies departments in contemporary academic institutions comprise the main subject matter for Miyoshi and Harootunian’s edited volume, *Learning Places: The Afterlives of Area Studies*.

This article will attempt a close and critical examination of the arguments in this book, bolstered (and contested) by the personal narratives of others within area studies, in order to provide a well-rounded perspective on the ways in which contemporary academic disciplines have been defined, sustained, and challenged. My hope is to draw attention to sometimes overlooked issues of disciplinary boundaries within a field of study that is overtly concerned with geographical boundaries.

Masao Miyoshi begins his article, “Ivory Tower in Escrow,” the first in the book, with the foreboding statement: “Higher education is undergoing a rapid sea change. Everyone knows and senses it, but few try to comprehend its scope or imagine its future.”³ The change to which Miyoshi refers is in the relationship between universities and industry, what he calls the “corporatization of the university,”⁴ and it is within this change that he believes a simultaneous “bankruptcy of the humanities”⁵ is occurring. He focuses on the postwar phenomenon of the gradual shift away

geographic regions) are referred to as “conventional disciplines” if not by their proper names (e.g., anthropology, political science, etc.).

³ Masao Miyoshi, “Ivory Tower in Escrow,” in H.D. Harootunian and Masao Miyoshi, eds., *Learning Places: The Afterlives of Area Studies* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 19.

⁴ Ibid., p. 38.

⁵ Ibid., p. 14.

from ideas of universality and totality towards the ideal of diversity in academic thought.

While Miyoshi sees the merit in this ideological shift, he also sees a correlated and potentially dangerous shift taking place towards the commodification of learning in today's rapidly globalizing economy. Referencing the shifting socio-political scenes of the twentieth century, Miyoshi discusses the major corresponding shifts in intellectual hegemony. From Sartre's humanism, universality, and collectivism to Lévi-Strauss' abandonment of these ideals, the stages paving the road to post-structuralism are laid out in order to explain the forces that have shaped the present-day ideological rejection of essentialism and collectivism.

The socio-political changes that went hand-in-hand with this ideological shift stemmed from the increased diversification of the global community. Because of the rise in globalization and border-crossing among individuals, Miyoshi warns that "multiculturalism is the urgent issue both of pedagogy and political economy in the university in the United States."⁶ He clearly acknowledges the need for social equalization and the inclusion of "marginals," but also believes that the paradigm of multiculturalism is promoting more than social equality and acceptance. He explains:

The principles of diversity and plurality demand that one's own ethnicity or identity be deemed to be no more than just one among many. If this requirement of equal limitation and discipline were accepted by all members of the "global community," multiculturalism would make great strides toward the realization of a fair and just human community. Self-restriction, however, is seldom practiced for the betterment of general and abstract human welfare – especially when it involves material discipline and sacrifice for the parties involved.⁷

The connection made between these multiculturalist ideals and the academic institution is through the resultant diversification of identity politics among scholars – Miyoshi asserts that dispute and disagreement have become the norm within departments, and that "agreement is ipso

⁶ Ibid., p. 43.

⁷ Ibid., p. 44.

facto suspect and unwanted.”⁸ He points out how various individual factions, be it feminists, Marxists, conventional disciplinary scholars, less-conventional interdisciplinary scholars, novelists, or formalists all believe that their own method is superior to all others. This often irreconcilable internal disagreement, coupled with the problem of faculty members having their own professional agendas to attend to, has led Miyoshi to fear that humanities departments are being placed in a state of academic bankruptcy – presumed to be incapable of handling themselves.

Miyoshi’s claims and concerns are not unfounded. He has extensive data to back up his points regarding the corporatization of the university (or the “conversion of learning into intellectual property”), and a lengthy career within the academy so as to justify his claims about the declining state of the humanities. Paula Roberts, Assistant Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, corroborates Miyoshi’s fear of the marginalization of the humanities by pointing out the relatively meager funding available to their field. As part of her responsibility to acquire funds for the Center, Roberts has attended numerous meetings and conferences on the allocation of subsidies across the University. She recalls being surprised to hear that of all the government and private grants given annually to Penn, roughly ninety percent of the money goes to the medical school and the professional schools (including Engineering, Wharton, and Law).

Within the money that is allocated to the School of Arts and Sciences, around ninety percent goes to the “pure sciences” such as chemistry and physics.⁹ This means that about one percent of Penn’s annual government and private foundation grants go directly to fund research in the humanities and social sciences. Even if the monetary amount is not meager,¹⁰ the minute fraction of overall money which the humanities ever sees certainly seems to support Miyoshi’s claim that, “to all but those inside, much of humanities research may well look insubstantial, precious, and irrelevant, if not useless, harmless, and humorless.”¹¹

⁸ Ibid., p. 46.

⁹ Paula Roberts, Personal interview, April 27, 2005.

¹⁰ This is similar to the case of Japan’s massive military expenditures, which are often stealthily cited as “only one percent of the nation’s GDP.”

¹¹ Masao Miyoshi, “Ivory Tower in Escrow,” p. 48.

Miyoshi's ultimate advice is for academics in the humanities to "restore the public rigor of the metanarratives,"¹² and to abort attempts to keep track of any one particular area, nation, race, age, gender, or culture. He provides convincing arguments that a continuation of the unbridled rivalry that exists between academic factions will result in further isolation and ill-defined scholarship, which will, in turn, do nothing to combat the corporatization of the university. However, beyond the acknowledgement that humanities research is regarded by some on the outside as being irrelevant and useless, he does not convincingly differentiate between humanities research and, say, social science research, which is also seen by some on the outside as lacking in practical value. The "academic bankruptcy" arising from the instability and lack of coherence of ideologically opposed factions within departments should ostensibly be occurring across the institution, and yet Miyoshi inexplicably focuses on the humanities as the site of a particularly acute crisis.

Furthermore, given that his article appears in a book sub-titled *The Afterlives of Area Studies*, it is somewhat surprising that Miyoshi makes no direct mention of area studies programs. Instead, his focus is on the academic institutions that house these departments. While his reasons for focusing on the larger institution of academia in the context of area studies programs are clear, the outcome of starting a book on area studies with this broad-sweeping article is that "area studies" becomes conflated with "humanities" which becomes conflated with "academic institutions." While these entities overlap in certain important ways, the differences between them are key to understanding what is meant by a "crisis in area studies" (i.e., the overarching theme of the book). How does the alleged deterioration of the humanities as a result of university corporatization pointed out by Miyoshi relate to a deterioration that may (or may not) be occurring in area studies departments? While Miyoshi does not broach this topic, many of the other contributors to the volume suggest ways in which area studies fits into the larger structures of "humanities" and "academic institutions."

Rey Chow's article, for example, complements Miyoshi's by providing a clearer breakdown of where precisely the supposed "crisis" resides with respect to area and cultural studies. Like Miyoshi, she seeks to "restore the public rigor of the metanarratives" in order to "overturn

¹² Ibid., p. 49.

existing boundaries of knowledge production that, in fact, continue to define and dictate their own discourses.”¹³ Unlike Miyoshi, though, Chow has a far more optimistic outlook on the future of the humanities, which provides an insightful counterpoint to Miyoshi’s point on the “bankruptcy of the humanities.” In her piece, “Theory, Area Studies, Cultural Studies: Issues of Pedagogy in Multiculturalism,” Chow draws parallels between the reaction to “theory studies” of the 1960s and 70s and the reaction to “cultural studies” today, in an attempt to defend cultural studies as a legitimate field.

In the ‘60s and ‘70s, she explains, critics of theory, particularly literary theory, argued that it introduced issues that were not about literature, but rather about philosophy, sociology, and other areas that fell outside “the intrinsic qualities of literature itself.”¹⁴ She carefully traces the similarities between theory and cultural studies, first pointing out four types of analysis that have developed and have had a great impact on discussions within North American cultural studies programs.¹⁵ She explains that in a poststructural sense, these analyses collectively demonstrate cultural studies’ close relation to “theory,” in that both have the chief characteristic of needing to challenge the center of hegemonic systems of thinking and writing.¹⁶

Of area studies, Chow says that they are similar to cultural studies¹⁷ in that they produce “specialists” who report to both the government and to the academic community about “other” civilizations and

¹³ Rey Chow, “Theory, Area Studies, Cultural Studies: Issues of Pedagogy in Multiculturalism,” in H.D. Harootunian and Masao Miyoshi, eds., *Learning Places*, p. 115.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

¹⁵ These four types of analysis are: 1) critique of Orientalism (of Western representations of non-Western cultures); 2) investigations of subaltern identities; 3) minority discourses (the most prevalent and productive conceptual model in U.S. cultural studies); and 4) focus on “otherness” as the site of opposition.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹⁷ Chow describes herself as “a literary and cultural theorist whose work straddles cultural studies and theory,” so the emphasis in her article is on cultural studies more than area studies. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

“other” ways of life.¹⁸ This “otherness” has in turn become the object of investigation in cultural studies. Chow explains that although cultural studies as a discipline is relatively new, it is in fact just a “new name for certain well-established pedagogical practices.” The problem that Chow sees with area studies, the “crisis” as it were, is that they tend to approach the study of “culture” in the name of cross-cultural understanding and scientific objectivity, which ultimately continues “to belie the racist underpinnings of the establishment itself.”¹⁹ While clearly in favor of the critical engagement with theory that cultural studies demands over the (practically caricatured) simplicity of area studies, G. Cameron Hurst III, Professor of Japanese and Korean Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, notes that work within area studies can be either pure theory or devoid of theory, but that the spectrum between these two extremes is huge.²⁰ Chow’s characterization of area studies, then, is ironically simplistic. However, her emphasis on the need to engage in critical theoretical inquiry in both area studies and cultural studies is well-founded and deserves consideration by those who choose to approach the study of a geographic area without utilizing theory.

Focusing on a different perceived shortcoming of area studies, Bernard Silberman’s article, “The Disappearance of Modern Japan: Japan and Social Sciences,” attempts an objective look at both the structure and the content of these programs from the perspective of a social scientist who has done extensive work on Japan. He writes, “In recent years...area studies have come under attack from several directions and appear to be in the process of dissolution.”²¹ His justifications for this statement come from the higher-ups of the Social Science Research Council, who have announced programs that are “largely intended to replace the Foundation’s support for area studies, as they are traditionally defined.”²² As a professor of Japanese

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 108.

¹⁹ Cultural studies on the other hand, she argues, “cannot similarly pretend that its tasks are innocent ones,” Ibid., p. 108.

²⁰ Cameron Hurst, Personal interview, April 26, 2005.

²¹ Bernard Silberman, “The Disappearance of Modern Japan: Japan and Social Sciences,” in H.D. Harootunian and Masao Miyoshi, eds., *Learning Places*, p. 303.

²² Stanley J. Heginbotham, “Rethinking International Scholarship: The Challenge of Transition from the Cold War Era,” *Items: Bulletin of the*

political science (who is not part of his university's Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations), he speaks from the vantage point of one who has a seemingly vested interest in retaining the study of Japanese social sciences in one form or another. His essay, as he states, "is an attempt to understand the increasing impatience of much of social science with the idea of societies such as Japan being the object of integrated holistic analysis – that is, as a *field*."²³

Touching on some of the same pragmatic points as Miyoshi, Silberman examines the role of fiscal interests in shaping academic disciplines. When university funds are low, he explains, the first departments to come under attack are generally those that are the least firmly anchored in departmental structures, such as area studies and cultural studies, because they are assumed to be inferior in terms of methodology and conceptual rigor. Importantly, though, he points out that the social sciences are arbitrary constructions that arose from "the eighteenth-century Enlightenment fascination with categorizing and the nineteenth and twentieth-century economic incentives and compulsion to draw professional boundaries."²⁴ Thus, with respect to the relationship between funding and disciplinary "credibility," Silberman draws attention to the arbitrary nature of disciplines in an attempt to write off the issue of whether or not funding is contingent upon a department's utility in an academic and political sense. By "arbitrary boundaries," Silberman means that they are arbitrary in the sense that they could have been constructed otherwise. Intellectually, then, you can deconstruct boundaries. In real life, though, boundaries come to have a very significant meaning.

In a discussion about area studies with Hurst, this issue of arbitrary disciplinary boundaries came up several times. Having been in the field for well over thirty years, Hurst has seen significant changes in disciplinary definitions, as the social sciences have become progressively more theory-driven. He cites the example of James Morley, who was one of the leading political scientists of Japan in his time. Because his work was not highly theoretical, though, his "political science" scholarship reads more like the

Social Science Research Council 48/2-3 (June-Sept. 1994): 33-40. Quoted by Bernard Silberman, p. 303.

²³ Bernard Silberman, "The Disappearance of Modern Japan," in H.D. Harootunian and Masao Miyoshi, eds., *Learning Places*, p. 304.

²⁴ Ibid.

“history” scholarship of today. Hurst has seen the disciplinary focus of his own field, history, change over the years as well. While history scholarship today is highly driven by theory, Hurst chose to enter the field partially because at the time it was *not* taught as a discipline in which some grandiose theoretical framework was necessary to analyze the information you gathered.²⁵

The very fact that there is a repeated mention of the importance of theory in both *Learning Places* and discussions with area studies scholars deserves attention. While all the arguments allude to it, Chow’s article is most explicit in addressing theory. She writes that for all the critics of area and cultural studies who claim those fields to be “untheoretical” and “empiricist,” there are also critics of theory who claim it to be “elitist,” “abstract,” and “universalist.”²⁶ One of the problems that this dichotomy points out, though, is that there is no unified “theory” in scholarship, and that different definitions of theory prevail distinctly within each academic department. Therefore, to say that scholarship is or is not “theory-driven” is a subjective statement in and of itself, as the theory used in History departments, say, is bound to be different from that which is used in a Philosophy or an English department. One could even argue that the decision *not* to use conventional theory is itself theory-driven, as such a decision would presumably be motivated by a desire to present material in the most (theoretically) coherent possible way.

While Silberman points out the importance of theory in its capacity as being something that defines fundamentally arbitrary disciplinary boundaries, the bulk of his essay focuses on the more pragmatic facets of area studies programs. Like Silberman, Bruce Cumings looks at the utilitarian relationships between area studies programs, funding, and the U.S. government in his article, “Boundary Displacement: The State, the Foundations, and Area Studies during and after the Cold War.” He writes, “It is now fair to say, based on the declassified evidence, that the American state and especially the intelligence elements in it shaped the entire field of postwar area studies, with the clearest and most direct impact on those regions of the world where communism was strongest: Russia,

²⁵ Cameron Hurst, Personal interview, April 26, 2005.

²⁶ Bruce Cumings, “Boundary Displacement: The State, the Foundations, and Area Studies during and after the Cold War,” in H.D. Harootunian and Masao Miyoshi, eds., *Learning Places*, p. 109.

Central and Eastern Europe, and East Asia.”²⁷ The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Western communism, he therefore implies, have threatened area studies programs and have brought to light the issue of the academy’s relationship to the government. Because of this changing relationship, i.e., the government having less of a need to obtain information through academics who speak the language and understand the culture, Cumings points out that “the provisioners of [area studies’] ongoing funding are stingy.”²⁸

Parts of Cumings’ article reads like an exposé of the U.S. government’s association over the years with academic institutions, as he argues that the ultimate force shaping area studies programs is economic and political power. As Hurst points out, though, the government is not attempting to conceal its link to academia or to coerce scholars into gathering intelligence to the extent that Cumings’ article would have you believe it was. Government-funded programs such as National Security Education Program (NSEP) scholarships make the link between academia and the government very explicit, stating in the pamphlet:

The NSEP encourages U.S. undergraduates to add an international component to their education, a feature that is becoming increasingly important in today’s interdependent world. The NSEP aims to build a strong base of future leaders with expertise in critical areas...who have the international experience and language skills necessary for competitive performance and visionary leadership in the global arena....The NSEP enhances opportunities for its award recipients to gain federal employment. All recipients of NSEP awards are required to seek employment with a federal agency or office involved in national security affairs.²⁹

Therefore, while Cumings’ point that the flow of funding may be less directed towards area studies programs than in the past is accurate, his portrayal of the relationship between the state and the academy as being a covert and potentially dangerous one appears to be exaggerated.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 261.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ 2005 NSEP Pamphlet.

(Further) Shortcomings

While *Learning Places* focuses on the disciplinary scenarios that are nearest and dearest to its authors, the concerns surrounding area studies are not unique to U.S. institutions. The issues facing academic institutions in other parts of the world where area studies are common, namely Australia and Europe, are hardly mentioned.³⁰ Even just a quick glance at the situations in these other countries can provide a significant comparative perspective that the book is lacking.

In a 2002 review of the state of Asian Studies in Australia by the Asian Studies Association of Australia entitled, “Maximizing Australia’s Asia Knowledge: Repositioning and Renewal of a National Asset,” the scholars who compiled the study wrote:

The need for the review grew from a sense of crisis felt throughout the Humanities and Social Sciences in Australian universities, especially among those who study and teach about the countries of Asia. More than 80 percent of ASAA members who responded to our survey believe that Australian universities face a “crisis of renewal” in the next five years.³¹

When asked about the problems endemic to area studies departments in Australian Universities, Rio Otomo, a professor of Japanese studies at the University of Melbourne says:

Because Asian Studies are interdisciplinary, the lecturers are often half associated with their disciplinary base such as politics, history or sociology. But the main body of Asian Studies is language teaching, which means the dept is full of language teachers who did their PhDs on applied (socio) linguistics. This is the main income of the department because of the sheer number of language

³⁰ Rey Chow mentions in a footnote that her perspective is based on those doing work in the United States, and notes, “Ironically, to those who work outside the United States, American Cultural Studies can appear to be – contrary to the charge that it is too empirical - already too theoretical,” “Theory, Area Studies, Cultural Studies,” p. 116.

³¹ “Maximizing Australia’s Asia Knowledge: Repositioning and Renewal of a National Asset” (Asian Studies Association of Australia, Inc., 2002), p. 8.

students. But the professors and senior lecturers are usually “studies” people who lecture the subjects other than languages. There is a huge communication problem between the two sectors, and language lecturers often lack their representatives who can voice their concerns at the management level.³²

Brigitte Steger, a professor of Japanese studies at the University of Vienna who researches sleep in Japan, expressed similar concerns about area studies in Vienna. With respect to the Otomo’s point about the department getting the bulk of its income from language teaching, Steger notes an important distinction of Austrian universities – that they are free and open to the public. The result is extreme over-crowding in classes and a low retention rate. The Japanese studies department, which has only four faculty members, currently has over 500 students. In 2005, 180 new students were admitted, and about twenty-five students got degrees (mainly at the BA level, but a handful of MA and PhDs were also awarded).³³

Another issue which is under-explored in *Learning Places* is the factor of personal preference when it comes to academics’ choosing area studies over more traditional disciplines, and vice versa. The rigidly structured social sciences, for example, may seem too constraining for many scholars who wish to retain more personal autonomy and freedom within their “area” of study. These scholars, who may have equally strong interests in, say, literature and anthropology, might intentionally choose area or cultural studies because of the fuzzy boundaries and opportunities for disciplinary overlap that it can offer. Furthermore, the requirements for a degree in area studies might be more appealing and practical to a scholar than the broader, often theoretical, requirements demanded from the disciplines. Hurst, for example, focused on pre-modern Japanese history in his dissertation. In a conventional history department, he explains, he would have had to choose several other sub-fields to study in conjunction with Japanese history, like French or German history. The requirements demanded from his East Asian Languages and Cultures department, namely the study of other East Asian languages, proved to be far more germane and useful to his research.

³² Rio Otomo, “Re: Thanks so much!” E-mail to author, April 25, 2005.

³³ Brigitte Steger, Personal interview, April 27, 2005.

For all the benefits of flexibility that area studies allow, though, there are also institutional barriers that can be problematic for those in the field. As Steger has noticed over the years, there tends to be a distinctive split when it comes to researching and teaching within area studies. In the research and publication phase, it is an ostensible advantage to have multiple disciplinary tools at your disposal. You can get research funding from, say, a social science foundation and/or the Japanese government, and can publish in a variety of disciplinary journals. However, when it comes to getting a job, the problem is that each university is set up slightly differently when it comes to area studies, so unless you are lucky enough to find an institution whose disciplinary overlap is consistent with your own,³⁴ area studies scholars are more likely than those in the conventional disciplines to fall through the proverbial cracks. This underlying tension in scholarly goals – producing groundbreaking and interesting work on the one hand, and trying to maneuver the career path on the other, – is an easily discernible concern among many of those in area studies I have spoken with, particularly those who do not yet have jobs secured.

With respect to personal choice, Otomo's take on deciding to reside within an area studies department at the University of Melbourne encapsulates the sentiments of many of those in area studies with whom I have spoken:

Overall, I'm happier outside a conventional discipline, and Asian Studies is often a good hiding place for me to pursue what I want

³⁴ Steger points out the differences in disciplinary overlap between the U.S. institutions she has visited and the University of Vienna. She explains that the Japanese studies department in Vienna focuses primarily on ethnographic research in anthropology or sociology as opposed to the textual and literary focus of most U.S. departments. The history behind this disciplinary leaning, as Steger tells me, stems from the fact that the department was started in the late 1930s when Japanese anthropologist Oka Masao collaborated with Austrian Japanophile Alexander Slawik. The department went through several incarnations, being fully enveloped into the anthropology department at one point during WWII, but in recent years has seen a tremendous surge in popularity and remains a thriving field of study, especially at the BA level. Personal interview, April 27, 2005.

to do. Because all humanities disciplines are becoming more and more inclusive in the choice of topics, it seems disciplinary confinement is something that is doomed to disappear at some stage. Or am I too optimistic?³⁵

Conclusion

New York Times Op-Ed columnist David Brooks published a column in the *International Herald Tribune* entitled, "Reimagining Intelligence," in which he strongly endorses the continued effort of area specialists. Explaining a specific case from the 1960s (using recently declassified information), Brooks discusses how the CIA's conclusion in the '60s to abort attempts to improve relations with China was the opposite conclusion reached by Donald Zagoria, a China scholar. In short, Zagoria's knowledge of Chinese culture and understanding of how the Chinese would respond to and interpret moves by the US led to his far more accurate and helpful analysis than did the "compilations of data by anonymous technicians" that did not "draw patterns based on an understanding of Chinese history."³⁶ Brooks' argument pulls together several of the central themes in this book, as well as the opinions of area studies scholars to whom I have spoken.

Throughout this article, a conscious effort has been made to remain neutral towards both sides of the debate, placing no greater emphasis on those arguments touting the merits of conventional disciplines than on those arguing for greater disciplinary fluidity. After a thorough consideration of why scholars either reject or endorse area studies, though, it seems that Brooks is accurate in deducing that there *is* a very real need for area specialists. The role of these scholars will remain controversial, though, as the varied positions expressed by the authors of this book can attest.

While some, like Cumings, believe that the problems of area studies reflect a dangerous connection between scholarship and the state, others see issues of academic boundaries as far less threatening and worthy

³⁵ Rio Otomo, "Re: Thanks so much!" E-mail to author, April 25, 2005.

³⁶ David Brooks, "Reimagining Intelligence," *International Herald Tribune*, April 5, 2005 (<http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/04/04/opinion/edb Brooks.html>).

of concern. If scholars in area studies are doing historical, anthropological, literary, economic, and theoretical research on a given geographical area, and scholars in the conventional disciplines are looking at the same area through historical, anthropological, literary, economic, and theoretical lenses, then does this argument get reduced to a question of semantics? Does the way departments label/organize themselves influence the scholarship that comes out of them, or do the scholars themselves have more individual agency than this paradigm would suggest?

It seems fair to say that the scholars comprising area studies departments tend to have more of an impact on the department than the department has on them, while in the conventional disciplines the reverse is true. Those in area studies choose a topic (related to a given country or region) to focus on and then have the freedom to choose the most appropriate methodology to approach that topic. So within our department, as Hurst points out, we have several professors working on “China,” but all approaching it in very different ways and thus offering varied perspectives and analyses. Those in the conventional disciplines, on the other hand, prefer to use prescribed theoretical methodology to approach a chosen topic in order to empirically verify certain claims. Cumings eloquently illustrates the tension that arose between the social sciences and the “Orientalists” beginning in the early postwar period:

Soon, a certain degree of separation which came from the social scientists inhabiting institutes of East Asian studies, whereas the Orientalists occupied departments of East Asian languages and culture. This implicit Faustian bargain sealed the postwar academic deal – and meant that the Orientalists didn’t necessarily have to talk to the social scientists, after all. If they often looked upon the latter as unlettered barbarians, the social scientists looked upon the Orientalists as spelunkers in the cave of exotic information, chipping away at the wall of ore until a vein could be tapped and brought to the surface, to be shaped into useful knowledge by the carriers of theory.³⁷

It is precisely these differences in focus – language for the area studies and theory for the social scientists – which underlie the irreconcilable

³⁷ Cumings, “Boundary Displacement,” p. 265.

differences that Miyoshi fears are draining the humanities, which Chow sees as causing certain fields to be more or less fair in their theoretical depictions of areas and cultures, which Silberman sees as creating arbitrary boundaries and tension within the academy, and which Cumings sees as relying on an antiquated association between the government and area studies scholarship.

While the overarching arguments of this book may be seen by many within area studies as a mere polemic against area studies created by a cliquish group of Chicago academics and their cronies, I believe that their arguments merit some attention from the field. Those who have decided to pursue the study of a geographically bounded region ought to read about the diverse controversies surrounding this decision. It is difficult to get a cohesive overview of area studies today, as those who speak about it tend to be so deeply invested in the arguments (either for or against it) that an objective perspective is difficult to come by. In light of the fact that disciplinary boundaries are constantly shifting and changing, a point on which everyone seems to agree, *Learning Places* provides a necessary call to attention regarding both the causes and the consequences of these disciplinary transformations. My hope is that this article has provoked those involved in these transformations to reflect upon the overriding themes of the debate and to consider the future direction of area studies programs.

**LEARNING FROM HURRICANE KATRINA:
COMPLEXITY AND URGENCY IN THE HOLISTIC
MANAGEMENT MODEL (A RESEARCH NOTE)**

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In our earlier paper, "Learning from Kobe: Complexity and Urgency in the Holistic Management Model" published here in 2007, we reviewed the preferred Japanese model of holistic management. In this research note, we apply this model to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in the United States in the fall of 2005.

Margaret Wheatley (2005, 1995, and 1992) argues that the vast complexity in the contemporary business environment has forced organizations and institutions to allow for the possibility of anything happening. The reality of anything happening has given rise to holistic management models requiring a total commitment to the system by all of its individual members and components. The holistic model has proven to be effective in the management of complex environments. The model emphasizes total participation, cooperation, and consideration of every possible component. The model considers how the system as a whole can adapt and improve continuous training, learning, and sharing of information.

While the holistic approach is often highly effective in enabling organizations and institutions to adapt to uncertain situations, it is questionable whether holistic approaches can effectively react and adapt when there is a vast amount of diversity in a complex environment. The heavy reliance on total commitment, continuous learning, and sharing of information makes it difficult for holistically managed systems to rapidly incorporate information and resources which are not considered to be part of the system. This analysis will examine how holistic management systems respond when dealing with the diversity of complex environments by examining the potential flaws which can arise and challenge previously held assumptions. When the environment presents such demands, they generally must be managed by an open approach to varying perspectives and values. As an example, an analysis of the responses of the American natural disaster preparedness system during the Katrina hurricane will be conducted to show when and how holistically managed systems are not equipped to handle diversity.

Holistic Management and Hurricanes

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Mississippi Gulf Coast and broke the levee protecting New Orleans, leaving an unofficial total of 1,383 people dead and some eighty-five percent of the affected areas homeless and 6,600 persons still missing as of mid-December 2005. The final death toll was expected to rise as some of the still-missing are ruled dead. The death toll and other records are unofficial, because the “record-keeping on refugees is chaotic, scattered, haphazard, and utterly inadequate,” according to journalist Robert Lindsay, with losses estimated at \$40-\$55 billion, displacing the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack as the single-most expensive insured occurrence in the United States today (Guinn, 2005; Lindsay, 2005).

This system, in which various public and private agencies provide disaster prevention and relief, is highly bureaucratic in both form and function. Before the latest devastating hurricanes, Americans assumed the nationwide disaster preparedness system – Department of Homeland Security (which includes FEMA – the Federal Emergency Management Association) and the Red Cross, in particular – could deal with the aftermath in the events of the Gulf Coast region. However, in post-hurricane analysis, it is apparent, as in the Japanese example, that reliance on a bureaucratic approach to disaster preparedness does not necessarily ensure that the system can effectively manage a disaster.

After the devastating Hurricane Camille in 1969 on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, the U.S. government took pride that the nationwide disaster preparedness system could prevent a future tragedy. After Katrina, it has become apparent that the American system, similar to that of Japan and other countries around the world, relies on a holistic approach to emergency management. This approach does not necessarily ensure that the system can effectively manage a disaster.

Holistic Management in Complex Environments*Katrina as a Complex Environment*

Complex environments are characterized by rapid change, high volumes of information, high levels of uncertainty, increasing interrelatedness of parts within the whole, diverse assumptions and perspectives, and continuous new information driving changes in the fundamental structure of organizations and institutions (Cyert & March, 1963; Scott, 1992). It is the opposite of a deterministic, predictable, and controllable state of affairs. The three components of complex environments discussed in detail in the analysis

of the Kobe earthquake in Japan are continuity, abstraction, and stochastic (Takeda, Helms, and Jones, 2007). Our analysis revealed that in response to complex environments, holistic management systems suffer from negative effects of the main phenomenon – slow response time, escalation of commitment, and an inability to absorb outside information.

To manage effectively in complex environments, systems have become holistic, in that they operate with the imperative that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Proponents of the holistic model, among who are the Japanese, believe the essence of a thing is not found in the details but within the whole. Thus, they are relatively unconcerned about the individual elements of a given system. In the United States, the emergency response system assumes this holistic approach in its structure and design as is reflected in the interdependent, overlapping, and complex system of organizations, including FEMA and the Red Cross. A host of other state and local relief agencies, governmental entities, and non-governmental organizations (NGO's) are typically involved in managing relief in a catastrophic event (see Table 1 on page 136).

Slow Response Time and Decentralized Decision Making

In the holistic management model, the vast complexity of organizations and the need to gather massive amounts of information to make decisions created a heavy reliance on meetings. While this information sharing helps to reduce uncertainty, it requires large amounts of time and effort. The heavy reliance on sharing of information hinders the system's ability to make swift and decisive actions. The reliance on a multi-layered decision-making process made it difficult for the disaster preparedness system to respond quickly and efficiently in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. While a number of agencies had authority over the various parts of the system, there was a heavy reliance on shared information. Examples include:

- In an evacuation order beginning at noon on August 28, 2005 and running for several hours, all city buses were redeployed to shuttle local residents to "refuges of last resort" designated in advance, including the Superdome. The state had pre-positioned enough food and water to supply 15,000 citizens with supplies for three days, the anticipated waiting period before FEMA would arrive in force and provide supplies for those still in the city. A BBC documentary indicated FEMA had provided these supplies, but Michael Brown

[Undersecretary of Homeland Security for Emergency Preparedness and Response and head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at the time] was greatly surprised by the much larger numbers seeking refuge. Brown also held back supply vehicles from delivering food and water for two days before they arrived on Friday, September 2, 2005 (MacCash & O'Bryne, 2005).

- In another example of decentralized and late decision-making, on the night of August 31, the governor of Louisiana, Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, was begging FEMA and other federal authorities for transport without success. The same day, Governor Blanco issued an executive order where “she has in consultation with school superintendents, utilized public school buses for transportation of Hurricane Katrina evacuees.” On September 3, she ordered school superintendents to supply bus inventories (Lipton, Drew, Shane, & Rohde, 2005).
- On August 31, President Bush observed damage from Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans as the media openly criticized the local and national government response. Reports continued to show hunger, deaths, and lack of aid. More than two and a half days after the hurricane struck, police, health care, and other emergency workers voiced concerns in the media about the absence of National Guard troops in the city for search and rescue missions and to control looting (“Waiting for a Leader,” 2005).
- Slow approvals and paperwork seemed to be to blame for the late response, as governors and other officials in several states expressed surprise that they did not get formal requests for their National Guard troops until days after the hurricane struck. “We could have had people on the road Tuesday,” said the commander of the Michigan Guard. Louisiana’s governor had accepted an offer of National Guard reinforcements from New Mexico on August 28, but this was not approved by the federal government until September 1. The number of National Guard in New Orleans from other states was only 723 (Moran & Lezon, 2005).
- According to the *Hattiesburg American*, Vice President Dick Cheney,

a former oil industry executive, personally called the manager of the Southern Pines Electric Power Association on the night of August 30 and again the next morning. Cheney ordered him to divert power crews to substations in nearby Collins that were essential to the operation of the Colonial Pipeline, which carries gasoline and diesel fuel from Texas to the Northeast. The power crews were reportedly upset when told what the purpose of the redirection was, since they were in the process of restoring power to two local hospitals but did it anyway. Blogger Joshua Micah Marshall found the swiftness of this response an interesting contrast to the general disorganization of the relief effort (Marshall, 2005).

- “White House and Homeland Security officials wouldn’t explain why [Michael] Chertoff [Director of Homeland Security] waited some thirty-six hours to declare Katrina an incident of national significance and why he didn’t immediately begin to direct the federal response from the moment on August 27 when the National Hurricane Center predicted that Katrina would strike the Gulf Coast with catastrophic force in forty-eight hours. Nor would they explain why Bush felt the need to appoint a separate task force. Chertoff’s hesitation and Bush’s creation of a task force both appear to contradict the National Response Plan and previous presidential directives that specify what the secretary of Homeland Security is assigned to do without further presidential orders. The goal of the National Response Plan is to provide a streamlined framework for swiftly delivering federal assistance when a disaster – caused by terrorists or Mother Nature – is too big for local officials to handle” (Landay, Young, & McCaffrey, 2005).
- On September 2, 2005, CNN’s Soledad O’Brien asked Brown, “How is it possible that we’re getting better information than you were getting...we were showing live pictures of the people outside the Convention Center...also we’d been reporting that officials had been telling people to go to the Convention Center...I don’t understand how FEMA cannot have this information.” When pressed, Brown reluctantly admitted he had only learned about the starving crowds at the Convention Center from media reports on September 1, 2005, a full three days after Katrina hit, even though twenty-four-hour

coverage of the event filled every television network. O'Brien said to Brown, "FEMA's been on the ground four days, going into the fifth day, with no massive air drop of food and water. In Banda Aceh, Indonesia, they got food drops two days after the tsunami" ("The Big Disconnect," 2005).

- Testifying before a special House Committee on the Government Response to Hurricane Katrina on October 19, DHS Director Chertoff said that FEMA had been "overwhelmed" by the scope of the disaster, and estimated that "eighty percent or more of the problem" could be attributed to poor planning by FEMA. Chertoff directly disagreed with Michael Brown's earlier testimony that state and local officials were responsible for the slow response to the hurricane, saying that he had experienced no problems in dealing with state and local officials and that Brown had not informed him of any problems (Hsu, 2005).

These examples indicate the information sharing and total participation upon which the holistic management model depends can produce dysfunctional responses to the demands to consider outside information. There is no mechanism in the system for rapid decision-making at the proper levels of authority. It is interesting to note that in the Katrina example, the only rapid decisions were made by people, groups and organizations that were virtually outside the system.

The Refusal to Consider Outside Information

Individuals in the natural disaster preparedness system chose to ignore outside information. The U.S. bureaucracy served to limit the opportunities for outside assistance, even though there was a tremendous shortage of medical supplies and a great need for medical attention. Examples include:

- Several foreign leaders expressed frustration that they could not get a go-ahead from the Bush administration to administer help. President Bush said on the ABC News program *Good Morning America* that the United States could fend for itself: "I do expect a lot of sympathy and perhaps some will send cash dollars," Bush said of foreign governments. The immediate response from many nations was to ask to be allowed to send in self-sustaining search-and-rescue teams to

assist in evacuating those remaining in the city. France had a range of aircraft, two naval ships, and a hospital ship standing ready in the Caribbean. Russia offered four jets with rescuers, equipment, food, and medicine, but their help was first declined before later being accepted. Germany offered airlifting, vaccination, water purification, and medical supplies including German Air Force hospital planes, emergency electrical power, and pumping services; their offer was noted and they received a formal request three days later. Similarly, Sweden had been waiting for a formal request to send a military cargo plane with three complete GSM systems, water sanitation equipment, and experts. The Netherlands offered help out of the island Aruba in the Caribbean Sea ("U.S. Receives Aid...", 2005).

- Authorities refused Australian consular officials access to the affected areas, citing dangerous conditions ("Australians Refused Access," 2005).
- The mandatory evacuation called on August 28 made no provisions to evacuate homeless or low-income and households without transportation, as well as large numbers of elderly and the infirm, yet officials knew many New Orleans were without privately-owned cars. A 2000 census revealed that twenty-seven percent of New Orleans households, amounting to approximately 120,000 people, were without privately owned transportation. In a BBC documentary Walter Maestri, head of emergency preparedness for Jefferson Parish, stated that a year previously this issue had been fully discussed with FEMA officials who promised that within forty-eight hours of a hurricane emergency they would provide assistance with transporting evacuees from the city. Karen Tumulty of *Time* magazine stated, "New Orleans...clearly did not have an adequate evacuation plan, even though the city was fully aware that over 100,000 people there don't have cars" (Davis, 2005).
- When Wal-Mart sent three trailer trucks loaded with water, FEMA officials turned them away. Agency workers prevented the Coast Guard from delivering 1,000 gallons of diesel fuel, and on Saturday they cut the parish's emergency communications line, leading the sheriff to restore it and post armed guards to protect it from FEMA

(Arenda, 2005; Shane, Lipton, & Drew, 2005).

- Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, announcing the creation of a city-sponsored “Chicago Helps Fund,” said of the slow federal response: “I was shocked...We are ready to provide considerably more help than they have requested...We are just waiting for the call...I don’t want to sit here and all of a sudden we are all going to be political...Just get it done” (“Daley ‘shocked’ ...,” 2005).
- “Michael D. Brown, (FEMA), urged all fire and emergency services departments *not to* respond to counties and states affected by Hurricane Katrina without being requested and lawfully dispatched by state and local authorities under mutual aid agreements and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact” (“First Responders Urged Not To Respond...,” 2005).
- “The General Manager of the Astor Hotel at Astor Crowne Plaza said the hotels teamed to hire ten buses to carry some 500 guests. But Peter Ambros said federal officials commandeered the buses, and told the guests to join thousands of other evacuees at the New Orleans Convention Center. One man says he and others had paid \$45 a seat for the buses, and that they were ‘totally stunned’ when the buses never arrived. Another woman said the crowd had waited fourteen hours for the buses. She said the idea of walking to the convention center scared her because of reports of looting” (“Katrina: at a Glance,” 2005).
- The U.S. Forest Service had water-tanker aircraft available to help douse the fires raging on the New Orleans riverfront, but FEMA refused aid. When Amtrak offered trains to evacuate significant numbers of victims – far more efficiently than buses – FEMA again dragged its feet. Offers of medicine, communications equipment, and other desperately needed items continued to flow in, only to be ignored by the agency (“Landrieu Implores President,” 2005).
- On Tuesday afternoon, August 30, Jefferson Parish Sheriff Harry Lee asked for all citizens with boats to come to the aid of Jefferson Parish. A short time later, Dwight Landreneau, the head of the

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, remarked that his agency had things under control and citizen help was not needed. Apparently, Sheriff Lee did not agree with that assessment, and had one of his deputies provide the Lafayette flotilla (approximately 1,000 citizens pulling 500 boats) with an escort into Jefferson Parish. Sheriff Lee and Senator Gautreaux – 1,000 of Louisiana's citizens responded to the public's pleas for help. They were prevented from helping by Dwight Landreneau's agency, the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries which had been taken over by FEMA" ("Securing America," 2005).

- Wal-Mart agreed to provide bottled water, but FEMA officials turned the trucks back; the Coast Guard had agreed to provide fuel, but FEMA overruled the Coast Guard; and a FEMA official had deactivated the Parish emergency communications tele-data line (Gaouette, Miller, Mazzetti, McManus, Meyer, & Sack, 2005).
- "More than fifty civilian aircraft responding to separate requests for evacuations from hospitals and other agencies swarmed to the area a day after Katrina hit, but FEMA blocked their efforts. Aircraft operators complained that FEMA waved off a number of evacuation attempts, saying the rescuers were not authorized. 'Many planes and helicopters simply sat idle,' said Thomas Judge, president of the Association of Air Medical Services" (Gaouette, Miller, Mazzetti, McManus, Meyer, & Sack, 2005).
- The relief request form on the FEMA website turned people away if they were using any browser other than Microsoft Internet Explorer Version 6.0. This made it difficult for users of non-Windows operating systems to request aid. In some cases, Internet access stations set up for refugees and volunteers using Mac OS or Linux systems were incompatible with FEMA's site (Krakow, 2005).
- At FEMA's request for firefighters for "community service and outreach," some 2,000 showed up in a staging area in an Atlanta hotel. Many were highly trained and brought special equipment and were frustrated when they arrived, believing their skills would be used – or would be better used – for search and rescue operations.

Newspaper reports say FEMA requested them to prepare for “austere conditions,” and firefighters were quoted as saying they had brought equipment according to FEMA’s advice. These volunteers were disappointed when they found themselves watching training videos and attending seminars in a hotel, waiting, in some cases days, to be deployed in secretarial or public relations jobs. Some firefighters called it a misallocation of resources; others were simply frustrated at the delay (Rosetta, 2005).

Escalation of Commitment to the System’s Failed Course-of-Action

One of the most significant components of the informal structure in the holistic Japanese management model is its heavy reliance on group decision-making. This model relies on the continuous sharing of information, experiences, and opinions of all group members in the decisions which affect the group and the organization. This group decision-making structure is driven by a sense of total commitment of group members to their leader and vice-versa (Ishikawa, 1988; Hamabata, 1990). While this level of commitment and loyalty to one’s group within a system is one of the reasons holistic management systems are able to produce such effects as commitment to the whole and consensus decision-making, this absolute loyalty to the whole also has the potential to hinder the system’s ability to identify and to react appropriately when the system is following a failing course-of-action.

The idea that extreme loyalty and commitment to a greater whole produce a reluctance to identify or abandon a system’s failing course-of-action is based on prospect theory which holds that people will throw good money after bad (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The strong commitment to the whole makes it difficult for the system to change its behavior, even if its response to the presence of outside information is a complete failure. Escalation of commitment, therefore, is a naturally occurring phenomenon when holistic management systems must rapidly consider and use information and resources which have not traditionally been considered as part of the system. Examples from Katrina include:

- It has been widely reported that no one wants to deliver bad news to President Bush, who may be warm in public but is cold and snappish in private. The bad news on Tuesday, August 30, (again twenty-four hours after Hurricane Katrina had ripped through New Orleans), was that the president would have to cut short his five-week vacation by a

couple of days and return to Washington. The President's Chief of Staff Andrew Card; his Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin; his counselor Dan Bartlett, and his spokesman Scott McClellan, held a conference call to discuss the delicate task of telling him. President Bush did not quite realize how bad the hurricane had been. According to several aides, the reality of the severity of the storm did not really sink in with the president until Thursday night. How this could be – how the president of the United States could have even less “situational awareness,” as they say in the military, than the average American about the worst natural disaster in a century – is one of the more perplexing and troubling chapters in a story that, despite moments of heroism and acts of great generosity, ranks as a national disgrace.

Bush can be petulant about dissent; he equates disagreement with disloyalty. After five years in office, he is surrounded largely by people who agree with him. When Katrina struck, it appears there was no one to tell President Bush the truth – that the state and local governments had been overwhelmed, that FEMA was not up to the job and that the military, the only institution with the resources to cope, could not act without a declaration from the President overriding all other authority (Thomas, 2005).

- Even as the hurricane did its damage, President Bush did not alter his schedule. As an example, early on the morning of August 30 (the day after the hurricane made landfall), President Bush attended a V-J Day commemoration ceremony at Coronado, California. Some twenty-four hours before the ceremony, storm surges began overwhelming levees and floodwalls protecting the city of New Orleans (Moran & Lezon, 2005 and MacCash & O'Byrne, 2005).
- Commitment to legal jurisdiction also hindered relief efforts. Whenever active duty federal troops are deployed, there is reference to the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. §1385, which prevents ordinary use of the federal military force in support of local and federal law enforcement or in quelling riots or civil disorder. The National Guard remains under the control of the governor during ordinary times. The president can waive the requirement and assume

control of the military in an emergency. However, in practice the president will not assume control of a state's National Guard or move federal troops into a state on a law and order mission until requested by the state's governor. In addition, the Stafford Act states that the president cannot declare that a disaster exists in a state unless requested to do so by the state's governor, who must furnish information on the disaster and the steps the state has taken to resist or recover from it as part of the request.

The Louisiana governor took the required steps before the storm hit. Some Bush administration supporters contend that Louisiana Governor Blanco did not request military assistance for several days after the hurricane hit. However, Lieutenant General Russel Honoré, the head of the Department of Defense's Joint Task Force Katrina, indicated in a briefing on September 1 that the governors of Louisiana and other Gulf Coast states requested that the Pentagon establish local defense coordinating offices on Friday, August 26, and that the Army began operating in those states that same day and the following weekend in preparation for the hurricane. In addition, Governor Blanco formally requested that the president declare a state of emergency in Louisiana on August 27, in a letter complying with the terms of the Stafford Act ("Tracking Katrina...", 2005).

- William D. Vines, a former mayor of Fort Smith, Arkansas, helped deliver food and water to areas hit by the hurricane. But he said FEMA halted two trailer trucks carrying thousands of bottles of water to Camp Beauregard, near Alexandria, Louisiana's staging area for the distribution of supplies. FEMA would not let the trucks unload. The drivers were stuck for several days on the side of the road, ten miles from Camp Beauregard. FEMA maintained the drivers needed a "tasker number" to unload, yet no one understood what a "tasker number" was or the process for acquiring it (Lipton, Drew, Shane, & Rohde, 2005).

The End Result of the Holistic System's Response to Katrina, an Unusual Event

The natural disaster preparedness system's response to Katrina, in which the system faced numerous demands to consider and use outside

information and resources, shows how and when holistic management systems have difficulty managing in complex environments.

The system's slow response time and failure to take swift and decisive actions led to mass death and destruction in the aftermath of the hurricanes. Quite simply, the holistic natural disaster preparedness system was ill-equipped to handle this demand to rapidly acknowledge and use outside information. While the hurricane itself and the U.S. management models have been emphasized, the theory behind the failure can be generalized to predict and explain how holistic management models produce inadequate and/or inappropriate responses in such situations.

Lessons from Kobe and Katrina

The efficient management of diversity is imperative if an organization or system is to operate effectively in the global business environment. An ideal model of emergency response management may be unattainable. The holistic management model's application to Kobe and Katrina revealed that aspects of the holistic model hindered the system's ability to produce rapid change and adaptation. While in theory, a total approach to issues of uncertainty may logically make sense, if people assume they have prepared for all possible contingencies, then nothing will be left to chance. The danger in this thinking lies in the belief that there is a way to consider and prepare for all possible contingencies. As the natural disasters in Japan and the United States have shown, the misguided belief that the system can and will manage anything can lead to disastrous results.

While we can plan for various contingencies, we cannot believe the system is infallible. This requires education, training, and allowing individual responders to act in ways they believe are appropriate given the context and situation they are faced. The lesson is that we need to free our reliance on the system in a way that allows people individual decision-making and action-taking that result in effective responses.

Table 1: Disaster Relief Organizations

See <http://www.disastercenter.com/agnecy.htm> for a complete description of each organization.

Action by Churches Together	National Organization for Victim Assistance
ACTION AID	Nazarene Disaster Response
Adventist Community Services	Northwest Medical Teams International
African Medical & Research Foundation	Nippon Volunteer Network
AmeriCares	One World Organization
American Rescue Team International	Oxfam
Amnesty International	PAHO
AMURT	PeaceNet
American Radio Relay League, Inc.	Phoenix Society for Burn Survivors
Australian Aid	Points of Light Foundation
Baptist World Aid	Presbyterian Disaster Assistance
CAFOD	Project HOPE
CARE	REACT International
Carter Center at Emory University	Red Cross/Red Crescent
Catholic Charities USA	Red Cross
Children's Aid Direct	ReliefWeb
Christian Aid	Salvation Army
Christian Children's Fund	Save the Children Alliance
Church World Service	Second Harvest
Christian Disaster Response International	Seventh Day Adventist
Christian Reformed World Relief Community	Society of St. Vincent de Paul
Church of the Brethren Disaster Response	Southern Baptist Disaster Relief

ConflictNet	Samaritan's Purse
Episcopal Relief & Development	Swiss Disaster Relief Unit
European Community Human. Office	Tear Fund
Feed the Children USA	Trocaire
FEMA	UJA Federations Of North America
Foundation Hironnelle	UN Development Programme
Food for the Hungry	UN Food & Agriculture Organization
Food for the Poor	UN Refworld
HelpAge International	UN Reliefweb
Friends-Quaker Organizations	UNHC Refugees
Human Rights Organizations	UNICEF
InterAction	UN World Food Programme
International Association of Jewish Vocational Services	United Methodist-Relief
International Rescue Community	US Small Businesses Administration
International Orthodox Christian Charities	US Service Command
International Relief Friendship Foundation	USAID
Japanese Red Cross Society	Volunteers in Technical Assistance
MAP International Relief and Development	Volunteers of America
Lutheran Disaster Response	World Food Programme
Mennonite Disaster Service	World Health Organization
National Emergency Response Team	World Relief
National Voluntary Organizations	World Vision

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BOOK REVIEWS

Susan L. Burns, *Before the Nation: Kokugaku and the Imagining of Community in Early Modern Japan*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003. 282 pp. ISBN 10: 0-8223-3172-1 (pbk), \$23.95. ISBN 10: 0-8223-3183-7 (hbk), \$84.95.

Reviewed by Daniel A. Métraux

Anthropologist Margaret Mead often commented that the people of any culture experiencing momentous change must have a firm knowledge of their roots and that the loss of this connection to the past can cause problems of self-identity. Contemporary Japan is a fascinating example of a modern culture that is continually striving to define itself through endless studies and debates over what it means to be Japanese. This process, however, is by no means modern, for Japanese scholars as early as the early Edo period have been studying classical Japanese literature and ancient writings with the goal of trying to identify especially Japanese cultural elements or examples of purely Japanese culture. One of the results of this current was the development of a late eighteenth century intellectual movement known as *kokugaku* (the “study of our country” or “national learning”).

Susan L. Burns, associate professor of History at the University of Chicago, has provided a superb analytical study of the *kokugaku* movement before and during the early stages of the Meiji era. Burns’ goal is to analyze how various early modern Japanese scholars began to define Japan as a unique social and cultural identity, the “prehistory of Japanese nationness” (p. 9). She begins her work with a thorough analysis of Motoori Norinaga’s *Kojikiden* [Commentaries on the *Kojiki*], which when completed in 1798, became one of the most important intellectual works of the late Edo period. She then contrasts Norinaga’s ideas with the work of three other contemporary *kokugaku* scholars, Ueda Akinari, Fujitani Mitsue, and Tachibana Moribe, all of whom variously challenged many of Norinaga’s conclusions and greatly expanded the *kokugaku* debate.

Burns regards her work as a “case study” of how “a self-consciously modern nationalism was constructed by deploying existing culturalist notions of community” (p. 225). Even though some scholars date the start of the *kokugaku* movement to the late seventeenth century, Burns chooses to start her analysis with Norinaga because it was his work which

formed the basis of subsequent debate on the idea of Japan. While admitting that her examinations of the work of these *kokugaku* scholars “represent disparate and with the exception of that of Norinaga, discontinuous forms of *kokugaku* that played no great role in the major histories of nationalism,” her study of *kokugaku* from this perspective reveals:

The emergence in the late Tokugawa period of a complex and contentious discourse on the nature of Japan. By interrogating language, textuality, and history, the *kokugaku* scholars made the early Japanese texts the means to articulate new forms of community that contested the social and political order of their time. Against divisions such as status, regional affinities, and existing collectivities such as domains, towns, and villages, they began to make “Japan” the source of individual and cultural identity (p. 220).

Burns’ study of these late Tokugawa writers exposes a gradually expanding debate concerning the nature of Japanese society during what was a tumultuous era marked by profound economic change, growing mobility, increased literacy, and the emergence of a burgeoning publication industry and a national media. One sees through Burns’ analysis of the debate among writers like Norinaga, Akinari, Mitsue, and Moribe how inadequate the early Tokugawa concept of a society where social and geographic mobility would be limited had become. Burns’ analysis of the profound differences between the intellectual ideas of these writers exposes the growing intensity of the intellectual ferment of the period.

In her last chapter, Burns explores how *kokugaku* became the basis for efforts by a variety of Meiji era scholars to develop new modern conceptions of nationness within such disciplines as national literature and intellectual history. She examines the work of such modern scholars as Konakamura Kiyonori, Haga Yaichi, and Muraoka Tsunetsugu who:

Selected, reorganized, and adapted aspects of *kokugaku* practice to sustain new conceptions of national character and national culture, a process that necessarily involved attempts to silence concepts of “Japan” that had the potential to challenge the modern version of the nationness. Moreover, the referencing of early modern *kokugaku* allowed modern scholars to conceal the historical moment that gave rise to the nation and its political exigencies. In

other words, the rise of the Meiji state was portrayed as the result of nationalism, rather than nationalism as the product of the nation-state (p. 224).

Before the Nation is a work that will best be appreciated by well-trained Japanologists who have a solid background in classical Japanese literature and language. There are extensive quotes in romanized Japanese without English translations that would only be helpful to experienced scholars of Japanese studies.

Susan L. Burns has prepared a thoroughly researched in-depth analysis of the development of *kokugaku*. She works from a very broad range of original sources and engages in extensive literary analysis of contemporary texts to support her arguments. Her work is like a brilliant searchlight that exposes the reader to both the complexity and as the brilliance of Japanese scholarship in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. She introduces us to long forgotten scholars who played a major role in shaping the modern concept of the Japanese state. *Before the Nation* is one of those rare feats of scholarship that should become mandatory reading for any student of pre-modern and modern Japanese history and politics.

Yuasa Katsuei, *Kannani* and *Document of Flames*. Mark Driscoll, trans. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005. 208 pp. ISBN-13: 978-0822335177 [ISBN-10: 0822335174] (paper), \$21.95.

Reviewed by Leslie Williams

The history of Japanese-Korean relations is a troubled one; vivid memories, dogged misconceptions, and fiercely-defended emotions thrive on both sides of the contested issues. The complexity of this politicized divide was greatly exacerbated by Japan's thirty-five year occupation of Korea prior to the end of World War II in 1945.

Mark Driscoll's smooth translations of two short novels by Yuasa Katsuei (1910-1982) open the "Pandora's box" of Japanese postcolonial discourse. Both of Yuasa's works are rather detailed, almost ethnographic accounts of life in Korea under the domination of Japan's imperializing military machine. While very much in touch with aspects of life in colonized Korea, these novels obtain their vivid credibility from the fact

that Yuasa grew up in the occupied nation prior to his education at Waseda University in Tokyo. The novels Driscoll has translated are alive with the detailed interactions of Japanese and Koreans who live side-by-side, but both pieces serve as allegories for deeper messages of political and social discourse.

The first, *Kannani* (1934), shows the life of a Japanese boy, Ryūji, who accompanies his family to live in occupied Korea. In particular, Ryūji's friendship with a Korean girl, Kannani, is the center of this piece. These two innocent children become friends, and Kannani, who is conversant in Japanese, introduces Ryūji to the wonders of life in her native country. As children, their friendship is straightforward and true. Largely because of his friendship with Kannani, Ryūji expresses his desire to be like the Korean children near whom he lives. The childlike simplicity of the two children from different cultural backgrounds serves as a foil, however, for the very complicated perceptions and interactions between Japanese and Koreans in the adult world. For example, Ryūji's mother tells him not to eat Korean food because it is "dirty," but he finds this odd adult label to be untrue. The disturbing political and social upheavals that take place between Koreans and Japanese in this novel serve to make the relationship between Kannani and Ryūji look all the more pure and natural, especially when they become adolescents and their friendship blossoms into young love. Yuasa's work skillfully drives home the point through the protagonists of his story that hate and misunderstanding are not innate, but are acquired aspects of the twisted, adult cultural world.

A much darker novel, *Document of Flames* (1935) is a disturbing account of Nuiko and her mother, natives of northern Kyushu. Nuiko's mother is severely abused by her husband. She suffers a brutal divorce, and takes little Nuiko with her back to her hometown. But society in the rural town is unsympathetic to the hapless two, and Mother decides to take Nuiko and make a new life for them in colonial Korea. Life in Pusan becomes even more despondent as they struggle to have sufficient food to survive. Mother works first as a street peddler, then as a dock porter, and finally desperate to provide for Nuiko, as a prostitute. Life changes when, through unforeseen circumstances, Mother inherits an estate near Suwon. Having been severely downtrodden by male-dominated society, first in Japan and then in Korea, a system that had callously exploited Mother in return for a pitiful level of survival, Mother becomes a landowner. She callously exploits the poor Korean peasants, milking them and the male-dominated system to provide for herself and Nuiko in grand style. In fact, Mother

becomes so good at the male-privileged game that she is absorbed by it all. She takes on male characteristics, jealously wants (now grown-up) Nuiko to serve and wait only on her, and at one point even stoops to seduce her own daughter. Nuiko and her mother become estranged, and finally have a horrifying reunion at a funeral.

Yuasa again skillfully weaves a tale that is a comment on colonial Japanese rule and economic exploitation of Korea. The disadvantaged and downtrodden in Japanese society, in this case a divorced woman, perpetuate the same harrowing system from which they escaped by transferring the position of the disadvantaged to Korean nationals. The exploitative system replicates itself repeatedly by driving the victims to victimize others. All that is humane is lost in the process, as the game twists both victimizers and victims into grotesque reflections of their former selves. In a couple of instances, Yuasa presents extremely uncomfortable scenes that could evince in the reader revulsion and a troubled state of mind. This, it seems, is the author's means of provoking the reader to think about the uncomfortable realities involved.

Lest the reader feel too comfortable about the untidy realities of other peoples in East Asia, Mark Driscoll reveals in his afterward the complexities of "postcolonialism in reverse." Driscoll divulges what he claims is a pervasive, joint political and intellectual collusion by the United States and Japan to present pristinely monolithic images of themselves that make "hybrid and postcolonial contaminants" anathema. Thus, by publishing Yuasa's work, Driscoll is revisiting and legitimizing multi-ethnic realities, ones that the myth of Japanese uniqueness has tended to discredit and leave out of the pattern of Japanese culture. Driscoll's translation is perspicuous and engaging; his explication of Japanese history's heretofore cautious presentation is thought-provoking and well-argued. His assertions about postcolonialism and postcolonialism in reverse illuminated (to this reader) intriguing aspects of certain idiosyncratic Japanese social attitudes, as well as some prevalent assumptions that have previously limited the field of American scholarship on Japanese topics.

Jilly Traganou, *The Tōkaidō Road: Traveling and Representation in Edo and Meiji Japan*. New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004. xvii + 270 pp. ISBN: 0-415-31091-1, \$190.00.

Reviewed by Laura Nenzi

In this richly illustrated and very informative book, Jilly Traganou reconstructs the many meanings of the Tōkaidō highway from the Tokugawa to the Meiji periods. It is her contention that the Tōkaidō ought to be looked at “as a metaphor” (p. 1) for the social, cultural, and geopolitical values that defined the two eras. Such values become evident first and foremost in the rich iconography and literary production that celebrated the road in all its manifestations. It is precisely through the examination of images and texts that Traganou follows the “major epistemological and sociopolitical transformations that shaped not only landscapes and representations, but also the geographical desires and imaginations of travelers and spectators” (p. 3).

Each one of the three lengthy chapters that constitute the core of the book follows a different aspect of the Tōkaidō and of its meanings across the Tokugawa-Meiji divide. Chapter Two considers the iconography of the Tōkaidō, from official maps, mandalas, and “labyrinthine” maps to the railway maps of the Meiji era. Chapter Three shifts to the literary creation of the Tōkaidō in guidebooks, travel fiction, travel diaries, and even railway songs. Finally, Chapter Four wraps things up by examining “the Tōkaidō’s micro-scale,” that is to say the road as a lived space and as a space of experience (p. 145).

While acknowledging that “the borders between the Edo and the Meiji eras are not clear-cut” (p. 5), Traganou still highlights important transitions and innovations that enriched and changed the discourse on space and mobility. The introduction of the railroad figures prominently in Traganou’s characterization of the new (modern) modes of travel and representation and is, in my opinion, among the most fascinating topics of this book. Traganou argues that technology transformed travel by linking time and money and by replacing an emphasis on the journey with an emphasis on the destination. At the same time, the old *sakariba* (“crowded places,” or spaces of play) of the Edo period were replaced by the Meiji era train stations, not only as main nodes in the flow of goods and people, but also as sites that promoted “new urban models and public behaviors, while at the same time operating as the back-stage of the townsmen’s activities”

(p. 149). Just as illuminating is her discussion of how Meiji period literary works and artistic representations of the road projected new, “modern” values onto the landscape. Works in the league of *Illustrated Guidebook of Owari* (1890) promoted industrial sites as must-see locations (pp. 124-125), while Meiji period iconography began to incorporate not only images of trains and telegraph poles, but also whimsical tributes to illumination, steam, tunnels, and bridges.

In the conclusion Traganou offers some especially intriguing considerations about the Meiji period reconfiguration of historical memory. She argues that, in the modern era, Edo period locales traditionally associated with hedonism and non-productivity ceased to be treasured. The Edo past was then “re-authorized through the ideals of modernity” (p. 216): in art, this resulted in the elimination of highway scenes or of scenes that would evoke “the licentious aspects of traveling” (p. 217). Purged of their libidinal/liminal connotations, Edo period travelscapes were simply recast within the frame of a nostalgic yearning for the (idealized) days of old – a trend that, as Traganou shows in the final pages of her work, persisted well into the 1990s in the politics of the “Tōkaidō Renaissance” movement.

Another important theme (or perhaps sub-theme) in *The Tōkaidō Road* is the notion that Tokugawa period travel literature and cartography fostered the creation of a “standardized language and commonplace iconography” that eventually “paved the way for the formation of a nationhood” (p. 119). Such proto-national character of Edo period maps is a point Traganou makes repeatedly throughout the book and then picks up again in the conclusion, which is aptly titled “The Tōkaidō as a medium of national knowledge.” I found this to be especially interesting when read against the final chapter of another prominent work on Edo period spaces, Marcia Yonemoto’s *Mapping Early Modern Japan* (University of California Press, 2003). In her conclusion (“Famous Places are not National Spaces”) Yonemoto questions the applicability of “the vocabulary of the ‘national’” to Edo period spatial representations and rejects any teleological claim that early modern mapping “constituted a form of ‘proto’-geography or cartography” (p. 176). Given such difference in interpretation, I would have liked to see Traganou engage directly and openly with Yonemoto’s position in the conclusion.

This is not to say Traganou ignores existing scholarship. To the contrary, *The Tōkaidō Road* is a meticulously researched book whose bibliography reads like a Who’s Who of Tokugawa and Meiji cultural, literary, and social history. Traganou’s interdisciplinary approach is rich in

theoretical underpinnings, from cultural geography to spatial anthropology, which may make the book difficult to use in an undergraduate class. Generally speaking, however, Traganou uses theory mostly in the introduction; the rest of the book is, for the most part, straightforward and clear. Overall, *The Tōkaidō Road* is well worth reading. The rich gallery of case studies it presents successfully brings to light the complex and intricate vocabulary of space and mobility in the transition between the Edo and Meiji periods, and greatly enriches our understanding of the many ways in which modernity reconfigured landscapes and their representations.

Sawa Kurotani, *Home Away from Home: Japanese Corporate Wives in the United States*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005. 241 pp. ISBN-13: 0-8223-3630-8 (hbk), \$74.95; ISBN 10: 0-8223-3622-7 (paper), \$21.95.

Reviewed by Don R. McCreary

Question: Why did the Japanese housewife ship a two-year supply of shampoo from her home in Japan to the U.S.?

The answer to this question and many others can be found in this fascinating fieldwork by Sawa Kurotani, an anthropologist at the University of Redlands in California. I found this book to be well worth my time because I have lived for twenty-two years in a small city with a Japanese manufacturing plant and have met most of the expatriate Japanese employees and their families that have come and gone. The family situations described by Kurotani, especially those in the Midwestern city, “Centerville” (a pseudonym), ring true and are replicated more or less in the expatriate families I have gotten to know well. In her ethnographic study, Kurotani analyzes the physical settings, housing situations, daily and weekly routines, educational conditions, family roles and responsibilities, emotional considerations, and psychological issues that confront expatriate Japanese housewives in the United States. It is clear that Kurotani was included in the housewives’ inner circles and was privy to their intimate thoughts and emotions.

This ethnographic fieldwork examines three very different locations in the U.S: the Midwestern city “Centerville” which has one large (car?) manufacturer, the North Carolina Research Triangle, with its high

tech firms, and the Greater New York City area, with its diversity and its stable Japanese communities. Since she was able to live in these three different settings and became close to Japanese women in several different social classes, Kurotani can claim that her findings may be applicable to a good number of the Japanese expatriates in the U.S.

Kurotani elucidates several key areas, “traveling” rather than settling, global rather than local, going native, and *uchi-soto* relationships. “Traveling” or “on a vacation” is a popular description by the housewives themselves. Ironically, Kurotani, in her very detailed accounting of their daily work schedules, demonstrates that they are working virtually non-stop, and are rarely on vacation. Similarly, they are traveling from time to time in the U.S., but they are not going anywhere to experience the culture first hand or in depth. Only in the New York area did Kurotani find anyone interested in assimilation.

As for global-local issues, the housewives feel ambivalent about globalization as applied to homemaking practices. The idea that the housewives are transnational hybridized workers, taking some cultural practices from Japan and mixing them with some Western practices is understood by the housewives but not fully accepted. Instead, they appear to be in denial about it. Combined with the notion of “traveling” above and the language barrier, they appear to insulate themselves from potential life-changing experiences in America, instead preferring to maintain their Japanese lifestyle. “Going native” does occur in the New York area, and by those Japanese expatriates who prefer “a more *ningen rashii ikikata* [human-like or humane lifestyle],” according to Kurotani (p. 211).

Kurotani relies heavily on the notion of *uchi* and *soto*: The home in the U.S. is the housewife’s *uchi*, a simulacrum of a cozy, cluttered urban home in Japan. As soon as they take off their shoes at the *genkan*, or rather its imaginary substitute, people enter a non-Western world created by the housewife. Kurotani describes the work routines, addressing homemaking as *shigoto*, one of the housewives’ perceived roles or responsibilities (*yakume*), and *kaji*, maintaining the physical space, illustrating this with colorful expressions, such as “*dosoku de fuminijeru* [‘trample on with the dirty feet’]” (p. 90). Kurotani’s fieldwork also examines herding practices by the Japanese wives, all going to the same Chinese restaurant, all trying out the same Asian grocery, all trying the same American restaurant during the same week, which occurs since the housewives’ rumor mill is efficient and specifies which places are “the best.” In addition to the shampoo buying in the opening question, Kurotani explains other odd or unusual

behaviors, such as buying “eggs for sukiyaki” only at the local Japanese or Asian grocery in the American town, since only these eggs can be eaten raw, or so they believe. The tendency to go out in a group is explained by Kurotani by linking it to the idea of America as a *kowai tokoro* [a scary place]. As for the huge supply of shampoo, the housewife believed that shampoos in the US would not be appropriate for Japanese hair.

Kurotani also reports on the racial perceptions of the housewives. In the New York area, expatriate Japanese divided white Americans into “true whites” and “lesser whites” (p. 172), those from southern and Eastern Europe, light-skinned Hispanics, and Jews. In Centerville and in North Carolina, the Japanese women understood the racial divisions only as a black-white dichotomy, with themselves in the role of “privileged outsiders” (p. 172). Around New York City, Kurotani finds that Japanese expatriates have strained relations with Japanese-Americans and Korean-Americans, while African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans are little known and are on the outer fringes of their *soto*, their world of outsiders.

Kurotani provides a penetrating analysis of a popular urban legend among expatriate Japanese wives, which has been circulating for at least thirty years. The story begins in New York. While shopping in New York (usually on Fifth Avenue at Macy’s), a group of Japanese women notice that one woman is missing. The missing woman has become separated from the group somehow while shopping. The rest of the group searches for her without success. A few days later, she comes home in a disheveled state. She tells them that she was kidnapped on Fifth Avenue (or in Macy’s) in broad daylight by a gang of armed black men. She is taken away, drugged, and repeatedly raped. She says she cannot identify the men or tell where she was taken. The tale has several endings that coexist. She disappears, finds her way back to the group to relate the terrible tale, is sent back to Japan by herself, or “she commit[s] suicide out of shame” (p. 169).

The Japanese Consulate in New York has looked into this tale and according to Kurotani, “Consulate personnel conducted a thorough investigation and concluded that the story was a complete fabrication” (p. 169). However, the folktale serves a useful purpose, maintaining the conformity and cohesion in the housewives’ groups in many expatriate communities. The implicit warnings noted by Kurotani include a lack of safety (even on Fifth Avenue), the probability of danger when acting alone outside the Japanese group, fear of blacks, fear of guns that are everywhere, the prevalence of drugs in the city, and the chance of solitary activity by a

housewife inviting rape. Kurotani explains, "Fear, then, had the effect of keeping the boundaries tight...and keeping women close to home" (p. 171).

As for frustrations caused by some weaknesses in the book, first, I found that the hints throughout the book about Kurotani's own lifestyle and attitudes made me want to read more of her own narrative since I noted a few indicators that she seems to have tried to assimilate into the culture; however, personal events, such as her divorce, are presented only as bits of information that tend to contrast with the housewives' lives. These personal narratives written in colloquial language are very readable, but the prose style often shifts to academic jargon. Second, Kurotani examines *nihonjinron* in two chapters and includes a discussion of "Japanese blood" as a measure of purity, but tends to leave the issue up in the air, distancing herself by relating ideas such as, "Whether objectively accurate or not,...insiders have often cited...the presumably uniquely Japanese combination of attributes" (p. 56). Since some of the housewives were permanently influenced by life in America and raised children who were becoming Americanized, Kurotani could have taken the opportunity to comment more about *nihonjinron*. Third, the housewives' work routines and play routines are repeatedly examined from several perspectives in three chapters, usually with *uchi-soto* as the analytical tool. For this reader, this repetition, combined with occasionally pedantic "dissertationese" left over from her thesis, caused me to lose interest at several points.

The strengths in this largely enjoyable book greatly outweigh the weaknesses. The workaday situations described by Kurotani sound familiar to me, and her ethnographic analysis also rings true. Several strong features are evident in her fieldwork. She was included in the women's inner circles and came to know her informants very well, in some individual cases getting to know them intimately. She found consistent themes that ran across three communities, even though they were geographically very far apart, involved very different work settings and policies, and that ran across several different social classes. She writes lucid prose, especially when she is inside the narratives from the housewives, gives ample illustrations, and has a cohesive narrative, one that is appropriate for both undergraduate and graduate students as a supplementary text in anthropology and gender studies courses.

Sawa Kurotani, *Home Away from Home: Japanese Corporate Wives in the United States*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005. 241 pp. ISBN-13: 0-8223-3630-8 (hbk), \$74.95; ISBN 10: 0-8223-3622-7 (paper), \$21.95.

Reviewed by Patricia Pringle

Sawa Kurotani's ethnography, *Home Away from Home*, will be of great interest to anyone wanting to know more about the Japanese women who accompany their husbands to the United States when their husbands are sent here on assignment by Japanese multinational companies. Kurotani is the first scholar to look closely at the experiences of these women. Much is written about the growth of Japanese multinationals in the U.S., but the wives' contribution has been taken for granted and completely overlooked by those researching Japanese business. This may reflect how the role of the housewife is perceived by Japanese businesses and the larger Japanese society, as well as our own. In addition, as Kurotani points out in her introduction, some scholars of migration and globalization have suggested that the mobility experience of Japanese housewives is not worthy of scholarly attention, since they are "sheltered" and remain "Japanese" throughout their sojourn in the United States. Kurotani's study shows how the wives' role of creating a Japanese home away from home to make husband's foreign assignment more livable for their husbands and children fits into the overall themes of globalization, migration, and women's domestic labor.

For this ethnography, Kurotani conducted formal and informal interviews with over 120 women in three large expatriate communities in the U.S.: "Centerville" (a pseudonym), a town in the Midwest with a major Japanese automotive manufacturing plant and related Japanese suppliers; the New York metropolitan area; and the Research Triangle area in North Carolina. Each of these areas has its own particular Japanese expatriate community, social structure for the wives, and own particular issues. For example, New York has convenient shopping for Japanese foodstuffs, but there are more concerns for personal safety. Centerville is comfortable and suburban, but the women have to deal with a hierarchy of wives mirroring that of the husbands. In the Research Triangle area, there is no oppressive hierarchy, but the wives spend many hours in traffic, chauffeuring their children back and forth to play dates and other activities.

Kurotani's book begins with a theoretical discussion of migration, gender, and national culture, linking her subject matter to these topics.

Throughout the book, she ties the findings of her ethnography to a broader discussion of globalization, domesticity, and Japanese cultural norms.

Relationships with other expatriate wives form an important part of the assignment experience. Other Japanese women provide support, friendship, and local information needed to live in an unfamiliar town. However, looking after one's own need for friendship is always subordinate to serving the needs of husbands and children. Kurotani met many of her informants through her own participation in a number of informal women's groups. Though she is a scholar and not a housewife, the women shared with her the details of their lives and relationships, and their fears about living in the U.S.

Kurotani's study illustrates a number of interesting points. Companies wish to be successful in the global marketplace and develop their (male) employees as global businesspeople, yet they rely on the wives to provide a Japanese haven for the husband to return to after an exhausting day of dealing with foreigners and using a foreign language. While their husbands are becoming global businessmen, the wives are the ones managing the day to day interactions in the foreign environment: children's education, maintenance on the house, the yard, and the car, and learning to navigate around unfamiliar cities.

The wives see themselves as "on a long vacation" (in the sense that they do not have the same responsibilities that they have in Japan), yet they must work very hard to maintain a "Japanese" home for their husbands and their families. For example, grocery shopping in Japan is relatively simple and can easily be done on foot every day. In the U.S., however, wives must often drive many miles across town to find Japanese ingredients for making familiar Japanese dishes. She may spend many hours a day preparing specialized meals for different members of her family: rising early to prepare the "o-bento" lunch box for her husband, meals for herself and her children, after school snacks, and even a separate late night meal for her husband when he comes home late at night from the office. In Japan, some of these meals could be made from or at least supplemented by prepared foods from supermarkets and department stores, but in the U.S., these meals have to be made from scratch. Kurotani discovered that her informants spent an average of four to five hours a day on food preparation, and an average of one hour a day on grocery shopping.

Throughout the book, Kurotani remarks on the incredible tedium of the wives' daily schedules – days fragmented by the endless cycle of feeding the various family members, chauffeuring the children around, and

tending to the household. I am an American housewife, and I was struck by how similar my schedule is to Japanese housewives' schedule she describes as being so oppressive. One does not have to be a Japanese wife to be constrained by the demands of caretaking and transporting our children in the U.S., where our children depend on us for transportation rather than walking or taking public transit, as is common in Japan. I found the adjustment of the Japanese informants to typical U.S. suburban lifestyles the most interesting part of the book.

Kurotani's ethnography of the lives of the Japanese wives provides a rare view of what a U.S. assignment for a Japanese multinational company means for the families involved.

Cathy N. Davidson, *36 Views of Mount Fuji: On Finding Myself in Japan (With a New Afterward by the Author)*. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2006 (reprint of original published by E.P Dutton, 1993). xv + 248 pp. ISBN-13: 978-0-8223-3860-4 [ISBN-10: 0-8223-3860-2] (cloth) \$64.95; ISBN-13:978-0-8223-3913-7 [ISBN-10: 978-0-8223-3913-7] (pbk), \$19.95.

Reviewed by Pamela D. Winfield

In 1980, Cathy Davidson signed up for Michigan State University's faculty exchange program with Osaka's prestigious Kansai Women's University (KWU). Her first ten months there and her three subsequent visits to Japan form the basis of this insightful 1993 travel memoir, whose title invokes Hokusai's famous series of woodblock prints. In this series, scenes of fleeting everyday life are set against the unchanging omnipresence of Mount Fuji, so that when viewed altogether, they form a composite portrait of the land as a whole. Davidson likewise looks back over the "individual encounters, intimate moments and small revelations that helped me make sense of Japan" (p. xiii), yet she also considers how her Japanese friends make sense of America and Americans. As a result, the volume provides the reader with a rich meditation on the nature of the cultural encounter and the transformative effect it has on both sides of the Pacific. *36 Views of Mount Fuji: On Finding Myself in Japan* thus helps both the first-time traveler and the seasoned veteran better understand some of Japan's most constant refrains. It also helps one to appreciate more fully

the feedback loop of expectation and accommodation that occurs whenever two Others meet and find their Selves remade in the process.

Davidson begins each chapter of her account with a carefully selected image from Hokusai's series of Edo-period life (fittingly enough, these images were influenced by European-style single-point perspective, then avidly collected by nineteenth-century Europeans seeking something but were "typically Japanese"). Chapter One on "Seeing and Being Seen," for example, contemplates the fact that tourists and foreigners are always and everywhere both the agents and the objects of vision. This reciprocity of gazes is suggested by Hokusai's print of an arched bridge with a passing boat of fishermen below and the ubiquitous Mount Fuji in the background. The horizontal gaze across the East-West gap, the vertical glances between the high and low within Japanese society, and the depth of vision established between Mount Fuji and the spectator observing from the outside suggest that things are often best understood when perceived from afar.

Davidson often ventures beyond her own frame of reference to perceive both sides of every coin – herself included. She is able to describe Japan's natural beauty and urban blight with equal passion, and she understands how America's unrivaled expanses and self-interested greed appear excessive when seen through Japanese eyes. She writes eloquently of mystical Okinawan shamanesses as well as overworked drunk salarymen, and she appreciates how many Japanese tourists stock up on Cartier, Gucci, and Hermes *omiyage*, even as they suffer from a profound inferiority complex when traveling in Europe. She is fully aware that her Japanese-style home in North Carolina literally reconstructs her idealized projection of traditional Japanese life, just as Kansai Women's University's Victorian-style Practice House near Osaka attempts to domesticate Japanese notions of Euro-American mores and manners. Insightfully, Davidson recognizes that for every opposite there is another opposite [*Ura ni wa ura ni aru*] (p. 105), and that all such imitations, "like most forms of nostalgia, pay homage to a place we never really knew" (p. 167).

Despite such disclaimers, it is evident that Davidson understands a great deal about Japanese culture, as well as her place in it and its place in her. She is highly attuned to Japan's visible and invisible boundaries, even noting its effect on her physical body. Her posture, comportment, walk, gestures, and entire way of being become more compact and less obtrusive in Japan, but re-expand like a sponge once returned to America. She paradoxically finds freedom within the confines of Japan's social

conventions and recounts one unforgettable night in Osaka's demi-monde, since foreign women technically slip between Japan's traditional gender roles and often get treated as fellow males by default. Her liminal social role allows her to "get away with" such taboos, and this liminality extends to her Japanese female friends as well, who are temporarily freed from their gendered, conventional behaviors when they are in her company. This dynamic attests to the mutually transformative nature of the cultural encounter.

Davidson is at her best when she analyzes such gender roles in Japan and America, but one wishes that this reprint of her 1993 manuscript updated her statistics either in footnotes or in her 2005 *Afterward*, which only updates how her friends fared ten years earlier in the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake. Her personal anecdotes and recalled episodes, however, continue to enliven such generalized principles as the boundaries between public/private space, inside/outside dynamics, individual/group identity, pure/impure activities, honorific/humble communication, and even the fact that when the ultimate boundary between life/death is crossed, "we have rules for how to break the rules" (p. 120). Her poignant reflections on her mother-in-law's passing, a tragic and fatal car accident, a Japanese funeral, the atmosphere of death in Okinawa, at Kōyasan, on Ōki Island and in Kansai after the earthquake are informed both by her study of Buddhism and her interdisciplinary grounding in the humanities. However, unlike other travelogues such as Alex Kerr's *Lost Japan* or Pico Iyer's *The Lady and the Monk*, this travel memoir is not an elegy but a living and still highly relevant personal account of one woman's discovery of – and self-discovery in – Japan.

Davidson's insights still ring true twenty-seven years after her first trip to Japan, and are once more made available to a new generation of students and adventurers. Her explanations of Japan's pressure-cooker educational system are perfect for those about to study abroad or teach English in Japan, and her love/hate relationship with the language resonates with anyone who has experienced all the little victories and embarrassing frustrations of trying to master Japanese. Her hilarious episodes with unabashed *obaachan* and her thoughtful reflections on everything from the photographic lens to Japan's irrational street addresses are all written with a sympathetic voice in a highly engaging, accessible style. Taken together like Hokusai's images of Mount Fuji, Davidson has given us an overview of the land and has taught us that the grass may be greener on the other side, but with great distance there also comes great perspective.

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