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CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----|
| Editor's Introduction | i |
| Re: Subscriptions, Submissions, and Comments | ii |
| ARTICLES | |
| How to Fit in: Naming Strategies among Foreign Residents of Japan <i>Giancarla Unser-Schutz</i> | 3 |
| Youth Nationalism in Japan during the Lost Decades <i>Zeying Wu</i> | 31 |
| Narratives of the Early Stage of American Occupation in Okinawa <i>So Mizoguchi</i> | 51 |
| The Portrait of an Outcaste Actor: Mikuni Rentarō's Novel and Coming Out as Burakumin <i>Noboru Tomonari</i> | 77 |
| <i>Bureaucracy Meets Catastrophe: Global Innovations from Two Decades of Research</i> <i>Margaret Takeda, Ray Jones, and Marilyn Helms</i> | 101 |
| ESSAYS | |
| Writing Japan: Intertextuality in Enrique Gómez Carrillo's and Arturo Ambrogi's Travelogues <i>Joan Torres-Pou</i> | 125 |
| An Oral History of a Young Ainu Mother: Tomoyo Fujiwara Talks about Her Experiences in Contemporary Japan <i>Kinko Ito and Paul A. Crutcher</i> | 137 |

BOOK REVIEWS

Shōbōgenzō zenbon kaidoku 『正法眼蔵』全巻解説

[Deciphering the *Shōbōgenzō* Fascicles]

By Kimura Kiyotaka 木村清孝

Reviewed by Eitan Bolokan 157

Understanding Japan: A Cultural History.

By Mark Ravina

Reviewed by Daniel A. Métraux 162

Rice, Noodle, Fish: Deep Travels through Japan's Food Culture

By Matt Goulding

Reviewed by Steven E. Gump 166

EDITORS/CONTRIBUTORS

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the twenty-second volume of the *Japan Studies Review* (JSR), an annual peer-reviewed journal sponsored by the Asian Studies Program at Florida International University. JSR remains an outlet for publications related to Southern Japan Seminar events that encourages submissions from a wide range of scholars in the field. The 2018 issue (Volume XXII) features five articles branching into different aspects of Japanese studies.

This year's journal begins with an analytical study by Giancarla Unser-Schutz titled, "How to Fit in: Naming Strategies among Foreign Residents of Japan," highlighting how foreigners living in Japan adapt their names and the multifaceted difficulties they experience with the way their names are treated. The second article titled, "Youth Nationalism in Japan during the Lost Decades" by Zeying Wu, explores Japanese youth experiences during the economic growth of the 1970s–1980s and the stagnation of the 1990s, while addressing how experiences during the Lost Decades shaped their national identity with distinct political undertones.

A third article, "Narratives of the Early Stage of American Occupation in Okinawa" by So Mizoguchi, delves into comparative studies of the early stage of occupation that emphasizes how tales of postwar Okinawa are distinguished from those of mainland Japan. Furthermore, Noboru Tomonari in "Mikuni Rentarō's Novel and Coming Out as Burakumin," discusses Rentarō's biography as one of the most versatile actors of Japanese cinema and his work *The Portrait of Rie*, mainly to express his identity and discourse on *buraku* as a significant part of minority history in modern Japan. Finally, "Bureaucracy Meets Catastrophe: Global Innovations from Two Decades of Research" by Margaret Takeda, Ray Jones, and Marilyn Helms is an intricate collective study that reviews emerging themes from recent studies on global disaster management by focusing on important natural catastrophes in Japan and elsewhere.

In addition, there are two essays included in this issue. Joan Torres-Pou presents the intertextuality of two Central American writers' travelogues, namely Enrique Gómez Carrillo and Arturo Ambrogí, written in the West but marked by unique preconceived Eurocentric visions of Japan and a sense of Otherness. The second essay by Kinko Ito and Paul A. Crutcher summarizes the oral history of a young Ainu mother known as Tomoyo Fujiwara, comprised of a series of interviews sharing her personal experiences while living in contemporary Japan.

There are three book reviews. Kimura Kiyotaka's *Shōbōgenzō zenbon kaidoku* [Deciphering the *Shōbōgenzō* Fascicles] is reviewed by Eitan Bolokan; Mark Ravina's *Understanding Japan: A Cultural History* is reviewed by Daniel Métraux; and Steven E. Gump reviews Matt Goulding's *Rice, Noodle, Fish: Deep Travels through Japan's Food Culture*.

Re: Submissions, Subscriptions, and Comments

Submissions for publication, whether articles, essays, translations or book reviews, should be made in electronic formats, preferably Word for Windows via email attachment (please inquire about other formats). The editor and members of the editorial board will referee all submissions.

Annual subscriptions are \$35.00 (US). Please send a check or money order payable to *Florida International University* to:

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Professor Heine's office number is 305-348-1914. Submissions for publication should be sent to asian@fiu.edu.

Visit our website at <http://asian.fiu.edu/jsr>. PDF versions of past volumes are available online.

All comments and feedback on the publications appearing in *Japan Studies Review* are welcome.

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Articles

HOW TO FIT IN: NAMING STRATEGIES AMONG FOREIGN RESIDENTS OF JAPAN

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Overview: Adaptation and Names

Names are generally felt to be special kinds of words, and are commonly perceived to be part of one's unique self.¹ Because names are culturally and socially situated, moving to a new society with different naming practices may require individuals to make decisions about presenting their names, and consequently, their identities. While names provide important information about one's ethnicity or geographical origin, through either legal or personal processes of adaption "...they may also provide the vehicle for crossing boundaries between those very same categories."² Previous research on immigrants in the United States and Canada has shown that such adaptations are complex and fluid, with people's negotiations differing by historical moment. As Alatis and Klymasz describe, there has been a history of adapting names amongst Greek and Slavic immigrants, with Anglicization common.³ However, these assimilatory patterns seem to fade as societies become more accepting of multiculturalism. Although historically there was pressure for Asian immigrants and their descendants to assimilate through the selection of Anglicized personal names, with more

¹ Kenneth L. Dion, "Names, Identity, and Self," *Names* 31/4 (1983): 245–257.

² Barbara Bodenhorn and Gabriele vom Bruck. "'Entangled in Histories': An Introduction to the Anthropology of Names and Naming," in Gabriele vom Bruck and Barbara Bodenhorn, eds., *An Anthropology of Names and Naming* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4.

³ James E. Alatis, "The Americanization of Greek Names," *Names* 3/3 (1955): 137–156; Robert Klymasz, "The Canadianization of Slavic Surnames; a Study in Language Contact Part I," *Names* 11/2 (1963): 81–105; Robert Klymasz, "The Canadianization of Slavic Surnames; a Study in Language Contact Part II," *Names* 11/3 (1963): 182–195; Robert Klymasz, "The Canadianization of Slavic Surnames; a Study in Language Contact Part III," *Names* 11/4 (1963): 229–253.

Asian immigrants and the Asian-American movement, Asian-Americans have increasingly chosen to use ethnic names, suggesting that American society is becoming more welcome to multiculturalism.⁴

The right – or lack thereof – to control one's name is also a crucial part of maintaining autonomy over one's identity; as Bodenhorn and Bruck write, "[t]o the extent that people are able to negotiate their social relations through their own decisions concerning which names – and persons – are to potentiate those relations, naming is often about agency."⁵ Additionally, individuals' own attitudes and their homelands' naming practices can influence which strategies are more appealing. Kim found that for Korean students in Toronto, choosing to Anglicize one's name was dependent on one's sense of habitus in regards to Korea, with those maintaining stronger ties or seeing less need to forge Canadian roots less likely to adapt their names.⁶ On the other hand, in a survey of Japanese, Korean and Chinese (speaking) individuals living in Toronto, Heffernan found that although Japanese people tend not to change names, the other two groups tend to adopt English personal names.⁷ Even within Chinese-speaking groups, however, how individuals chose English names differed upon where they were originally from, leading him to argue that such changes were not motivated by simply pragmatic issues (e.g., ease of pronunciation), but also cultural differences.

In societies historically less multicultural than the U.S. or Canada, one might suppose that pressures to adapt one's name to integrate into society work differently. One such comparatively homogenous society would be Japan. Although a large body of research shows that homogenous Japan is a myth,⁸ the number of foreign residents in Japan is nonetheless relatively low.

⁴ Ellen Dionne Wu, "'They Call Me Bruce, But They Won't Call Me Bruce Jones': Asian American Naming Preferences and Patterns," *Names* 47/1 (1999): 21–50.

⁵ Bodenhorn and vom Bruck, "Entangled in Histories," 27.

⁶ Tae-Young Kim, "The Dynamics of Ethnic Name Maintenance and Change: Cases of Korean ESL Immigrants in Toronto," *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 28/2 (2007): 117–33.

⁷ Kevin Heffernan, "English Name Use by East Asians in Canada: Linguistic Pragmatics or Cultural Identity?" *Names* 58/1 (2010): 24–36.

⁸ See Mike Douglass and Glenda Susan Roberts. *Japan and Global Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society*

In December 2015, the number of mid- to long-term foreigners in Japan was 1,883,563 with permanent residents accounting for 37.19% (Ministry of Justice 2015).⁹

Moreover, the number of special permanent residents was 348,626 – these are individuals of primarily Korean or Taiwanese heritage who remained in Japan after WWII but whose citizenship was reverted to that of their ancestral country, often called *zainichi* – bringing the total to 2,232,189 (approximately 2% of the current population). This total is miniscule compared with the approximately 13% foreign-born population of the U.S. in the 2010 census, and somewhat less than 44% of those who are naturalized.¹⁰

Research on naming practices amongst foreigners in Japan has generally focused on specific groups with unique situations. Kim observed that *zainichi* Koreans have been using Korean names more actively recently to create a sense of ethnicity, suggesting changes in how names are approached.¹¹ However, names can represent larger problems for foreigners in Japan. Hatano analysed how Brazilian and Peruvian *nikkei* (people of Japanese heritage) children's names are registered in public schools, arguing that because it is done unsystematically, problems such as children not knowing their legal names can arise, leading Hatano to press for more consideration of their human rights. Yet, both cases are unique. *Zainichi*

(Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2003); John Lie, *Multiethnic Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Michael Weiner, Michael, ed., *Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity* (London: Routledge, 2008).

⁹ Ministry of Justice, “Kokuseki/chi’iki betsu zairyū-shikaku-(zairyū-mokuteki)-betsu sō-zairyū gaikokujin,” E-Stat, December 2015 (accessed March 23, 2018, <http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/GL0202010.1.do?method=xlsDownload&fileId=000007481093&releaseCount=1>).

¹⁰ Elizabeth M. Grieco, Yesenia D. Acosta, G. Patricia de la Cruz, Christine Gambino, Thomas Gryn, Luke J., Larsen, Edward N. Trevelyan, and Nathan P. Walters, “The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2010,” United States Census Bureau, May 2012 (accessed July 15, 2018, <https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2012/acs/acs-19.html>).

¹¹ Taeyoung Kim, “‘Identity Politics’ and Korean Youth in Japan: A Case Study of a Junior High School Student,” *International Education Journal* 3/5 (2002): 56–63.

Koreans are generally not newcomers but rather were born in Japan with little personal experiences in South or North Korea, and *nikkei*, while generally born abroad and often of mixed heritage, have some claim to Japanese ethnic roots; both groups are also treated differently in the immigration process.¹²

Today, there are many different groups living in Japan, from English-language teachers from the U.S. and Canada to refugees from Vietnam and Laos as well as trainees from countries as varied as Bangladesh and the Philippines. Although their experiences have been less frequently covered in the previous research, their diverse circumstances may lead to different strategies. Related research on how Japanese negotiate addressing foreigners paints a complicated picture. Looking at how foreigners were addressed on Japanese television, Maeda found that although it is polite practice in Japanese to refer to people one does not know well using their surname and the honorific suffix *-san*, it is common to refer to foreigners using personal names only, even in contexts where that would be rude.¹³ Maeda argues that this is the result of a common belief that foreigners prefer personal names, but as her research suggests, there is a great deal of uncertainty in how to call foreigners, both in terms of address and names more generally.¹⁴

Names, Identity and Immigration

Historically, Japanese names have been used to both differentiate and assimilate others. Indeed, the newly placed importance of Korean names described above may partly result from the historical pressures that Koreans were subjected to during the colonial period (1910–1945). While Koreans were first banned from using Japanese names in 1911, the law was changed in 1939 to require the registration of a family name. For a fee, one could choose a Japanese surname and change one's personal name to match (otherwise, one's Korean name was automatically registered). This was presented as an opportunity to select Japanese names, yet it has been

¹² Hatano Lilian Terumi, *Mainoriti No Namae Wa Dono Yō Ni Atsukawareteiru No Ka: Nihon No Kōritsu Gakkō Ni Okeru Nyūkamā No Ba'ai* (Tokyo: Hituzi-shobo, 2008), 25–30.

¹³ Margaret Maeda, "How the Japanese Address and Refer to Non-Japanese: A Survey of Usages on Japanese Television," *Kanagawa Daigaku Gengo Kenkyū* 25 (2002): 139–62.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 160–161.

interpreted as an attempt to weaken the traditional patriarchal family system of Korea, breeding loyalty to the Japanese emperor.¹⁵ Using Gerhards and Hans's terms, the use of Japanese names amongst Koreans could thus be called a case of *forced acculturation*.¹⁶ Even today, many choose to use Japanese *tsūmei* – names registered at city office and used in daily life in place of one's legal name – to avoid prejudice because of their Korean heritage.¹⁷

Another important example is the people of Amami and the Ryukyu islands, a series of small chains stretching towards Taiwan. Despite forming a larger cultural-linguistic area, since Amami is situated relatively close to Kagoshima, Amami differs in many respects from the southern Ryukyus, or present-day Okinawa. Historically, Okinawa existed as the independent Ryukyu kingdom, but in 1609, it was made a vassal state of the former Satsuma clan of Kagoshima. The Satsuma clan banned the use of Japanese names in 1624 in the Ryukyu kingdom, and from 1783 in Amami, permitted only one-*kanji* (Chinese characters adapted for use in the Japanese language) surnames, which differs from most Japanese names, most of which are two *kanji* long.¹⁸ Following Gerhards and Hans, one could describe the forced non-use of Japanese names in Amami and the Ryukyus as cases of *forced segregation*.¹⁹ Yet these policies later reversed course completely, when their relationship within Japan changed again: being annexed formally into Japan in 1879 lead to their having to take Japanese names – particularly from 1911 to 1926, when it was conducted forcibly.²⁰

In these cases, Japanese names were used to assimilate *and* differentiate populations, strategically locating names as an important part of

¹⁵ Mizuno Naoki. *Sōshi Kaimei: Nihon no Chōsen Shihai no Naka de* (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 2008), 50.

¹⁶ Jürgen Gerhards and Silke Hans, "From Hasan to Herbert: Name-Giving Patterns of Immigrant Parents between Acculturation and Ethnic Maintenance," *American Journal of Sociology* 114/4 (2009): 1102–1128.

¹⁷ See Taeyoung Kim, "Identity Politics," for an enlightening case study.

¹⁸ "Amami Studies" Publishing Group, *Amami-gaku: Sono Chihei to Kanata* (Kagoshima, Japan: Nanpōshinsha, 2005).

¹⁹ Gerhards and Hans, "From Hasan to Herbert," 1103.

²⁰ Koji Taira, "Troubled National Identity: The Ryukyuans/Okinawans," in Michael Weiner, ed., *Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity* (London: Routledge, 1997), 140–77.

a supposed Japanese identity. Which pattern is more likely today depends on how non-Japanese residents are viewed. As regards this, Japan currently has what is describable as a non-immigration oriented system of absorbing foreign nationals. Instead, "...foreigners have been regarded as people to be controlled and monitored rather than as equal contributors in Japanese society."²¹

For many foreigners living in Japan, one's long term status can seem precarious. While all workers must have health insurance and enter the pension system, there is no equivalent to U.S. green card lotteries. To apply for permanent residency, one must be in Japan for more than ten years, five of which must be on a work or spousal visa. One must also have received the longest work or spousal visa available and have had the visa expired and renewed at least once. (Highly skilled workers or those married to Japanese are sometimes exempted from the ten-year rule). The maximum terms were previously three years for spousal and work visas, but were extended to five in 2012, leading to concerns that permanent residency applications may take even longer.²² Even with permanent residency, one's rights can be uncertain. In 2014, the Supreme Court of Japan ruled that non-naturalized foreigners are not automatically entitled to receive welfare benefits, leaving it to the discretion of local governments.²³ Although the Anglicization of names has been one way that some immigrants to the U.S. signify their adoption of a new national identity,²⁴ making it a case of Gerhard and Hans's *voluntary acculturation*,²⁵ one would not expect it in Japan. Instead, the precariousness

²¹ Hiroshi Komai, "Immigrants in Japan," *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 9/3 (2000), 322.

²² Saitō Yoshifumi, "Hōmushō Nyūkoku-Kanrikyoku 'Zairyū Kikan 5nen Wo Kettei Suru Sai No Kangaekata (An)' Ni Kansuru Kaichō Seimei," Tokyo Bar Association, June 15, 2012 (accessed January 27, 2018, <http://www.toben.or.jp/message/seimei/5.html>).

²³ Tomohiro Osaki, "Welfare Ruling Stuns Foreigners," *The Japan Times*, July 19, 2014 (accessed March 23, 2018, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/19/national/social-issues/welfare-ruling-stuns-for-eigners/>).

²⁴ See for example Chang-rae Lee's essay excerpt in Linda Watkins-Goffman, *Lives in Two Languages: An Exploration of Identity and Culture* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2001), 89–91.

²⁵ Gerhards and Hans. "From Hasan to Herbert," 1103.

of even long-term foreign residents' status suggests that they are not likely to adopt Japanese identities through names, nor to feel that Japanese names, so clearly delineated as a part of Japanese identity, are available to them.

The Registration of Names

This does not mean that people do nothing at all; rather, the changes are different from simply adopting a Japanese name. Indeed, the legal process of registering as a foreign resident can force some changes. Any foreigner residing in Japan for a stay exceeding three months is required to register with the government and receive a *zairyū-kādo* (resident card). Registration must use the Roman alphabet (*rōmaji*); interestingly, naturalization requires the use of the Japanese syllabaries and/or *kanji*, but no *rōmaji*, thus delineating foreigners' names as non-Japanese. The *rōmaji* used must follow one's passport, which can lead to some confusion: For example, middle names not used in everyday life are also included on resident cards if they are on one's passport. There are, however, differences in how foreigners from *kanji* cultures (countries where *kanji* are used: China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) and non-*kanji* cultures are registered.

In addition to Romanized versions, individuals with *kanji* names can also formally register them.²⁶ While modern Japanese does not use all the ideographs found in Chinese, many are shared, have substitute forms, or are related to *kanji* found in Japanese. This allows for many names to be read using their Japanese pronunciations, while still maintaining their original written form – a common way to deal with Chinese names.²⁷

People whose native languages do not use ideographs have no choice but to register their name exclusively in *rōmaji*, whether their language uses *rōmaji*, Cyrillic or other systems. Although most Japanese study English at school starting in the fifth grade and learn *rōmaji* from the third grade, such knowledge can be unhelpful when encountering *rōmaji* names. Firstly, names from languages Japanese people are less familiar with remain opaque, even if they use the Roman alphabet. As Hatano notes, the most common explanation by educators for the misregistration of South American *nikkei* children's names at school is that “they just don't know

²⁶ Ministry of Justice, “Zairyū kādo mata wa tokubetsu eijūsha shōmeisho no shimei no kanji hyōki ni tsuite,” Immigration Bureau of Japan, May 7, 2012 (accessed May 27, 2018, http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/topics/kanji_kokuji.pdf).

²⁷ Hatano, *Mainoriti No Namae*, 80–81.

anything about foreigners' names."²⁸ Secondly, even names from English may not be clear, given the notorious lack of transparency of English orthography.²⁹ Thirdly, because *rōmaji* is studied within a Japanese context, children learn how *rōmaji* can be used to write Japanese, resulting in a tendency to use the same rules of reading non-Japanese words as they would for Romanized Japanese, leading to discrepancies.³⁰

One may achieve some phonetic transparency by registering one's names in *katakana*, a Japanese syllabary used to write loan words; however, because *katakana* is adapted specifically for Japanese, non-Japanese words are phonologically transformed when written in *katakana*. Although it was previously not required, with the introduction of the My Number identification system in 2015, all individuals – including Japanese – living in Japan now have a phonetic *katakana* version of their name registered, making it essentially universal.³¹ However, situations requiring *katakana* names are not new. They include creating bank accounts, where one's name is written in both *rōmaji* and *katakana*; or registering one's personal seal (*jitsuin*), used when applying for loans or declaring taxes. Seals are also required in many everyday situations, such as clocking in at work.

Linguistic Issues

Even talking to someone Japanese in one's native language may require accepting some change given different pronunciations due to first-language interference. Many social situations make a *katakana* version desirable or convenient; if one is talking in Japanese, names will also be

²⁸ Ibid., 184.

²⁹ See Charles A. Perfetti and Ying Liu, "Orthography to Phonology and Meaning: Comparisons Across and within Writing Systems," *Reading and Writing* 18/ 3 (2005): 193–210 on transparency and writing systems.

³⁰ Hatano, *Mainoriti No Namae*, 100.

³¹ For information on the new system see The Japan Agency for Local Authority Information Systems, "Website for the Individual Number Card / Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)," Individual Number Card, July 14, 2016 (accessed August 8, 2018, <https://www.kojinbango-card.go.jp/en/faq/index.html>); for criticisms, see Martin King, "'My Number' System: A Worrying Glimpse of the Future," *Japan Today*, October 1, 2015 (accessed March 23, 2018, <http://www.japantoday.com/category/opinions/view/my-number-system-a-worrying-glimpse-of-the-future>).

adapted to Japanese phonology. Because Japanese has a relatively small suite of phonemes, this can mean dramatic changes in pronunciation. Japanese features five phonemic vowels and 13 phonemic consonants, limited in comparison with English's nine vowels and 24 consonants, or Mandarin Chinese's five vowels and 23 consonants. Japanese syllable structure is rigid, requiring most syllables to be open (i.e., end with a vowel) with the exception of some geminates and /n/. All foreign words borrowed into Japanese must be adjusted to fit these constraints.




Figure 1. Ways to adapt names from cultures where the language uses *kanji* and from cultures where the language does not use *kanji*

Take the English name *Crystal*, normally pronounced /kristl/ or /kristəl/, with two consonant clusters and, depending on the speaker, a syllabic /l/, all of which are impermissible in Japanese. It also includes two difficult sounds for Japanese speakers: /r/ and /l/, neither of which are used in Japanese, which only has the flap /ɾ/. Japanese speakers encountering the

name *Crystal* are likely to adjust and insert vowels and replace both the /r/ and the /l/ with a flap, leading to [kʉrisʉtarʉ]. Naturally, Japanese phonology also affects Japanese native speakers' pronunciations of words while speaking foreign languages, resulting in the typical Japanese accent, such as the tendency to add vowels at the end of closed syllables.³²

The strategies available to people also differ by their language and cultural background. Specifically, names from *kanji* and non-*kanji* cultures can be adapted into Japanese in two very different ways, demonstrated in Figure 1. The female Chinese name '郁蕙' *Yuhui* is substituted with '郁恵', as '蕙' is not used in Japanese, but is homophonic with the very similar '恵'. The reading *Yuhui* is then substituted for the Japanese readings of the kanji, *Ikue*, which maintains a connection to its original written form, while still adapting to Japanese. In comparison, the female English name *Crystal* /kristl/ must be written in *katakana* as 'クリスタル' – [kʉrisʉtarʉ] – to command a similar level of readability, representing a double departure: both of these sound very different from their original pronunciations, but whereas the Japanese-illiterate Chinese speaker might still recognize '郁恵' as their name, the Japanese-illiterate English speaker would not likely recognize 'クリスタル'.

The Study and Methodology

As these points make clear, social and legal circumstances may cause foreigners in Japan to alter their names, but these changes may be both subtle and unconscious. It is possible that people do not perceive these as changes; if they do, how do they manage and negotiate them? The non-immigration oriented system and special status of names as symbols of Japanese identity also suggests that Japanese names may not seem as available to foreigners, as compared with Anglo names in countries like the U.S. or Canada.

To start the exploration of these issues, I conducted a survey of foreigners in Japan, from the fall of 2012 through the summer of 2013, first reported on in the author's 2014 article.³³

³² T. J. Riney and Janet Anderson-Hsieh, "Japanese Pronunciation of English," *JALT Journal* 15/1 (1993): 21–36.

³³ Giancarla Unser-Schutz, "The Use and Non-Use of Japanese Names by Non-Japanese," *Names* 62/4(2014): 202–213.

| Number of countries | Participants | | | Chinese speakers | | English speakers | |
|---------------------|--------------|------|-------|------------------|----|------------------|----|
| | Female | Male | Total | | | | |
| 28 | 85 | 53 | 138 | China | 23 | Australia | 5 |
| USA | 24 | 18 | 42 | Hong Kong | 2 | Canada | 12 |
| <u>Top 3</u> China | 12 | 11 | 23 | Taiwan | 3 | Ireland | 1 |
| Canada | 9 | 3 | 12 | | | New Zealand | 2 |
| | | | | | | UK | 12 |
| | | | | | | USA | 42 |
| <i>Total</i> | | | | 28 | | 74 | |

Table 1. Major home countries and native languages of participants

| Japanese language level | Number of participants | Responded in English | Survey language | Number of participants |
|--|------------------------|----------------------|---|------------------------|
| None | 1 | 1 | <u>English</u> | 106 |
| A little (greetings, etc.) | 18 | 17 | <u>Japanese</u> | 32 |
| Conversational (can hold basic conversations with friends) | 69 | 49 | By Chinese (Mandarin, Cantonese, Taiwanese) native speakers | 26 |
| Business (can conduct high-level business matters) | 39 | 31 | <i>Total</i> | <i>138</i> |
| Native/near-native | 11 | 8 | | |

Table 2. Participants' self-reported Japanese language ability³⁴

The survey was conducted using Google Form, in English and Japanese. To maximize potential participants, I targeted non-Japanese people living in Japan or who had lived there, not taking into consideration age, gender, ethnicity or nationality. The survey consisted of 36 questions, including 13 background questions and 23 name-related questions, and were a combination of selection, Likert-like ratings, and free-response questions. The survey garnered 138 replies, using a snowball approach to participant recruitment. While respondents were from 28 different countries, Americans consisted of about one-third (30.44%) of the total, with the majority from European language blocks, likely due in part to the languages of the survey (Table 1); there were also more female respondents (61.59%). At 86.23%,

³⁴ Adapted from Unser-Schutz, "The Use and Non-Use of Japanese Names."

the majority of participants had at least conversational Japanese speaking skills (Table 2). The average length of time lived in Japan was 7.60 years ($SD=7.37$), with a range of 1 to 41 years.

Following issues brought up in Hatano, Kim, and Wu, the name-related questions focused on individual's perceptions of the difficulty of their names and what problems they experienced; whether their names had undergone change while in Japan; their use of Japanese or *katakana* names; and how they introduced their names.³⁵ In framing how they are discussed, I specifically considered these specific questions:

1. How actively do foreigners living in Japan adapt their names, and how do they approach adopting Japanese names?
2. What kind of difficulties do they experience with how their names are treated, and how do they respond to those problems?

To consider how background differences affect naming patterns, I also looked at how individuals from English speaking countries (the U.S., Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Ireland and New Zealand) and Chinese language (Cantonese, Mandarin, Taiwanese, etc.) speaking countries (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) differed. Although it would have been ideal to look at individual countries, given the sample size it was deemed impractical. However, by comparing these two groups, which make up the majority of participants (78.46%; Table 1), it is possible to examine how naming strategies differ in *kanji* cultures. Regarding these groups, I also examined an additional question:

3. Do the varied possibilities available affect how individuals from English and Chinese areas lead to different naming strategies?

³⁵ See Hatano, *Mainoriti No Namae*; Kim, "The Dynamics of Ethnic Name Maintenance and Change"; Wu, "Asian American Naming Preferences and Patterns."

As mentioned previously, note that this article shares its data set with the author's previous 2014 article, which focused on the limited question of whether foreign residents felt Japanese names were accessible to them.³⁶ By expanding the focus to the specific problems and strategies that foreign residents experience and use, this article therefore offers an updated and deeper exploration of naming issues and practices for amongst foreign residents of Japan.

Results and Discussion

Changes in Names

A small majority of people (76, 55.07%; Table 3) felt that the name they used most commonly in Japan was different from what they used in their home country. Of those 76, only 41 felt that their name changed slightly, suggesting that the changes were not dramatic. The most commonly perceived change was in pronunciation (47), followed by the use of surnames instead of personal names (19) and new nicknames (12). The fact that changes in pronunciation dominate indicates that linguistic issues are the major factor here; however, the use of surnames instead of personal names also points to an adaptation to Japanese practices. Responses suggest that most changes used the respondents' original names as a base, rather than a wholly new name.

The most common motivation behind altering names was to make it easier to remember (36). Relatedly, seven individuals gave discomfort or uncertainty of Japanese people using their name as a reason to change it, suggesting that pragmatic issues are a determining factor. These responses were followed by personal discomfort at one's name being mispronounced (13). Given the frequency of changes in pronunciation, this is unsurprising, but low: this also means that many who reported feeling that their names changed in pronunciation did not do so because it was discomforting to them, a recurrent theme below.

Introductions, Katakana and Japanese Names

To ascertain how actively people adapted the pronunciation of their names, I also asked how participants pronounced their name when introducing themselves to Japanese people, to which 71 (51.45%) said they

³⁶ Unser-Schutz, "The Use and Non-Use of Japanese Names."

only introduced themselves using Japanese pronunciations (e.g., [kurisuutaru] over /kristəl/; Figure 2).

| Changes in names occurred | Number of participants |
|--|------------------------|
| <u>No</u> | 62 |
| <u>Somewhat</u> | 41 |
| <u>Yes</u> | 35 |
| <u>Changes in names</u> | |
| Altered pronunciation | 47 |
| Surname instead of personal name | 19 |
| A nick-name not used previously | 12 |
| Personal name instead of surname | 6 |
| Changed name in marriage | 4 |
| Dropped middle name | 1 |
| Japanese middle name | 1 |
| Shortened name | 1 |
| -San suffix | 1 |
| <u>Reasons for changes</u> | |
| To make it easier for Japanese people to remember | 36 |
| Discomfort or annoyance at name being mispronounced | 13 |
| Japanese people seemed uncomfortable using name used at home | 7 |
| Automatically changed due to differences in language | 4 |
| Changed due to Japanese name practices (surname) | 3 |
| Made it easier for Japanese people to pronounce correctly | 2 |
| Cultural differences in name practices caused confusion | 2 |
| Other | 7 |

Table 3. Number of respondents who felt there was a change in their names and the perceived changes and reasons for them (multiple answers possible)³⁷

³⁷ Adapted from Unser-Schutz, “The Use and Non-Use of Japanese Names.”

As shown in the figure below, only 21 (15.22%) did not offer a Japanese-pronunciation of their name. Combined with those who gave the original pronunciation after saying it in Japanese (8) and those who gave a Japanese pronunciation after saying it in its original pronunciation (29), the majority of people (78.28%) actively gave a Japanese-friendly version (nine did not respond or supplied other answers). Chinese-speakers were significantly more likely to introduce themselves by prioritizing the katakana version, with 78.57% having reported giving their name's Japanese pronunciation only or before giving the pronunciation in its original form, compared with 53.73% of English-speakers ($2(1, 95) = 4.13, p = .042^*$).




Figure 2. Differences in ways to introduce oneself, between original- and Japanese-oriented versions³⁸

On the other hand, 25.68% of English-speakers reported that they only gave the Japanese version after saying it in its original form, compared with 3.57% of Chinese-speakers. One Chinese-speaker noted that because he usually used the Japanese reading of his name, Kō, he felt strange when some Japanese speakers would call him Fan, which is phonetically closer to his Chinese name (Huang), showing the normalcy of using the Japanese readings of *kanji* names (all names have been changed for privacy). The majority (84.78%) stated that they had a consistent way of writing their name in *katakana* (Table 4). These results seem to suggest that most individuals are

³⁸ Adapted from Unser-Schutz, "The use and Non-Use of Japanese Names."

in control of how they present their names. However, while it was most common to select a *katakana* version on one's own (38), it was almost equally common to have it assigned by one's Japanese teacher (37), with help from a friend (24) also common.

This may reflect the fact that *katakana* versions are often decided at an early time in one's stay, as it is necessary to open bank accounts or apply for health insurance; hence the six people reporting that their bank or city hall chose it. Once it is chosen, it sets a precedent for how the name will be written: Even if they later realize that it is not ideal, it is no longer easily changed. Thus, while foreigners may quickly adapt to a *katakana* version, they may not always play an active part in how they are used or selected; nor does everyone find it desirable to do so. For some, the necessity of a *katakana* name can be construed as forced acculturation: as Jamie, a 65-year old Canadian long-term resident noted, "I only have problems to write my name... [a *katakana* version] is completely outside my identity as me and gave me a lot of culture shock in the beginning. i (sic) am still happier if someone else will write it and have not bothered/tried to learn the *katakana* of my name. It (sic) is not me."

| Consistent <i>katakana</i> form used | Number of participants |
|---|------------------------|
| <u>No</u> | 20 |
| <u>N/A</u> | 1 |
| <u>Yes</u> | 117 |
| Chosen by individual | 38 |
| Japanese teacher chose it | 37 |
| Japanese friend helped | 24 |
| Bank/employer/city hall chose it | 6 |
| Standard way to write name in <i>katakana</i> | 4 |
| Bilingual (non-Japanese) friend helped decide | 2 |
| Other/NA | 6 |

Table 4. How many participants used consistent *katakana* forms and how they chose them

Consistent *katakana* names are also not uncontested. A 25-year old American long-term resident, Erica, notes that as a child in Japan, she wrote her name using ‘ヱィ’, a *katakana* way of expressing /vi/ only used in loan words because her surname includes the sound /v/, which is not in Japanese. However, as an adult many people tried to correct her with ‘ヱ’ /bi/, which follows Japanese phonology, forcing her to respond by “...nod(ding) politely at my sensei’s [teacher’s] disapproval.” Choosing a *katakana* form can thus be an assertion of autonomy, which may need protecting from other people’s sense of authority of how *katakana* should be used. Indeed, one must juggle a variety of different factors to settle upon a good form. A long term 39-year old resident, Lette, notes that although her name is easy in her native Denmark, written in *katakana*, it sounds like a boys’ name in Danish. Thus, for her own comfort, she chose a *katakana* form close to her name in English, completing two changes: Danish to English, English to *katakana*.

| Have a Japanese personal name | Number of participants |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| <u>No</u> | 115 |
| <u>N/A</u> | 2 |
| <u>Yes</u> | 21 |
| Chosen by individual | 8 |
| Japanese teacher helped | 7 |
| A relative chose it | 2 |
| Similarity in pronunciation | 2 |
| Other | 2 |

Table 5. How many participants used Japanese personal names and how they chose them

In comparison, only 21 people (15.22%) selected a Japanese (personal) name (Table 5). Like *katakana* versions of names, the most common ways to select Japanese names were to choose a name that one liked or with help from a Japanese teacher. No one noted friends helping, hinting that it may not be common for Japanese people to suggest Japanese names to foreigners. It should be noted that I specifically did not ask about surnames. Because surnames act as symbols of family relationships and often change through marriage, they are less likely to be altered as freely and informally as personal names. In regards to this, 49 respondents (35.51%) were married

or in a relationship with a Japanese partner; in particular, 31.76% of female respondents – who would be more likely to experience a surname change through marriage given cultural practices – reported being in a relationship with a Japanese partner (this was somewhat lower than men: 41.51%).

Half of those who took Japanese names were Chinese speakers, suggesting they are more willing to do so. Chinese-speaking respondents perceived their names to be different more than English-speaking respondents did (64.29% vs. 45.95%); however, this was not significant ($\chi^2(1, 102) = 2.05, p > .1$). They *did* seem to actively change their names more commonly, as far as pronunciation is concerned. While most (24/28) *only* gave Japanese readings of kanji, this was not necessarily perceived as a change: nine who said there were no changes introduced their names using the Japanese readings, which seems consistent with Heffernan's report on Chinese speakers in Canada showing that English names were chosen for reasons beyond their original name being too difficult.³⁹

Difficulty of Names and Experiences of Discomfort

There were no clear trends in regards to people's assessment of the difficulty of their names. On a scale of one to five, with one being low in difficulty and five being high, participants' average self-reported personal perception of the difficulty of their personal names came to 2.83 points (SD = 4.56); surnames scored similarly at 3.10 points (SD = 3.56), suggesting that most respondents did not feel that their names were especially easy or difficult in general. Not surprisingly, on a scale of one (never experience difficulty) to five (experience difficulty all the time), the average frequency of respondents' perceived difficulty of their names for Japanese people came to 2.87 (SD = 7.64). There was a gap between people's evaluations of the difficulty of their name's pronunciation and their perception that Japanese people have difficulty with their names (Figure 3): Whereas 48 people (34.78%) thought that their personal name was very or extremely difficult, and 61 (44.20%) thought their surname was, only 43 (31.16%) reported feeling that Japanese people had problems with their name often or all the time. When people perceived difficulties, it was usually related to pronunciation issues (67) and that Japanese people seemed uncertain that they were getting it correct (52) (see Table 6), both likely related to the common feeling that one's name had changed in pronunciation. Although there were no statistical differences for the sense of change or discomfort

³⁹ Kevin Heffernan, "English Name Use," 32–33.

amongst people from English-speaking and Chinese-speaking countries, the English-speaking group may be somewhat more likely to experience difficulty (trending at $t(99) = 1.922$, $p = .0575$).




Figure 3. Perceived difficulty in names and experiences of Japanese feeling difficulty

| Causes of difficulty | Number of participants | Weighted score (sum of all scores on 1~5 scale) | Average score (weighted score/number of participants) |
|---|------------------------|---|---|
| Difficult to pronounce | 67 | 245 | 3.66 |
| Uncertain about its being correct | 52 | 182 | 3.5 |
| Difficulty distinguishing between personal and surnames | 27 | 104 | 3.85 |
| Too long to remember | 20 | 70 | 3.5 |
| Difficulty distinguishing gender | 11 | 38 | 3.46 |
| Name reminds people of other words | 2 | 7 | 3.5 |
| Inconsistent in variety | 2 | 7 | 3.5 |
| Personal/surnames differ in difficulty | 2 | 5 | 2.5 |
| Other | 4 | 12 | 3 |

Table 6. Perceived causes of Japanese people's difficulty with foreigners' names

That Japanese people experience difficulties with their names does not appear to necessarily cause foreign residents discomfort. On a score of 1 (none) to 5 (always), the average came to just 1.72, with most (80 people, 57.97%) never experiencing discomfort (Table 7); only 12 people (8.70%) reported experiencing discomfort frequently. Consistent with previous results, the most common reason for feeling discomfort was mispronunciations; the fourth most common reason, that one's name was improperly remembered, may be related to this. Given the low scores for discomfort, it seems safe to say that having one's name mispronounced is not a major cause for concern *per se*. As Rene, a 41-year old female long-term resident from New Zealand comments, "(a)lthough it's an annoyance because it's ongoing, I don't blame people for not being able to pronounce my name... It only bothers me if people blame me for having such a name!" Conversely, the use of non-approved or disliked nicknames were common reasons for discomfort (10), hinting at respondents' desire to maintain their autonomy over their names: having one's name mispronounced may be inevitable but not usually malicious, whereas others actively changing one's name is a greater threat to one's ability to choose how they present themselves to others. However, given that the most common response in dealing with these issues was to repeat one's name (27), and the second most common to do nothing, this may not always be actively defended.

Interestingly, the second most common reason was personal names used instead of surnames, in line with Maeda's argument that Japanese people overuse personal names with foreigners.⁴⁰ In the free response section, several respondents specifically mentioned this as an issue. Sometimes, people specifically encouraged using personal names: Elizabeth, a 50-year old long-term British resident notes that, particularly before taking her husband's Japanese surname, she liked to use her personal name because it was "easier." However, it is not always so simple. Shirley, a 41-year old long-term Canadian resident, noted that while she prefers her personal name, "I know that some foreign people do not like to be called by their first names in situations where Japanese people would use last names." In regards to foreigners married to Japanese partners, she specifically noted "...that there is sometimes a hesitancy to call foreign spouses by their new Japanese surname (e.g. calling a foreign wife of a Japanese man 'Suzuki-san'), so they

⁴⁰ Maeda, "How the Japanese Address and Refer to Non-Japanese," 140–141.

will sometimes be called by their first names instead,” intimating that Japanese names are apparently not seen as fitting for non-Japanese.

| Experiences of discomfort | Number of participants |
|---|------------------------|
| <u>Scaled responses</u> | |
| 1 (never experience discomfort) | 80 |
| 2 | 32 |
| 3 | 13 |
| 4 | 7 |
| 5 (experience discomfort all the time) | 5 |
| <u>N/A</u> | 1 |
| <u>Reasons for discomfort (responses to scales 2~5)</u> | |
| Mispronunciations | 30 |
| Use of personal name over surname | 11 |
| Non-approved/disliked nickname | 10 |
| Improperly remembered | 10 |
| Use of surname over personal name | 5 |
| Jokes about name | 2 |
| Use/non-use of middle names | 2 |
| Other | 7 |
| <u>Strategies for dealing with discomfort (responses to scales 2~5)</u> | |
| Tell them again | 22 |
| Nothing | 20 |
| Give them a nickname | 7 |
| Encourage use of a particular name | 3 |
| Other | 4 |

Table 7. Experiences and strategies for dealing with discomfort

Indeed, the belief that Japanese names are for Japanese people only can inappropriately set expectations of Japanese identity. Elizabeth further commented that although some people seem to find it difficult to use her

Japanese surname received through marriage, using it generally made things easier. Yet this could sometimes be problematic as “...it does generally raise their expectations as to my language ability!”: a Japanese name means being Japanese, which therefore also means speaking Japanese. Even people born with Japanese names, such as many *nikkei*, may seek to avoid their use for this very reason. Indeed, one 30-year old South American respondent, Eric, noted that he preferred using his personal name rather than his Japanese surname because he “(doesn’t) want people to mistake (him) for a Japanese person.” One can read from Eric’s comment a sense that taking a Japanese identity means one is only Japanese, and does not allow individuals to have a more mixed or hybrid identity, an issue Kamada explores in detail in her discussion on *hāfu* or mixed-race children living in Japan.⁴¹

Of course, foreigners are not always being intentionally or consciously treated differently. One respondent, Alexis, a long-term 39-year old Canadian resident, had a telling story. Although she used to experience difficulties when her personal or middle name – or both – would be called out at office settings, confusing her because she anticipated being called by her surname, these problems went away when she married her Japanese partner and took his name. At least in some cases like Alexis’s, overusing personal names may be caused by a lack of familiarity with non-Japanese names, making it difficult to determine which is which, similar to Hatano’s findings concerning the misregistration of Brazilian and Peruvian students’ names in school documents.⁴² Similarly, Vicky, a long-term 32-year old American-Chinese resident, married with children to a Japanese man, noted the discrepancy between how she and other mothers are referred to. While most are referred to as *Tomoko no mama* ‘Tomoko’s mom’, she alone is usually referred to by her personal name. Yet it is not Vicky who is offended by this practice, but her mother-in-law, who does not like that other people refer to her in a way that would – by Japanese norms – be considered inappropriate. Their personal relationship may be influential in her mother-in-law’s feelings: as opposed to the limited public interactions people have with bank tellers or other children’s mothers, being invested in long time, familial relationships likely encourages people to be more conscious of these differences and how they affect others.

⁴¹ Laurel Kamada, *Hybrid Identities and Adolescent Girls: Being 'Half' in Japan* (Buffalo, NY: Multilingual Matters, 2009). 6–8.

⁴² Hatano, *Mainoriti No Namae*, 124.

Like Vicky's mother-in-law, many respondents reported finding the use of their personal name inappropriate because it goes against the local rules, meaning that they are not being treated in the same way as Japanese people would expect to be. This was a particularly common reaction to the use of *yobisute* (using someone's name without an honorific), which several participants specifically noted frustration with:

I'm not bothered by people addressing me by my first name with no title or honorific on a person to person basis, but it bothers me when it's done systematically, or if I'm the only one in a group addressed that way... *Rene, 41, female, New Zealand*

Yobisute only bothers me when it's inappropriate... I think names should be used in a culturally appropriate way. To not do so sets foreigners apart, and is racist, regardless of good intentions. *Melanie, 39, female, Canada*

Two things that really bother me are the automatic presumption that because I'm a foreigner of European descent: a) It's OK to address me by my first name, and b) It's OK not to use an honorific with my name... In Japan, such familiarity is almost a sign of contempt. Regardless, they seem to think that the rules do not apply to "others,"... *Benjamin, 38, male, Canada*

Clearly, *yobisute* itself is not viewed negatively. The problem – as with personal names – is when it unilaterally goes against local norms, making non-Japanese residents' position as "others" stand out. As a foreigner, standing out may be somewhat inevitable; given that many people do not feel that Japanese names are actively available to them, or desire them in the first place, having an obviously non-Japanese name contributes to that. However, standing out because one's name is different and standing out because one is being subject to different norms are two different proverbial fish; the results here suggest that although the former is of no great concern, the latter is.

Conclusion

In reviewing the results, the answer to the first question – how actively do foreigners living in Japan adapt their names, and how do they approach adopting Japanese names? – It appears to be that foreigners do actively make adaptations to their names while living in Japan. However, the changes reported were relatively minor, e.g., related to pronunciation rather than the adoption of a fully new name; compared with many of the reports on name changes amongst immigrants in the U.S. and Canada, very few of the respondents took Japanese names. On the other hand, the answer to the second question – what kind of difficulties do they experience with how their names are treated, and how do they respond to those problems? – appears to be that while name problems are frequent, they do not necessarily cause negative feelings. Although it is tempting to frame name changes negatively (a somewhat necessary evil brought through pressure to assimilate) in reality such changes are multifaceted. As Kim showed with Koreans students in Toronto, students were not always pressured to take English names, but did so as part of their active identity negotiations, making it a potentially positive way of forging local ties.⁴³ Similarly, the fact that most people did not feel strong discomfort because of problems they experienced with their names may mean that issues with names are taken as part of the larger changes that one naturally experiences when moving to a new society.

Take the fact that the second most common change was the use of one's surname over one's personal name (19): only five people felt discomfort because their surnames were used, suggesting that the majority were not offended. Instead, this can be interpreted as a relatively minimal adjustment to local naming practices, and thus small enough to avoid discomfort. More importantly, there may also be mechanisms at work which help foreigners express autonomy over their identity. The use of a consistent *katakana* form and the preference towards introducing oneself using Japanese pronunciations both show how foreigners can control how they are presented. While a *katakana* form may be necessary in Japanese life, precisely because it is an informal requirement, there is no reason why it not remain *ad hoc*. However, by choosing one form, and voluntarily using it, some foreigners may find that they are able to proactively adapt, and thus control, how they are referred to in everyday life.

⁴³ Kim, "The Dynamics of Ethnic Name Maintenance and Change," 128–130.

At the same time, the fact that most people did not take a Japanese personal name but rather took other approaches (altered pronunciation, nicknames) is also important. Although adaptation may be a part of negotiating one's identity, not all strategies are perceived as being available to all people. Indeed, their availability appears to change by the status and treatment of new comers in their host countries. As mentioned, Wu showed Chinese-Americans previously used Anglo names more in order to assimilate, with the trend of using Chinese names only recently spreading.⁴⁴ She associated this with the diversification of the U.S., meaning that the two strategies (taking an Anglo name or using one's ethnic name) swayed between other variables. In the case of Japan, assimilation does not appear to be an option, and it may be that the participants do not feel comfortable using Japanese names because of its strong association with a Japanese identity.

It is clear that the strategies people take depends partially on their backgrounds. Individuals from Chinese-speaking areas appeared more open to taking Japanese names, and used the Japanese readings of their *kanji* names more actively than people from English speaking areas. They also appeared to be less likely to register such usages as changes. As I have noted elsewhere, there may be several reasons for this.⁴⁵ First, individuals from Chinese speaking countries may be generally more willing to make such adaptations. Indeed, it is common in Taiwan, China and Hong Kong to have English nicknames, suggesting that they may be less hesitant to take on other names. The social and cultural importance given to *kanji* may offer *kanji* names a privileged space, allowing people to feel that their name has not changed so long as they use *kanji*. While there is a tendency to speak about "Chinese," China is a multilingual country with many different languages (such as Mandarin, Cantonese, and Shanghainese). Within that context, *kanji* are often perceived as playing a unique role in creating a sense of Chinese identity by uniting the different languages or dialects⁴⁶, which may contribute to the low concern about pronunciation.

Given the long history of immigration from Taiwan, China and Hong Kong, it may be that there are established community practices in

⁴⁴ Wu, "Asian American Naming Preferences and Patterns," 36–41.

⁴⁵ Unser-Schutz, "The Use and Non-Use of Japanese Names."

⁴⁶ Richard Oliver Collin, "Revolutionary Scripts: The Politics of Writing Systems," in Michael A. Morris, ed., *Culture and Language* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 29–68.

regards to dealing with names. In examining how Chinese-speaking students of English as a second language in the UK selected English names, Edwards makes the observation that they may not be open to adopting new names simply because their conception of names is different, but rather because it can offer practical yet subtle solutions to more complicated problems, such as how to maintain appropriate distance.⁴⁷ By taking an English personal name, for example, Chinese speakers can avoid using their Chinese personal names when it would not be normally appropriate in Chinese-speaking situations, such as with teachers; thus, while they are superficially complying with English norms, it can also be construed as a form of resistance that protects Chinese norms. Although the use of personal names is not as relevant in Japanese, it is also possible that the adaptation of Japanese names amongst Chinese speakers is masking other pragmatic practices.

In comparison, while England and Ireland had large emigrant communities in the past, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. have been largely a place for immigrants to *come to*, rather than emigrate out of. This suggests that there may be fewer community practices in terms of adapting names. As noted above, the new tendency in the U.S. to be more accepting of ethnic names may also lead some Americans to feel reluctant to adapt their names. Thinking of Edwards's analysis, one might suggest that the reluctance to use a Japanese name is one form of resisting the larger pressures to conform and adapt to Japanese society. Ethnic issues may also be at play: as the typical idea of a "foreigner" in Japan is of a Caucasian individual, the expectations for non-Asian individuals to have non-Japanese names may also be stronger than for Asian individuals from Chinese speaking countries. Avoiding a Japanese name – even when it is one's legal name – may be one way to shoot down unwanted conversations. These possibilities all point to the need to look at changes amongst foreigners from multiple sides: both from the position of the policies within their host countries, but also from their own cultural backgrounds.

As a preliminary exploration, there are naturally some limits to the current study. In particular, the sample was small, with slightly more women. Although the average length of time in Japan was not inconsiderable, with the mode at two years, the majority had been in Japan for a relatively short

⁴⁷ Rachel Edwards, "What's in a name? Chinese Learners and the Practice of Adopting 'English' Names," *Language, Culture and Curriculum* 19/1 (2006): 90–103.

period of time, which may influence individuals' desire to adapt their names. In addition, while ethnicity and country of origin appear to have been factors affecting respondents' inclinations to change their names, the sample was skewed in terms of the countries represented, and a more balanced sample would be desirable. Further research is necessary, and there is good reason to believe that how foreign residents in Japan adapt their names will be a point of contention in the future. Looking ahead, there is a distinct possibility that the practices described here are in transition, and the situation may drastically change soon.

As the data presented here was taken before the My Number system was introduced, none of the individuals had to formally register a *katakana* version of their name. With the My Number system, all foreigners will have a *katakana* version. Since people's identification numbers will be linked with their bank accounts as part of the new system, the name registered in My Number may well supplant other opportunities to create *katakana* names. Because the paperwork will be conducted at the city office wherein a recent arrival would register their domicile, it is likely that civil servants will have a more influential role in the creation of *katakana* names for new residents.

While this may mean more consistency in the *katakana* forms used, it may also mean that they will less accurately reflect names' pronunciations, since many new comers will register their names when they are not sufficiently competent in Japanese to negotiate more accurate versions. With the birth of the My Number system, long-term residents also had to register a *katakana* version of their name, of which suggestions were sent out by local city offices for confirmation: unlucky, too, were people who did not know how to read *katakana*, as their confirmation would not have been helpful. This added level of bureaucratic control in how names are registered suggests there will be an impact on how foreign residents perceive not only their names themselves, but also how they are positioned in Japan. This question of foreign residents' autonomy and control over their identity is one that will likely become more important in the future.

YOUTH NATIONALISM IN JAPAN DURING THE LOST DECADES

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Overview

With the bursting of the “bubble economy” in the early 1990s, Japan has been experiencing deflation for more than two decades—known as Japan’s “Lost Decades.” What has been the impact of this prolonged economic stagnation on Japan’s youth? In particular, how has it influenced and shaped their national identity and, accordingly, their nationalism? Looking from a constructivist approach and guided by the experiential theory of social generation, this study examines how Japanese in their 20s have come to mediate and respond to economic stagnation and reconstruct national identities different from those of Japanese youth in the 1970s and 1980s.

It suggests that without inheriting the previously established national identity and homogeneous economic nationalism of the prior generation, yet with their constant aspiration to ensure Japan’s global competitiveness, current Japanese youth have tried to identify Japan with various other social institutions rather than simply with economic development. They have, therefore, exhibited a high level of heterogeneity in their nationalism, signifying a similar transition from homogeneity to heterogeneity in many other sectors of Japanese society during the Lost Decades.¹

Introduction

Commonly viewed as a modern phenomenon, nationalism was argued to be associated with all kinds of social, cultural and historical institutions like political and economic power, social class stratum, ethnic identity or historical memory, etc. In different nations, due to particular social and historical context, nationalism can be specifically subject to different institutions. In the case of Japan, as argued by Liah Greenfeld (2001, 326), “owing to the circumstances of its emergence, Japanese nationalism from the outset was focused on the economy and developed as economic nationalism in the first place.” In the postwar era, nationalism also played a key role in motivating the Japanese people to revive Japan through its “Economic

¹ Author’s Note: I thank Professors Hidetoshi Taga, Brian Bridges, Shalendra D. Sharma and Liah Greenfeld for their help with this article.

Miracle” (Johnson 1982; Woo-Cumings 2005). Clearly, Japanese nationalism has been closely related to the country’s economic development. But what about Japanese nationalism during the Lost Decades? With economic deflation lasting more than two decades, is Japanese national identity still closely tied to Japan’s remarkable economic achievements? Do the Japanese still believe and hold faith in their country’s ability to reclaim the glorious economic mantle it once enjoyed over other nations?

There have been long debates about the origins, nature, types, causes and therefore definitions of the term–“nationalism”. The theory behind the scholarship on nations and nationalism, as Spillman and Faeges (2005: 411) argue, has resulted in a definitional proliferation in the field. Traditionally, scholars of nationalism have crafted their own definitions specifically for their empirical or case studies, making nationalism one of the terminologies most notoriously difficult to define (Smith 2013). Being aware of such a definitional proliferation on nationalism and using a constructivist approach, I define nationalism in this study as a continuous construction of people’s political identities in regards to their nation, which is fundamentally motivated by people’s constant aspiration to ensure their nation’s equality or superiority over other nations.²

Moreover, according to the experiential theory of “social generation”, it is suggested that what youth experience during their formative years (17–25 years old) is critical to the formation of their identities and attitudes throughout later life stages (Mannheim 1952; Rintala 1963). This study, thus, focuses on the experiences of Japanese youth in their 20s during the period of high economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s and the period of economic stagnation since the early 1990s. Through examining and comparing Japanese youth’s experiences in these two different periods, this study addresses how those experiences during the Lost Decades have shaped their national identities and, accordingly, their nationalism.

² Liah Greenfeld argues, “Nationalism, among other things, connotes a species of identity, in the psychological sense of the term, denoting self-definition.” Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1992), 20. In her later book, she also noted that “...because of the members’ investment in the dignity of the nation – that is, its prestige – which is necessarily assessed in relation to the status of other nations, nationalism implies international nationalism.” See Liah Greenfeld, *The Spirit of Capitalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001), 22.

Debates Over the Seemingly Rising “Conservative” Nationalism Among Japanese Youth

In sharp contrast to their active participation in peace movements in the 1960s and the widely condemned nihilism among them in the 1970s and 1980s, growing nationalistic phenomena have been observed among Japanese youth since the late 1990s (Honda 2007). Scholars have been warning of a resurgence of a more strident and “conservative” nationalism among Japanese youth in recent years after witnessing their fanatical support of the national team and singing of the national anthem, *kimigayo*, in unison in the World Cup Soccer Tournaments in 2002, the increasing online conservative criticism and street protests against foreign immigrants, and their growing support for a stronger Self Defense Force as well as their rather hostile attitudes towards China and South Korea (Kayama 2002 & 2004; Pyle 2006; Takahara 2006; etc.).

Despite the warnings and criticisms noted above, there have also been counterarguments suggesting Japanese youth’s weak commitment to aggressive nationalism. Japanese scholar Akihiro Kitada (2005), for example, has suggested that the current youth’s embracing of nationalism, if there is any, is simply a resurgence of the romantic reflections (*hansei*), while “simplistically projecting the identity of ‘me’ onto the nation” and “reassessment of one’s relationship with the world” (Honda 2007, 283), which were passionately embraced by youth in the 1960s, but purposely avoided as protest by youth in the 1970s and 1980s. He notes that the recent rise of nationalism among young people is nothing new or harmful and should not be interpreted as necessarily negative. Drawing on worldwide surveys and placing Japanese youth in comparisons with youth in other industrialized societies, Tadokoro (2011, 68) also argues that despite their pessimistic economic outlook, having grown up in one of the most affluent societies in the world, Japanese youth are increasingly attracted to peaceful pursuits such as arts and culture, rather than to the enhancement of national prestige through riches – be it via winning gold medals in the Olympic Games, or via military conquest and supremacy.

Thus, views about Japanese youth’s nationalism in the Lost Decades are varied and seem contradictory.³ However, which of these competing

³ In addition to the studies mentioned above, there have been discussions on how a range of factors such as global context, media and conservative intellectuals, as well as the decline of leftist parties, nationalist manga, the

viewpoints hold greater salience regarding Japanese youth growing up during the Lost Decades? To answer this question, we need to closely look at the exact socioeconomic circumstances which current youth have faced. Looking from a constructivist approach, which suggests that national identity is socially constructed, a close examination on what youth have experienced in different time periods can shed light on their nationalism. To make sense of the distinguishing experience that current Japanese youth have, moreover, we need to compare their experience with that of the prior generation growing up in the high growth period of postwar Japan. The following thus provides such examinations and comparisons.

Japan's "Lost Generation"

Since the bursting of the economic bubble in the early 1990s, more than two decades of economic recession have negatively impacted Japan in many ways, including unprecedented socioeconomic consequence for Japanese people in different age cohorts. During hard economic times, however, youth who encounter challenges in transitioning from schools to workplaces with little social capital are particularly vulnerable (Brinton 2011; Toivonen 2013).

Higher Unemployment Rate and Two "Employment Ice Ages"

Due to the traditional employment practices of Japanese firms, which tend to be rigid on age and favor new-graduate hires (so-called *shinsotsu saiyou* in Japanese), it was once taken for granted that the middle-aged workers in Japan would face more difficulties during economic recessions (Kambayashi and Kato 2011). Empirical studies, however, unexpectedly find that young Japanese workers, especially those educational non-elites,⁴ have suffered more from the economic recessions than prime-

internet, and international sporting events have contributed to the rise of nationalism among Japanese youth. See Hironori Sasada, "Youth and Nationalism in Japan," *SAIS Review* 26/2 (2006): 109–122.

⁴ Mary C. Brinton focuses on the employment situation of young Japanese people who graduated from junior or senior high schools (including general and vocational ones) and benefited from the schoolwork institutions of the high-growth period. To compare them with college graduates, especially those who graduated from top universities and have faced a more stable and better employment environment, Brinton named them "educational nonelites." Brinton, *Lost in Transition: Youth, Work, and Instability in Postindustrial Japan* (New York: Cambridge UP, 2011), 29.

aged employees (Yoshikawa 2001; Genda 2005; Mitani 2008; Brinton 2011). According to official statistics (see Figure 1), the unemployment rate of youth, particularly those aged 15-24, has risen precipitously since the early 1990s compared to all other age groups. The impact from the financial crises of 1997 and 2008 saw the unemployment rate of young people rise to two new highs – up to 10% – respectively in the early 2000s and early 2010s, marking the two well-known “employment ice-ages” (*hyōgaki*) in postwar Japan.




Figure 1. Unemployment rate for different age cohorts in Japan (1970–2014)⁵

Before the early 1990s, Japan was envied for its low unemployment rate in all age groups (Brinton 2011). Compared with the low unemployment rate of youth in the 1970s and 1980s, the precipitous rise in their unemployment rate since the early 1990s is particularly noticeable. Japanese youth’s rapidly climbing unemployment rate during the Lost Decades is even more conspicuous when contrasted with the relatively steady unemployment rate of other age groups during the same period. All these contrasts confirm the fact that when facing economic recessions, Japanese youth have been far more vulnerable than any other age groups.

⁵ The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (*Sōmusho*), “Kanzen Shitugyo Ritu” [The Complete Unemployment Rates], 2015.

Increasing Non-regular Employment

During the Lost Decades, what accompanies the rapidly mounting unemployment rate of Japanese youth is a significant increase of non-regular employment (*hiseiki koyō*) among them. Traditionally, regular long-term (full-time and life-long) employment was one highly valued component of the three special characteristics of the way Japanese men worked.⁶ Since the early 1990s, unfortunately, this practice is only preserved among prime-aged workers. The irregular employment rate of young Japanese men aged 15-24, as shown in Figure 2, has more than doubled since 1990.⁷

Throughout this high-growth period, legal protections were set up to ensure life-long employment for most employees in Japan. These legal protections remain effective in protecting the benefits of current prime-aged employees who continue being employed under the life-long employment system. With continuities of both legal protections and employment practices favoring prime-aged employees, regular employment for new employees has been severely cut. Facing economic recessions and forced to reduce labor cost as much as possible, many Japanese companies have chosen to recruit new employees in non-regular forms. In addition, under the Koizumi Cabinet's reform package, the Japanese government started deregulating the labor market to allow employers to hire non-regular employees on a long-term basis since 2004. This has further worsened young workers' job prospects in Japan's regulated labor market. Consequently, many young workers have been pushed into the non-regular job market. In postwar Japan, while regular employment equates to job security, income stability, on-the-job skill training, high and stable pension and other kinds of benefits, non-regular employment promises none of these. The significant increase in non-regular employment among youth, therefore, also points to their economic vulnerability, especially during recessions.

⁶ The other two are the seniority-based wages and company unions. See Yuji Genda, *A Nagging Sense of Job Insecurity: The New Reality Facing Japanese Youth*, trans. Jean Connell Hoff (Tokyo: Kokusai Bunka Kaikan, 2005).

⁷ Most of the non-regular work has been taken by Japanese female workers, particularly those above middle age. Since the early 1990s, while middle-aged women are still taking most of the non-regular work, more young Japanese women under 35 have taken non-regular work as well. See data in The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (*Sōmushō*), "Rodoryoku chōsa" [Surveys on Workforce], 2015.




Figure 2. Irregular employment rate among Japanese men (by age, 1990–2014)⁸

In the Japanese labor market, moreover, due to the continuities of other traditional employment practices like the periodic mass recruitment (*teiki saiyō*) and the preference to recruit new university graduates (*shinsotsu*) at schools, the mobility between regular and non-regular employment has been strictly limited (Genda 2005; Toivonen 2013).⁹ This also indicates that youth who fail to be regularly employed when they first transition from schools to workplaces are unlikely to be regularly employed afterward. Social security based on regular employments, therefore, has become out of reach for many Japanese youth as a consequence of the Lost Decades.

⁸ The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (*Sōmushō*), “Rodoryoku chōsa” [Surveys on Workforce], 2015.

⁹ In Japan, most corporations tend to open most full-time positions to new graduates nationwide at certain periods of time. While it used to be for the months of October, November and December of each year, after 2015, it has shifted to July, August and September. Beyond these time periods, full-time job opportunities are rare. See Genda, *A Nagging Sense of Job Insecurity*.

High Job Turnover Rate, Freeters¹⁰ and NEETs

Up until the early 1990s, Japan was also famous for its effective institutions which mediated well between schools and companies and helped new graduates to transit smoothly from schools to work.¹¹ Due to the long-term economic recessions, however, many Japanese companies can no longer offer the same amount of regular jobs as they did previously. These institutions have thus become dysfunctional (Brinton 2011). Without effective institutional support students are much more likely to encounter employment mismatch, resulting in an unprecedented high job turnover rate—known as “seven-five-three” among new graduates at different levels.¹²

As mentioned previously, it is very difficult for Japanese employees to find regular employment during the fixed recruitment period each year.

¹⁰ Freeter, a Japanese neologism derived from the English word “free” and the German word “Arbeiter” (laborer), refers to young people who are not regularly employed but who work at one or more part-time jobs or at one short-term job after another. Genda, *A Nagging Sense of Job Insecurity*, 52. It can be equally taken as “permanent part-timer” in English. See the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, “Provision against Young People [‘Freeter’ (Job Hopping Part-Time Workers), NEET]” (accessed February 28, 2018, https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/dl/Overview_eng_04.pdf).

¹¹ During the high-growth period, through the effective mediation between schools and companies (so-called *jisseki kankei*), those institutions like the *shinro shidōbu* (school academic and career guidance office), *shokugyō anteijo* (local public employment security offices), and *shokugyō nōryoku kaihatsukō* (vocational training school) were once able to work effectively to guarantee most of the new graduates a suitable job and ideal workplace. See Naoki Mitani, “Youth Employment in Japan after the 1990s Bubble Burst,” in *Young Workers in the Global Economy: Job Challenges in North America, Europe and Japan*, Gregory DeFreitas, ed. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008).

¹² The high job turnover rate among Japanese young people is known as “seven-five-three,” which means the percentages of new graduates who quit their jobs within three years of their employment are respectively 70% in the case of junior high school graduates, 50% for high school graduates, and 30% for college graduates. See Genda, *A Nagging Sense of Job Insecurity*, 53. See also the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2010 (accessed February 20, 2018, <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/2010/01/tp0127-2/dl/24-01.pdf>).

Having turned over one or more jobs (no matter if it is regular or not), new graduates are unlikely to be regularly employed at further stages. As a matter of fact, many of them later end up changing different part-time and short-term jobs. Without being regularly employed, similarly, these new graduates are also bereft of social security from which they are supposed to accumulate human capital through on-the-job training or further education opportunities.

Lacking these opportunities, many of these youth consequently turned into the so-called NEETs, who are not in education, employment or training. What is worse, due to the low salaries of part-time and short-term jobs,¹³ many non-regularly employed youth simultaneously fall into another social group called “working poor” (*wākingu puā*) whose income is lower than Japan’s poverty line. Official statistics show that the numbers of both Freeters and NEETs (aged below 35) have actually increased over the 1990s and reached a peak in the early 2000s (see Figures 3 and 4).

Despite some slight decrease, these numbers, sustained at a high level throughout the 2000s, still remain high (Pesek 2014). From these persistently high numbers of Freeters and NEETs, it is reasonable to conclude that the loss of regular employment and social security has resulted in enduring negative consequences for the young workers. Specifically, due to persistent economic recessions as well as the lack of mobility and flexibility of the employment system, Japanese youth have been consequently trapped in a vicious circle from which they find no way out. They have faced and continue to face more daunting challenges and a more unfortunate fate compared with Japanese youth who grew up in the high-growth period and who enjoyed much smoother transitions between different life stages. The fact that current Japanese youth have encountered such unfortunate circumstances during their formative years has actually made them into Japan’s “Lost Generation” (Zielenziger 2006; Brinton 2011).

¹³ On average, the part-time employees are paid only 40% as much as full-time employees per hour. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Economic Survey of Japan 2006: Income Inequality, Poverty and Social Spending,” 2006 (accessed March 5, 2018, <http://www.oecd.org/eco/labour/economicsurveyofjapan2006incomeinequalitypovertyandsocialspending.htm>).




Figure 3. The number of Freeters in Japan (1987–2011, in million)¹⁴




Figure 4. The number of NEETs in Japan (1993–2011, in million)¹⁵

¹⁴ The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (Sōmushō), “Shugyō Kōzō Kihon Chōsa” (Basic Survey on Employment Structure), 2011.

¹⁵ Ibid.

In the early postwar years, after facing total defeat and economic destruction in World War II, Japanese citizens were mobilized by the developmental state to contribute to the nation's economic recovery by working hard for Japanese corporations; creating a unique corporation style popularly known as "Japan Inc." (Johnson 1982 & 1995). In return, Japanese people were rewarded with an affluent economy and a growing homogeneous middle-class. According to various public opinion surveys, approaching the 1970s and 1980s, more than 90% of Japanese people would identify themselves as middle-class (Vogel 1971; Murakami 1982; Sugimoto 2010). During this period, Japan as a whole was known as a nation of *ichioku sōchūryū* (literally "all one hundred million in mass middle class").

Also characterized by the political iron triangle – Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, the business sector, and the bureaucracy – as well as by the unique socioeconomic structure in postwar Japanese society – lifetime employment, nuclear family structure,¹⁶ and a stable and secure living community tightly connected with workplaces, Japan became an international model for other leading industrial societies (Vogel 1981). Proud of Japan's "No. 1" status in the world and as one of the "mass middle-class" societies, in the late 1980s, nearly 90% of Japanese youth held a positive view of Japan's economic power (see Figure 5).

However, this view dropped steeply during the recessionary 1990s and could not return to the level of the early 1970s since then; despite recovery of this figure in more recent years. While youth viewed Japan's economic power positively for most of the time leading up to the early 1990s, they have come to view Japan's economic power least positively in the late 1990s. Why have the youth changed their perceptions of Japan's economic power so dramatically? The fact that those in their 20s have encountered severe challenges during the Lost Decades may offer hints to this question. To address it thoroughly, however, we need to further explore the formation mechanism of Japanese people's national identity in the postwar era and to understand the national identity formation of youth in the Lost Decades in contrast with that of youth in Japan's high growth period.

¹⁶ Nuclear family refers to a family characterized by a father working, a mother at home not working, and approximately two children. See Emiko Ochiai, *The Japanese Family System in Transition: A Sociological Analysis of Family Change in Postwar Japan* (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1996).




Figure 5. Japanese positive view on Japan's economic power (by age, 1973–2013)¹⁷

After WWII, as is argued by many sociologists and anthropologists of contemporary Japanese society, most Japanese adults tended to derive their sense of well-being and social status from a social security network based on their permanent workplaces (Wilkinson 1962; Nakane 1970; Vogel 1971; Reischauer 1977; Nathan 2004; etc.). So-called *shokuba* a permanent workplace is not simply a place for work for many Japanese. It is more like a second home where both the workers and their families are connected with other families, the Japanese society and even the world outside Japan (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Mobilized by the developmental state to realize their personal value and to make social contributions through working hard for big corporations under the lifetime employment system, indeed, not only did most Japanese individuals before the early 1990s gain their sense of well-being and social status from their workplaces, they also tended to connect themselves with the nation by becoming a permanent member of the “Japan Inc.”

¹⁷ Based on the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, “Nihonjin No Kokuminsei Chōsa,” National Character Survey, 1973–2013 (accessed July 8, 2018, http://www.ism.ac.jp/kokuminsei/table/data/html/ss9/9_12/9_12_all.htm).

However, the doors of “Japan Inc.” closed for youth in the Lost Decades. As discussed above, facing high unemployment and increasing non-regular employment, many Japanese in their 20s have been trapped in a vicious circle caused simultaneously by persistent economic recessions as well as the lack of flexibility of the Japanese labor market. They have been bereft of the unique social security network taken for granted by youth in the 1970s and 1980s (Brinton 2011).

Having lost the likelihood to enter the middle-class stratum, ironically, current youth are still taught by their parents to compete for the monolithic postwar Japanese middle-class goals of good diploma, good job at a big company, and good marriage, and to be focused on institutions such as homes, schools, and corporations that used to socialize individuals into national subjects in postwar Japan (Yoda and Harootunian 2006, 39). Youth in the Lost Decades are thus torn between what they have encountered – irreconcilable contradictions between the inherited postwar Japanese middle-class goals and the hopeless realities under the prolonged economic stagnation. What is worse, these irreconcilable contradictions exist both in reality and at a psychological level and usually come to reinforce each other, resulting in a fundamental destruction of the monolithic postwar Japanese middle-class goals among current youth (Takahara 2006). Empirically, therefore, we have observed that the positive view over Japan’s economic power is no longer prevalent among those in their 20s since the early 1990s even though it is far better preserved among the elders.

At the same time, while the elders still sustain their self-confidence against the West due to the enduring generational impacts from positive views and psychology formed in their early formative years in the high economic growth period, the self-confidence of those in their 20s have correspondingly dropped most severely. As seen in Figure 6, they have come to the bottom in thinking Japanese are more excellent than their western counterparts almost throughout the Lost Decades.

Nationalism in Transition: from Homogeneity to Heterogeneity

As Japan successfully rose to be the world’s second biggest economy following its defeat in WWII, with Japanese people being a major force behind this astonishing success, there was no doubt that both the ascendance of national pride and the construction of a national identity largely relied on Japan’s great economic achievement in the early post-war period. Having witnessed Japan’s rise in economic prowess, the prior generation growing up in the high-growth period had indeed homogeneously

identified Japan as a strong economic power and asserted strong economic nationalism against other nations, including the West (the U.S. in particular), during the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁸



Figure 6. Japanese people who thought Japanese are more excellent than westerners (by age, 1953–2013)¹⁹

However, if economic achievement before the early 1990s was intrinsic to the ascendance of Japanese national pride and the construction of a Japanese national identity after WWII, economic downturn after the early 1990s must be the key to the perceived decline and destruction of the established national pride and national identity over the Lost Decades (Jain and Williams 2011). From survey data, the decline of national pride and destruction of a national identity were most evidently perceived among

¹⁸ Ishihara Shintaro's xenophobic rhetoric in his popular book, *Japan can say "No"* was one example. See Shintaro Ishihara and Akio Morita. *"No" to Ieru Nihon (The Japan That Can Say "No")* (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1989).

¹⁹ Based on the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, "Nihonjin No Kokuminsei Chōsa," National Character Survey, 1973–2013 (accessed July 8, 2018, http://www.ism.ac.jp/kokuminsei/table/data/html/ss9/9_12/9_12_all.htm).

current youth who have never had a chance to experience or to directly benefit from Japan's postwar economic growth. Having suffered from tremendous loss compared with the prior generation, clearly, current youth have not embraced strong economic nationalism as the prior generation did. Yet, with the aspiration to strengthen Japan's competitiveness in the world, they have somehow started searching for new national identities and have accordingly re-asserted nationalism of other various kinds.

Drawing from the global popularity of Japanese culture that began in the 1990s, scholars have argued the recessionary 1990s was the decade of "return to J" (*J kaiki*), in which "J" referred to J-Pop instead of Japan (Starrs 2004). By inventing unique Japanese popular cultures – such as J-Pop, video games, animations and other sub-cultures like *otaku*, Japanese youth have had Japan's uniqueness and superiority appealed through cultural products rather than purely economic prowess.²⁰ They are more of cultural nationalists and tend to derive national prestige from Japan's cultural uniqueness, if not, superiority.

On the other hand, the aspiration to strengthen the global competitiveness of Japan also serves as an impetus for some youth resuscitate certain national symbols (Oguma and Ueno 2003; Yamada 2009). As was mentioned earlier, the early 2000s witnessed their fanatical support of the Japanese national team and singing of the national anthem, *kimigayo*, in unison at the World Cup Soccer Tournaments, and their sudden increasing passion for Japanese traditional cultures as well as attachment toward the imperial family (Kayama 2004). Despite the rising nationalistic phenomena among Japanese youth, survey results (see Figure 7), on the other hand, released a rather contradictory picture showing the particularly low turnouts of Japanese youth in elections since the early 1990s, rendering them, on the contrary, criticized for their political apathy and nihilism (Kayama 2002; Oguma 2002). Their nationalism, therefore, has been simultaneously seen as rather weak and superficial and labeled as "petit nationalism" by Rika Kayama, a psychiatrist and popular commentator of Japanese society.

²⁰ Originally referring to people with obsessive interests, commonly in anime and manga. A vital non-Western intervention in postmodern culture and theory, "Otaku" is also an appealing and perceptive account of Japanese popular culture. See Hiroki Azuma, *Otaku: Japan's Database Animals* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).




Figure 7. Japanese people's turnout in the elections for House of Representatives (by age, 1967–2014)²¹

According to worldwide surveys, when compared with youth in other nations, Japanese youth are found to be relatively more reserved in expressing their patriotism and pride of being Japanese.²² Throughout the Lost Decades, it was also found that there had been consistently more than

²¹ The Association for Promoting Fair Elections, “Chronological Voting Rates of the Elections of House of Representatives (By Age),” 2016 (accessed July 8, 2018, <http://www.akaruisenkyo.or.jp/070various/071syugi/693/>).

²² Ever since 2000, public opinion surveys conducted by Japan’s Cabinet Office have shown a majority of “don’t know” responses (above 50%) among youth when they were asked to be feeling patriotic or not, see the Cabinet Office of Japan, “Shakai Ishiki Ni Kansuru Seron Chōsa” [Survey on Social Thinking], 2000–2014 (accessed July 28, 2018, <https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/index-sha.html>). The World Value Surveys also found that Japanese youth in particular, have ranked almost the lowest to feel proud of being their nationality, see the World Value Surveys, 1983–2014 (accessed July 28, 2018, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>).

80% of Japanese youth showing high concerns about international issues ranging from environmental protections to the needs of developing countries.²³ A majority of them have also revealed their support for Japan's peaceful constitution although there have been more youth expressing simultaneous support for a stronger defense policy against potential military threat over the past decade.²⁴ Most recently, when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pushed to enact a more robust defense policy, thousands of students formed groups called the "Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy (SEALDs)" to protest in front of the National Diet Building, chanting slogans ranging from "Give Peace A Chance" and "Our Future, Our Choice" to "Fight For Liberty" (*Japan Times*, 21 July 2015).

Neither being simply conservative nor liberal yet remaining nationalists in various ways, current Japanese youth's nationalism can hardly be generalized in dichotomic terms. Compared with the homogeneity of youth's national identity and nationalism in the high growth period, the above contradictory and somewhat chaotic picture of youth's nationalism during the Lost Decades genuinely shows a high level of heterogeneity in their newly formed national identity. With this picture of youth's heterogeneous national identity/nationalism, it is rather safe to conclude that what current youth – the "Lost Generation" – have lost and now embrace is not exactly any certain type(s) of national identity/nationalism. Given the fact that there is not yet a clear sign showing any national identity/nationalism becoming the mainstream, what has been true and will continue to be true in the near future is the current generation's loss of the homogeneity that has been long standing among prior generations in pre-1990s postwar Japanese society.

In all, while the recessionary decades have catalyzed a wide-reaching transformation in Japanese society and cut deeply into the core of postwar Japanese social compact, the monolithic postwar Japanese middle-class goals and stratum are collapsing (Yoda and Harootunian 2006; Kingston 2013). Heterogeneity instead of homogeneity are, therefore, more

²³ See the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, "Nihonjin No Kokuminsei Chōsa," National Character Survey, 1993–2013 (accessed July 28, 2018, http://www.ism.ac.jp/kokuminsei/table/data/html/ss9/9_16/9_16_all.htm).

²⁴ See the Cabinet Office, "Jietai Ya Boeimondai Ni Taisuru Kanshin" [Concern over the Self Defense Force and National Defense Issues], 1999, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2011 (accessed July 28, 2018, <https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/2-1.html>).

likely to be the key feature of Japanese society in the future. In this light, with the uncertain prognosis of Japan's economic future, youth nationalism in Japan seem unlikely to lead to clear directions. What is clear, however, is a patent transition from homogeneity to heterogeneity in youth nationalism and more broadly, in many other sectors of Japan.

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NARRATIVES OF THE EARLY STAGE OF AMERICAN OCCUPATION IN OKINAWA

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Introduction

On March 3, 1947, Gen. Douglas MacArthur reported to the American press that “the war-ravaged islands of the Ryukyu groups, including Okinawa, are slowly returning to normal.”¹ MacArthur never missed an opportunity to impress on people his achievements and he radiated a self-assured assessment about the American occupation of Okinawa.² Many American servicemen, who were stationed in Okinawa, shared, to a degree, the self-congratulatory opinions of their commander. They believed that “the native Okinawans are genuinely appreciative of the benefits conferred on them by the Americans [and] these include elaborate systems of highways, the reestablishment of the school system, the furnishing of employment and the outright maintenance of the destitute and hungry.”³

The Okinawa people could not deny that under long American tutelage Okinawans achieved social and economic progress.⁴ However, the triumphalism of such history is not always constructed from a shared past. The master narrative induces a selective historical amnesia in relation to specific event that would not fit into the well-organized structure. Influenced by the increasing saliency of studies of subaltern groups, this article attempts to evaluate the positive representations of American relief efforts in postwar Okinawa. Did Okinawans enjoy U.S. administrative control? The purpose of this article is to shed light on this simple question.

Many scholarly works have not fully explored the early stage of American Occupation in Okinawa. Some historians highlight Japan’s fast economic recovery and treat Okinawa as a part of this narrative.⁵ However,

¹ “M’arthur Reports Gains in Okinawa,” *New York Times*, March 3, 1947.

² Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 20–25.

³ “Okinawa Recovering,” *New York Times*, April 1, 1946.

⁴ Mikio Higa, “Okinawa Recent Political Development,” *Asian Survey* 3/9 (1963): 415–426.

⁵ See Theodore Cohen, *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New*

they overlook the fact that the early stage of occupation in Okinawa was a time of hardship for the indigenous people and their survival was not guaranteed at all. The new generation of occupation studies could strongly highlight distinguished narratives of postwar Okinawa from those of the mainland.⁶

The poverty in postwar Okinawa was a result of U.S. military operations. The most pressing concern of the islanders was to obtain food. Even before the Pacific War, food production did not achieve self-sufficiency in Okinawa and thus food had to be imported from the mainland of Japan. Tenth Army Headquarters, which was in charge of the American occupation after the battle of Okinawa, knew of this food problem and planned to take care of some 450,000 islanders but food soon became very scarce. This scarcity was the result of the tremendous devastation there. The food situation on the outer islands (where battle-related destruction was far less than on Okinawa) was less serious.⁷ But the battle-related damage to the main islands included not only devastation of fertile land but also loss of most of the livestock and the fishing fleets. One Okinawan recalled that only butter was distributed in his internment camp for a week. Because of this difficulty in obtaining food, the Okinawans sought out the remaining crops such as sweet potato, wheat, barley, and millet under military government supervision.

While the scope of the research field has expanded, there have been few studies to examine a variety of American and Okinawan social and cultural interactions during the years of occupation.⁸ Testimonies of the islanders reveal that the female food seekers were sitting ducks for sexual

Deal (New York: The Free Press, 1987); Arnold G. Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–50* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1988).

⁶ See Kensei Yoshida, “Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa Under U.S. Occupation” *East Asian Studies Press* 31 (2001); Yakabi Osamu, *Okinawasen, beigunsenryoshi wo manabinaosu: Kioku wo ikani keisyosuruka* (Yokohama: Seori shobo, 2009).

⁷ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–50*, 44–48.

⁸ See Donna Alvah, *Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 1946–65* (New York: New York University Press, 2007); Roger Dingman, *Deciphering the Rising Sun: Navy and Marine Corps Codebreakers, Translators, and Interpreters in the Pacific War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009).

assaults.⁹ Regulations prohibited enlisted Americans from having sexual relations with these women but the non-fraternization rule ceased to be binding on the plains where the Military Police (MP) could not monitor individual female Okinawans. The report issued by the Military government concludes that “at the end of the fighting on Okinawa crime was at a minimum,” but testimonies of civilians in Okinawa reveal a different situation.¹⁰ For Filipino troops, the sexual exploitation of the islanders did not always mean just seeking pleasure. Seeing no difference between the Okinawans and the Imperial Japanese soldiers who had occupied the Philippines, these soldiers avenged their homeland on Okinawan women.¹¹

Despite Okinawan’s plights, the military government still emphasized how they helped the islanders to recover from the war-related ruin. However, the credibility of this narrative was highly skeptical even at that time. Some American mass media reported that reconstruction made very slow progress. Diplomatic historians reveal that the Truman administration had debated about Okinawa’s future from the end of the Pacific War to October 1948 when the president approved policy paper, Recommendations with Respect to U.S. policy towards Japan (NSC 13).¹² The policy debate in Washington had left the military personnel in Okinawa uncertain about their mission. A confusing series of flip-flop between the U.S Army and Navy on responsibility for governing Okinawa delayed reconstruction of the island’s infrastructure. In July 1946, the authority there was transferred to Army control. However, this event brought no major change to the Ryukyu Islands.

⁹ See Okinawa ken, *Okinawa kenshi 10* (Tokyo: Gennando Shoten, 1975).

¹⁰ Summation of United State Army Military Government Activities in the Ryukyu Island, No1 (July–November, 1948), Box 13 Miscellaneous Untitled Weekly and Monthly Summations of Various Activities of SCAP 1945–48, Record of the Allied Occupational and Occupation Headquarters, WWII, RG331, National Archives College Park, MD: NACP.

¹¹ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–50*, 82–86.

¹² Robert D. Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.–Japan Relations, 1945–52* (New York: Garland Publishing, INC, 2001), 228; Taira Yoshintoshi, *Sengo Okinawa to beigunkichi: “Zyuyo” to “kyozetu” no hazamade 1945–1972* (Tokyo: Hosei Daigaku Shuppan Kyoku, 2012), 41.

Until the president made the decision on Okinawa's future, the Army lacked a grand design to reconstruct Okinawan society.¹³

Although I critically examine the U.S. master narrative, my goal is not to develop an anti-American alternative. U.S. and Japanese historians have re-narrated the American occupation of Okinawa using abundant resources. For example, it became evident that Okinawans preferred the benevolent American image, especially in the case when they contrasted the U.S. soldiers with the Japanese who forced Okinawans to commit suicide instead of surrendering to the U.S. Army. According to a study of the Ministry of Health and Welfare concerning the causes of death of 11,483 children under the age of 14 during the Battle of Okinawa, almost 1 percent of the children died because they had their food taken or were shot by their own army.¹⁴

In the development of methodology such as oral history, however, historians must pay close attention to the analysis of sources.¹⁵ We know that the complexity of historical events is easily simplified or modified in the context of politics. In the case of Okinawa, I cannot ignore the fact that memories and perceptions of the occupation are not a solid whole. The unspeakable memories withheld in Okinawan society coexist with the authentic memories publicly displayed in the survivors' testimonies.¹⁶ Due to the incredible cruelty and shame that the islanders experienced, many people were reluctant to talk about the depressing stories of the American occupation. Since some people have overcome their reluctance to speak of those painful situations, researchers could now develop a more comprehensive picture of what actually took place. Many shameful and cruel things such as prostitution and slaughter also constituted the American occupation.

¹³ Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, *Key Stone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.- Japanese Relations* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 39.

¹⁴ Masahide Ota, "Re-examining the History of the Battle of Okinawa," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Okinawa: Cold War Island* (Cardiff, UK: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), 33.

¹⁵ Alessandro Portelli, *The ballet of Valle Giulia: Oral History and the Art of Dialogue* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1997), 3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 158.

During the early stage of this occupation, antagonism between Japanese and American may have not made sense. The base politics have often highlighted antagonism between the U.S. military and Okinawans. However, this construct was not always immutable. The mass media played an important role in forming the images of occupation. The military bases' mere existence agitated the American occupation of Okinawa during its twenty-seven-years duration.¹⁷ As a result, this article reveals more complex interactions between the U.S. military personnel and the islanders. Using different types of resources such as declassified government documents, newspapers, and testimonies, this research displays the complexity of occupation narratives. After the reversion to the mainland, there was an expansion of testimonies of Okinawans edited by government printing offices, journalists, historians, and others. The purpose of the testimonies was varied. Some of them are to record the memories of Japanese soldiers in the Battle of Okinawa. Others are to report military misconducts by both the Japanese and the U.S. soldiers against the islanders. In this article, I mainly use the testimonies edited by Okinawa Prefectural Board of Education (OPBE). OPBE published its testimonies in order to record war and occupation experiences of ordinary people in Okinawa. All editors of these testimonies are eminent Okinawan historians and scholars.¹⁸

Testimonies are an important source to understand and interpret the U.S. military occupation. However, historians cannot claim their objectivity and impartiality in their editing of what the islander saw and how they felt. Miyume Tanji argues that the stories of suffering and discrimination during U.S. military occupation were accompanied by the politics of protest and resistance against the United States. In her view, the U.S. occupation was more complex than was often described in the stories of Okinawans' abuse and marginalization.¹⁹ I recognized the importance of this argument and admitted that Okinawan editors may tend to homogenize the vanquished vision of occupation, while this article focuses on criticizing the victors' simplified vision. Finally, my research concludes that U.S. master narratives

¹⁷ T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White and Lisa Yoneyama, eds., *Perilous Memories: The Asia Pacific War(s)* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 97.

¹⁸ Okinawa ken, *Okinawa kenshi 10*, 1095–1115.

¹⁹ Miyume Tanji, *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa* (London: Routledge, 2006), 2.

have not fully recognized the gaps between the ideal and the reality of American occupation of Okinawa.

Occupation Plan and War

Before the Battle of Okinawa, the United States had already prepared for military occupation of Japan. By 1943, the U.S. Navy enlisted the help of economists, political scientists, lawyers, and anthropologists as well as men with practical experience in the Far East. The purpose of this group was to collect and organize all the available information on the Pacific islands that the Imperial Japanese military would occupy. The outcome of this research was a number of handbooks of factual knowledge about the North Pacific. Some of these handbooks formed the basis of military planning and operations in the Ryukyu Islands, especially as they became the target of the Tenth Army's invasion.²⁰ The Ryukyuan Handbook covered a wide range of topics about Ryukyuan (Okinawan) society.

U.S. experts on Far Eastern affairs also contributed to the military occupation by offering Army and Navy officers, civil affairs courses. On an experimental basis, the University of Chicago started a civil affairs program for the Far Eastern theater. Five other schools (Harvard, Michigan, Northwestern, Stanford, and Yale) also provided Far Eastern programs. The civil affairs policies evinced idealistic principles, stressing that "an occupation should be as just, humane and mild as possible and that the welfare of the people governed should be the goal of every civil affairs officer."²¹

Moreover, U.S. relief efforts, which Okinawans were amazed by and grateful for during the Battle of Okinawa, represented the U.S. military personnel's high-mindedness. One Japanese woman, who was captured by the U.S. Army, remembers that:

GIs gave us water and food saying that we would not be killed. But, convinced that the water and the food contained poison, nobody touched them. The GI took a bite and a sip to show that they were safe. We, then, ate and drank.²²

²⁰ Clellan S. Ford, "Occupation Experience on Okinawa," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 267 (1950), 176.

²¹ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–50*, 8.

²² Yoshida, "Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa Under U.S. Occupation," 9.

By and large, many Americans showed their goodwill towards the enemy's civilians. Some of them handed out their own rations such as candy, chocolate, cigarettes, and chewing gum to people in spite of instruction by Tenth Army headquarters not to do so. In addition, most captives could survive by depending on the U.S. military government for food, clothing, shelter, and work even as they were forced to live in internment camps under a state of martial law.²³

For the Tenth Army, however, the relief mission was an integral part of the tactical preparation for a direct assault on Okinawa (Operation Iceberg). The assault forces were certain to encounter thousands of Okinawans in the U.S. advance across the islands. To facilitate military operations, the islanders had to be removed from the front lines. Military government planning began on August 15, 1944, when four Army and fifteen Navy civil affairs officers arrived at Schofield on Oahu. The Tenth Army's planners received guidance from the Pacific commander, Admiral Chester William Nimitz. The Nimitz directive contrasted in tone with the military government manual. Admiral Nimitz made clear that "the treatment afforded the islanders would depend on how they behaved."²⁴ At every point, plans for dealing with the islanders had to be further adapted to the plans for fighting the war. The planners expected that the Imperial Japanese Army might have used civilians as a weapon of war. They explored the possibility that the enemy would panic civilians and employ them to hamper U.S. operations. Densely populated areas were regarded as an ideal set-up for such schemes. One of most effective ways to prevent the islanders' sabotage was to send them to segregation points which would cause the least interference with military operations.²⁵ During the Battle of Okinawa, one combat division of the U.S. landing force was in charge of establishing internment camps.

In October 1944, the Tenth Army military government headquarters had prepared lists of supplies and equipment for the future occupation. The planners estimated that the Tenth Army would need to take care of some 450,000 natives who would presumably be rendered helpless and homeless as a result of Operation Iceberg. The mission of civil affairs was to provide

²³ Michael S. Molasky, *The American Occupation of Japan and Okinawa* (London: Routledge, 1999), 19.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 16–20.

²⁵ Civil Affairs Okinawa Operation Book No.2, Box 704 RG389, NACP, 3.

Okinawans with minimum food and shelter, screen out any Japanese military, prevent sabotage, restore law and order under U.S. military rule, to combat disease and maintain health and sanitation, and to begin their rehabilitation as soon as conditions would permit.²⁶

Contrary to the Tenth Army's wariness about meeting a hostile people, the U.S. military found Okinawans passive and cooperative. A military government detachment reported that "they were completely docile in carrying out every order."²⁷ Although the Tenth Army got help from the local people, it had to face enormous problems immediately after Operation Iceberg. For Okinawans and the military government, the most impending problem was food shortages. The tremendous devastation, which resulted from the combination of air raids and ground warfare, disrupted agricultural, fishing, and livestock industries. Most of the crops had been lost during the war as had most of the livestock and fishery. Statistics suggest that almost 90 percent of the livestock was lost and all motorized boats and 70 percent of oar-powered boats were destroyed.²⁸

Nevertheless, Tenth Army headquarters still believed that there was no immediate food crisis because enough food would be provided by their great relief efforts. Moreover, in the southern part of Okinawa, the U.S. soldiers confiscated food from the islanders' meager stores. The military government allowed the islanders to seek out food caches. During the battle, 1,402 tons of processed foodstuffs and 2,079 tons of harvested crops were salvaged and rationed. By the end of the battle, between 75 and 85 percent of the population was fed more from local resources.²⁹

One of the U.S. soldiers who served in the military government recalled that several errors in planning finally illustrated the necessity of a flexible plan. The most striking error was that the Tenth Army headquarters underestimated the number of civilians who were expected to be captured. For invasion purpose, Okinawa was divided into a northern part to be attacked by the Marines, and a southern part to be attacked by Army forces.

²⁶ Ibid., 4–6.

²⁷ Yoshida, "Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa Under U.S. Occupation," 10.

²⁸ Summation of United State Army Military Government Activities in the Ryukyu Islands, No.1, Box 1999 Folder 12, RG 407, NACP., 25–26; Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–50*, 47, 133.

²⁹ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–50*, 47.

According to this operational categorization, the Tenth Army headquarters computed the number of Okinawans in the north and in the south. It was thought that in the sparsely populated north, relatively few natives would be captured after the Marines moved northward.³⁰ Unexpectedly, the preliminary bombing of southern Okinawa before the battle of Okinawa prompted the Imperial Japanese military to order the islanders to move into the northern part of the island. On October 10, 1944, U.S. B-29 planes repeatedly struck Naha City, the capital of Okinawa prefecture, and burned down 90 percent of the city.³¹ Many islanders who were frightened by the threat of air raids rushed away from densely populated areas.

On April 1, 1945, the Tenth Army started the actual invasion of Okinawa but they soon realized that there was no enemy fire. This is because the Thirty-Second Army lacked the strength to defend the beaches. While the landing operation was timid, the Army units were soon forced to start intense fights with the Japanese Army. At the end of April, the U.S. Army pushed through the first Japanese defense line. On May 29, the Tenth Army captured Shuri Castle. Seizure of the castle represented both strategic and psychological blows for the Japanese and was a milestone in the Battle in southern Okinawa.

On the other hand, the Marines easily reached the northern tip of Okinawa on April 13. The consequence of rapid conquest of the northern half of the island put a greater effort than expected on civilian affairs. The uncontested landing and rapid conquest of the northern half of the island, including 200,000 Japanese captives, put a greater than expected emphasis on logistical efforts. The blueprint for planning had concentrated on construction of airfields, roads, munitions storages and other military installations. The remaining areas had been allocated for the housing and sheltering civilians. The planners had calculated that 12 refugee camps would be built to house some 120,000 civilians, in addition to the military government personnel themselves.³² As it was, engineering teams soon understood that the U.S. military needed more space for military installations and thus no space remained for the captives.³³ Although the construction

³⁰ Ford, "Occupation Experience on Okinawa," 177–178.

³¹ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–50*, 38.

³² Ibid., 55.

³³ Ford, "Occupation Experience on Okinawa," 178.

work in the initial plan supported the tactical forces engaged in the battle of Okinawa, the ultimate goal was to construct the bases and airfields for the final assault on mainland Japan. Engineers had to engage in extra work such as widening roads and bridges due to the poor conditions of roads in rural regions.

Under these adverse circumstances, the military government decided to use the Okinawans' houses as emergency shelters. Some dwellings, which had housed five to 10 people, became shelter for 50 or more. Such overcrowding made sanitary standards difficult to maintain. Many Okinawans have never forgotten their squalid quarters in the emergency shelters. One Okinawan woman remembers that her daughter gave birth to a child in an overcrowded shelter. She had terrible anxiety about cutting her grandchild's umbilical cord with scissors that were covered with mold.³⁴

In the southern parts of the islands, the bloody battle had continued. The battle of Okinawa raged for three months – from April to June 1945 – and resulted in the deaths of approximately 65,000 Japanese soldiers, 94,000 noncombatants, and 12,500 Americans.³⁵ The longer the war was prolonged, the more the U.S. military government moved refugees to the northern areas. Under the strain of the abrupt evacuations from the front lines, the military government sometimes mismanaged refugees. On several occasions, refugees were sent to a new location that had been filled beyond capacity and refused to take them in. For the evacuees, these refusals meant waiting many hours in the back of overcrowded trucks during which time some became dehydrated or ill.³⁶ As a result of the war, approximately 75 percent of the population was dislocated from the area of its original domicile.³⁷ After the suicide of the Japanese Army commander Ushijima Mitsuru, on June 23, 1945, Japan's military resistance largely ceased, and thousands of Okinawans were placed in internment camps. The number of residents in camps had been increasing from the first month of the invasion in April, 1945. By the end of June, it amounted to a majority of the surviving population on the Ryukyu Islands. Most Okinawans wanted nothing more than to return to their homes.

³⁴ Okinawa ken, *Okinawa kenshi* 10, 447.

³⁵ Yoshida, "Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa under U.S. Occupation," 3.

³⁶ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–50*, 59.

³⁷ Daniel D. Karasik, "Okinawa: A problem in Administration and Reconstruction," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 7/3 (1948): 264.

Overlapped Experiences: War and Occupation

Scholarship contends that Okinawans have correlated the experiences of the war and occupation with postwar political opposition against the American military bases. What specific stories or memories in the war have been directly linked to the Okinawan community of protest? Interestingly, many scholars do not clearly answer this question, which they themselves posed.³⁸ This is because scholars know that the survivors of the Pacific War have ambivalent feelings toward American soldiers. Many islanders admit that Americans made greater efforts to save Okinawans than did the Imperial Japanese soldiers. Some of them contrasted a benevolent American image with the Japanese one of forcing Okinawans to commit suicide instead of surrendering to the U.S. army. The Imperial Japanese government had educated people to commit suicide instead of surrendering to the U.S. army. Many islanders resorted to acts of desperation: strangling and suffocating their own children, stabbing one another in the throat, and when a grenade was available to expedite the task, huddling around the device and pulling the pin. According to some Japanese captives, they would have surrendered earlier except for fear of their own soldiers.³⁹

While Japanese propaganda proclaimed that the Imperial Army would defend civilians in return for their support of Japan, the safety of Okinawans was given low priority.⁴⁰ As the situation for Japanese forces worsened and morale amongst the civilian populations declined, the Imperial Army issued increasingly restrictive decrees. Okinawans were required to contribute to food levies, wages, and corvee labor to support the war. The violations of these decrees provided the basis for a campaign of selective violence by the Japanese soldiers against the islanders. In some places, the

³⁸ See, Tanji, *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa*; Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., *Island of Discontent: Okinawa Response to Japanese and American Power* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC, 2003); Chalmers Johnson ed., *Okinawa: Cold War Island* (Cardiff, UK: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999).

³⁹ Molasky, *The American Occupation of Japan and Okinawa*, 16; Newspaper Clipping, *Papers of James T. Watkins IV*, Reel 1, Box1, James T. Watkins Papers, Department of Special Collections and University Archives Stanford, California: DSCUAS.

⁴⁰ Tanji, *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa*, 38; Hein and Selden, *Island of Discontent*, 48.

Japanese army officers' action had become increasingly paranoid. A Japanese sailor recalled that:

One guy was executed in front of the village chairman and the voluntary guards' leader, for carrying the documents (leaflets?) from the Americans. With his hands tied behind his back, he was lashed to a tree, and two soldiers stabbed him from both sides with their bayonets, but they did not kill him. Lieutenant Kayama dispatched him with a shot to the head.⁴¹

The U.S. military appealed to the local people to stay away from Imperial Japanese Army. U.S. propaganda leaflets, which targeted civilians, cast doubt on waging the war. An Okinawan remembers:

The leaflet, which the U.S. military dropped, said "it would be sagacious to return to your home town and then live calmly. The U.S. military would never attack the civilians." The rumor of leaflet spread among Okinawans who were frightened by artillery strikes. When the next leaflet noticed that the U.S. military would start a mopping-up operation, they decided to surrender.⁴²

Leaflets, which utilized Okinawa's historical, social, and anthropological information from the Ryukyuan Handbook, adroitly focused on the traditional Japanese bias that Okinawans were backward rustics.⁴³ Ironically, the U.S. military government also tended to look down on the islanders as second class citizens during the occupation of Okinawa.⁴⁴ For example, Colonel William S. Triplet wrote in his diary that:

The Surviving natives crept from their ruins and found hordes of Americans driving hundreds of Jeeps, trucks, and

⁴¹ Hein and Selden, *Island of Discontent*, 52.

⁴² Okinawa ken, *Okinawa kenshi 10*, 497.

⁴³ Leaflets during the battle of Okinawa, *Papers of James T. Watkins IV*, Reel 1, Box 1, DSCUAS.

⁴⁴ Alvah, *Unofficial Ambassadors*, 168.

tanks hither and yon..... Unfortunately, the unsophisticated natives were unable to gauge the speed of an oncoming truck.⁴⁵

Although the U.S. military boasted that the civilians in Okinawa began to cooperate once they lost their fear of Americans, Okinawans gave greater support to the Japanese war effort. Contrary to standard opinion in Okinawa, which holds that the islanders were bystanders, Japanese conscripts might have accounted for up to one-third of the island's defender. Okinawans fought well and their knowledge of local terrain helped their unit during the battle of Okinawa.⁴⁶ Civilians showed their pity for remnants of defeated Japanese troops and distributed food to them when troops assumed a humble attitude toward them.⁴⁷ In some huge internment camps, Japanese soldiers were concealed by the islanders.⁴⁸

Relatively speaking, Okinawans were better fed in the camps than in their old hideouts. In some villages, rations from the Japanese were so poor that infanticide occurred as a way of feeding others. After the war, the severity of food shortages depended on locality. A fortunate woman recalled that:

In my internment camp, the U.S. military supplied us with an ample rationing. Military officers also provide us special rationing such as milk or canned foods.... After I engaged in military chores, our life gradually became well off. In my case, I never experienced food shortage.⁴⁹

On the other hand, another woman suffered from malnutrition in her camp. According to her:

We Stayed at Kushi for 7 or 8 months. At first we lived in a huge tent which accommodated from 50 to 100 people.

⁴⁵ William S. Triplet. *In the Philippines and Okinawa: A memoir, 1945–48* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2001), 207.

⁴⁶ Sarantakes, *Key Stone*, 7–8.

⁴⁷ Japanese troops more often seized food from civilians. Therefore, many Okinawans hated the Imperial army. Okinawa ken, *Okinawa kenshi* 10, 858.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 864.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 447.

Because there was no mat, we slept on the ground. We were literally treated like livestock.... The food situation was also terrible. Although the U.S. military equally distributed foodstuff, ration was not enough to survive. Everyone suffered from malnutrition. I saw many people who died of starvation. So, we had to seek potato for 30 kilometers' distance.⁵⁰

In places where the food situation was aggravated, the islanders often scavenged from garbage or stole food from the U.S. bases. Sly people sold the leftovers of garbage after adding water. The islanders called stolen things the fruits of a battle. Under these conditions, people lost their morality and boasted about their swag.⁵¹

The sexual exploitation of Okinawans by U.S. soldiers was also a common story among the survivors. The military government restrained enlisted Americans from having sexual relations with Okinawans. By the end of 1946, the MP reported 30 cases of rape and attempted rape.⁵² Although it is impossible to know accurate numbers of crimes, the islanders' testimony reveals that the American sexual exploitation of Okinawans was a serious problem. Not just a few women seem to have prostituted themselves for food. One Okinawan told that:

When I was doing potato-digging, one white soldier, who was hiding near me, suddenly lifted me on his shoulder and ran to a coppice. It seemed that he had prepared to engage in prostitution because wheat, cigarettes, and so forth were placed on the ground. Gesticulating with his body and hand, he suggested to me that he give these things.... I gestured that I would take all. Because I was ashamed of

⁵⁰ Ibid., 474.

⁵¹ Yakabe Osamu, "Ekkyo suru Okinawa: Americanism to bunka henyo," in Yoshimi Shunya, ed., *Reisen taisei to sihon no bunka* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2002), 249.

⁵² Summation of United State Army Military Government Activities in the Ryukyu Island, No.1, Box 1999 Folder 12, RG 407, NACP, 20.

being seen by someone, I gestured him to move to other place.⁵³

A large number of women were actually raped. According to one newspaper article, as many as 10,000 Okinawans were raped.⁵⁴ One woman witnessed that her niece had been abducted by a white soldier. According to her:

The soldier threatened us with a gun. We could not resist him...After a while, the leader of vigilance visited my home and then he chased the soldier with my grandfather. They pretended to be Military Police officers and shouted that "MP was coming."...They found my niece in the mountain. The soldier had already disappeared.⁵⁵

The islanders' testimonies reveal that women were often raped when they sought food. In some places, only black soldiers were regarded as rapists by both the islanders and MP. An Okinawan negotiated with an MP to supervise black soldiers. The MP started to patrol his village, but black soldiers disappeared during the patrol time and showed up after the MP left.⁵⁶ This reputation for crime and misconduct earned by black soldiers could be traced to the system of segregated units. It is natural that only black soldiers committed crimes in villages where black units were stationed.

The military government understood that "success of occupation depended not only upon the dedication of the civil affairs personnel, but also upon the good behavior of all American servicemen on Okinawa."⁵⁷ U.S. soldiers were expected to behave like ambassadors, whether or not they were conscious of that expectation. Some soldiers showed their goodwill to the islanders. An Okinawan related the following:

I was captured with my son and my brother...My brother, who had stayed in Canada, could speak English. He

⁵³ Okinawa ken, *Okinawa kenshi* 10, 438.

⁵⁴ "3 Dead Marines and a Secret of Wartime Okinawa," *New York Times*, June 1, 2000.

⁵⁵ Okinawa ken, *Okinawa kenshi* 10, 441.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 470.

⁵⁷ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–50*, 81.

explained to American soldiers that we were civilians. In our camp, we were surprised by the American hospitality. They provided us with a pile of foodstuff and new clothes...When my wife gave birth to our fifth baby, the American soldiers zealously helped to find a doctor. I really appreciated their help.⁵⁸

During the War, the Imperial Japanese government extolled extreme patriotism and prohibited the populace from accessing U.S. media and popular culture. Japanese were even banned the use of the language of the enemy, English. Under these conditions, Okinawans, who returned from abroad, were often regarded as anti-nationalists. They were threatened by the Japanese soldiers and thus many of them were willing to surrender.

Contrary to the military government's expectation, a minority of the troops began to torment the islanders. In the worst cases, slaughtering occurred in some villages. A woman remembers that:

We moved from Momoyama to Henako. Although we often ran into the American soldiers, we did not always feel uneasy about them because almost all soldiers did not torment us. However one lean guy, who was named "civilian," was like a demon. He always carried a gun, beat males, and raped females. Several people were killed by him. One guy was killed in a plain because he evacuated young ladies when civilian came to our village. The civilian forced him to kneel and then shot him.⁵⁹

The Director of General Affairs for the military government, Lt. Comdr. James Watkins IV, noted that "extreme ill will had developed between the blacks and the islanders" and said "fear of cruelty, rape, and violence replaced respect for American authority."⁶⁰ The military government admitted that black troops were by no means the only offenders, but it linked an increasing number of black servicemen and serious crimes on Okinawa. Complaints against black soldiers diminished as many of their

⁵⁸ Okinawa ken, *Okinawa kenshi 10*, 851–852.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 480–481.

⁶⁰ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–50*, 83.

units were gradually withdrawn from Okinawa in 1946 and 1947. However, the military government soon discovered that the departure of black soldiers did not solve the problem of civil-military conflict. Indeed, conflict between the islanders and the replacement unit from the Philippines increased. Some Okinawans conjectured that the Philippines avenged their homeland on Okinawans. In fact, many of the Filipino servicemen had experienced, or at least witnessed, atrocities committed by the Japanese in the Philippines during the Pacific War.⁶¹ A demobilized Japanese soldier recalled the following when he returned to Okinawa:

I went back to Okinawa on July 3, 1947. Sometime I visited Moromizato where my relatives lived. Whenever I visit Moromizato, ships had to pass through Koya Zyuziro where a Filipino unit was stationed. Because the demobilized soldiers, wore the same dark-blue trousers, it was quite easy to recognize who Japanese soldiers were. They always reviled and threw something at us. Although they did not shoot us, I was very scared.⁶²

Throughout the two years they remained on Okinawa, the Philippine Scouts were accused of numerous crimes against the islanders. For the period January to July 1948, Koshin Shikiya, the Governor of Okinawa Gunto (Ryukyu Islands), reported 68 violent incidents involving the Philippine Scouts. The Okinawan police commissioner, Kenshin Nakamura, reported that "Since November 1945 four civil policemen had been killed on duty by black or Filipino servicemen."⁶³ Historian and journalist reveal that these reports were wrong. Black and Filipinos, who served there, made up only a part of the occupiers stationed on Okinawa but no one has identified the culprits because the U.S. military officials have not published MP records.⁶⁴

The friction generated between the U.S. military and the Okinawans remained a severe hindrance to reconstruction of Okinawan life.

⁶¹ Ibid, 85.

⁶² Ryuzo Saki, *Kiroku shogen Okinawa Zyumin gyakusatu* (Tokyo: Shin zinbutsu ouraisha, 1976), 185–186.

⁶³ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–50*, 86.

⁶⁴ "3 Dead Marines and a Secret of Wartime Okinawa," *New York Times*, June 1, 2000.

Furthermore, the military government did not resolve this problem. Reports of serious crimes continued to plague the military government until the end of the 1940s, when the new government, the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, was established. Although the U.S. military's racial policies further exacerbated these frictions, the decline of the soldiers' discipline stemmed from the disruption in the chain of command. Because the Truman administration left the status of the Ryukyu Islands at the conclusion of World War II to the State Department, the Navy and Army proceeded to enact different occupation plans. A confusing series of flip flop between the U.S. Army and Navy on responsibility for governing Okinawa left the American soldiers confused.

The Forgotten Islands

Okinawans as well as ordinary Americans did not know how the political and military clash within the Truman administration affected the occupation of Okinawa. However, the people could infer that the occupation policy did not work well. By 1948, *Uruma Shinpo* was the only Okinawan newspaper left and it was censored by the military government. It reported that Okinawans were gradually getting back to normal life under the military government's tutelage. On August 1, 1947, *Uruma Shinpo* reported the governor's interview with American journalists on the front page. The governor explained to the journalists that the islanders appreciated assistance from the United States. According to Shikiya:

A small number of Okinawans long for reverting to the mainland, but almost all want to economically develop under the American tutelage. Okinawans would die of starvation if the American military left Okinawa. To avoid this, the military should stay for a long time.⁶⁵

Some journalists seemed dubious of the governor's unctuousness. The Deputy Commander for Military Government, Col. William H. Craig, always stayed by the governor and interrupted journalists' questions. For the military government, the governor was "a landmark for progressive self-government" because the representative of local village and city councils elected Shikiya. The official Army history describes that "the evolution of political reforms continued under Army auspices."⁶⁶ However, everyone

⁶⁵ *Uruma Shinpo*, August 1, 1947.

⁶⁶ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–50*, 108.

realized that the governor held a purely nominal status. He had no political power without the military government's permission. Consul General U. Alexis Johnson remembered that when he met the governor, Shikiya explained to him that his job was only to nod and smile at the Americans. An American liaison officer between the military government and the governor was satisfied with Shikiya, because of his docile personality.⁶⁷

The U.S. mass media is often a useful resource for understanding the situation in Okinawa. The information reflected the resident reporters' views. Some articles reported that the islanders had increasing anti-American feelings. On April 1, 1946, the *New York Times* had an article with the caption that "Island's people remain docile but are ready to see us go."⁶⁸ The article summarized their attitude toward the military government like this:

Thank you very much for all you've done for us, but please go away as soon as we are able to stand on our own feet economically. We want to live our own lives, but since we've gotten used to Japanese ways we prefer them.

One of the most severe anti-occupation journalists was *Time* correspondent, Frank Gibney. On November 28, 1949, *Time* magazine published his article which criticized the U.S. military government in Okinawa. According to this article:

The U.S. troops "in Okinawa" whose morale and discipline have probably been worse than of any U.S. force in the world, have policed 600,000 natives who live in hopeless poverty. The battle of Okinawa completely wrecked the islands' simple farming and fishing economy; in a matter of minutes, U.S. bulldozers smashed the terraced fields which Okinawans had painstakingly laid out for more than a century. Since war's end Okinawans have subsisted on a U.S. dole.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Kano Masanao, *Sengo Okinawa shiso zo* (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 1987), 81.

⁶⁸ "Okinawans Prove American to Rule: Island's People Remain Docile, but Are Ready to See Us Go," *New York Times*, April 1, 1946.

⁶⁹ *Time*, November 2, 1949.

A report by MacArthur's headquarters in 1949 reaffirmed this reputation, noting that "personnel assigned to the Ryukyu reportedly were 'of lower caliber than those assigned to Japan.'"⁷⁰ The ideal goal of America's mission in Okinawa was to teach the islanders the meaning of democracy. In reality, however, the credibility of this purpose in the early occupation period was less reliable. By the fall of 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided that "the Ryukyu Islands were vital and that they were to be considered as one of the primary base areas in American postwar security arrangements."⁷¹ The JCS thus argued that the United States should have exclusive control of Okinawa. However, not many in the Truman administrations were satisfied with this recommendation. The State Department desired to follow the principle of the Atlantic Charter, which declared no territorial aggrandizement, and to keep cooperative and friendly relations with Japan in the context of the growing Cold War. In response to the JCS, the State Department argued that "control of the Ryukyu would involve the United States in the thankless task of governing the three-quarters of a million people of totally alien culture and outlook."⁷² The President, Harry S. Truman was placed in a dilemma between the JCS and the State Department. In his diary, Truman wrote that:

I found that the State Department held views that differed from those of the War and Navy Department. I listened carefully to both points of view. In the end, I sustained the Army and Navy chiefs on the major issues of the security of the bases. But I also saw the validity of the ideal for which the State Department was contending.⁷³

The political deadlock had been gradually dissolving after the Navy modified its opinion. At first, the Navy assumed that Okinawa was desirable as a naval base and thus accepted responsibility for military government. However, after examining the anchorages in Buckner Bay, the Navy finally found these places less desirable than originally thought. In addition,

⁷⁰ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–50*, 81.

⁷¹ Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem*, 83.

⁷² Sarantakes, *Key Stone*, 26.

⁷³ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, Volume I: Year of Decisions* (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), 274–275.

typhoons, which devastated the developing ports in the region, clearly made naval interest in the islands decline. Admiral Nimitz recommended a trusteeship for Okinawa. Trusteeship implied that the military government would administer the territory for a limited time. Trusteeship was also useful to camouflage “the unpleasant odor of colonialism.”⁷⁴ The Army compromised on the condition that the United States possess exclusive control over all military installations.⁷⁵

In October 1948, debate about Okinawa’s future was settled for the time being when the president approved policy paper, NSC 13. NSC13 concluded that:

The United States should make up its mind at this point that it intends to retain on a long-term basis the facilities at Okinawa.... The base on Okinawa should be immediately developed. The United States agencies responsible for administering the above mentioned islands should promptly formulate and carry out a program on a long-term basis for the economic and social well-being, and to the extent practicable for the eventual self-support of the natives.⁷⁶

During the political debate, the military government lost its momentum in the occupation. “Military government personnel were uncertain about their mission and purpose.”⁷⁷ Since the military was unsure how long it would stay on the island, it did not repair the damages of war or build permanent buildings that would stand up to typhoons. Even facilities for Americans were not much better. Colonel Triplet describes that:

Housing at Awase was becoming slowly, very slowly, available, and three or four quonset houses would shortly become available to us.... Three lieutenants preferred the housing offered in Awase now to waiting for our

⁷⁴ Sarantakes, *Key Stone*, 26.

⁷⁵ Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem*, 175.

⁷⁶ Revised Paragraph 5 of NSC13/1 (October 26, 1948), *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol. 6, 877–878.

⁷⁷ Sarantakes, *Key Stone*, 28.

construction. I certainly couldn't blame them for wanting to move out. Even since one of these child brides had been awakened from a sound sleep by a rat biting her on the lip, they had shown signs of cracking a bit.⁷⁸

The JCS originally assigned both operational control and military government responsibility for the Ryukyu Islands to the Navy, but neither the Navy nor Army wanted to assume responsibility for the region.⁷⁹ Because the Navy declined an interest in Okinawa, all administrative authority in Okinawa finally was moved to the Army on July 1, 1946. This transfer of command soon affected occupation policies. Although the Okinawans overseas had sent relief items to their native place, the relief transportation, for which the Navy was in charge, was suspended.⁸⁰ The command reorganization coincided with a general demobilization of engineer units in Okinawa. By late spring only four of twelve units were actually engaged in construction activity. The funds available for base construction also dwindled. In February 1946, Headquarters, Army Forces, and Western Pacific, estimated that \$93 million would be needed to build base facilities in Okinawa. However, Congress actually provided only \$31 million.⁸¹ The decline in military construction was worldwide, but the particularly dramatic curtailment of funds for Okinawa reflected the lowered priorities that characterized American policy toward the Ryukyu Islands during the 1945-48 period.

Despite the apathy and neglect among political leaders in Washington D.C., Okinawa slowly recovered from the ruins. The purpose of the military government's economic mission was to provide for the repair and restoration of damaged properties and facilities and to devise a plan for the economic development of Okinawa. First of all, the military government decided to release most of the islander's land so that refugee camps would be dismantle and Okinawans could be resettled into communities. At the same time, 20 percent of the land under cultivation before the Pacific War was confiscated to create military bases. While there was a competition over land between the U.S. officials charged with creating strategic bases and those

⁷⁸ Triplet, op. cit., 214.

⁷⁹ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945-50*, 79.

⁸⁰ Nahashishi hensyu iinnkai, *Sengo wo tadoru* (Okinawa: Ryukyu Sinposha, 2007), 44.

⁸¹ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945-50*, 78.

assigned to the rehabilitation of Okinawan society, military construction programs finally played the central role of reconstruction of the Okinawan economy.⁸² The most important commercial crop on Okinawa was sugar cane, but Okinawa sugar cane industry did not revitalize until 1951. Other crops reserves on Okinawa were meager as well as the livestock reserves.⁸³ Under these conditions, a great number of the islanders worked as construction workers, grounds-keepers, drivers, domestics, and concessionaries in jobs indirectly but closely related to American military housing and base construction and operation. The monetary economy reinstated in order to pay the wages for Okinawans whom the military government employed on U.S. bases. The black market where the islanders sold their belongings or booty disappeared by the end of 1948.⁸⁴

The military government broadcasted the image that base construction was cooperation work between Okinawans and Americans. Washington Post reported that:

Life is going on among the half million Okinawans. Little by little, they were digging out of the rubble created by man and God – the war and then the typhoon. United States Army engineers also are busy, rebuilding military installations wrecked by the storm. Japs – fast being repatriate – are helping out.⁸⁵

Although many Okinawans were industrious workers, they were not eager to construct the U.S. military installations. Okinawa Times reported that:

Although the people cannot get jobs in their villages, they may get a job related to base construction around Naha City. The youth do not have money to buy cigarettes. Under these conditions, they are attracted by any kind of job.⁸⁶

A primary school teacher remembers that:

⁸² Ibid., 121, 164, 168.

⁸³ Ibid., 124–125.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 144; Nahashishi hensyu iinnkai, Sengo wo tadoru, 20–23.

⁸⁵ “Army Settles Down to Stay in Okinawa,” *Washington Post*, November 19, 1946.

⁸⁶ *Okinawa Times*, June 25, 1951.

My salary was 300 yen per month. In those days, one dollar was 120 yen.... A pack of cigarettes was just 300 yen. My salary was so low that I sold my belongings as haoris (Japanese traditional coats) because Americans wanted to buy those like a souvenir.... Many able Okinawans got a job related to military installations, although salary was not so good.⁸⁷

In sum, many Okinawans engaged in base constructions only to survive. But an insufficient capital flow did not allow the regional economy to fully develop. The emergence of the Cold War and the rise of communist strength in the Far East ignited the base economy because policy makers renewed their interest in Okinawa as a strategically important forward base.⁸⁸ The rehabilitation of Okinawa needed another war – the Korean War. In 1950, Congress appropriated \$50 million of aid, which was higher than the amount of the previous three years combined.⁸⁹ The Truman administration finally spent over a billion dollars to expand military installations in the Ryukyu Islands.

The Cold War positioned the island as a part of the global ideological battle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Under the context of the global Cold War, the United States intended to demonstrate how democratization of Okinawa succeeded in the world. For this political reason, the United States invested a huge amount of capital into Okinawa. The centerpiece of the new policy was to promote political, economic and social rehabilitation.⁹⁰ Under the guidance of Major General Joseph R. Sheetz, the military government engaged in the first organized effort to cope with the Okinawan's problem.

Conclusion

To say that the planning was organized does not imply that the U.S. occupation of Okinawa was, in general, successful. The rose-colored occupation narrative, which was reshaped by the military government, showed an aspect of occupation history. The images of benevolent Americans sprang from the high-mindedness of the American soldiers. The Tenth

⁸⁷ Saki, *Kiroku shogen Okinawa Zyumin gyakusatu*, 177.

⁸⁸ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–50*, 153.

⁸⁹ Sarantakes, *Key Stone*, 69.

⁹⁰ Nahashishi hensyu iinnkai, *Sengo wo tadoru*, 80–81.

Army's civil affairs upheld a humanitarian occupation policy and enlightened military personnel. Contrary to the Japanese war propaganda image of U.S. soldiers as brutal murderers and rapists, the U.S. Army provided foods and materials for survival. Many Okinawans remember that Americans were more eager to save Okinawans than the Imperial Japanese soldiers. However, these heartwarming episodes would not become the only lasting memories. The U.S. military occupation and a series of base-related problems such as crimes and fatal accidents have had a lasting impact on the Okinawan psyche. Civil affairs were always subservient to the plans for fighting the war. To facilitate military operations, the islanders were forced into filthy and overpopulated internment camps. Not a few Okinawans suffered from hunger there. To make matters worse, the U.S. military often deferred construction of the camps in order to focus on logistical efforts.

With the end of the War, the military government faced the friction between the military personnel and the civilians. In particular, the sexual exploitation of Okinawans by military personnel was a well-known story among the islanders. The reasons why morality among the military personnel declined were complicated. However, the military government simplified the matter and linked increasing number of black servicemen to serious crimes on Okinawa. Ironically, the arrival of Filipino units exacerbated the friction. Policy debate in D.C. also prevented the military government from conducting occupation policy. The political compromise between the State Department and the JCS agreed that the U.S. should control the military installations in Okinawa but it did not propose a specific revitalization plan. This result occurred because the Navy declined its interest in Okinawa and surrendered all authority to the Army. While they tried to construct military bases in Okinawa, it could not stop the demobilizing process and failed to acquire an adequate budget from the U.S. Congress.

As Okinawa slowly recovered from the war-related devastation under the Army's auspices, the government overstated the outcome of occupation. Yet, it was easy to discern their inflated rhetoric because some American journalists reported the actual circumstances there. Only the emergence of the Cold War in East Asia made it possible for policy makers in Washington to set about the reconstruction of Okinawa.

**THE PORTRAIT OF AN OUTCASTE ACTOR:
MIKUNI RENTARŌ'S NOVEL
AND COMING OUT AS BURAKUMIN**

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Introduction

Mikuni Rentarō (1923–2013) was one of the most versatile character actors in the history of Japanese cinema. (Mikuni was a stage name; his real name was Satō Masao.) He played in numerous films and garnered many awards following his screen debut. Japanese film directors he worked for read like a who's who of great Japanese filmmakers: included are luminaries such as Kinoshita Keisuke (1912–1998), Naruse Mikio (1905–1969), Ichikawa Kon (1915–2008), Inagaki Hiroshi (1905–1980), Uchida Tomu (1898–1970), Imai Tadashi (1912–1991), Yamamoto Satsuo (1910–1983), Kobayashi Masaki (1916–1996), Imamura Shōhei (1926–2006), Ōshima Nagisa (1932–2013), and Yoshida Kijū (1933–). Mikuni's handsome looks, which lasted into his middle-age years, branded him an alpha male. Three coffee table books of his portraits were published between 1998 and 2010.¹ Mikuni was also exceptional among Japanese actors in that he was extremely articulate. He authored several books on his life and on Japanese Buddhism, and he coauthored discussions with writers and scholars such as Noma Hiroshi (1911–1995), Okiura Kazuteru (1927–), and Yan Sogiru (1936–). He was also an anomaly for a Japanese celebrity in that he came out during the 1970s in regard to his family origin being burakumin (the literal meaning of the word is “people of the hamlet”; it denotes Japanese outcastes) and later wrote and spoke on the subject. With his exceptional curriculum vitae, his passing in April 2013 was big news in Japan, and numerous obituaries appeared. The aspect of his burakumin identity, however, was downplayed in those obituaries. The film journal *Kinema Junpō*'s July 2013 issue, for example, carried ten cover articles on Mikuni the actor and his accomplishments.² Among the ten articles,

¹ See Sawatari Hajime, *Cigar* (Tokyo: Parco, 1998); Ichihara Motoki, *Kao: mikuni rentarō* [Faces of Mikuni Rentarō] (Tokyo: Daisan shokan, 2003); and Shida Ikkō, *Mikuni rentarō no utsuwa* [Mikuni Rentarō: The Vessel] (Tokyo: Futabasha, 2010).

² *Kinema Junpō* 2455 (July 2013): 24–53.

however, only one, by Satō Tadao, makes reference to Mikuni's family origins.³ A book that was published in the same year, journalist Utsunomiya Naoko's memoir of her conversations with Mikuni, does not refer once to his burakumin background.⁴ I see the minimizing of his family origins and the issue of burakumin origins in obituaries for Mikuni as part of an alarming tendency in general that current scholars and authors in Japan working on the burakumin see, namely that the burakumin issue has become absent (*muka*) from the mainstream Japanese media.⁵ This paper, then, counters such a tendency and argues that Mikuni's biography, especially his coming out as and his discourse on buraku, was important for the actor as well as being a significant part of burakumin and minority history in modern Japan.

Mikuni the Film Actor

Mikuni made his first screen appearance in the 1951 film *Good Devil* (*Zenma*), directed by Kinoshita Keisuke. In order to promote their new actor, the Shōchiku film studio publicized their new signee as not only handsome but “a graduate of the engineering department at the University of Osaka, who excels in swimming and judo; [and] won top prizes in varsity swimming.”⁶ Mikuni did practice judo and swimming in middle school, but the rest was a blatant fabrication. He was actually a middle school (in the prewar education system) dropout who ran away from his parents' house when he was 16 years old. Except for the two years he served in the Japanese military, Mikuni worked odd jobs until he was scouted by Shōchiku at the age of 27.

³ Satō Tadao, “Senjō kara kaette kita otoko [A Man Who Returned from the Battleground],” *Kinema junpō* 1641: 31–33.

⁴ Utsunomiya Naoko, *Wakare no nani ga kanashii no desuka, to mikuni rentarō wa itta* [“What Is There to Be Sad about Goodbyes?” said Mikuni Rentarō] (Tokyo: Chuō kōron shinsha, 2013).

⁵ Kurokawa Midori, *Tsukurareta “jinshu”: buraku sabetsu to jinshushugi* [Constructed “Ethnicity”: Buraku Discrimination and Racism] (Tokyo: Yūshisha, 2016), 242–52; Uehara Yoshihiro, “Kaisetsu [Afterword],” in Uehara Yoshihiro, ed., *Roji: hisabetsu buraku o meguru bungaku* [The Alleyway: Literature on Buraku] (Tokyo: Kōseisha, 2017), 257–89.

⁶ Mikuni Rentarō, *Ikizama shinizama: mikuni rentarō* [Mikuni Rentarō's Way of Life] (Tokyo: KK Long Sellers, 2006), 79.

Mikuni's running away from home was related to his burakumin background. His father worked as an electrician, but this was still akin to being a day laborer. Working with electricity was a trade that his father learned while serving in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905-1906. Prior to that, he had worked with Mikuni's grandfather in their family business making caskets for the dead, which was a burakumin profession in Japan.⁷ Although not explicitly told his heritage, Mikuni sensed that something was amiss when he was the first to be suspected at his school when someone's bicycle was stolen.⁸ He also found it strange that his grandparents lived away from others in their home village.⁹ Mikuni reflected that even though he did not want to enter middle school, which was not yet compulsory in pre-World War II Japan, his father beat him into submission to do so: "I reluctantly entered middle school, but a very strange atmosphere pervaded my middle school dorm life. I was already at a self-conscious age and was quite aware of how other students saw me. I was obviously discriminated against at my school. With the school environment as such, I was forced into thinking that I could not stay there."¹⁰ When Mikuni dropped out of middle school in his third year, his father again beat him relentlessly. Unable to tolerate the beatings, he ran away from his family in Izu Peninsula, where he had grown up.

Away from home, Mikuni wandered for a few months in what were then Japanese territories but which are today's People's Republic of China and Korea, after which he settled down in Osaka, where he worked one job after another. He tried to evade military conscription in wartime Japan, but his mother informed the police. He was arrested in 1943 and

⁷ Mikuni, *Ikizama Shinizama*, 46. Other professions in premodern and modern Japan that were largely burakumin-specific included butchering, leather and fur crafting, the making of Japanese musical instruments that use animal skins, and performing arts such as trained monkey performing (*saru mawashi*).

⁸ Mikuni Rentarō, *Shinran ni itaru michi* [My Path to Shinran] (Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 2010), 48.

⁹ Ibid., 49.

¹⁰ Ibid., 48–49. In this book, Mikuni offers, in the guise of fiction, his memory of having attended his grandmother's funeral and witnessing his grandfather making a casket and then burying her on his own.; Ibid., 246–251.

immediately sent to the Chinese front, serving there until the end of hostilities in 1945. He again did a lot of job-hopping until he was finally scouted by Koide Takashi, a Shōchiku producer, six years later. Kinoshita Keisuke, who had become a major film director in the immediate postwar years, took a liking to Mikuni and straightaway cast him in three major supporting roles in his films. Among Mikuni's initial successes during the 1950s was playing a main supporting character in *Samurai I: Miyamoto Musashi* (Miyamoto Musashi, dir. Inagaki Hiroshi, 1954), and also in *Burmese Harp* (Biruma no tategoto, dir. Ichikawa Kon, 1956). He then started appearing in the films of Independent Production (*dokuritsu puro*), an entity set up by communist directors including Imai Tadashi, Yamamoto Satsuo, and Ieki Miyoji (1911–1976), who had been purged by major film studios in the early 1950s for their political activism. The two renowned Independent Production films in which Mikuni appeared were *Half Brothers* (Ibo kyōdai, dir. Ieki Miyoji, 1957) and *Songs of a Handcart* (Niguruma no uta, dir. Yamamoto Satsuo, 1959).

When these directors resumed their careers at larger film studios in the 1960s, they continued to cast Mikuni in their films. Among Mikuni's major films of that time was *A Fugitive from the Past* (Kiga kaikyō, dir. Uchida Tomu, 1964). The 1960s also saw him make an appearance in *The Profound Desire of the Gods* (Kamigami no fukaki yokubō, 1968), an epic film directed by Imamura Shōhei and set on an Okinawan island. Mikuni later appeared in another Imamura classic, *Vengeance Is Mine* (Fukushū suru wa ware ni ari, 1979). He also worked with film auteur Yoshida Kijū, playing main characters in films such as *Coup d'Etat* (Kaigenrei, 1973) and *A Promise* (Ningen no yakusoku, 1988).



Figure 1. Mikuni putting on makeup for his Gerald O'Hara role in *Gone with the Wind*, 1974

While building up his career as a renowned film actor, Mikuni started to write and talk on burakumin issues after confessing his burakumin background in the late 1970s. From the 1980s into the 1990s, Mikuni came to write about and discuss two main points concerning the burakumin and Japanese culture; one was an understanding that the premodern forebears of the burakumin, the *eta*, *hinin*, or *kawaramono*, played a major role in creating Japanese culture, especially the performing arts. He argued that it was essentially the outcastes who created and developed Japanese theater arts such as *noh*, *bunraku*, and *kabuki* that are still performed today, and that the actor's profession was a modern rendering of what his burakumin ancestors had created and perfected. Mikuni's view was based on historical and anthropological findings by scholars such as Yanagita Kunio (1875–1962) and Orikuchi Shinobu (1887–1953), and also by Mikuni's contemporaries such as Amino Yoshihiko (1928–2004), Morooka Sukeyuki (1928–2006), and Okiura Kazuteru. Mikuni, together with others, argued that the Tokugawa shogunate (which ruled Japan from 1603 to 1868) had disciplined and regulated burakumin to an unprecedented degree, and this dampened the cultural creativity that the outcastes exercised during Japan's medieval period, creativity that culminated in performance arts such as *noh* and *bunraku* plays. During the Tokugawa era, nevertheless, *kawaramono* continued to develop performance arts and founded *kabuki*.

The second issue in Mikuni's writings is on the teachings and practices of the medieval Buddhist monk Shinran (1173–1262), who founded the Jōdo Shinshū (New Pure Land) sect of Japanese Buddhism. Shinran became renowned as a priest who himself married and broke the Buddhist law of celibacy. He also reasoned that laypeople who live on diets of fish and meat can also achieve enlightenment and salvation. Mikuni, relying on the writings of Noma Hiroshi and others, argued that medieval priests such as Shinran were thus able to break out of earlier teachings of Buddhism that served only the elite: the imperial family and the aristocrats. Shinran, among others, subverted earlier Buddhism by providing a theoretical and practical basis for the salvation and inclusion of the non-elite, including the burakumin. Mikuni's thoughts on Shinran culminated in his historical novel *Shinran: Path to Purity* (Shinran: shiroi michi), which he published in 1982. He later wrote a screenplay based on his novel and directed a feature film of the same title based on it in 1987. The film won the jury prize at the Cannes Film Festival that year.

Despite the disappearance of the buraku issue from the Japanese mainstream media, there has been active academic research on the

burakumin in the English language scholarship. Monographs on modern histories of the burakumin have appeared consistently.¹¹ Several in-depth anthropological studies on the issue have also been published.¹² There are also multiple studies on Nakagami Kenji (1946–1992), a major burakumin author of fiction.¹³ This article builds on those recent studies and looks at Mikuni's critique of burakumin discrimination. While Mikuni's origin has been publicized in the past, even burakumin studies in Japan have so far paid scant attention to Mikuni's accomplishments in cinema and his publications.¹⁴ There are many entry points to Mikuni's performances and

¹¹ Among them are Ian Neary, *The Buraku Issue and Modern Japan: The Career of Matsumoto Jiichirō* (London and New York: Routledge, 2010); Jeffrey Paul Bayliss, *On the Margins of Empire: Buraku and Korean Identity in Prewar and Wartime Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2013); and Noah Y. McCormack, *Japan's Outcaste Abolition: The Struggle for National Inclusion and the Making of the Modern State* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).

¹² Among them are Timothy D. Amos, *Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011); Flavia Cangià, *Performing the Buraku: Narratives on Cultures and Everyday Life in Contemporary Japan* (Zurich, Switzerland: LIT Verlag, 2013); Joseph D. Hankins, *Working Skin: Making Leather, Making a Multicultural Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2014); Christopher Bondy, *Voice, Silence, and Self: Negotiations of Buraku Identity in Contemporary Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015).

¹³ There have been other burakumin authors, such as Hijikata Tetsu (1927–2005), but among the authors of fiction who have come out as burakumin, Nakagami remains the most prominent. Among the English-language Nakagami studies are Nina Cornyetz, *Dangerous Women, Deadly Words: Phallic Fantasy and Modernity in Three Japanese Writers* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Eve Zimmerman, *Out of the Alleyway: Nakagami Kenji and the Poetics of Outcaste Fiction* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007); Anne McKnight, *Nakagami, Japan: Buraku and the Writing of Ethnicity* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).

¹⁴ Kurokawa Midori made the only reference in existing buraku studies to Mikuni's biography; this in the endnotes of her *Egakareta hisabetsu*

writings in connection to the issue of the burakumin, but I will focus in this paper on two aspects: that he published a novel in 1957 titled *The Portrait of Rie* (Rie no shōzō), and that he came out as burakumin in the 1970s. Read with today's knowledge of Mikuni as a person with burakumin origins, the novel carries marked aspects of his concealed identity as well as antecedents of ideas that Mikuni develops later in his writings.

The 1957 Novel

Mikuni was a middle school dropout, but he became an autodidact who read avidly on his own. He was known as an actor who read screenplays and plays extremely thoroughly. He also read other books and resources in order to interpret the characters he played.¹⁵ In his later years, he never agreed to play a role in a film unless he had read the script first. Even after shooting started, Mikuni frequently argued with the director and other actors as to what was the better interpretation of their roles.¹⁶ It was his reading as such that eventually paved the way for his own writing, which he carried out actively since the 1980s. The novel *The Portrait of Rie* was something of an anomaly, in that it was his very first publication and appeared in 1957. The writing and publication of the book was carried out almost two decades prior to his coming out as a burakumin, and it does not offer any explicit referencing of the burakumin issue. Buraku had already become a serious social issue in Japan by the late 1950s, however, and Mikuni's novel possesses interesting aspects that show the author's awareness of that issue.

Mikuni was in a strange position in the years 1956–1957 in that he became the first actor to violate the Five Company Agreement (gosha kyōtei, 1953–1971). The agreement was put in place during the heyday of Japanese cinema; it dictated that an actor had the legal right to appear only in films made at her or his studio unless permitted otherwise. His violation

buraku: eiga no naka no jigazō to tashazō [Buraku Represented: Self-Representations and Representations by Others of Buraku in Japanese Cinema] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2011), 68–70.

¹⁵ Watanabe Eriko, “Tokushuna kōsen [A Special Light],” in Mikuni Rentaro and Yan Sogil, eds., *Fūkyō ni ikiru* [Eccentric Living] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1999), 139–42.

¹⁶ Sano Shinichi, *Kaiyūden: mikuni rentarō, shinu made enji tsuzukeru koto* [Biography of an Eccentric Actor: Acting until the Very End] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2011), 42–43.

of the agreement made him infamous as a rebel actor in Japanese cinema and left him unable to work, albeit very briefly. Mikuni had been appearing in numerous films until then: twelve in 1953, five in 1954, ten in 1955, and five in 1956. In 1957, the figure was reduced to three, a number that includes *Half Brothers*, Mikuni's first work for Independent Production, a studio company that operated outside the Agreement. Together with his work for Independent Production, he was able to negotiate a new contract with Tōei in 1958 that also allowed him to work for other companies. The number of his films immediately jumped back to six that year. The year 1957 is thus exceptional in that Mikuni's screen appearances that year were limited, as this was the time in Mikuni's life in which he opted to write his novel instead.

The one and only edition of Mikuni's novel carries ten black-and-white portraits of Mikuni the actor that are inserted towards the end of the book.¹⁷ The portraits were shot by photographer Yamamoto Zennosuke (1931–2001), demonstrating that already in his early thirties, Mikuni was considered a photogenic actor. Yamamoto describes Mikuni as a “star (*sutā*)” in his comments on his pictures of Mikuni, and the actor was a well-known celebrity in 1957.¹⁸ The ten portraits include three pictures of Mikuni preparing for a stage play, two pictures working on the film *Half Brothers*, three pictures spending time in Tokyo, and two pictures at his home, one with a young woman, presumably his wife at the time. The pictures are relatively unremarkable pictures of Mikuni the celebrity, at work and offstage.

What is remarkable, however, is a discrepancy between the ten pictures and the content of the novel, the latter depicting a strange relationship between a painter husband and a fashion model wife. Most of the other main characters in the novel are professional actors, but there is

¹⁷ Mikuni Rentarō, *Rie no shozō* [The Portrait of Rie] (Tokyo: Moriwaki bunko, 1957), 1–10.

¹⁸ Yamamoto Zennosuke shot his Mikuni portraits in 1956, when Mikuni was appearing in the film *Half Brothers*. Yamamoto exhibited his portraits as “120 Days with Mikuni Rentarō,” and the exhibit made the rounds of six major Japanese cities in 1957. For Yamamoto's comments on his series, see “Yamamoto Yoshinosuke Photo Work Collection,” Blog.Goo, October 11, 2011 (accessed August 1, 2018 <http://blog.goo.ne.jp/zenyam/e/d693628b6a04db815169e63fe2d33192>).

also some ambiguity as to how those characters or the story itself relate to Mikuni. The novel opens up one foggy night in downtown Tokyo. Mitani Yūji, a film actor (the family name Mitani in Chinese characters is 三谷, so name-wise Yūji is an alter ego of Mikuni 三國, the author), encounters and befriends a painter named Ōgami Ryūji.¹⁹ Mitani accompanies Ōgami to the latter's studio apartment, where he is shown a beautiful portrait of Ōgami's wife, Rie. From that point onward, Ōgami takes over as the main narrator who tells his story.

Ōgami tells Mitani that although still not divorced, he currently lives separately from his wife because she had an adulterous relationship with his older brother Yamagiwa Kōzō, a celebrity actor and theater director. Ōgami actually witnessed the two having an affair at Yamagiwa's mansion. The name Kōzō in Chinese characters is 浩三, which again includes the number three; he is thus another double for Mikuni. The multiple alter egos would have been unsurprising to Japanese readers, who are used to the Japanese *shishōsetsu* subgenre of fiction (autobiographical novels; I-novels). Most likely unfathomable for them, however, would have been how to connect the story to Mikuni, a celebrity film actor. Yamamoto's portraits of Mikuni in the book are furnished with headings such as "Desolation," "Lies and Truth," "Between Acts," "In Darkness," and "Clown without Pathos," so the pictures themselves would have enhanced the notion of Mikuni as a brooding, contemplative actor/performer.²⁰ Mikuni's false label as a University of Osaka alum would have been strengthened by the pictures and his introspective novel.

In the novel itself, Ōgami further discloses to Mitani that Rie had an incestuous relationship with her father during wartime when she was 21, her first sexual experience. From here, the theme of incest, more than that of adultery, takes over as the main theme of this novel, it being also a connecting thread between Ōgami and his wife Rie. Rie's now deceased father, despite being a Buddhist priest, was a serious womanizer, once discovered by his wife, Rie's mother, to be lying in a futon with another woman. Rie's aunt, sister of her now also deceased mother, tells Rie that the father tried to sleep with her too. Ōgami's side of the family is also

¹⁹ The similarity of the two names, Yūji and Ryūji, also implies that the two characters are something of doppelgängers that are connected to the author of the novel.

²⁰ Mikuni, *Rie no shozō*, 1–3, 6, 9.

marked by an incestuous disposition; Ōgami and Yamagiwa's younger sister Miho, an actress from whom he first hears about Rie's incestuous relationship with her father, tells Ōgami that Yamagiwa tried to seduce her too. Yamagiwa's wish was unconsummated as Miho immediately ran away from him, but her disclosure makes Ōgami reflect:

“(On hearing my brother trying to seduce my sister) I became more scared instead of angry or hating my brother. This is terrible, I thought: I carry in my veins the same blood as my older brother...But even more terrible was as regards Rie, as she slept with her own father, her biological father. This is daunting as she would have been already 21 years of age then and had proper schooling at that: she would have known the rights and wrongs. She described to me her sleeping with her father, however, as giving her a sense akin to the unity of heaven and earth; the unity of heaven and earth!”... Ōgami said that he feels his brother and Rie sleeping together can be reduced to the issue of their blood. He made references to Émile Zola's *Les Rougon-Macquart* series and argued that Nana can only spring from a blood that is not pure.”²¹

To Ōgami's claim, Mitani wonders: “What does Ōgami mean by blood? Why does he seek answers by distinguishing one kind of blood from another?”²² Here, the curious aspect of this novel is that it is not a straightforward condemnation of incest or of breaking taboos. Rie is a beautiful woman, and the numerous portraits of her drawn by Ōgami are beautiful objects of art. While Ōgami hears of his wife's relationship with her father only from his sister Miho and later Rie, he actually witnesses an encounter between Rie and his brother through a window of Yamagiwa's mansion. The extraordinary aspect of his experience is that rather than being shocked by witnessing such a scene, Ōgami is enchanted and entranced by observing Rie's naked body as she has sex:

²¹ Ibid., 20–21. Nana is a prostitute protagonist in the 1879 Zola novel of that title.

²² Ibid., 21.

Rie seemed (to Ōgami) that her object of focus was not just Yamagiwa, with whom she was having sex. It looked as though she was crafting on her own the elations of life. Her body was making a movement that was akin to a confident music performance; carried out by an individual who has never known defeat. He felt as though in Rie's figure, he was witnessing a goddess of infatuation. Rie was magnificent. Her sweating body that was indulging in sex was stunningly beautiful and alive.²³

Ōgami describes Rie's body while having sex as an ideal beauty, even as another part of him tries to infer it as a direct manifestation of her having inherited dissolute, debauched blood from her father. While marking how sinful human beings are, Ōgami at the same time could not help but become entranced by the beauty of Rie when she is having sex and later composed at their home. Ōgami took part in battles during World War II, and coming back to peacetime Japan, he found that untruths had been spewed and had become universal back home. He could not stand such lies. Rie's body and its beauty marked a truth that stood in contrast to the falsehoods that otherwise surrounded Ōgami in everyday life.²⁴ With Rie's profession as a fashion model, Yamagiwa's as an actor and stage director, and Ōgami's as a painter, Ōgami's view from the garden is as a voyeur, and one can see that the gazing relationship in the novel mimics performance art onstage or a film audience in the darkness of a theater.

Thus, the novel foregrounds not only incest but also performance and film arts, and the debauchery that signifies human truths providing the basis for the latter. The fact that Ōgami is a professional painter (albeit an unsuccessful one) who can later represent the beauty of Rie's "performance" in his artwork marks the significance of his gaze toward her; of him watching and her performing, and the centrality that such intertwining occupies in art and human lives. Sano Shinichi, who interviewed Mikuni in regard to his prominent film appearances, reminiscences after Mikuni's death that acting for him was not just Mikuni playing a role but Satō Masao (Mikuni's real name) performing "Mikuni," and this "Mikuni" playing a role in film or onstage on top of that. Sano finds such multiple layers of

²³ Ibid., 36.

²⁴ Ibid., 21.

reality and falsehood to have been very much at the basis of the late actor's professional career.²⁵ With that, the ten photographs by Yamamoto that accompany the novel can be interpreted as "Mikuni" posing in work and in everyday life. Mikuni had not yet come out as a burakumin at that point in 1957, so a discrepancy between Satō Masao, a burakumin-identified individual, and Mikuni the celebrity would have been starker for the actor.




Figure 2. Mikuni performing the role of Meiji activist Tanaka Shōzō in *Ragged Flag* (*Ranru no hata*, dir. Yoshimura imisaburō, 1974)

When confronted later by Ōgami about her affair with Yamagiwa, however, Rie flatly denies that it had taken place and says he must have been delusional. She says that Ōgami is the only person whom she loves. After witnessing her affair, however, he becomes further exhilarated by Rie's facial features and body, once observing her waiting for him through binoculars from afar: "What strange allure her eyes impart. Their colors carry unfathomable tensions. How could such lights exist for real?"²⁶ Her figure began to attract and to repel Ōgami even more after the affair, and he could not stop painting her on canvasses. Ōgami's observer status becomes

²⁵ Sano Shinichi, "Satō masao mo ita ['Satō Masao' Was Also There]," *Kinema junpō* 1641: 34–37.

²⁶ Mikuni, *Rie no shozō*, 81.

even more pronounced by his sexual impotence and emasculation; he did not have a thorough, satisfying sex life with Rie, a matter that is disclosed in the later part of the novel.²⁷ This further distances Ōgami and Rie physically. Ōgami's impotent self becomes even further conflated with his gaze alone, a person who observes and crafts artworks but who is unable to participate in life itself. After coming out as burakumin, Mikuni makes numerous attempts to interpret the burakumin and their community in Japanese history as a hotbed of cultural production. Ōgami, an alienated painter, is an antecedent of Mikuni's burakumin/performers that the author later finds as subjects of history.

The novel and its protagonist, moreover, try further to contemplate Rie's incest and adultery. Later in the novel, an unnamed middle-aged American military man, a self-proclaimed Yale graduate and likely homosexual (he leaves with his arm around the shoulders of a male prostitute), appears in the story, who similarly finds beauty in Ōgami's paintings of his wife. When Ōgami shares her secrets with the American, the latter describes Rie's state of affairs as that, which forgoes the spirit (*seishin*), or god (*kami*). He sees it, as close to an evil that is the original sin (*genzai aku*) in humans. The American tells Ōgami, nevertheless, that it is the struggle between the spirit and the evil that constitutes in-depth human culture:

But the people who remain uninterested in culture as such, and hence our true selves, abound in this world. Most of us deceive ourselves into identifying with ethics, laws, and customs that have been built by a handful of elite, the powerful, and the invaders; that such ethics are an absolute. What human beings really need to desire and to look for are things that are virtually hidden at the bottom of the lake, the lake that is our everyday lives. What we need to seek out and experience, through wandering, is an anarchical state of one's spirit and body. The eyes of that woman attest to her having seen anarchy... [Rie's actions, which include being incestuous and adulterous] clearly

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 86–87. They do have sex once, but Ōgami does not find her alluring and alive then as she was when she was having sex with Yamagiwa. *Ibid.*, 129–30.

deviate from ethics and norms. There is, however, blind acceptance or obedience to morals and ethics that flatly denies raw, human nature, even when such morals are mere constructs. Her actions, in contrast, can become a superior culture when they are eventually tempered by rationality and spirit.²⁸

Another significant point is that this novel interprets Rie and Yamagiwa's transgressions as embodiments of the human state of helplessness and malignancy that is universal. An unflinching gaze at such a state, moreover, provides an impetus toward religious and spiritual transcendence, which Mikuni, in his post-coming out years, began developing through his understanding of Shinran and Shinran's strand of Buddhism. Mikuni renders Rie's name in Chinese characters as 理慧 in his novel: the first character denotes "reason" or "rationality," while the second character denotes "wisdom" but most pertinently also "Buddhist enlightenment." Rie and her Buddhist priest father, then, are germane figures who are preparing themselves for salvation in the Buddhist sense. If the novel is to be read as a *shishōsetsu*, Rie and her father are also the doubles of the author in a deeper connotation.²⁹ Rie and the novel itself can also be read as an allegory of humanity in general: corrupted but also potentially transcendental. Mikuni saw the most significant achievement of Shinran's teachings as having promised salvation to the poor and the oppressed; they do not distinguish believers by their social standings. Mikuni argues that while Buddhism in general strengthened class divisions and discriminations with the conceptions of destiny and "karma" (*gō*), medieval Buddhists such as Shinran and Nichiren (1222–1282) subverted and nullified such conceptions.³⁰

Unable to bear the tension between his own senses of attraction and animosity toward Rie, Ōgami opts to move out of their apartment. He is,

²⁸ Ibid., 114–16.

²⁹ Mikuni later played incestuous characters, landmarks in his acting career, in two films directed by Imamura Shōhei. He played a father who, after sleeping with his daughter, is chained up and eventually murdered by other villagers in Imamura's film *The Profound Desire of the Gods* (1968). He also played the role of a man who lusts toward the wife of his son but who stops at the last minute in *Vengeance Is Mine* (1979).

³⁰ Mikuni, *Ikizama shinizama*, 94–97.

nevertheless, obsessed with Rie, continuously thinking about her and trying to portray her on his canvasses. Perhaps things like reason and rationality were beyond her reach, he ponders: she might be akin to a primitive person (*genshijin*). What agency does she carry as an individual after all? “Blood is something that we cannot do something about. The individuals are not responsible. It is either to accept that or to reject it, in which case we become extinct.”³¹ Ōgami later visits a small town near Okayama, Rie’s father’s hometown, in order to find out the secrets of Rie’s blood; a section that markedly connects Rie’s behavior and the issue of her blood to the issue of the burakumin.³² However, he finds nothing in Okayama that explains the actions of Rie and her father. The novel ends by showing that four years after Ōgami moved away, Rie continues to visit the impoverished artist to take care of him and to discuss their reuniting.

As buraku studies attest, the burakumin have been discriminated against for many centuries, with many people seeing them as constituting an ethnicity that is different from the majority Japanese. Such a racial distinction has been disputed, and it is at present commonly recognized that they are part of the majority Japanese. Historian Kida Sadakichi (1871–1939), for example, as early as 1919, refuted the notion that the burakumin constitute an ethnicity that is different from mainstream Japanese.³³ Despite that, the prejudice that they belong to another, inferior ethnicity has persisted as a rationale for discriminating against them. Eight years after Mikuni’s novel was published, the Buraku Liberation League (Buraku kaihō dōmei, henceforward BLL; the largest Japanese buraku organization) in 1965 had to confirm in its report that “there was no evidence of a different racial origin” as regards the burakumin.³⁴ Because of that,

³¹ Mikuni, *Rie no shozō*, 134.

³² Ibid., 162. Some Japanese villages and areas were recognized as burakumin communities as a whole. In 1975, *The Complete List of Burakumin Areas* (Buraku chimei sōkan), a list of burakumin communities and areas, was edited and marketed illegally to companies. As many as 240 companies are said to have purchased the list in order to avoid employing burakumin. Kurokawa Midori, *Kindai burakushi: meiji kara gendai made* [Modern History of Buraku: From Meiji to the Present] (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2011), 235–36.

³³ Ibid., 112–14.

³⁴ Neary, *The Buraku Issue and Modern Japan*, 228.

throughout Japan's modern history, from the Meiji era (1868–1912) to the present, the matter of marriage has frequently remained an issue. Marriages between burakumin and non-burakumin individuals have often been opposed and obstructed by the non-burakumin families.³⁵

When Mikuni's novel appeared in 1957, buraku had already become an issue in Japanese popular culture. Cinema-wise, the first film version of Shimazaki Tōson's *Broken Commandment* (*Hakai*, dir. Kinoshita Kesuke) appeared in 1948, as part of the burgeoning democratization of Japan that took place after 1945.³⁶ Both the original novel of 1906 by Shimazaki Tōson (1872–1943) and its first film version depict the internal and external struggles of a young elementary school teacher, Ushimatsu, who carries a burakumin origin, and his eventual coming out as such in front of his pupils. The 1948 film was directed by none other than Kinoshita, who had discovered Mikuni in 1951 and helped him begin his career in cinema. When the Tōson novel was again made into a film, this time directed by Ichikawa Kon in 1962, Mikuni played the role of a burakumin legislator, Inoko Rentarō, a mentor figure of the protagonist Ushimatsu. Tōson's 1906 novel, however, still carries numerous shortcomings that include using the above understanding that the burakumin constitute an ethnicity that is different and distinctive from the majority Japanese.³⁷

Encouraged by the democratization that took place in Japan after World War II ended in 1945, buraku activism also came to be further empowered. The Buraku Liberation National Committee (henceforward BLNC; Buraku kaihō zenkoku iinkai) was set up immediately after the war in 1946. The BLNC evolved into the BLL with mass activism (*taishū undō*) as its main objective. With this, the 1950s can be described as a decade

³⁵ A recent Japanese documentary, *Aru seinikuten no hanashi* [Tale of a Butcher Shop], dir. Hanamura Aya (2013), depicts a butcher shop family in Osaka, a family that carries a burakumin background. The director interviews a young son of the family and his non-burakumin wife, whom he marries in the course of the film, whether they have experienced opposition to their marriage. They answer in the negative.

³⁶ Kurokawa, *Egakareta hisabetsu buraku*, 27–37.

³⁷ According to Kurokawa Midori, this was also the view of the Japanese government as they sought to improve the living conditions of the burakumin in the early twentieth century. *Ibid.*, 53–54.

during which the first postwar mass buraku activism commenced.³⁸ Among the common prejudices that the BLL and other buraku groups tried to dispel at the time was the general understanding that the burakumin carry a genetic problem. This was because the burakumin were thought to have been marrying only those in their own community, due to discrimination. In reality, this was not the case, as burakumin communities existed all over Japan and intermarriage between different buraku communities frequently took place. A frequently shared misconception, then, was that problems regarding the burakumin and their communities existed because of the problems of their blood and inferior kinship.³⁹

The burakumin and their communities countered such prejudices by carrying out anti-discrimination education in schools (*dōwa kyōiku*), which became an important objective for buraku organizations after 1945. Among the seminal events that involved burakumin, activism during the 1950s was the *All Romance* incident. The tabloid magazine *All Romance* carried in its October 1951 issue a short story titled “Special Buraku: An Exposé” (Bakuro shōsetsu: tokushu buraku). The work was written by Sugiyama Seiichi, who worked for the City of Kyoto. Sugiyama’s fiction mainly featured Koreans, but their place of residence in Kyoto was categorized as a “buraku,” and his main characters and their settings were considered to be extending existing stereotypes of the buraku community and its residents. His story was thus condemned by buraku activists on two fronts; one was the negative depictions of the buraku community, and the second was that a local government worker had written and published it.⁴⁰ Despite such a negative reaction toward Sugiyama’s story, there emerged a stronger interest in novels that addressed the issue of the burakumin, a trend that pervaded the 1950s. Noma Hiroshi and Matsumoto Seichō (1909–

³⁸ Kurokawa, *Kindai burakushi*, 192–93, 212.

³⁹ Kurokawa Midori, *Tsukuri kaerareru shirushi: nihon kindai, hisabetsu buraku, mainoritii* [Transforming Signs: Modern Japan, Buraku, and Minorities] (Osaka: Kaihō shuppansha, 2004), 199–200.

⁴⁰ Kurokawa, *Kindai burakushi*, 206–8. “Special Buraku: An Exposé” has been reprinted in Uehara, “Kaisetsu,” 221–56. Uehara writes that there was a reappraisal many years later holding that the BLL had overreacted in 1951 and that Sugiyama’s novel was not quite as negative a portrayal of the buraku as it had been accused of being. *Ibid.*, 292. I agree with this reappraisal.

1992), who were major authors of fiction in postwar Japan, describe such a tendency in their roundtable talk of 1959 as an ongoing “buraku boom” in fiction.⁴¹ Possibly encouraged by such a boom, Sumii Sue (1902–1995) started her research on the issue in 1958 and began serializing her epic burakumin novel *River without a Bridge* (*Hashi no nai kawa*) in the following year.⁴²

These are, then, possible backdrops to *The Portrait of Rie* when one considers the yet closeted but burakumin-identified Mikuni. With this in mind, one can assume that with the foregrounding of the notion of blood, Mikuni’s novel can be regarded as having been an antecedent to the works of later burakumin authors such as Nakagami Kenji, who came to regard the issue of blood as central to his fiction writings. This is understandably so, when in reality, the physical appearance of the burakumin could not be distinguished from that of the majority Japanese. Nakagami brings that point up in his 1985 discussion with another author of fiction, Murakami Haruki (1949–). Nakagami comments: “I can feel another difference between [your works and mine]....Blood, in other words. I think that the difference is whether you keep these absolute ties in mind or cut yourself off from them completely...My work resembles *shishōsetsu*, but it is different from any other *shishōsetsu* ever written. Most *shishōsetsu* wash away the absolute ties of blood.”⁴³

From this, Eve Zimmerman argues that for Nakagami, the “absolute ties of blood” were “indispensable” to his writing. Zimmerman, moreover, writes that the issue of incest was an issue that Nakagami constantly foregrounded in his early works of fiction that appeared during the 1970s. She cites Hillis Miller, who analyzes the works of William Faulkner, who also wrote on incest that, “incest corresponds to constative

⁴¹ Uehara, “Kaisetsu,” 38, 50. Uehara also writes that the 1950s “buraku boom” ended up as an anomaly in regards to fiction in Japan. He argues that a neglect of the burakumin issue in Japanese fiction, which was the case prior to the 1950s, resumed after that decade, and that this still maintains today. *Ibid.*, 257–89.

⁴² Hōjō Tsunehisa, *Hashi no nai kawa: sumii sue no shōgai* [River without a Bridge: The Life of Sumii Sue] (Tokyo, Fūtōsha, 2003), 119–120, 146–147. Sumii Sue, *My Life: Living, Loving, and Fighting* (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Japanese Studies, the University of Michigan, 2001), 75.

⁴³ Zimmerman, *Out of the Alleyway*, 101.

narration – the telling and retelling of past events, the inability to live in the present, the obsession with repeating a single pattern.”⁴⁴ At the same time, it carries within its scope a critique of the system of patriarchy that was at the center of both the American south as regards Faulkner novels and the burakumin community of Shingū, in the case of Nakagami.⁴⁵

Mikuni’s foregrounding of incest with Rie, her father, and Yamagiwa in the 1957 novel, then, possibly mirrored the author’s own obsession with lineage and blood; something that must have plagued Mikuni prior to his coming out as burakumin.⁴⁶ He sees it as the basis of a shortcoming on the part of the heroine and other characters in the story, and if that is the only way his fiction represents heredity, then it is certainly problematic. If so, that means that Mikuni interiorized a prejudice toward the burakumin and their blood, a notion that has been shared by the majority Japanese for centuries. As Nakagami later proved, however, incest and the issue of blood can also be employed in order to make a critique of the discrimination against the burakumin. What is notable in Mikuni’s fiction is that vice is not attributed to the heroine and her father alone, but also to Yamagiwa, her husband’s kin. The vice is thus shown as a kind of general malaise that afflicts people in general. Neither Rie’s family nor her husband Ōgami’s family is necessarily burakumin. Thus, the fiction does not conflate the issues of blood and burakumin heritage.

The novel, moreover, takes a step further by identifying Rie’s vice (incest and adultery) as the basis of the beauty of her eyes and her body. Her body was never before as beautiful and transcending for Ōgami than at the moment she was having sex with Yamagiwa. Under the guise of an American military man in the novel, Mikuni argues that encompassing such vice as a part of true human nature is what constitutes an insight into the

⁴⁴ Ibid., 105.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 106.

⁴⁶ Mikuni writes, that his mother might have been pregnant when she met his father for the first time. He also claims that he witnessed, when he was a child, a man in a suit seeking his custody. His mother was not a burakumin, so that means Mikuni might not be a biological son of his burakumin father. Mikuni also writes, nevertheless, that he identified far more with his father than with his mother despite the former’s corporal punishments. This is likely to have been one basis on which he became burakumin-identified later in his life. Mikuni, *Ikizama shinizama*, 167–168, 171.

truth. Moreover, comprising such truth is essential for an in-depth culture that includes religion and the performing arts. An unflinching gaze on human evil and fallibility, argues the novel, is a firm basis on which authentic religion and art become possible. This was a view that Mikuni further developed in the 1970s, after his coming out as a burakumin, and he forged a further affinity between himself, his family origins, his performance art, and the Buddhist teachings of Shinran.

Coming Out as Burakumin in the 1970s

Mikuni's coming out took place in the 1970s, through an interview in either the magazine *Weekly Asahi* (Shūkan Asahi) or *Asahi Journal*, with journalist Senbon Kenichirō (1935–).⁴⁷ Christopher Bondy writes that coming out as a minority, to share one's identity as a minority, is largely selective and contextual: "The strategy of selective sharing is an active process that is dependent on both individual agency in recognizing the level of relationship and an understanding of what it means to be a minority in that particular setting, be it a gay man in the United States or a burakumin youth in Japan."⁴⁸ What kind of individual agency and general setting, then, did Mikuni carry when he came out as a burakumin-identified individual during the 1970s?




Figure 3. Mikuni while shooting his incomplete film, *The River without Shores*, 1972

⁴⁷ Mikuni, *Ikizama shinizama*, 26, 89.

⁴⁸ Bondy, *Voice, Silence, and Self*, 151.

It was a phase in his life in which Mikuni became confused about his priorities. In 1972, he divorced his wife and took off with an eight-member crew to direct and shoot a film that he tentatively titled *River without Shores* (Kishi no nai kawa) in Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan. He envisioned his film as a kind of semi-documentary about an individual who, after accidentally killing his own son, wanders the desert on a donkey and ends up with a bird burial, in which birds consume his remains. Mikuni and his crew had spent fifty days altogether shooting in West Asia, but he was ultimately unable to finish editing and complete his film.

While he had been unable to finish it, the project had been enlightening for Mikuni in that he was able to carry out further soul-searching until it dawned on him that “human beings were akin to specks of sand in the whole of nature.”⁴⁹ During the shooting in India, Mikuni encountered numerous pilgrims who reminded him of the power of religion. He began reading books on Buddhism after returning to Japan, among them Noma Hiroshi’s work on Shinran, which had just come out in 1973. Mikuni identified as a burakumin, and also started to channel his research into seeking resources for his own film on Shinran.

As discussed earlier, Ōgami’s voyeur role, in part, glorifies the role of the peripheral observer. Based on the studies by writers, historians, and anthropologists such as Noma, Amino, Morooka, and Okiura, Mikuni proclaims that the ancestors of the burakumin, such as the *eta*, *hinin*, and *kawaramono*, traveling entertainers, and puppet performers in the medieval era, played a central role in the formation of the arts in premodern Japan. Shinran himself was not a burakumin, but his connections with the rural poor that included the burakumin enabled him to rewrite Japanese Buddhism, argues Mikuni.⁵⁰ While earlier Buddhism helped to distinguish and brand social classes and essentially served the elite, Shinran expanded the notion of the Pure Land (Buddhist heaven) and argued that regardless of family origins, heredity, or training, anyone is capable of reaching it by repeating holy sutras.⁵¹

Burakumin activism has also evolved since Mikuni’s novel was published in 1957. According to Anne McKnight, the author Nakagami

⁴⁹ Mikuni, *Ikizama shinizama*, 127.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 92–95.

⁵¹ Ibid., 96–97.

Kenji also came out as a burakumin in an interview in 1981.⁵² This was four years after Nakagami had described, in the third person, his own experiences as a burakumin at a roundtable on discrimination that took place in 1977, which also included Noma Hiroshi and Yasuoka Shotarō (1920–2013). The discussion was originally organized and published by *Asahi Journal* that year.⁵³ McKnight writes that what is noticeable about the decade of the 1970s is “the striking prominence of the theme of confession and *buraku* identity in 1970s fiction.”⁵⁴ Moreover, she sees 1977 as a “landmark year for activists conscious of how language, power, and buraku identity were related in postwar life.” This took place as, “[u]rged on by Noma, the movement activists were beginning to turn their attention to regulating elements of culture that they felt injurious to the buraku cause.”⁵⁵

Fostering this cultural turn on the part of buraku activists of the 1970s was the changing material circumstances of buraku communities at the time. With the high development phase of the Japanese economy and the Marxist view foregrounding the betterment of the economic state of the buraku communities firmly in place, the so-called assimilation projects (*dōwa taisaku jigyō*) and policies that goaded national and local government budgets into rebuilding buraku communities came to be established. The conservative Liberal Democratic Party (henceforward LDP), with such a vision in mind, established the non-Marxist All Japan Dowa Association (henceforward AJDA, *Zen nihon dōwa kai*) in 1960.⁵⁶ The projects as such came to be envisioned and planned by various

⁵² McKnight, *Nakagami, Japan*, 70.

⁵³ Their discussion is included in Noma Hiroshi and Yasuoka Shotarō, eds., *Sabetsu: sono kongen o tou, jōkan* [Questioning the Origins of Discriminations Vol. 1] (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 1984), 174–212.

⁵⁴ McKnight, *Nakagami, Japan*, 71.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁵⁶ Kurokawa, *Kindai burakushi*, 227. Ian Neary also writes, “[AJDA] had overt links with the LDP and sought to provide burakumin with an alternative to supporting the left-wing parties, but in many ways its analysis of the buraku problem was not dissimilar to that of the BLL. [AJDA] too saw discrimination linked to poverty in a vicious cycle and thought that a comprehensive set of government-funded policies was needed to enable buraku communities to break out of this cycle.” Neary, *The Buraku Issue and Modern Japan*, 227.

government offices and buraku activists during the 1960s and eventually took off in the mid-1970s; they continued until 2002. The projects changed the appearances of burakumin communities quite thoroughly. Simultaneously, they functioned as a wedge between buraku activism and Marxism. The activists such as those in the BLL supported those projects, and that meant that the buraku activists, who in immediate postwar Japan identified solely with Marxism, began to distance themselves from non-burakumin Marxists. Embodying this in part is the split between the BLL and its Japan Communist Party (henceforward JCP) critics that became marked in 1965: the two split entirely in 1970.⁵⁷ With this, identity politics came to supersede Marxist politics in buraku activism.⁵⁸

According to Kurokawa: “[e]arlier on, burakumin discrimination was said to signify the lecherous living standard of the communities themselves. An economically deterministic point of view as such came to be questioned [in the 1970s]. Morooka Sukeyuki, for example, argued that history studies were insufficient and it is necessary to employ also sociology and anthropology in order to understand the burakumin. In other words, the economic subculture was in earlier times understood to altogether determine culture: a superstructure. When discrimination persisted despite external changes, then, what emerged was an understanding that culture as superstructure is autonomous and should be accordingly understood and dealt with.”⁵⁹ Writers and scholars such as Noma, Morooka, and Okiura spearheaded this cultural turn that was taking place in burakumin activism.⁶⁰ Another significant event at this time was the publishing arm of the BLL becoming the separate Liberation Publishing Company (henceforward LPC; *Kaihō shuppan sha*) in 1975.

⁵⁷ Neary, *The Buraku Issue and Modern Japan*, 230.

⁵⁸ An instance of this is the clash that took place in November 1974 between BLL supporters and teachers (JCP supporters) at Yōka High School in Hyōgo. See Uehara Yoshihiro’s depiction of the incident in Uehara, *Sabetsu to kyōiku to watashi* [Discrimination, Education, and I] (Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 2014), 82–120.

⁵⁹ Kurokawa, *Kindai burakushi*, 238.

⁶⁰ Among the seminal PLC publications at the time was Morooka Sukeyuki, Ōga Masayuki, and Okiura Kazuteru, *Buraku kaihō riron no sōzō ni mukete* [Towards the Creation of a Theory for Buraku Liberation] (Osaka: Kaihō shuppansha, 1981).

While individually motivated, Mikuni's coming out and his consequent writings for the burakumin cause can be said to have been encouraged in the post-1970s setting in which buraku activism became further independent from established Marxist parties such as the JCP. With this, identity politics became unbound from class struggles and came to be foregrounded in burakumin activism, unlike what was the case earlier. Mikuni and Nakagami's coming out as burakumin was also part of such a turn of events in burakumin history. The LPC, for example, was the original publisher of Mikuni's discussion with Okiura Kazuteru in 1997. Mikuni's writings since his coming out as burakumin, including his writing and directing of the 1987 film *Shinran: The Shining Path*, was part of such a cultural turn of burakumin politics and history.

**BUREAUCRACY MEETS CATASTROPHE:
GLOBAL INNOVATIONS FROM TWO DECADES OF RESEARCH**

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Introduction

On January 17, 1995, *Hanshin Daishinsai*, a Category 7 earthquake hit Kobe, Japan killing over 5,300 people, injuring 30,000 and leaving 500,000 homeless.¹ The media were present within minutes, but rescue teams and equipment arrived hours later, even though Japan has one of the world's highest per capita GDP expenditures for earthquake detection and prevention, enforces rigid building codes and practices annual drills for police search and rescue, helicopter deployment, seismic testing and emergency train stoppages.² In two decades since Kobe, one fact remains: bureaucracy could not manage the catastrophe. Analysis of response described "the severe holistic management's shortcomings as a paradigm for responding to situations in which the magnitude of the system's task is overwhelmingly complex and the timing process is bounded by the timing urgency."³

¹ M. Aoki, "Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis: Motivations and Some Tentative Theorizing," *Japanese Economic Review* 47/1 (1996): 1–19; M. Iijima, S. Komatsu, and S. Katoh, "Hybrid Just-In-Time Logistics Systems and Information Networks for Effective Management in Perishable Food Industries," *International Journal of Production Economics* 44/1 (1996): 97–103; N. Kawamiya and H. Aoki, "Japan as Hyper-Construction State: Fiscal, Financial and Environmental Crisis," *Journal of Australian Political Economy* 43 (1999): 63–87.

² H. Fukunaga and K.H. Chinone, "Taking on the System, the Discounting Boom," *Tokyo Business Today*, May 1994, 4–13.

³ M. M. Helms, R. Jones, and M. B. Takeda, "Learning from Kobe: Complexity and Urgency in the Holistic Management Model," *Japan Studies Review* 11 (2007), 27.

Japan leads in teamwork, lean production methods, and quality management. Its holistically managed organizations have found success in complex environments, demanding individuals adapt to benefit the whole in the Kaizen continuous improvement approach.⁴ Moreover, this commitment has serious side effects when outsiders or outside information must be included. Research identified psychological, social, and economic constructs to explain why flawed decision-making and ineffective, slow responses occurred. Escalation of commitment, group-think, peer-pressure, saving face, and holistic management were suggested for the Japanese bureaucratic response.⁵ These same problems occurred in 2005 during *Hurricane Katrina* with the U.S. government, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private organizations, and citizens.⁶

In contrast, outside-the-system responses are suggested for fluid, dynamic, and effective emergency management.⁷ Disaster management research from scholarly journals in the past decade finds 60,000 entries in Ebscohost® and 120,000 in ABIInform Complete® and related business databases. According to the EM-DAT International Disaster Database, from 2002–2011 there were almost 10,000 natural disasters worldwide, resulting in over 2.4 million deaths. Across the globe, over 190 Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are joined by disaster focused NGOs, governmental agencies, and private organizations dedicated to prevention, recovery and

⁴ A. Medinilla, *Understanding Kaizen: A Brief Introduction to Continuous Improvement Cultures* (Berlin, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg Publishing, 2014).

⁵ Helms, Jones, and Takeda, “Learning from Kobe,” 23–50.

⁶ Helms, Jones, and Takeda, “Learning from Hurricane Katrina: Complexity and Urgency in the Holistic Model,” *Japan Studies Review* 12 (2008): 107–124.

⁷ Takeda and Helms, “Bureaucracy, Meet Catastrophe: Analysis of Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts and Their Implications for Global Emergency Governance,” *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 19/4 (2006a): 397–411; Takeda and Helms, “Bureaucracy, Meet Catastrophe: Analysis of the Tsunami Disaster Relief Effort and Their Implications for Global Emergency Governance,” *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 19/2 (2006b): 204–217.

relief. In fact, a whole specialized global industry of universities, think tanks, and engineering firms have evolved.⁸

This study reviews the emerging themes from two decades of global disaster management research. It is important to note the changing definition of a catastrophe. “Disaster” and “catastrophe” often used interchangeably have shifted in the past decade as governmental organizations and the insurance industry specify boundaries for a catastrophe.⁹ According to FEMA in the U.S., a catastrophe is “...any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.” For continuity, in this study the word “catastrophe” is used to refer to the broader field of “disaster management.”¹⁰

Methodology and Organization

The methodology for this longitudinal review is based on theoretical and paradigmatic academic research trends. In *Facing the Unexpected*, functionalist theory is implicitly used in the “demand-capability” model and key theoretical research perspectives include:¹¹

⁸ D. Guha-Sapir, R. Below, and P. Hoyois, *EM-DAT: International Disaster Database*, Brussels, Belgium: Université Catholique de Louvain, 2015 (accessed July 20, 2018, <https://www.emdat.be/annual-disaster-statistical-review-2015-0>); and B. D. Phillips, “Disasters by Discipline: Necessary Dialogue for Emergency Management Education,” Presentation, “Creating Educational Opportunities for the Hazards Manager of the 21st Century” Workshop, Denver, Colorado, October 22, 2003.

⁹ T. E. Drabek, D. A. McEntire, “Emergent Phenomena and Multi-organizational Coordination in Disasters: Lessons from the Research Literature,” *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters* 20 (2002): 197–224.

¹⁰ Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), *National Response Framework*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2008 (accessed July 12, 2018, <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf>), 42.

¹¹ K. Tierney, M. Lindell, and R. Perry, *Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the U.S.* (Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press. 2001).

- *Social constructionism*: “argues against viewing disasters as objective physical phenomena [but as] “social processes through which groups promote claims about disasters and their consequences.”
- *European critiques of modernity and industrial society*: “sees the potential for disasters as immanent in the social order itself rather than originating outside it, and conceptualizes disasters as an inevitable and direct consequence of the social relations and practices that characterize modern society.”
- *Conflict-based and political-economy theories*: “sees disasters and their impact as resulting from political-economic forces that simultaneously shape both the vulnerability of the built environment to disaster damage and the social vulnerability of exposed populations.”
- *Political-ecological perspectives*: “sees communities not as unitary systems but rather as consisting of loosely-coupled, heterogeneous ecological elements and networks...within these ecological groupings power and resources are not distributed equally” (58).

In *American Hazardscapes*, two common paradigms of disasters were identified:¹²

- *Hazards Paradigm*: “society interacts with the physical environment and this interaction produces both beneficial and harmful effects”.
- *Risk Paradigm*: “has four primary elements: risk identification, dose-response assessment, exposure assessment and risk characterization...the ultimate goal of the risk assessment process was to identify remedial options that posed the least threat to human and ecosystem health” (38).

¹² S. L. Cutter, L. Barnes, M. Berry, C. Burton, E. Evans, E. Tate, and J. Webb, “A Place-Based Model for Understanding Community Resilience to Natural Disasters,” *Global Environmental Change* 18/4 (2008): 598–606.

This review focuses on decision-making systems in catastrophic contexts that reflects an organic (versus intentional) reliance on the political-ecological perspective similar to Richardson, who highlighted how disaster phases represent a relationship between structure and meaning.¹³ To offer new insights in disaster theory, modeling, and management, this research considers the question: What key thematic changes in disaster management research have influenced “innovations” in decision-making within each of the four risk-related phases of disasters (preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation)?

The Four-Phase Model of Disaster Management

The use of phases is common in social science and has endured over 60 years organizing data, describing events, and focusing research analyses.¹⁴ With computer modeling and global sharing of disaster databases, robust phase models emerged.¹⁵ The United States National Governor’s Association (NGA)¹⁶ is credited with early definitions of comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) defined as (11):

“a state’s responsibility and capability for managing all types of emergencies and disasters by coordinating the actions of numerous agencies. The comprehensive aspect of CEM includes all four phases of disaster or emergency activity and applies to all risks including attack, man-made, and natural, in a federal-state-local partnership.”

¹³ B. K. Richardson, “The Phases of Disaster as a Relationship Between Structure and Meaning: A Narrative Analysis of the 1947 Texas City Explosion,” *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, 23/3 (2005): 27–54.

¹⁴ David M. Neal, “Reconsidering the Phases of Disaster,” *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters* 15/2 (1997): 239–264.

¹⁵ M. Sullivan, “Integrated Recover Management: A New Way of Looking at a Delicate Process,” *The Australian Journal of Emergency Management* 18/2 (2003), 4.

¹⁶ National Governor’s Association, *Emergency Preparedness Project Final Report*, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1979.

The NGA report described and identified activities related to the phases:

- “Preparedness activities are necessary to the extent that mitigation measures have not, or cannot, prevent disasters.” (11).
- “Response activities follow an emergency or disaster. Generally, they are designed to provide emergency assistance for casualties ... they also seek to reduce the probability of secondary damage.” (11).
- “Recovery activities continue until all systems return to normal or better ... or improved levels.” (12).
- “Mitigation includes any activities that actually eliminate or reduce the probability of occurrence of a disaster.” (11).

The phases often remain in flux. In a review of disaster phase model developments, a meta-analysis found the four-phase model commonly employed by both researchers and practitioners with support from the Vanderbilt Center for Transportation Research and FEMA.¹⁷ Particularly, Jorgust undefined the stages as preparation, warning, impact, and aftermath and agreed the final aftermath phase should be separated into multiple time periods.¹⁸

Preparedness in Disaster Management

Organizations should make non-routine disaster decisions quickly and effectively. Over the past two decades, organizations of all types and sizes have evolved in their level of preparedness by engaging in the disaster decision-making routines that define the mission and scope, create procedures for various scenarios, and model the processes that will occur as they maintain readiness. Modeling effective disaster preparedness (creating, testing and refining plans) is one of the most cited innovations, but targets

¹⁷ See Phillips, “Disasters by Discipline”; and Malcom E. Baird, “The Phases of Emergency Management,” Background Paper, Vanderbilt Center for Transportation Research, January 2010 (accessed August 1, 2018, http://www.memphis.edu/ifti/pdfs/cait_phases_of_emergency_mngt.pdf).

¹⁸ K. Jorgustin, “The 4 Stages of Disaster. In the Modern Survival Blog – Preparedness for Life,” Modern Survival Blog, 2013 (accessed July 20, 2018, <http://modernsurvivalblog.com/natural-disasters/the-four-stages-of-disaster>).

only one group (i.e., local community, national NGO, government department) and is, until only recently, coordinated across groups or levels.¹⁹ Research suggests this modelling has the highest efficacy when “decisions are shared, and the coordination of shared decisions is harmonized, in order to optimize the entire system.”²⁰ For optimal preparedness, the first step is to understand the characteristics and operational modes of each impacted group and ensure that decisions and routines are harmonized up the hierarchy. In the past decades, there has been significant public and private investment in disaster management innovations, resulting in distinctive decision-making technologies and systems. Preparedness models include the “Hierarchical Holographic Modeling,” a holistic methodology to capture and represent diverse attributes of a system, including multiple features, perspectives and hierarchies. “Phantom System Modeling,” represents a “system of systems,” integrating multiple subsystems, hierarchical organizations, decision-makers, stakeholders, objectives, and sources of risk and uncertainty.²¹

A different evolutionary “managerial” component of disaster decision-making is “strategic preparedness,” a proactive phase of risk management grounded on dynamic and comprehensive scenario structuring.²² To reduce negative consequences, an iterative process using the latest in computational design develops scenarios that require planning for human action and reaction in hypothetical situations.

Another innovation in decision-making models is the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM)²³ based responses to environmental hazards

¹⁹ Y. Y. Haimes, “On the Definition of Resilience in Systems,” *Risk Analysis* 29/4 (2009): 498–501.

²⁰ Ibid; Y. Y. Haimes, “Strategic Preparedness For Recovery From Catastrophic Risks To Communities And Infrastructure Systems Of Systems,” *Risk Analysis* 32/11 (2012): 1834–1845; and Haimes, “On the Definition of Resilience,” 499.

²¹ Haimes, “Strategic Preparedness for Recovery,” 1834–1845.

²² F. H. Norris, S. P. Stevens, B. Pfefferbaum, K. F. Wyche, and R. L. Pfefferbaum, “Community Resilience as a Metaphor, Theory, Set of Capacities, and Strategy for Disaster Readiness,” *American Journal of Community Psychology* 41/1-2 (2008): 127–150.

²³ M. K. Lindell, R. W. Perry, “The Protective Action Decision Model: Theoretical Modifications and Additional Evidence,” *Risk Analysis* 32/4 (2012): 616–632.

and disasters. The multistage PADM model “integrates the processing of information derived from social and environmental cues with messages that social sources transmit through communication channels to those at risk” and identifies reception, attention, and comprehension of warnings preceding further processing.²⁴ The PADM process produces a behavioral response and highlights “realistic” human decision-making processes versus prescriptive or “hoped for” versions from other sources. The lesson from the PADM model is that warning sources carry importance for compliance based on their level of credibility. The higher the degree of ambiguity in disaster messaging, the less likely the target population will respond. PADM counters overlooked natural weaknesses in prescriptive human information processing.

Furthermore, researchers have approached disaster management by assessing why a bureaucratic approach to decision-making in government organizations tends to generate a standardized response in the midst of a catastrophic disaster event.²⁵ Still, the theme of “disaster administration” literature has encouraged bureaucratic actors to focus on sound planning, training and response capabilities, as well as response and recovery from public administration theory.²⁶ Besides decision-making modeling, strategic planning, and prescriptive process developments, breakthrough studies in psychology have studied the human cognition in disaster situations. One primary example considered the effects of preparatory information on enhancing performance under stress where information prior to a stressful event reduced negative responses.²⁷

Results indicated “those who received preparatory information prior to performing under high-stress conditions reported less anxiety, were more confident in their ability to perform the task, and made fewer performance errors than those who received no preparatory information.” These findings

²⁴ Ibid., 618.

²⁵ Jon K. Christensen and Jody K. Young, “Drivers of Complexity in Humanitarian Operations” (Ph.D. diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 2013).

²⁶ R. J. Herzog, “A Model of Natural Disaster Administration: Naming and Framing Theory and Reality,” *Administrative Theory & Praxis* 29/4 (2007): 586–604.

²⁷ C. M. Inzana, J. E. Driskell, E. Salas, and J. H. Johnston, “Effects of Preparatory Information on Enhancing Performance Under Stress,” *Journal of Applied Psychology* 81/4 (1996), 429.

became the basis for further research in high stress related situations, including disasters.²⁸

Researchers tested three types of preparatory information. First sensory information considers how the individual is likely to feel under stress. Individuals may perceive intrusive physical and emotional sensations and physiological reactions often include increased heart rate, sweating, shallow breathing, and muscle tension. Emotional reactions include fear, frustration and confusion and are a direct source of interference and distraction to the task performer, and in a highly ambiguous catastrophic event scenario, could prove fatal. Second, procedural information describes events that likely occur in the stress environment, including a description of the setting, the types of stressors, and effects the stressors may have. Previously described scenario planning could mitigate the negative effects of chaotic procedural information by providing performers with pre-conscious conditioning to unknown stressors. Finally instrumental information reduces stress, especially since people have no prior experience with catastrophic events and cannot visualize how to react or what to do.²⁹

It is “common knowledge” that disaster readiness training and education should involve these factors. While not an exhaustive review of decision-making in disaster readiness, this overview of major developments is an advancement from the 1990s.

Response in Disaster Management

Emergency logistics is an emerging field that focuses on the response phase of disaster management, specifically centered on the distribution of rescue resources to facilitate search and rescue operations, provide shelter and food, and enable locals to become self-sufficient again.³⁰

²⁸ Ibid. 426.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ M. S. Chang, Y. L. Tseng, and J. W. Chen, “A Scenario Planning Approach for Flood Emergency Logistics Preparation Problem under Uncertainty,” *Transportation Research* 43/E (2007): 737–54.; L. Özdamar, E. Ekinici, and B. Küçükyazici, “Emergency Logistics Planning in Natural Disasters,” *Annals of Operations Research* 129/1-4 (2004): 217–245.; W. Yi, and L. Özdamar, “A Dynamic Logistics Coordination Model for Evacuation and Support in Disaster Response Activities,” *European Journal of Operational Research* 179/3 (2007): 1177–1193; D. C. Whybark, “Issues in Managing Disaster Relief Inventories,” *International Journal of Production Economics*

During the response phase or emergency response, activities are focused on emergency relief to save lives and meet basic human needs. The length of this period varies from a few days to months or even years according to the circumstances.

According to Chang and his colleagues, emergency response is a two-stage process with the first stage being the life-saving, sustaining response and the second stage the self-sufficiency response.³¹ The life-saving component consists of search and rescue operations while the life-sustaining component involves provisions of human needs.³² These first-stage responses are effective when victims are rescued from life-threatening conditions but is ineffective if needs are not met, resulting in victims experiencing a “second” disaster. Improper burial of the dead, resulting in outbreaks of infectious diseases, is such an example. Responders and decision-makers face dynamic, complex problems with environmental, organizational, and activity-based issues. Way and Yuan developed a framework of context-aware multi-party coordination systems extending dynamic decision-making support systems in response to catastrophic events.³³ Their contribution incorporated context-aware, multi-party relationship management and task-based coordination components into a framework for maximum response based on an analysis of the March 2011 triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant meltdown in Japan, in which 14,508 people were confirmed dead, 11,452 were missing, 76,000 homes were destroyed, 244,000 homes were damaged and over 350,000 citizens were displaced.³⁴ Prior to this event,

108/1 (2007): 228–235; S. H. Shen, C. H. Chiu, and T. S. Hsu, “An Age Replacement Policy Via the Bayesian Method,” *International Journal of Systems Science* 42/3 (2011): 469–477.

³¹ Chang, et al., “A Scenario Planning Approach,” 737–54.

³² United Nations High Commission for Refugees (U.N.HCR), *Handbook for Emergencies*, February 2007 (accessed July 20, 2018, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/46a9e29a2.html>).

³³ S. Way and Y. Yuan, “Transitioning from Dynamic Decision Support to Context-Aware Multi-Party Coordination: A Case for Emergency Response,” *Group Decision and Negotiation* 23/4 (2014): 649–672.

³⁴ N. Mimura, K. Yasuhara, S. Kawagoe, H. Yokoki, and S. Kazama, “Damage From the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami—A Quick Report,” *Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change* 16/7 (2011): 803–818.

many proposed and tested frameworks were proposed for government decision-makers.

In 2004, research provided design recommendations for a dynamic emergency response management information system (DERMIS) with specific system and design requirements based system training and simulation, information focus, crisis memory, exceptions as norms, scope and nature of crisis, role transferability, information validity and timeliness, free exchange of information, and coordination.³⁵

A 2005 study identified the major task requirements and associated key issues for intelligent *mobile* crisis response systems.³⁶ Additionally in 2010, another study proposed a system-oriented framework based on the work of Mitroff and Linstone in *The Unbounded Mind* (1993)³⁷ for analyzing and evaluating emergency response that became the foundation for an information system support protocol.³⁸ With the invention and continuous innovations in mobile communications, dynamic disaster decision-making support represents an opportunity for new applications of these technologies.³⁹

In the study of psychological foundations of disaster response decision-making "swift trust" emerges as a powerful explanatory variable in situations where professionals come together on short notice to respond to high stakes disaster events. This theory posits that trust occurs swiftly and implicitly, by the immediacy of the situation, requiring respectful, collaborative efforts to make sense of the situation. Additionally, situational

³⁵ M. Turoff, M. Chumer, B. V. de Walle, and X. Yao, "The Design of a Dynamic Emergency Response Management Information System (DERMIS)," *Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application* 5/4 (2004), 3.

³⁶ Y. Yuan and B. Detlor, "Intelligent Mobile Crisis Response Systems," *Communications of the ACM* 48/2 (2005): 95–98.

³⁷ I. I. Mitroff and H. A. Linstone, *The Unbounded Mind: Breaking the Chains of Traditional Business Thinking* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

³⁸ M. Abrahamsson, H. Hassel, and H. Tehler, "Towards a System-Oriented Framework For Analyzing and Evaluating Emergency Response," *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* 18/1 (2010): 14–25.

³⁹ Abrahamson, Hassel, and Tehler, "Towards a System-Oriented Framework," 14–25.

cues or influences, not organizational affiliation, shape decision-making preferences among responders.⁴⁰ Similarly, a major implication of the swift trust phenomenon is that organizational forms may be vulnerable to flawed decision-making in early stages of crisis response where temporary groups operate in a political structure, relying on affiliation influences to the exclusion of situational cues. Since accurate early problem formulation is critical for disaster response, this tendency could hinder effectiveness of readiness planning and execution.

Recovery in Disaster Management

Disaster Recovery represents a significant departure from other phases in the Disaster Management model. Because this phase has a longer time horizon, it is often industry specific in its analysis and approach (construction, health care, insurance), highly dependent on the success of prior phases (how well planners and responders prepared the groundwork for minimizing disaster impacts), and highlights the critical nature of stakeholder coordination and collaboration. Sullivan suggested an integrative approach to recovery management based on the *Australian Emergency Manual Disaster Recovery* with eight guiding principles: Define recovery; plan and manage; recognize changing needs and complexity; take a community development approach; involve human service organizations; begin at impact; train and exercise recovery arrangements; and comprehensive, integrated, timely, fair and flexible arrangement.⁴¹ This integrated approach places the community at the center of recovery management and includes planning, training and rehearsing, while emphasizing flexibility, the component most often found lacking when recovery failures are scrutinized.⁴²

⁴⁰ P. Drnevich, R. Ramanujam, S. Mehta, and A. Chaturvedi, "Affiliation or Situation: What Drives Strategic Decision-Making in Crisis Response?" *Journal of Managerial Issues* (2009): 216–231; L. Poppo, K. Z. Zhou, and S. Ryu, "Alternative Origins to Interorganizational Trust: An Interdependence Perspective on the Shadow of the Past and the Shadow of the Future," *Organization Science* 19/1 (2008): 39–55; Norris, et al., "Community Resilience as a Metaphor," 127–150.

⁴¹ Sullivan, "Integrated Recover Management."; and Peter Koob, ed., *Australian Emergency Manual–Disaster Recovery* (Canberra, Australia: Emergency Management Australia, 1996).

⁴² Sullivan, "Integrated Recover Management."

In 2013, a study analyzed post-disaster satisfaction levels of local stakeholders in housing reconstruction projects in Tunisia, where tactical decisions were concentrated by members of the Council of the Governorate at the regional level.⁴³ Interviews confirmed lack of active participation by end-users in decision-making and a top-down approach. Those responsible for the relocation said: “We have built housing for disaster victims. We have not had enough time to consult end-users as the presidential project imposed limited time.”⁴⁴

A Project Management Institute (PMI) study explored the structure of the team established to conduct housing reconstruction projects and the satisfaction of end-users, confirming the need to decentralize decisions at a level that optimizes the efficiency of local stakeholders, facilitates the participation of end-users, and allows an appropriate distribution of responsibilities and risks among stakeholders. Constraints to local involvement included:⁴⁵

- (1) Limited access to pertinent information for decision-making during project planning and development;
- (2) Temporariness of the project process which led to an important emphasis on tactical planning and caused difficulties for implementing strategic planning;
- (3) Temporary nature of the recovery team itself, which increases organizational fragmentation and causes difficulties for cooperation (PMI, 2008).

The PMI study and others like it, finds significant logistical barriers to understanding the interplay among variables affecting the efficacy of disaster planning and management. Each disaster is unique, within a diverse context of geographic, historical, cultural, social, psychological, and legal factors impossible to test or foresee. The recovery phase, like triage, does not ask

⁴³ Bouraoui, D., & Lizarralde, G. (2013). Centralized decision making, users' participation and satisfaction in post-disaster reconstruction: The case of Tunisia. *International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment*, 4(2), 145–167.

⁴⁴ Ibid. 151.

⁴⁵ Project Management Institute (PMI). (2008). *PMBOK Guide*. Newtown Square, PA: Project Management Institute.

deep questions but seeks to minimize the short-term damage and destruction. It is not until the relief phase that the disaster community can begin to ponder, “What next?”

Mitigation in Disaster Management

The final phase in disaster management cycles, and the first phase in the iterative process of resolution, is mitigation, which encompasses the long-term preparatory planning and modeling that are the foundation for disaster-proof infrastructures, architecture, and people-centered products and services. It addresses the long term humanitarian assistance that communities rely upon for years. There are many locale-dependent factors that limit comparison of relief efforts, however, certain “key success factors (KSF)” for effective relief that have been discovered to hold true around the globe.

Oloruntoba⁴⁶ explored KSFs for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of disaster mitigation in *Cyclone Larry*, which devastated the Australian coastline. KSFs grouped into preparedness and readiness and the unity of direction and cohesive control of responding government agencies, NGOs, private businesses, and individuals. Preparedness examples included prior cyclone awareness campaigns, education and community training. Stakeholders at all levels were involved in determining necessary relief measures, including updated equipment, infrastructure, and communication systems. Another readiness KSF was an early warning of the event, through modeling, before the cyclone made landfall. Communication strategies featured disaster modeling experts on TV, radio and Internet. The disaster administration human infrastructure was in a constant state of alert, communication, planning and preparation and represents a model to replicate in other regions.

Relief is supported by disaster decision support systems (DSS), i.e., software, programming, technology and engineering know-how, that over the past two decades has produced sophisticated modeling, equipment, and devices for disaster reduction (i.e., satellites, drones). DSS components include a data bank, data analysis capability, normative models, technology for display, and interactive data use.⁴⁷ Disaster DSS “provide support to

⁴⁶ R. Oloruntoba, “An Analysis of the Cyclone Larry Emergency Relief Chain: Some Key Success Factors,” *International Journal of Production Economics* 126/1 (2010): 85–101.

⁴⁷ W. A. Wallace and F. de Balogh, “Decision Support Systems for Disaster Management,” *Public Administration Review* (1985): 134–146.

decision-makers and their stakeholders; evolve as the users become more familiar with the technology; be interactive and controllable; recognize their non-routine, but consequential use; and adapt to the idiosyncrasies that are inherent in human decision making.”

In their DSS innovation, Thaler and Sunstein address the critical issue of retrofitting along with their nudge theory, defined as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.”⁴⁸ They developed the theory after observing ways homeowners failed to make rational decisions in natural disasters to benefit from loss reduction measures. An example is automatic enrollment in a benefit that is free or low to no risk, such as automatic enrollment in warranty programs upon purchase. Automatic enrollment provides the nudge necessary for individuals to accept a new status quo.⁴⁹ The implication is clear and provides automatic enrollment in retrofitting for disaster prevention.

Global Examples of Disaster Response

In the responses to the most publicized disasters, there is a comparison of global versus local responses and in most cases local groups outperform national planning. Recent Ebola and Zika virus outbreaks, lost airplanes and weather events share the same response challenges. Unfortunately disaster response has not improved and has possibly worsened. When the March 2015 snowstorm, *Thor’s Hammer*, blanketed several U.S. cities near the Kentucky and Illinois state border, over 400 stranded motorists waited 19 hours before a coordinated response occurred. A woman in one of the 15 miles of stranded cars stated there were no emergency vehicles and no information shared via social media about any forthcoming aid or helicopter assessments. Expectations were that governmental agencies, departments of transportation and other state and national governmental agencies would have winter storm preparedness responses in place particularly given

⁴⁸ R. H. Thaler and C. R. Sunstein, *Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 85.

⁴⁹ T. Fujimi and H. Tatano, “Promoting Seismic Retrofit Implementation Through ‘Nudge’: Using Warranty as a Driver,” *Risk Analysis* 33/10 (2013): 1858–1883.

accurate early weather forecasts. The slow responses were seen as too little and too late.⁵⁰

A similar snowstorm in Atlanta, Georgia found U.S. citizens living near the interstate offering food to stranded motorists at a grassroots level when organized governmental help was slow to arrive.⁵¹ Both examples were predicted but the responses were delayed and fragmented turning a disaster into a catastrophe, highlighting the escalating problems as well as response inefficiencies and lack of planning and coordination.

The developed U.S. economy with institutions supporting rapid response, and Nepal, a poor country with few resources, illustrate the same problems. Government managed disaster responses follow a traditional command and control structure. Recently there are signs of global and local improvements. Globally, the United Nations (U.N.) “Build Back Better” initiative has gained widespread traction, especially through its implementation in Japan (Fukushima disaster) and Nepal (earthquake May 2015).⁵² A key U.N. provision is rapid recovery and long term, integrated, coordinated “community based” resilience building:

During the World Conference, States also reiterated their commitment to address disaster risk reduction and the building of resilience to disasters with a renewed sense of urgency within the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, and to integrate, as appropriate, both disaster risk reduction and the building of resilience into

⁵⁰ S. Masunaga and K. Lee, “Hundreds Of Motorists Trapped On Kentucky Roads In Massive Snowstorm,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 5, 2015 (accessed August 2, 2018, <http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-ice-snow-southeast-northeast-winter-storm-20150305-story.html>); Heartland News, “I-24 Shut Down, National Guard To Assist,” *KFVS12*, March 2, 2015 (accessed August 1, 2018, <http://www.kfvs12.com/story/28243218/ky-national-guard-deployed-to-assist-300-stranded-vehicles-on-124/>).

⁵¹ C. Morgan, “Five Disaster Recovery Lessons from Atlanta’s Snow Storm,” *Recovery Zone*, January 31, 2014 (accessed July 20, 2018, <http://www.storagecraft.com/blog/recovery-lessons-atlanta/>).

⁵² William J. Clinton, *Lessons Learned from Tsunami Recovery: Key Propositions for Building Back Better*, December 2006, Office of the U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery (accessed July 20, 2018, http://www.conflictrecovery.org/bin/Clinton-Building_Back_Better.pdf).

policies, plans, programmes and budgets at all levels and to consider both within relevant frameworks (resilience is defined as: “The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions).⁵³

After the U.N. Conference on Disaster Relief hosted in Sendai, Japan ended in March 2015, the resolution was tested. Nepal experienced its most devastating earthquake in 100 years, losing over 9,000 lives. Within hours, U.N. member states voted to request the Secretary-General and the wider U.N. system assist Nepal in coordination of the national and international relief/reconstruction efforts. The 193-member body emphasized linking relief with rehabilitation and development, of building resilience, and building back better.⁵⁴ Community-based local responses embodied within the U.N. approach requires improvisation by people who have detailed knowledge of the community’s needs.

As seen in responses from religious-based organizations and NGOs in Hurricane Katrina, community-based responses are outside governmental disaster plans. Their response is quicker and more effective and often the only action some effected individuals see or receive aid from.⁵⁵ The bureaucratic failure to adapt during Hurricane Katrina exhibits numerous instances of reactive and paralytic crisis and the collective dysfunctional responses

⁵³ U.N. General Assembly, Resolution 69/283, Sustainable Development: International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, A/69/L.67, May 15, 2015 (accessed August 1, 2018, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/283).

⁵⁴ U.N. General Assembly, Resolution 69/PV.90, Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Assistance of the United Nations, Including Special Economic Assistance: Special Economic Assistance to Individual Countries or Regions, A/69/L.66, May 13, 2015 (accessed August 2, 2018, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/PV.90).

⁵⁵ A. Alvinus, “Bridging Boundaries in the Borderland of Bureaucracies: Individual Impact on Organizational Adaption to Demanding Situations in Civil and Military Contexts” (Ph.D. diss., Karlstad University, Sweden, 2013).

culminated in extreme conflict, repeated communication snafus, and an ultimate systematic failure.⁵⁶ The administrative failure in Hurricane Katrina, like Kobe, spurred agents to be more agile in their responses and design a system to promote resilience with attention to double-loop learning.⁵⁷

The emerging literature on disaster response is varied. One particular study found operations diverge from plans in emergency responses and call for a systems relationship between personnel and organizations⁵⁸ Researchers studying response capabilities needed by local governments found needs assessment, exchange of information, and logistical expertise should precede recovery, where expertise in damage assessment, debris removal, disaster assistance, and key capabilities are required.⁵⁹ Others suggest an integrated expert system can better model disaster assessment.⁶⁰ Herzog noted theory and reality differ, especially from management perspectives, as his disaster administrative model combines mitigation and planning, disaster management, response, and recovery, and learning from past failures.⁶¹

Interestingly an overwhelming number of studies only highlight problems. Most are hypothesized coordination models and leadership

⁵⁶ A. M. Olejarski, and J. L. Garnett, "Coping with Katrina: Assessing Crisis Management Behaviors in the Big One," *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* 18/1 (2010): 26–38.

⁵⁷ N. Mehrotra, V. Ahuja, and N. Sridharan, "Disaster Resilience and Self-Organization: Urban Development and Management Perspective," *International Journal of Business Continuity and Risk Management* 5/2 (2014): 85–107; D. D. Thompson, "Leveraging Learning to Improve Disaster Management Outcomes," *International Journal of Disaster Risk Science* 3/4 (2012): 195–206.

⁵⁸ C. Uhr, H. Johansson, and L. Fredholm, "Analyzing Emergency Response Systems," *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* 16/2 (2008): 80–90.

⁵⁹ B. Kusumasari, Q. Alam, and K. Siddiqui, "Resource Capability for Local Government in Managing Disaster," *Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal* 19/4 (2010): 438–451.

⁶⁰ G. Kou, D. Ergu, and Y. Shi, "An Integrated Expert System for Fast Disaster Assessment," *Computers & Operations Research* 42 (2014): 95–107.

⁶¹ Herzog, "A Model of Natural Disaster Administration," 586–604.

models. As an example, Uhr and Johansson⁶² continued research on a web-based method for mapping agent relationships and identifying key. Their study of responses to a release of 16,000 tons of sulphuric acid in Helsingborg, Sweden found some agents not part of the response plan played key roles. These groups were overlooked in the holistic planning yet the agencies were better informed and equipped to offer immediate aid. In research on *Hurricane Katrina*,⁶³ conceptual response patterns and the imbalance between counterproductive and constructive archetypes was the focus. Reactive behaviors were over-represented in their findings, leading to increased conflict, and communication and systemic government failures.

Flora profiled the Society for National Integration through Rural Development's success in involving local communities in India, finding participation in resource identification, capabilities, coping mechanisms, and vulnerability assessments, improved responses.⁶⁴ Flora's work extended a prior observation on the role of community participation and public awareness.⁶⁵ Similarly, Chou and Chen⁶⁶ suggest governments establish permanent recovery institutions and coordinators, but note rescue activities depend heavily on civilians and organizations, evident in the earthquakes, tsunamis, and nuclear radiation damage occurring in Japan in 2011. Other researchers found decision-making in disaster risk management has evolved and re-focused from a top down to a more people-centered approach with participation from local agencies, focused on private citizens.⁶⁷ However

⁶² C. Uhr and H. Johansson, "Mapping an Emergency Management Network," *International Journal of Emergency Management* 4/1 (2007): 104–118.

⁶³ Olejarski and Garnett, "Coping with Katrina," 26–38.

⁶⁴ U. P. S. Flora, "Disaster Management and Possible Strategies for Its Management in India," *National Academy Science Letters* 37/6 (2014): 555–560.

⁶⁵ J. K. Newport and G. G. P. Jawahar, "Community Participation and Public Awareness in Disaster Mitigation," *Disaster Prevention and Management* 12/1 (2003): 33–36.

⁶⁶ S. Y. Chou and D. Chen, "Emergent Disaster Rescue Methods and Prevention Management," *Disaster Prevention and Management* 22/3 (2013): 265–277.

⁶⁷ A. Scolobig, T. Prior, D. Schroter, J. Jorin, and A. Patt, "Towards People-Centered Approaches for Effective Disaster Risk Management: Balancing

insufficient local level resources and an unwillingness to share responsibility for disaster management with authorities often results and local participation created conflict between public and private interests. The solution is to understand both civil and state responsibility.

While participatory processes necessary for recovery are increasing, community-based disaster management is lagging. The growing role of NGOs in disaster relief and assistance in East Asia found civil society organizations emerged to meet urgent needs and area nongovernmental initiatives were critical in relief responses. The role of NGOs has become more significant. In the 2004 tsunami, half the \$14 billion pledged for the catastrophe was implemented by NGOs. Osa noted the magnitude and frequency of disasters exceeds the capabilities of governments and NGOs can mobilize monies and volunteers and make connections and offer services to rebuild communities, including food, water, medical services and shelter.⁶⁸

NGOs provide information and are often the first to arrive at disaster sites before U.N. agencies, FEMA, or governments. NGO's role can be noted in the *Building Back Better* key propositions, in Addendum 1, from a report by former U.S. President Clinton, heading the U.N. Secretary-General's special envoy for Tsunami recovery:

Addendum 1 – The United Nations “Build Back Better” Propositions⁶⁹

PROPOSITION 1: Governments, donors, and aid agencies must recognize that families and communities drive their own recovery.

PROPOSITION 2: Recovery must promote fairness and equity.

PROPOSITION 3: Governments must enhance preparedness for future disasters.

Rhetoric with Reality,” *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction* 12 (2015): 202–212.

⁶⁸ Y. Osa, “The Growing Role of Ngos in Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance in East Asia,” in R. Sukma and J. Gannon, eds., *A Growing Force: Civil Society's Role in Asian Regional Security* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Press, 2013), 66–89.

⁶⁹ William J. Clinton, *Lessons Learned from Tsunami Recovery: Key Propositions for Building Back Better*, December 2006, Office of the U.N. Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery (accessed July 20, 2018, http://www.conflictrecovery.org/bin/Clinton-Building_Back_Better.pdf).

PROPOSITION 4: Local governments must be empowered to manage recovery efforts, and donors must devote greater resources to strengthening government recovery institutions, especially at the local level.

PROPOSITION 5: Good recovery planning and effective coordination depend on good information.

PROPOSITION 6: The U.N., World Bank, and other multilateral agencies must clarify their roles and relationships, especially in addressing the early stage of a recovery process.

PROPOSITION 7: The expanding role of NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement carries greater responsibilities for quality in recovery efforts.

PROPOSITION 8: From the start of recovery operations, governments and aid agencies must create the conditions for entrepreneurs to flourish.

PROPOSITION 9: Beneficiaries deserve the kind of agency partnerships that move beyond rivalry and unhealthy competition.

PROPOSITION 10: Good recovery must leave communities safer by reducing risks and building resilience.

NGOs are trusted because they use local staff to offer aid. In the aftermath of the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in Japan, NGO assistance led to passage of an act to ease the incorporation of nonprofits. The Japan Platform of 2000 is a multi-sectoral system of NGOs, the government, and the community working together as equals. Their role was evident in the 2011 earthquake in Japan. NGOs remain effective even though they are often not acknowledged or accepted, but signs of change include faster regional cooperation and sharing best practices learned the Asian disasters.

Researchers investigated preparedness, impacts, and humanitarian responses in Eastern Uganda landslides following the 2010 flooding and found the community and governments were unprepared.⁷⁰ Similarly, a study

⁷⁰ S. Doocy, E. Russell, Y. Gorokhovich, and T. Kirsch, "Disaster Preparedness and Humanitarian Response in Flood and Landslide-Affected Communities in Eastern Uganda," *Disaster Prevention and Management*, 22/4 (2013): 326–339.

of earthquakes response and recovery in Canterbury, England, found that it mirrored those of U.S. Hurricane Katrina and the Australian bushfires.⁷¹ Other studies evidenced more entrepreneurial (than bureaucratic) community networks adapted to both formal and informal leadership that emerged. Hence, the research proposed a virtual database to allow information sharing among public and private community organizations to better mobilize resources.⁷² The significance of the process raises community awareness, using local knowledge and resources to provide faster assessment and aid. This model for community-based databases advances response management through networking resources.

Conclusion and Future Research

This 20-year review calls for collaboration on naming conventions and across research and practitioner disaster communities, improvements in scaling for promising research and practices regardless of the source (i.e., prestige of research institution, sophistication of the developer or technological innovation of the contribution). This study found using the same academic database in universities from different countries that the results varied, even when using translation software in the searches to minimize this outcome. Depending on an individual's location in the world, even in a prestigious university, understanding of the latest developments may be constrained simply because of an institution's database subscriptions.

A promising development is the rise of professional accreditation and certification in Disaster and Emergency Management. Resources for certificates, programs, webinars, social media links, and smartphone applications can be found internationally.⁷³ However, the unfortunate reality remains as bureaucracies remain unable to handle catastrophes. More collaboration among stakeholders in disaster management is needed at all levels to resolve this longstanding conundrum.

⁷¹ C. Mutch and J. Marlowe, "Lessons from Disaster: The Power and Place of Story," *Disaster Prevention and Management* 22/5 (2013): 385–394.

⁷² J. Li, Q. Li, C. Liu, S. U. Khan, and N. Ghani, "Community-Based Collaborative Information System For Emergency Management," *Computers & Operations Research* 42 (2014): 116–124.

⁷³ A U.S. search found FEMA's website featured many university degree programs, see "The College List," Emergency Management Institute, 2018 (accessed July 20, 2018, <http://www.training.fema.gov/hiedu/collegelist/embadegree/>).

Essays

WRITING JAPAN: INTERTEXTUALITY IN ENRIQUE GÓMEZ CARRILLO'S AND ARTURO AMBROGI'S TRAVELOGUES

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In his book, *Sensaciones del Japón y la China* [Sensations of Japan and China], the Salvadoran writer Arturo Ambrogi (1875–1936) describes the nights of Tokyo with these words:

All Tokyo goes to the shores of the Sumida-gawa and from the Yoshiwara, the “City without night, “from where I was returning after taking a walk among rows of almost empty gilded cages, and from the quiet “*hikité-tchayas*” of Naka-nocho – the great luminous artery – “*oiranes*,” “*geishas*,” “*maikos*” and “*hokanes*.” In other words, all the joy of the incomparable district hurried to enrich the overflowing fluvial joyfulness with the trilling of their laughter, the pulsations of his “*biwas*” and “*samisenés*,” and the warbling of his “*tankas*” and his “*utas*.” (Ambrogi 17, my translation).¹

As Raimundo Lazo mentions about Ambrogi's prose, his portrait of Tokyo nights is a clear example of his use of acoustic effects and arbitrary personal style to produce an impressionistic picture (251). True, but how do we really know what Ambrogi is saying if we do not know the meaning of the Japanese

¹ Author's Note: I will transcribe the original text for a better understanding of the different authors' techniques and styles: “Todo Tokio acude a las riberas del Sumida-gawa. Y del Yoshiwara, de la ‘Ciudad sin noche’, de donde volvía, después de pasearme por entre las ringlas de doradas jaulas casi vacías y de las silenciosas ‘hikité-tchayas’ de Naka-nocho, la gran arteria luminosa, las ‘oiranes’, las ‘geishas’, las ‘maikos’ y los ‘hokanes’, es decir, toda la alegría del barrio incomparable, habían volado a enriquecer con el trino de sus risas, las pulsaciones de sus ‘biwas’ y ‘samisenés’, y el gorjeo de sus ‘tankas’ y sus ‘utas’, la desbordante alegría fluvial.” (Ambrogi 17). Romanization in this paper is based on Spanish pronunciations.

words he uses? Who would understand the text in his time and day? To what kind of readers could *Sensaciones del Japón y la China* be addressed? These questions can only be answered by considering the role played by Japanese aesthetics (*Japonisme*) and the taste for Japan art (*Japonerie*) in Spanish-American society at the turn of the century.

Scholars agree about the difficulties of establishing, with certainty, when the influence of Japan in nineteenth-century European art began.² However, they all concur that, “japonisme was a shift of Copernican proportions, marking the end of Eurocentric illusionism and the beginnings of a new, modern way of seeing and recording the world” (Hokenson 17). It was not only a change in plastic arts, but also in literature. As Jan Walsh Hokenson points out about French literature: “Yet even in some of the most doctrinally Naturalist texts the Japanese allusions, if examined closely, cohere in deeper ways to invoke a contrastive aesthetic that challenges the protagonists’ facile assumptions and informs the narrative optic and structure” (18). Naturally, Spanish-American literature was no exception since it was deeply influenced by French literature.

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, *Japonerie* was an international fashion among upper classes, of which Spanish-American texts frequently reflect the appreciation. In fact, turn of the century Spanish-American and Spanish writers, such as Lucio Vicente López, Eugenio Cambaceres, Julián del Casal, Rubén Darío, Juan Valera, and Vicente Blasco Ibáñez, all introduced Japanese allusions and topics in their works. These entailed more than mere decorative descriptions: they reflected the importance that Japanese aesthetics had in the Hispanic world and the curiosity of Hispanic writers for Japanese culture. Edmond Goncourt’s monographs about Japanese painters, Lafcadio Hearn’s collection of Japanese legends and studies on Japan, and the incredible success of Pierre

² The most relevant works for the diffusion of Japanese art were Louis Gonse’s, *L’Art Japonais* (1883), William Anderson’s, *The Pictorial Art of Japan* (1886) and Edmond Goncourt’s (1822–1896), *Utamaro. Le peintre des maisons vertes* (1891) and *Hokusai. L’Art japonais du XVIII^e siècle* (1896). Paris International Expositions were also a decisive factor. The Paris International Exposition of 1867 had an exhibit of Japanese art, but the one celebrated in 1878 and particularly the 1900 International Exposition, offered more comprehensive exhibits of Japanese (and Eastern) aesthetics and culture.

Loti's books *Madame Chrysanthème* (1887) and *Japoneries d'Automne* (1889) made Japan a destination that only a few Spanish-American writers could reach. The Argentinian writer Eduardo F. Wilde (1844–1913) spent two months in Japan, from March 16 to May 22, 1897; the Mexican poet José Juan Tablada (1871–1941) stayed longer than Wilde, between 1900 and 1901. Another Mexican, Efrén Rebolledo (1877–1929), lived in Japan from 1907 to 1914, while the Central Americans, Arturo Ambrogi (1875–1936) and Enrique Gómez Carrillo traveled across the Far East including Japan. All of them wrote their experiences and impressions in different literary works. Wilde wrote an extensive travelogue, *Por mares y por tierras* (1899). Tablada, in addition to his travel book, *En el país del sol* (1900–1901), wrote *Hiroshigué, el pintor de la nieve y de la lluvia, de la noche y de la luna* (1914), a book in the line of Edmund Goncourt's studies on Japanese painters Utamaro and Hokusai. Enrique Gómez Carrillo wrote several books, such as *De Marsella a Tokio. Sensaciones de Egipto, la India, la China y el Japón* (1906), *El alma japonesa* (1906), *El Japón heroico y galante* (1912), and many editorials published first in journals and later collected in his many works. Finally, Rebolledo wrote a brief narrative based on his visit to the temples of Nikko, while Ambrogi chronicled his experiences in the aforementioned *Sensaciones del Japón y la China* (1915).³

Apart from Wilde's travelogue which is the work of both a man of letters and a scientist (Wilde was a physician), the texts produced by these travelers present a sketchy narrative which reveals the strong influence of previous readings. Therefore, while Wilde tries to give an exact portrait of Japan's society by providing a detailed description of places and habits, as well as the expected personal considerations of a traveler facing an exotic culture, the narratives of the other travelers lack the immediacy expected from a travel narrative. In other words, if we compare Wilde's text to those

³ It is worth mentioning that Tablada's and Gómez Carrillo's journeys to Asia have been frequently questioned. It was said that Gómez Carrillo wrote his columns on Japan in his Paris apartment. However, in the *Marsella a Tokio* prologue, Rubén Darío reproduced a letter sent by Gómez Carrillo from Japan and today Gómez Carrillo's trip tends to be fully accepted. However, not everyone agrees that Tablada actually went to Japan. In fact, José Pascual Buxó, author of the 2006 edition of *En el país del sol*, argues that Tablada's trip is more than doubtful, since it has not been possible to find his name in any of the arriving passenger records to Japan (12).

of other Spanish-American travelers, it is possible to establish that he avoided focusing on well-known places and looked instead for surprises and adventures in new venues where he could learn about the different cultures. Many other writers, in turn, traveled to merely verify and confirm what they already knew.

It is true that Tablada, Gómez Carrillo and Ambrogi wrote with a specific reader in mind: someone who, familiar with the descriptions of Far Eastern cultures, was expecting a recognizable narrative presented with an original variant. In Zweder von Martels' words, these readers "seek confirmation of old values dressed with a certain amount of novelty" (xvii). Writers, therefore, faced a strong dilemma: if they did not want to disappoint their readers they had to confirm the existence of a Japan that was familiar to their readers but that no longer existed or had never even existed, while at the same time presenting it through a new approach. The situation is especially interesting in the works of Gómez Carrillo and Ambrogi. Therefore, I will focus on the analysis of their texts.

The first obstacle that these two writers encountered was the fast transformation of Japan during the Meiji Era (1868–1912), from a traditional isolated culture into a modern and vibrant society. As it is well known, after the victories over China (1895) and Russia (1905), Japan entered a period of accelerated industrialization and territorial expansion. Japan no longer responded to the picturesque image that French artists created after admiring *ukiyo-e* scenes. It is true that the Japan depicted by the popular Lafcadio Hearn was the same Japan seen by Ambrogi and Gómez Carrillo, but how could they experience Hearn's Japan during their short journey not knowing a word of Japanese? Loti's fictional Japan, however, was easier to verify, criticize, deny or imitate, and, because Loti was more familiar to Hispanic readers than Hearn, quoting Loti was much more effective in describing Japan. Thus, Loti became the model and reference for other authors.

One aspect all of them could attest without risk of contradicting their predecessors was the disappearance of the colorful Japan of the floating world scene.⁴ Consequently, when encountering in Japan the same modernity

⁴ The great Japanese painters that were a sensation in France in the 1860s, Shranku, Utamaro, Hokusai and Hiroshige, died more than half a century before Ambrogi and Gómez Carrillo visited Japan, expecting to find the same Japan depicted in their paintings.

from which they thought they had escaped, their reactions were not unlike those of the romantic writers who searched for a more authentic society in the Far East only to see that progress had beaten them to it. Theirs was the feeling of belatedness discussed by James Buzard in his work *The Beaten Track*.⁵ It was necessary though not to disappoint their readers and keep up with the expectations of a travel account. Hence, following Loti's example, despite their complaints about the modernization of Japan, their narratives did not miss the familiar leitmotifs used to describe this land such as the ubiquitous image of Japan under the rain as popularized by Hiroshige with the scene of the *Sudden Shower Over Shin-Ohashi Bridge in Atake* (1857).

The parallel between Loti's and Ambrogi's description of Japan on a rainy day is evident. For example, Loti writes: "The next day the rain came down in torrents, regular downpour, merciless and unceasing, blinding and drenching everything -a rain so dense that it was impossible to see through it from one end of the vessel to the other...What wrecked weather for a first landing" (12).⁶ Moreover, Ambrogi enlightens us: "Tokyo under the rain. You must see it...this watery dust that falls for hours and hours, and covers the vast city in a humid muslin. A distressing landscape for those who wake up early, almost at dawn and, as any good tourist, lean out from their hotel room window. Brave prospect!" (Ambrogi 33, my translation).⁷ Both authors seem to make reference to a Hokusai painting and through their subtle use of intertextuality prove to readers the authenticity of their trips to Japan. Nevertheless, Ambrogi decides to swerve from Loti by accusing him of falsifying Hokusai's Japan in his novels (34). Contrary to Loti (and other writers), Ambrogi states that although Japan is in fact in a process of

⁵ See James Buzard's book *The Beaten Track. European Tourism, Literature, and the Ways to 'Culture' 1800-1918*. (110) for a complete analysis of "belatedness."

⁶ "Il pleuvait par torrents, le lendemain; une de ces pluies d'abat, sans trêve, sans merci, aveuglante, inondant tout ; une pluie drue à ne pas voir d'un bout du navire à l'autre...Un vilain temps pour mettre pied à terre une première fois..." (Loti, *Madame Chrysanthème*, 28).

⁷ "Tokio bajo la lluvia. Hay que ver lo que aquello es...Y aquel polvo de agua que se cierne durante horas y horas, y envuelve la inmensa ciudad en una húmeda muselina... Paisaje hartamente desconsolador para quien, muy de mañana, casi con el alba, como buen turista, deja el lecho y se asoma a la ventana de su cuarto de hotel. ¡Valiente perspectiva!" (33).

modernization, it still is and will ever be the eternal Japan. He declares himself in the position to attest it, because he can actually see the Japan around him, unlike those who approached it having already decided what they were going to encounter (35). In other words, Ambrogi seizes the authoritative voice, until then held by those who insisted on a picturesque and colorful Japan, and seems to deny its existence. But his position is only apparent, because he cannot and will not disappoint his readers and ends by giving them the expected conventional image of Japan. Thus, the chapter of his book devoted to Japan bears the title “*El Japón pintoresco*” (“Picturesque Japan”).

Gómez Carrillo resorts to the same strategy of denying Loti’s authority by affecting a comprehensive understanding of Japanese culture (and even of its theater), something difficult to believe from someone who did not know the language. Obviously, Gómez Carrillo’s Japanese cultural knowledge had to be based on what he had read in France or what he read during his journey to Japan. As a matter of fact, even his curiosity for Japanese sexuality reveals more literary or pictorial fantasies than truly lived experiences.

In *Erotic Japonisme: The Influence of Japanese Sexual Imagery on Western Art*, Ricard Bru examines how the West was surprised by Japanese drawings with explicit sexual images. From 1571 until 1630, dates in which the port of Nagasaki was open to commerce, these drawings (*shunga*) were exported along with other products to the Hispanic world and its demand was such that the Inquisition had to intervene (Bru 26). In the nineteenth century, particularly after the 1867 and 1878 Paris International Exhibitions, Japonerie reached great popularity and the *shunga* enhanced the idea of Japan as an erotic region of the world. Japanese society was viewed in opposition to a Western sense of decency. In Japan, where men and women shared naked public baths and the practice of prostitution was accepted, there were entire districts dedicated to the pleasures of the flesh; a man could even buy himself a wife by the day. It is to this Japan that Pierre Loti, who was already popular by his romanticized relations with exotic women, traveled in 1885 to find inspiration for new romantic stories.⁸ His journey was, as Michel Butor would say, traveling in order to write (*Je voyage pour écrire*, 9). The outcome was *Madame Chrysanthème*, a novel in which Loti relates his ephemeral marriage to a Japanese woman.

⁸ See Loti’s novels *Aziyadé* (1879) and *Le mariage de Loti* (1880).

Gómez Carrillo, who also knew that a touch of sexuality was the key to selling texts easily, went to Japan with Loti's same intention. His is not, however, the story of an ephemeral marriage. What he presents as the culminating experience for anyone who actually wants to understand the Japanese soul is a night of intercourse with a Yoshihara prostitute.⁹ As I discussed in a previous article, Gómez Carrillo, who was not a citizen from a country with imperialist objectives over the Orient, and who was even critical of the European colonial policies in Asia, has, nevertheless, the same colonial rhetoric of appropriation, aestheticization, and debasement of the other noted by post-colonial studies.¹⁰ Gómez Carrillo's is a Eurocentric turn-of-the-century discourse, and it could not have been otherwise since he was in Paris, writing for a cosmopolitan European and Europeanized group of readers.

In light of the aforementioned commercial and aesthetic reality, the importance of previous readings and the weight of readers' expectations is evident in the work of these two Central American authors. It is undeniable that travelers carry with them preconceived visions, but the question is whether those preconceived visions (and readers' expectations) could allow Gómez Carrillo and Ambrogio to describe a genuine impression. Could they actually "see" Japan? Did they describe their actual impressions or did they mimic what others had already said? In fact, at the time of the publication of Gómez Carrillo's works on Japan, Rubén Darío asked Ambrogio these same questions and he replied:

Enrique's Japan? Do you want me to speak freely, Rubén?
Enrique's Japan seems to me a Japan product of a reading.
A Japan of reflection, more than a Japan of emotion, of
personal impression. A Japan certainly obtained, with
artistry and talent, with charming amenity, from reading
Chamberlain, Mitford, Lafcadio Hearn, Ludovico Nadeau,

⁹ To present the vulgar brothel scene as an enriching cultural experience, Gómez Carrillo tells that his visit to the Yoshihara was encouraged by a respected Kyoto professor, who proclaimed that without having been at the Shimabara and without drinking a glass of sake with a Japanese prostitute, it was not possible to understand Japan (255–256).

¹⁰ For my analysis of Gómez Carrillo's colonial discourse see my article: "El discurso colonial en las crónicas sobre el Japón de Enrique Gómez Carrillo."

Aston, Tresmin Tremolière, and mainly from la Mazelière. There are also splashes of Pierre Loti (and indeed, among the different Japan descriptions to be found all over the world, Loti's is the most false). My dear Rubén, in spite of the proverbial British seriousness of the author of *Lettres du Japon*, even Rudyard Kipling's Japan suffers from serious flaws. The real Japan, the unpolluted one, is Lafcadio Hearn's, and maybe, maybe although not quite, those versions by Ludovico Nardeau and Luigi Barzini. I do not know what happens with Japan but it is a general problem.

When one arrives, when one sees it closely, the idea that one has after reading travelogues, the idea one has embraced during a long time and to which imagination has given a little touch, undergoes a tremendous setback. The disappointment is immense. From the dreamed image to the real sight, to what you feel, to what you can finally examine, there is a good distance. Nevertheless, when one is about to leave, the primitive idea, the legend, superimposes itself to your recent impression and erases it completely, in the manner of a palimpsest. It is then that one writes those enthusiastic pages, in which the real Japan, the one that we just saw and left, appears disguised in a delicious manner among orgies of colors and lights (Crónica, 15–16).

Indeed, Gómez Carrillo's Japan constantly reveals the influence of what he read about Japan. Nevertheless, Ambrogi also falls under the same influence. A first reading of *Sensaciones del Japón y de la China* can make us think the opposite, but the difference between Gómez Carrillo's and Ambrogi's travelogues does not reside in their lack of influence from previous texts, but in the difference of each one's preconceived image of Japan, coupled with a lack of similarity of purpose, and an altogether different group of readers.

The titles of Gómez Carrillo's books (*De Marsella a Tokio*, *El alma japonesa*, *El Japón heroico y galante*) make it clear that these are travel descriptions with an informative penchant. Thus, Gómez Carrillo talks not just about his journey to the Far East, but of a wide variety of topics related to Japanese culture: he mentions the strength of tradition and the menace of

modernization, goes over the main points of Japan's history, writes of literature, religion, theater, plastic arts, and habits. He also inserts short stories and anecdotes, talks about the samurais and the Japanese veneration of swords, the rigorous sense of honor, the importance of hara-kiri, the Japanese sense of humor and laughter, and particularly he writes about the Japanese women and he doesn't shy away from narrating his own sexual encounters. In a few words, as Ambrogi said to Darío, Gómez Carrillo creates his own Japan in the light of his previous readings. He produces a Spanish version of a preexisting Japan created in other languages by other authors and he even rewrites texts in French to explore more commercial and international audiences. Therefore, his texts were aimed at Hispanic readers familiar with *Japonisme* but also at an international audience always enthusiastic for books about Japan. Briefly, although his texts had an apparent cultural intention, they were fundamentally commercial venues.

On the contrary, Ambrogi travels with the purpose of questioning what others said and with the intention to describe what others missed. He wants to offer his personal impressions, but not in order to add a new Japan to the list of the already existing ones. Consequently, in his writings, he tries to avoid all historical references, all comments on religion, art or Japanese culture. Like the impressionists, who were so profoundly influenced by Japanese paintings, Ambrogi does not want to produce a realistic portrait but to generate an array of sensations in the readers. Accordingly, he refuses to recreate Japan in the light of what had been said by other travelers, and instead writes his sensations based on what had been painted.

Therefore, his work has a more refined Hispanic reader in mind, more refined and exclusive than the public to whom Gómez Carrillo addresses his texts. Ambrogi's readers must have been aware of the complexities of Japanese art and were capable, when needed, of perceiving a reference to Japanese images. As can be seen in the following fragment, such a difficult task is not possible by just inserting Japanese terms and the name of the inspiring artist has to be mentioned:

It is on the Sumida-gawa sleepy surface, a dazzling parade of 'ko-bune' of 'sampane' of 'fudo': of minuscules 'shosene' filled with lanterns and light balloons, like Christmas trees. – Hokusai! The name of the magician, the extraordinary painter of the Japanese life, arises in my memory, emerges in my lips. Yes, yes, Hokusai. The purest Hokusai!

And I remember, one by one, all his illustrations, reviewed enthusiastically, with patience and devotion, at the displays of the Ueno Museum and in the portfolios of the traders of 'curios' of Ginza stores, close to the Imperial, or in the huge 'shima-jins' of Singho in the all sacred Kyoto. And just like in Hokusai's images, in the middle of the shadows of the summer night, there is the long, gentle parade of the 'so' marching like lively coals, among the music of 'biwa' and 'shamisen', the roar of laughter, the commotion of voices and the explosion of colorful firecrackers and fireworks (*Sensaciones*, 16–17).¹¹

As can be noted, the mentioned paragraph does not show a genuine discovery of Japan, but rather a perception through a previous image. It is true, however, that Ambrogi's reflection is based on Japanese images and not on European concepts of Japan as it is the case with Gómez Carrillo. In this sense, the Salvadoran author is closer to those French writers who tried to find in Japanese art a way to renew literature (Goncourt, Mallarmé, Zola, Baudelaire), abandoning the realm of realism in order to obtain in their works the same effect achieved by the impressionist painters. As a matter of fact, I have no doubt that Ambrogi read the works of those writers and became familiar with their methods to provide descriptions with fewer objective details but with more feeling. Note the enormous similarity between the images from Zola's *L'Oeuvre* ["il n'y eut plus sur leurs têtes que cette

¹¹ "Es, sobre la superficie dormida del Sumida-gawa, un deslumbrante desfile de 'ko-bunes', de 'sampans' de 'fudos' de minúsculos 'shosenes' cundidos de linternas florecidos de globos de luces, como árboles de Noel. —¡Hokusai! El nombre del mágico, del portentoso pintor de la vida japonesa, surge en mi memoria, apunta en mis labios. —Sí, sí! Hokusai purísimo! Y voy recordando, una a una, una tras otra, sus estampas, revisadas con entusiasmo, con paciencia y devoción en las vitrinas del Museo de Ueno, y en los portafolios de los comerciantes de 'curios' de los tenduchos de Ginza, a un paso del Imperial, o en las grandes 'sima-jinas' de Shingo, en la sacratísima Kyoto. Y tal como en Hokusai, en medio del claro-oscuro de la noche estival, es el largo, lento desfile de las 'so', como ascuas, entre la música de las 'biwas' y de los 'shamisen', el estruendo de las risas, el vocerío estrepitoso y el estallar de los cohetes de colores y fuegos artificiales" (*Sensaciones*, 16–17).

poussière d'eau embrasée" (129)] and Ambrogi's *Sensaciones...* ["y aquel polvo de agua que se cierne durante horas y horas" (33)]. The image of "poussière d'eau," "polvo de agua" (watery dust) is too original to doubt that Ambrogi did not borrowed it from Zola. Naturally, the difference between Zola's work (a determinist French novel) and Ambrogi's (a brief travelogue) distances one text from the other to the point that a parallelism or an influence are difficult to detect, but the use of *Japonisme* to renovate prose is evident and places both authors on the same literary coordinates.

It is possible to conclude then that the alluded actual discovery of Japan may not have been a lived experience, but a literary strategy. Ambrogi claims to perceive the real Japan while he shows (as he might see it) Japan through the lens of *Japonisme*. However, this perception of Japan, tainted with admiration towards Japanese paintings, is somehow obsolete. At the time of Ambrogi's journey, the work of Hokusai was no longer appreciated in Japan. The *ukiyo-e* school, in which Hokusai had been its maximum representative, had been a revelation in Paris more than fifty years before, while in Japan it was already starting to be surpassed by the *yōga* school which, at the time of Ambrogi's trip, was, along with the traditionalistic *nihonga*, at the peak of development. Also, many of the European artists that had admired Hokusai's, Hiroshige's and Utamaro's artwork were already dead, as was the impressionist movement that owed so much to Japanese art.

Thus, it is possible to conclude that the "Japanese sensation" of Ambrogi's is totally sifted through the *Japonisme* of French writers. Therefore, his work is as much influenced by Western literature as Gómez Carrillo's. Like Gómez Carrillo (who boasted knowing Japanese theater yet considered Sadayako -a former geisha performing in European shows and displaying a European repertoire when in Japan-, the best Japanese actress), Ambrogi deceptively perceives Japan only through the images of a Japanese art that had become a European cliché, an aspect of Japan's past that had nothing to do with the real Japan he seemed incapable of seeing and appreciating. In other words, both Ambrogi's and Gómez Carrillo's descriptions of Japan reveal a strong Japonist influence differing only in the intention. Gómez Carrillo writes for a bourgeois public eager for exotic scenes and sensations from the East, while Ambrogi does it for a reader more familiarized with *Japonisme*, its terminology and painters. His prose is unquestionably more experimental and innovative than the one employed by Gómez Carrillo, but both recreations of Japan are equally inauthentic, mirroring a conception of Japan developed in the West through a distant

interpretation of Japanese culture and a profound Eurocentric sense of Otherness.

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AN ORAL HISTORY OF A YOUNG AINU MOTHER: TOMOYO FUJIWARA TALKS ABOUT HER EXPERIENCES IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN

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Overview

Tomoyo Fujiwara is an Ainu woman married to a *wajin* (non-Ainu Japanese). She is 30 years old, the mother of two small children, and lives in a rural area in Southwestern Hokkaido. The Ainu are an indigenous minority group of Japan, but the number of full-blooded Ainu is decreasing due to exogamy to non-Ainu Japanese, a practice that the Ainu traditionally promoted to reduce prejudice and discrimination. Tomoyo is a working mother and, unlike her ancestors who had to endure many hardships due to exploitation and oppression by the Japanese government, her life has been very comfortable. However, many Ainu people say that they still suffer from prejudice and discrimination at school, at work, and in marriage. This case study is based on the senior author's interviews with Tomoyo Fujiwara in 2012 and 2014, and it examines her life, especially her identity, sense of self, and her family in contemporary Japan. As with all ethnographic research, this insight into her life and history paints both a rich portrait of larger human experience and a significant map of a unique and rare culture. The authors hope that this case study benefits the collective goal of better understanding the Ainu and promoting equity and opportunity.

Introduction: A Brief History of the Ainu People

The Ainu are an indigenous, ethnic minority of Japan. The ancestors of today's Ainu lived in Hokkaido and the Northeastern region of Honshu. They also inhabited Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, which are now territories of Russia. Thus, the Ainu are not a monolithic group, and there are geographical and cultural diversities among them in regard to their dialects, customs, and manners (Poisson 2002).

Europeans and North Americans first learned of the Ainu around the end of the nineteenth century, and were curious because the Ainu did not look Japanese. John Batchelor, a British missionary to Hokkaido who lived with the Ainu for many years, referred to the Ainu as "this strange race" (1892, 8) and "this ancient race" (14). Indeed, Ainu racial classification has been contentious. Some theories claimed that the Ainu

were a proto-Caucasoid people who came to Japan through Siberia, while other theories tried to relate them to the aborigines of Australia. The Tripartite Pact in WWII between Japan, Italy, and Nazi-controlled Germany in 1940 was predicated on Nazi conclusions that the Ainu were the original Japanese, a white race. However, contemporary Japanese research and technological developments in the methodologies of physical anthropology, computer science, and statistical analysis flatly disprove early surmises that the Ainu have Caucasian origins. In fact, they are identified as Mongoloid (Hilger 1967; Ogasawara 2004, 11–16), something that sequencing Ainu DNA has supported. Recent research indicates that “the Jomon people bore considerable similarity to the present day Ainu of Hokkaido” and that “the Ainu are unmistakably descended from Jomon people” (Henshall 2004, 11). The Jomon people lived in Japan from around 10,000 BCE and engaged in primitive hunting, fishing, and gathering (Reischauer 1990).

Mongoloid and Jomon physicality racially distinguishes many of today's Ainu from today's Japanese. According to Mary Inez Hilger, who studied the Ainu in the 1960s in Hokkaido, a full-blooded Ainu has fair skin, a long nose, prominent eyebrows and cheek-bones, round, dark-brown eyes, rather long earlobes, high forehead, curling eyelashes, and “an abundant head of hair, often with a slight wave” as well as body hair (1967, 272). Full-blooded Ainu are also “strong, thick-set, squarely-built and full-chested” (Batchelor 1892, 18).

Notable also are descendants of *wajin*, who were adopted by the Ainu people as infants or children, often when abandoned by would-be settlers and immigrants to Hokkaido. Despite physically identifiable as Japanese, many *wajin* considered themselves Ainu. Their descendants continue to preserve the Ainu tradition and culture by performing Ainu religious ceremonies, lecturing to students on field trips to Ainu museums, and teaching traditional Ainu crafts (Kawanano & Kayano 2011).

Hokkaido was once called *Ainu Mosir* (Quiet Human Land), where the Ainu engaged in hunting, fishing, and gathering. The fifteenth century marked a substantial increase in Japanese immigration to Ezochi (today's Hokkaido) and threatened the Ainu's peaceful way of living. Since the Matsumae domain in the southernmost part of Hokkaido could not grow rice to sustain its obligations, the central Tokugawa Shogunate encouraged Matsumae to trade with the Ainu. The Japanese quickly established exploitative and violent trading practices, instituting harsh realities for the Ainu. Further exploitation of the Ainu and their homes took place when the Tokugawa Shogunate co-opted eastern Ezochi in 1799 and western Ezochi

in 1807 in order to capitalize on the international shipping trade. In his 1785 book *Sangoku Tsūran Zusetsu*, Sendai (in Honshu) samurai Shihei Hayashi argued for the necessity of looking outside of Japan to its closest neighbors (Korea, Okinawa, and Hokkaido) to establish trade and military defenses. *Sangoku Tsūran Zusetsu* evidences not only Hayashi's beliefs about Hokkaido, but also suggests wider opinion and policy.

In 1869, the Japanese government institutionalized and promoted its exploitation with the Hokkaido Colonization Board, providing new immigrants with travel money, housing, agricultural tools, and food. Great numbers of Japanese answered the call, taking advantage of the Ainu's ignorance of private landownership and resource control. The natural environment that enabled the Ainu's unique way of life rapidly decayed due to farming and over-harvesting. In 1870, for instance, the government prohibited the Ainu from fishing salmon (an Ainu staple) by using their traditional method, and in 1889, the government outlawed Ainu from hunting deer. Expectantly, the Ainu suffered periods of famine during the 1880s and had to fight for survival.

Beyond survival, the Japanese government pushed an ethnic cleansing campaign, including prohibitions on Ainu traditions, including women's mouth tattoos and men's earrings, and mandated learning and use of the Japanese language. The assimilation policies also included creation of Ainu family names. Government officials were sent to *kotan* (Ainu communities), and gave them new surnames such as Hirame, Hiranuma, Kaizawa, Kawakami, Kawanano, Kayano, Kurokawa, and Nabesawa that were based on geographical characteristics (Ainu 2009; Hilger 1967; Ito 2014; Kayano 2009; Namikawa 2010; Poisson 2002; Sekiguchi 2007; Uemura 2008).

In the years since, the Ainu have continually suffered prejudice, discrimination, injustice, and poverty. Institutional racism has systematically oppressed the Ainu, who have fewer educational and employment opportunities than the Japanese, and who face discrimination in dating and marriage. In 1986, the Japanese government reported that 2.19% of Japanese depended on social welfare, while 6.09% of Ainu did (Nomura et al. 1996, 44). In Hokkaido in 1999, the rate of Ainu on social welfare was about five times as high as that of non-Ainu Japanese, and in 2006, the rate remained about four times as high (Uemura 2008, 90–93). Ninety-four percent of Japanese attended senior high school, but the Ainu attended at a rate of only 78.4%, even with scholarships from the Japanese government. Only 8.1% of Ainu attended universities, but 27.4% of

Japanese did (Nomura et. al. 1996, 44). A 1993 survey in Hokkaido found nearly the same data – where 87.4% of the Ainu went to senior high school and 11.8% attended universities, while the rates for non-Ainu Japanese were 96.3% and 27.5%, respectively (Ogasawara 2004, 193). A 2006 survey by Hokkaido Prefecture found that 38.5% of non-Ainu Japanese in Hokkaido attended two-year junior colleges and four-year universities. The national average was 53.7%. As for the Ainu in Hokkaido, the number was only 17.4% (Uemura 2008, 90–93). Another survey from 2013, reported in the Hokkaido Government official site, found that 92.6% of the Ainu attended high schools, and 25.8% of them entered universities; moreover, 27.3% reported that theirs is a scanty livelihood, 50.3% find their lives somewhat difficult, and only 17.7% feel that their lives are somewhat easy (data from <http://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/>).

The Ainu as a whole suffer from *existential inequality*, an inequality that “allocates freedom and unfreedom [*sic.*] in the pursuit of personal life projects, rights, and prohibitions to act, and distributes affirmations and denials of recognition and respect” (Therborn 2006, 7). Many Ainu who can physically pass as Japanese avoid revealing their heritage due to stigmatization that produces existential inequality. Racism has been one of “the main, stark, classical forms of institutionalized existential inequality” (Ibid.), and Ainu continue to experience racial harassment. The 2006 Hokkaido prefecture survey on the state of Ainu life reported that the Ainu still suffer from substantial gaps in standard of living, economic prospects, well-being, and higher education. Broadly, about 17% of the Ainu people reported that they were discriminated against by government administration, in obtaining employment, at work and in school, and in dating and marriage. Notably, however, Hideaki Uemura argues that these statistics do not include indirect and structural discriminations that arise from misunderstanding and ignorance (2008, 90–93).

In response to racism, exploitation, and existential inequality, Ainu communities have promoted exogamy, the practice of marrying outside of one's racial/cultural group, especially to alter the experiences of future children. Exogamy and other practices explain why, in 1967, Hilger observed that “now the Ainu, who stood apart for millennia, face complete absorption by the Japanese” (268). The Ainu population was estimated at 23,782 in 2006 (Hokkaido Ainu Association 2012), but according to Barbara Aoki Poisson, the actual number “remains a mystery” (2002, 5). The number reported by the Hokkaido Ainu Association reflects only those who classify themselves as Ainu and are willing to cooperate

with the surveyors (Uemura 2008). There are mixed-race Ainu people who have Japanese ancestors, or ancestors who are members of other groups. And, of course, many Ainu prefer not to reveal their heritage due to racism, discrimination, and prejudice.



Figure 1. Tomoyo Fujiwara

Tomoyo Fujiwara – A Young Ainu Woman's Story

Tomoyo Fujiwara was born in 1985 in a district of a small town in Hokkaido where the Ainu population is larger than that of the *wajin* (non-Ainu Japanese) and where many are of mixed origins. The word *wajin* is generally used in everyday conversations only in Hokkaido and among the Ainu communities in metropolitan cities in Hokkaido, Tokyo, and its vicinities. The senior author, Kinko Ito, was surprised to hear the word *wajin* very often in their conversations among both the Ainu and *wajin* in the town. The *koseki*, or Japanese family registration system, is comparable to the practice of issuing birth certificates in the United States: one must fill in the baby's name, the birth order, and the names of the father and mother.

However, the *koseki* does not require one's race. Whoever was born to a Japanese parent is Japanese. All Ainu people are Japanese, but in communities where both the Ainu and non-Ainu reside, they use *wajin* to refer to non-Ainu Japanese. In Tomoyo's community, it seems that the Ainu/*wajin* dichotomy is very prominent in regards to their notion of identity and social status, as well as social types (Sekiguchi 2007; Simmel 1971).

Tomoyo's parents had known each other since childhood, but since her father was several years older than her mother, they did not play together. A mutual friend introduced them when her father was out of school and working, and her mother was in senior high school. They fell in love, got married, and had three daughters. Tomoyo's father was born in 1963, and her grandfather on her father's side is a full-blooded Ainu; her grandmother is half Japanese and half Ainu. Her grandfather on her mother's side was half Ainu and half *wajin* and her grandmother was *wajin*. According to Tomoyo, her father is "three quarters Ainu" while her mother is "one quarter." She said these numbers with a smile as she tried to think about her family tree.

Tomoyo attended a local elementary school, a junior high school, and a senior high school. Upon graduation from senior high school, she went to Sapporo, the capital city of Hokkaido. She went to a beauty school to earn a beautician's license issued by the government. She was encouraged by her parents to get out of their small town and go and study in Sapporo on her own. Tomoyo said, "I think my parents consider it a social learning to get out of the cozy home and live on your own in Sapporo." Her parents also urged one of her sisters to leave town to get some occupational training like Tomoyo, who had earned two occupational licenses: beautician and kindergarten teacher. Tomoyo said:

"You can't obtain beautician or kindergarten teacher's licenses in my home town. My parents only have girls, and I think they encouraged us to get national licenses, which would help us find jobs after having children, or in case we get married but get divorced later. There might be other reasons, but I think these are the primary reasons why they wanted us to get licenses."

In a few years, Tomoyo graduated from the beauty school, became a beautician, and worked in a beauty salon in Sapporo. She said:

“When I was working in the salon, it was tough sometimes, and I wished I could quit so many times. However, there were lots of happy times as well. I would like to work in a beauty salon again if I have a chance. I used to see Takeshi in those days, but since I had to work on Sundays, it was a problem when to see him.”

Tomoyo worked in the salon for two years before she got married to Takeshi, a non-Ainu Japanese who is also from her home town. They went back home to live. She explained how she met Takeshi:

“My husband and I are very distant relatives, even though there is no blood connection. My father's cousin married Takeshi's aunt. I only knew of my husband's name when I was in elementary school. We went to different elementary schools but the same junior high school. He was very good at baseball, and I belonged to a volleyball club. We used to go to school together or hang around with our friends talking in the neighborhood parks and playing games. Takeshi and I went to the same senior high school, but he soon dropped out and transferred to a senior high school in Sapporo. In our sophomore year, we 'dated' a little bit. Actually there are not many places where we could have dates in Three Rivers Town, so when he was home from school I used to go to his house. Since he was in Sapporo, we could only get in touch via cell phone and texting, and when he came back home, we saw each other.”

When Tomoyo and Takeshi wanted to get married, they did not have any problems. However, Takeshi's family had opposed the marriage of his relative to an Ainu man before. Tomoyo said:

“When my husband's aunt, that is, his father's younger sister, wanted to marry an Ainu man, there were a lot of family disputes. The disputes were just terrible, and his family did not like that. I suppose Takeshi's grandparents did not like Ainu people. I wonder if they did not like

Takeshi's aunt's husband regardless of his being Ainu or not, I don't know. Luckily, even though I am an Ainu, his family did not oppose our marriage. Maybe it is because we dated for a long time, and I don't think Takeshi's father does not dislike the Ainu. I know a man who is one year younger than I and a son of a very influential Ainu in Three Rivers Town. We went to the same high school and he dated a *wajin* girl, but the girl's parents were opposed to their dating saying, 'No Ainu boys!' I think that if a person does not like the Ainu, he would not like his child or grandchild to marry an Ainu. Or, perhaps you do not dislike the Ainu, but when you see their current situation, you might oppose the marriage. With Ainu blood, there might be occasions in which your child or grandchild might be hurt or have a very difficult time. I know a *wajin* woman in her 60s who told me that just because she married an Ainu, her children and grandchildren sometimes have hard time. She felt very sorry for them. I think her daughter was discriminated against because her father is an Ainu.

“My father says that there are Ainu people who are very talented in a particular field and can do a great job. However, some of them cannot last long in the work place. They quit the job too soon. Some Ainu might be a bit rough and violent, or say or do nasty, inappropriate things to the non-Ainu Japanese. Their behavior might have contributed to the negative feelings some people have for all Ainu people. An Ainu individual might work very hard, and be very diligent, patient, and non-violent. However, when there are Ainu people who fit the negative stereotypes very well, the individual Ainu who does not fit it also suffers.”

When Tomoyo said, “My husband is *wajin*,” with a big smile, she almost looked relieved, very happy, and even proud that she found a nice non-Ainu Japanese man. The senior author asked her what kind of identity she has and she said:

“I have thought of myself as an Ainu since my childhood. My parents do not hide that they are Ainu. My father is the head of the local branch of the Hokkaido Ainu Association, and my mother loves Ainu dances and embroidery. They always tell me and my sisters to be proud of our heritage.”

As in many other Ainu homes today Tomoyo's family speaks only Japanese, but their conversation is peppered with Ainu words. Her father often uses Ainu words such as *pirika menoko* (beautiful woman), *wakka* (water), *tuki-pasuy* (a spatula-like Ainu tool for transmitting one's wish to God), and *kamuynomi* (prayer for God). Tomoyo said:

“My family uses some Ainu words jokingly in our conversation, but to me, the Ainu language is an ancient language that people do not use in the modern era. The Ainu words are from the past. When I hear certain Ainu words I understand the meanings, but I do not use them often except when my mother, myself, and my sisters use them just for fun. Someone says 'Can you pass me those *pasuy*?' and I know he or she is talking about chopsticks. *Tuki-pasuy* is an Ainu's ceremonial spatula, but today *pasuy* only refers to chopsticks. The other one might say, 'Iyayraykere' (Thank You) in return when they are passed. Once there was a stray dog near our house, and my father said, 'Whose *seta* is it?' When our father uses Ainu words, we sisters sometimes may look at one another and say, 'Why is he using an Ainu word?'“

Regarding her identity, Tomoyo said that she is ambivalent about being an Ainu. She said:

“I am very happy I am an Ainu, but at the same time I feel ashamed...I don't understand the system very well, but when I was in senior high school, I got a scholarship. When I went to the beauty school in Sapporo, I went to the Department of Ainu Policies and registered myself. I got money from the Hokkaido Ainu Association, and my parents also helped me financially for two years while I

was in Sapporo. When your parents belong to the Ainu Association, you automatically are entitled to a scholarship.

“I had attended the Ainu Language School in town since my first grade and went abroad because of this connection. I went to the language classes offered by a *wajin* professor once a week for about two hours. I really enjoyed the class sometimes, but at other times I thought I would rather not go, like when I had difficulty memorizing certain Ainu words, which I felt was a nuisance. I like the sound of the voices of the old men and women talking in Ainu in a certain manner. However, they seem to speak with special mannerisms, using unique voices and idioms, and I do not understand them. I just love the sound though. I went to the language school from the first grade to the 9th grade, but I cannot remember all the words now. I can still sing Ainu songs for dancing or say tongue twisters. We did not have textbooks at the school. Our teacher gave us handouts each week, and we studied them.

“Not all children living in my community went to the language school. Their parents wanted to hide their Ainu identity. They have not 'come out,' and if the kid didn't know that he or she was an Ainu, the parents wanted to keep it that way. It is seldom the case that a person in this community would volunteer and say 'I am Ainu.' Even when others are talking about the Ainu, I wouldn't say 'I am Ainu,' either. I am proud of being an Ainu, but I have mixed feelings about making my Ainu identity public. There are many Ainu people living in the community, and there is not much prejudice toward the Ainu here. However, there are people who have prejudice. For example, there are *wajin* students who might say, 'You are an Ainu, aren't you?' as a joke to another *wajin*. If they say the same to an Ainu, it is considered as bullying. There are situations in which I can comfortably say 'I am an Ainu' though.

“Sometimes the *wajin* say things that insult the Ainu. They are kids, and they may not really know who the Ainu are, but they make condescending comments. I have never been exposed to that, but I think it was during my puberty, when I was in junior high school, that I felt ashamed of being an Ainu. Like, I am very hairy. ‘Why was I born an Ainu?’ I would ask my parents, and they would say ‘You are cute because you are an Ainu’.”

The senior author, when she felt that Tomoyo was comfortable talking about more private matters, asked her how she deals with her hairiness. She said:

“I shave my arms. You can bleach the hair, but that makes it glittery and stands out against your skin color. As for my face, I shave my face including my eyebrows, which tend to become a uni-brow. I love my thick eyelashes, but I do not like my body hair too much. My body hair grows really fast, and I have to shave once every three days or so. My sister has two strands of hair on her big toes, you know, just like those Japanese men who have hair at the bottom of the big toes. I do not have that hair and I boast about it to my sister,” Tomoyo laughed.

Tomoyo became more aware of her Ainu identity when she went abroad for the first time in an elementary school. She said:

“When I was in the 6th grade, I had an opportunity to visit Canada for 10 days with the teachers and junior high school students from the Ainu Language School. There were 15 children who were in the 4th to the 8th grade. I think there were 5 elementary school children. There were several adult leaders and translators. We drove to Sapporo, and flew to Narita (Tokyo International Airport) and then to Vancouver, which was extremely beautiful. From Vancouver, we flew in a very small propeller airplane to a place where there were many small islands. We did a homestay there for a few days and did cultural

exchange. I stayed in a home that included the oldest man on the island. I played with the children in the neighborhood, and we also rode boats. We went to a school on our last day and visited with the indigenous people. I was really impressed with their dynamic and energetic dances, and then we performed our Ainu dances. I think it was the very best performance we had ever done. Until then I did not have any feelings about whether I was happy as an Ainu or not. To tell you the truth, I had felt a bit shy about being an Ainu and was even embarrassed with our dances until I went to Canada. Those young people said to me, 'I am a native Canadian who belongs to such and such indigenous tribe' with so much pride that I thought that they were really cool. I thought, 'I need to be proud as an Ainu as well.' They taught me that it was not an embarrassing thing to be an indigenous person. It was rather cool, a wonderful thing to be proud of."

Tomoyo became more self-consciousness when she became a teenager. She said:

"When I was in my puberty, I started to dislike myself as an Ainu because of my hairiness. An Ainu cultural festival is held in the town auditorium every year, and our Ainu language school would present traditional dancing and singing, and perform a play. I was worried that my classmates from my junior high school might notice me perform Ainu dances or participate in the play. The dances and play give the Ainu their identity, they brand them as Ainu. I also didn't want my classmates to know that I was going to the Ainu language school. I did not want to perform in the cultural festival. My teacher would not insist that I should perform. She said, 'If you don't want to join us, it is okay.' I hardly participated in the cultural festival when I was in junior high school.

"I had not experienced prejudice, insult, or bullying myself, yet I did not want to be labeled as an Ainu. In those days there were people who looked down on the

Ainu as a whole. Once I am labeled as an Ainu, I would be put into that category and could become a target of prejudice, discrimination, and bullying.

“I really have mixed feelings about the Ainu. I need to do something for the Ainu, but I can do this only when I make it public that I am an Ainu. I can't do that because of my worries about how people see me. I don't want my children to have these same worries about this identity problem. I had an Ainu friend, a boy whom I was interested in when I was in the 10th grade. My parents warned me that if I wanted to marry this Ainu boy, my children would have problems. My parents know his parents, too. My parents have a pride in their heritage, but did not want me or my sisters to marry an Ainu. This sent me a mixed message and gave me mixed feelings about being an Ainu. If you marry an Ainu, your children might not like being Ainu, but they have to live with it for the rest of their lives. You cannot get away from your blood.”

Discussion: Then and Now

Tomoyo's experiences as an Ainu are quite different from those of her distant ancestors, and they also differ from her grandparents' experiences in a more contemporary Japan. For instance, Ainu men in their 80s in her town told the Kinko Ito that their lives were harsh when they were younger. For example, the men experienced persistent prejudice, discrimination, and bullying at school and at work in those days. One elderly man told Ito, “When we kids had a fight, my *wajin* teacher used to scold and blame me all the time just because I am an Ainu.” Another said, “I quit junior high school due to [my bad experience with] this female *wajin* teacher.” Yet another explained, “There were 47 students in my class, and four of us were Ainu. The Ainu were not considered human beings. Yet there were 50 to 60 young Ainu men from town who went to war and died for Japan.” The non-Ainu Japanese women who married Ainu men also told Kinko Ito about their problems with both their in-laws and with people in the communities where they lived.

Tomoyo said that she enjoyed hanging around with her friends, and she had not experienced any bullying at school. This is partly due to anti-bullying efforts on the part of teachers and the PTA, and the small

student population in the 1990s. There were only six students who were in the same grade in her elementary school. Her junior high school had students from three different elementary schools in town, which exposed her to more *wajin* students. In puberty she became more conscious about her heritage. However, Tomoyo is beautiful, attractive, and can pass as non-Ainu Japanese easily, and this could be one of the reasons why she did not feel so alienated.

Additionally, Tomoyo benefitted from recent social policy initiatives that were unavailable to older Ainu, which certainly explains some of the disparity in perspective. Government programs to assist those of Ainu ancestry include low-interest (2%) mortgages, scholarships for high school and university students, infrastructure programs aimed at improving roads and sewage disposal facilities in communities where Ainu live, salaries to those who teach Ainu crafts, and more (Kawanano 2012). Yet Tomoyo also benefitted from living in a rural community where the Ainu outnumbered non-Ainu Japanese. The community was characterized by *Gemeinschaft*-like associations in that people share the same ancestry, common values, norms, and mores; everybody knows everybody. However, the ascribed status in her town entails the entrenched dichotomy of Ainu vs. *wajin* (non-Ainu Japanese) that can be traced to the 1700s and earlier.

“Who is an Ainu? Is it blood or culture that makes one an Ainu?” the senior author asked Tomoyo. “I think both,” she reasoned. Yoshihiko Sekiguchi, who studied the Ainu in the Tokyo metropolitan area, states that “their existence as human beings cannot be framed by a single identity” because the boundaries between the Ainu and *wajin* could be ambiguous (2007, 238). Due to the systematic and constant promotion of exogamy, the racial boundaries are indistinct, as Tomoyo showed in her struggles to identify race in her ancestry. Sekiguchi's interviewee, Mr. H, moved to Tokyo when he was in the fifth grade. Sekiguchi states, “Mr. H identifies as an Ainu because of his blood. He does not know the 'culture'; but because of his 'blood' he considers himself an Ainu” (2007, 145–146). He continues, “Let's suppose that the mixed blood is a common occurrence among the Ainu: then the categories of Ainu vs. *wajin* do not have lucid boundaries, and his identity is ambiguously situated” (2007, 145–146).

Tomoyo's self-conception fluctuates between being an Ainu and being a non-Ainu Japanese. Sometimes she feels more of an Ainu, and she is proud of her Ainu heritage due to her socialization at home, while at other times she does not think about her Ainu identity. Her sense of self changes in different social settings, among different groups of people, and it

depends on how she defines herself. According to Eshun Hamaguchi, a Japanese social psychologist, one's notion of the self is *kanjin*, or "a situated self" that exists among the whole (e.g., groups of individuals) and is dependent on the context of one's social relationships. Hamaguchi calls *kanjin* "the contextual," a subject who always behaves in relation to other subjects in the shared and mutual life space. One's self is found and confirmed only within one's relationship to others, a phenomenon Hamaguchi argues is shown more commonly and strongly in Japanese than in other nationalities. Japan's social attributes stress interdependence, mutual trust and reliance, and human relationships (as opposed to egocentricity, self-reliance), and human relations as a "means" rather than as an "end" (Hamaguchi 1996).

The Ainu vs. *wajin* dynamic may be best explained by Georg Simmel's notion of social types. Just like "the stranger," "the mediator," and "the adventurer," the Ainu is a particular social type that is characterized by attributes of the social structure and interactive relations. In other words, the Ainu are given assigned positions and expected to play certain roles. They are viewed through the lens of what gets done to them by society (Simmel 1971). Tomoyo benefited from scholarships given to the Ainu students, attended the Ainu language school, and went to Canada to do cultural exchange with the native people near Vancouver. Certain numbers of Ainu are on social welfare, and there are also many Ainu who are engaged in tourism, selling Ainu crafts and performing Ainu dances and singing (Kayano 2009).

Growing Up and Performing Ainu

When she was a teenager, there were certain tender moments when Tomoyo felt ashamed of being an Ainu. Her junior high school had more *wajin* than Ainu students. In her puberty, her hairiness reminded her of her ancestry, and she did not like it. She went to the Ainu language school but did not want her new classmates to know it, nor did she want to appear in Ainu cultural festivals. For her, performing Ainu dances and Ainu plays equaled Ainu identity, and put one in a particular social category. What Tomoyo thought other non-Ainu Japanese classmates thought of her participating in Ainu performance, influenced how she felt about herself as an Ainu. This is an excellent example of *the looking-glass self*: Tomoyo imagined the ways her classmates perceived her performing the Ainu dances, she imagined how they evaluated her and label her an Ainu, which would peg her in a certain social category and social situations, and she felt

bad and withdrew from the activities (Cooley 1964). However, in her elementary school days, her experience with the native people of Canada and the Ainu dances she performed there made her feel proud of being an Ainu.

Tomoyo's mixed feelings about being an Ainu might come from her socialization, especially from her interactions with her parents who told their daughters to be proud of being Ainu, but warned them against marrying an Ainu. As Tomoyo said, "You cannot get away from your blood." Having an Ainu parent ascribes one Ainu status, yet in one's *koseki* paper (the Japanese family registration system), there is no mention of one's race. Because most contemporary Ainu are of mixed origins, being an Ainu seems to depend solely on one's personal definition.

Being an Ainu always made Tomoyo feel ambivalent about her identity, particularly during puberty. She loves the Ainu, but she does not like certain Ainu. She is proud to be an Ainu, but she felt embarrassed about belonging to a subculture. She loves Ainu dancing, but she did not want to perform Ainu dances in front of her non-Ainu classmates at a cultural festival.

Tomoyo told Kinko Ito that she loves Ainu culture and wants to embrace it fully. She said:

"When I am dancing an Ainu dance, I feel very excited and happy. When I am watching an Ainu dance, even when I do not join it, my body starts to move to the music by itself. When my children are bigger, I would like to join the adult section of the Ainu language school and learn traditional Ainu ballads. I want to embroider traditional Ainu embroidery, make kimonos -- there are so many things I want to do."

The young mother wants her small children to experience the Ainu culture firsthand. She always tries to bring them to cultural events held in her hometown. At the age of 30, she feels happy about being an Ainu and wants to do something for the preservation of the culture in the future. When the senior author was leaving town, she said, "I am very happy you are studying the Ainu. I really appreciate your interests." Tomoyo is currently pregnant with her third child, who is a girl, and she is very excited about the baby.

Conclusion

The Ainu culture has a long history. Its religious rituals, oral literature, music, fashion, and dances are unique and rich. Yet throughout history, the Ainu's human rights have been stripped. *Ainu Mosir*, the peaceable land of the Ainu, was co-opted as government land. Fishing salmon, hunting deer, men wearing earrings, and the tattooing of women were prohibited. Traditional Ainu names were replaced by Japanese names, and the Ainu were forced to speak Japanese. Their ecological way of life was threatened and ruined in the process of modernization. Japan's assimilation policy was basically a process of an ethnic cleansing (Kayano 2009; Namikawa 2010; Nomura et. al. 1996; Ogasawara 2004; Uemura 2008).

The Ainu continue to suffer from prejudice and discrimination in education, marriage, and employment, but are not alone in modern Japan. Other groups include *burakumin* (a group of people who descended from an occupational caste during the Tokugawa Period), the handicapped, the elderly, and residents who are descendants of Korean and Chinese immigrants. While policy and culture change to understand, compensate, and make equitable the experiences of the groups the ruling classes have historically oppressed, that same legacy of oppression works to eliminate the groups. Like many indigenous populations around the world, there is great concern that we have a narrow and closing window from which to understand and study full-blood Ainu and lived Ainu experiences.

The authors of this paper hope that Tomoyo's story will promote the equity projects associated with the Ainu and preserve the Ainu culture. Ultimately this paper answers the call of the Japanese government, its programs, human rights groups, and international scholars to chronicle and disseminate research, and we hope that work of this sort will improve the Ainu quality of life, opportunity, and freedom.

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Book Reviews

Kimura Kiyotaka 木村清孝, *Shōbōgenzō zenbon kaidoku* 『正法眼蔵』全巻解説 [Deciphering the *Shōbōgenzō* Fascicles]. Tokyo: Kōsei Shuppan, 2015. 568 pp. ISBN: 978-4-333-02719-4, 3800 ¥.

Reviewed by Eitan Bolokan

Kimura Kiyotaka 木村清孝 (b. 1940), abbot of the Sōtō temple Ryūhōji 龍寶寺 in Kanagawa prefecture, Professor Emeritus at Tokyo University and former President of the Sōtō-affiliated Tsurumi University, is one of Japan's leading scholars of "The Flower Ornament School" of Mahāyāna Buddhism (Jp. 華嚴宗 *Kegonshū*) and a specialist in the *Avatamsaka Sūtra* (Jp. *Kegonkyō*) that represents its core teaching.

Kimura's numerous publications provide us with an ongoing consideration of the philosophy of the *Avatamsaka Sūtra* and its place in the formation of Chinese Buddhism. His early work, "A Study of Avatamsaka Philosophy in Early China" (*Shoki Chūgoku Kegon shisō no kenkyū*, 初期中国華嚴思想の研究, Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1977), paved the path to pivotal later publications such as "A History of Chinese Buddhist Philosophy" (*Chūgoku bukkyō shisōshi*, 中国仏教思想史, Tokyo: Sekai seiten kankō kyōkai, 1979), "A History of Chinese Avatamsaka Philosophy" (*Chūgoku Kegon shisōshi*, 中国華嚴思想史, Heirakuji-shoten, 1992), "The Basic Framework of East-Asian Buddhist Philosophy" (*Higashi ajia bukkyō shisō no kisōkōzō*, 東アジア仏教思想の基礎構造, Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 2001), and "A Path to Awakening: Studying the Avatamsaka Sutra" (*Satori he no michi: Kegonkyō ni manabu*, さとりへの道: 華嚴経に学ぶ, NHK, 2014).

A Sōtō priest himself, Kimura has written extensively on the thought of the founder of the Japanese Sōtō School, Zen Master Eihei Dōgen 永平道元 (1200–53), and its affinity to the philosophy of the *Avatamsaka*. Kimura's latest publication, the voluminous study titled *Shōbōgenzō zenbon kaidoku* 『正法眼蔵』全巻解説 [Deciphering the *Shōbōgenzō* Fascicles], presents us with his lifelong consideration of Dōgen's philosophy. This is a massive collection with careful reflections providing many meaningful observations of Dōgen's Zen.

In the introduction to *Shōbōgenzō zenbon kaidoku*, Kimura provides a detailed presentation of the various editions of the *Shōbōgenzō* and their editorial process throughout the centuries. Kimura maintains that by focusing

on the 75-fascicle edition (*nanajūgo kanbon* 七十五巻本) and Dōgen's late writings in the 12-fascicle edition of the *Shōbōgenzō* (*jūni kanbon* 十二巻本), one can attain a holistic understanding of Dōgen's philosophy. To these Kimura adds what he considers as "Dōgen's preliminary exposition of the Dharma" (*Dōgen no saisho no honkaku tekina seppō* 道元の本格的な説法, 20), the *Bendōwa* essay from 1231 ("A Talk on the Wholehearted Way", 弁道話), and the two fascicles "Bodaisatta shishōbō" ("Bodhisattva's Four Methods of Guidance", 菩提薩埵四摂法) and "Hokke-ten-hokke" ("Dharma Blossoms Turn Dharma Blossoms", 法華転法華). Kimura maintains that these latter fascicles are crucial as they reflect Dōgen's appreciation of the *Lotus Sūtra* and the Mahāyāna path as a whole (*hokkekyō-kan to daijō-kan wo tanteki-ni arawasu* 法華経観と大乘観を端的に表す, 20). Kimura's primary source for his analysis is the *Shōbōgenzō* collection edited and annotated by Mizuno Yaoko (Tokyo: Iwanami Bunkō, 1990–1993, 4 vols.).

Here it should be noted that Kimura's editorial orientation seems to follow traditionalist Sōtō hermeneutics (*dentō shūgaku* 伝統宗学), which focus on the 75 and 12-fascicles editions of the *Shōbōgenzō* as the fundamental and authoritative scripture for engaging Dōgen's thought. Nevertheless, Kimura acknowledges the indispensability of a close reading of the sermons contained in the *Eihei-Kōroku* (*Eihei [Dōgen's] Extensive Record* 永平広録), as a complimentary source that is vital for appreciating Dōgen's Zen.

Additionally, in the introduction, Kimura explains his decision not to include a discussion of the "Shōji" fascicle ("Birth and Death", 生死), as he finds it to be straightforward in both articulation and meaning (*taihen wakariyasuku shitashimiyasui koto* 大変分かりやすく親しみやすいこと, 20). This is an intriguing declaration, as the fascicle is known to be a cardinal source for Dōgen's presentation of complex themes of birth and death, impermanence, and their relevance to actual practice. Of course, these themes are discussed in other fascicles, but excluding "Shōji" is somewhat bewildering, especially since pioneering traditionalist commentators such as Nishiari Bokusan 西有穆山 (1821–1910), Kishizawa Ian 岸沢惟安 (1865–1955), and Okada Gihō 岡田宜法 (1882–1961) have stressed its significance.

This brings us to a consideration of Kimura's hermeneutical stance, which he defines in terms of a "personal interpretation" (*shige* 私解). This, he maintains, enables the reader access to a definite and concise explanation

(*ittei no hairyo* 一定の配慮, 20) to each of the various fascicles of the *Shōbōgenzō*. Kimura's methodology brings to mind the classical commentary, *A Personal Account of the Shōbōgenzō* (*Shōbōgenzō shiki* 正法眼藏私記), compiled by the eighteenth-century Sōtō scholar monk Zakke Zōkai 雜華藏海 (1730–1788). Zōkai's work was one of the first to introduce what we think of today as a “participatory inquiry” (*sankyū* 参究) into Dōgen's writings or a personal account of one's reading of the theological treasury of the tradition based on the wisdom acquired by ongoing practice. Nonetheless, while most of the *sankyū* literature was confined to the scholastics within the Sōtō establishment, Kimura's commentary aims at informing and enriching anyone who wishes to deepen his understanding of Dōgen. In this regard, *Shōbōgenzō zenbon kaidoku* exemplifies the manner in which traditionalist literature found its path to the non-specialist reader, who views Dōgen as a towering figure of thought and creativity, and not only as the founder of a religious school (*kaiso* 開祖).

Kimura's presentation and analysis of the various fascicle is indeed useful and concise. Kimura clarifies the historical context and significance of each fascicle, and goes on to discuss the vital aspects that characterize it. Reading through Kimura's explanation to such pivotal fascicles as “Genjōkōan” (“Actualizing the Fundamental Point” 現成公案), “Busshō” (“Buddha Nature” 仏性), “Uji” (“Being-Time” 有時), and many more, I felt that he succeeded in creating a rich and useful collection of illuminating commentaries regarding the various fascicles. Nevertheless, I found little in the actual informative content that is not known to anyone who is acquainted with the vast literature on Dōgen within Japanese and Western academia.

I then turned to examining the ways in which Kimura's authority as a leading specialist of the *Avatamsaka* is reflected in his analysis of those fascicles that have a close affinity to the philosophy of the Kegon School. In his study of the “Kai'in Zanmai” fascicle (“Ocean Mudra Samādhi” 海印三昧), Kimura offers a detailed explanation of the philological opening to the essay by showing how Dōgen's quotes are taken from the record of the Chan Master Mǎzǔ Dàoyī 馬祖道一 (709–788), who himself quotes from the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra*. Hence, Kimura maintains that Dōgen's unique understanding of the very concept of the “Ocean Mudra Samādhi” is derived from the specific Chan literature of the Tang dynasty (88–89).

Not only does Kimura's analysis clarify these various philological issues, it also focuses on the *Avatamsaka* philosophical significance for the formation of Dōgen's Zen. For example, Kimura proposes that according to Dōgen, the meaning of the very concept "Ocean Mudra Samādhi" is the totality of *samādhi* achieved by all the Buddhas and Patriarchs (*subete no busso no zanmai* すべての仏祖の三昧). This is *samādhi* which is no other than the awakened activity and comportment of all Buddhas and Patriarchs (*busso tachi no arayuru katsudō* 仏祖たちのあらゆる活動, 90).

Another intriguing observation by Kimura regarding the significance of this *samādhi*, is that Dōgen did not confine it to the categories of meditative states. Quite to the contrary, Dōgen understood this *samādhi* as a cosmological designation that points to the dynamic manifestation of all of reality (*shuhō no araware* 衆法の現れ, 91). In this way, Kimura shows that the "Ocean Mudra Samādhi" is a designation of actual practice, but also a cosmological designation of the workings of all of reality. It is both the inconceivable dynamics of all phenomena and the particular practice of the ancestors. In fact, Kimura claims that these dialectics show the affinity between the Zen School's cardinal concept of the "Mind Seal" (*shinnin* 心印) and the Kegon "Ocean Mudra Samādhi" (91–92).

Kimura presents similar philological inspections of the "Sangai Yuishin" ("The Three Realms are Nothing but Mind" 三界唯心) fascicle, which is also deeply connected to the *Avatamsaka* philosophy. Here, Kimura focuses on the famous opening statements of the fascicle attributed to Shakyamuni Buddha, and discusses the difficulty in locating their textual sources. Interestingly, Kimura claims that Dōgen's familiarity with the various scriptures associated with the *Avatamsaka* can be traced to the writings of the Sòng dynasty Sōtō Master Tóuzǐ Yìqīng 投子義青 (Jp. Tosu Gisei, 1032–1083), who was a great scholar of the sūtra. These remarks are eye-opening as they serve as further examples of the scale in which Dōgen's Zen not only bears close affinity to the Tendai and Chan Schools, but also to other pivotal Mahāyāna traditions that need to be taken into account when considering its teachings.

This said, while the *Shōbōgenzō zenbon kaidoku* does provide many such intriguing and relevant insights, I do find it falling short of reaching its full potential. Considering the fact that Kimura is both a leading scholar in the field of *Avatamsaka* studies and in the field of Dōgen's studies, the current work could have served as a milestone achievement in both fields by

providing us with a study that only few can present within both Japanese and Western academia. What is the philosophical affinity between the *Avatamsaka* and the *Shōbōgenzō*? What are the ideas and terminologies so pivotal to the Kegon School that are reflected in Dōgen's own vocabulary and poetic imagery? In the current work, these and many more long-awaited questions are left, for the most part, untouched. It is true that Kimura notes that his work is the fruit of a lifelong study of Dōgen's Zen, and does not propose a study of the Kegon influences on Dōgen, yet I still cannot but feel that the current work did not attain its full potential.

The subject of the *Avatamsaka* and its influence on Dōgen's Zen has long been discussed within Japanese academia and Sōtō scholarship. Important works, such as Kamata Shigeo 鎌田茂雄 and Ueyama Shunpei's 上山春平 "Unlimited World-View: Kegon" (*Mugen no sekaikan: Kegon* 無限の世界観: 華嚴, Tokyo: Kadokawa, 1969) and Yoshizu Yoshihide's 吉津宜英 "A Historical Study of the Philosophy of Kegon-Zen" (*Kegon Zen no shisōshiteki kenkyū* 華嚴禪の思想史的研究, Tokyo: Daitō, 1985), have presented a careful analysis of this complex theme. Kimura himself, in an article from 2003 titled "Kegon and Zen" (*Kegon to Zen* 華嚴と禪, The Bulletin of the Research Institute of Zen of Aichigakuin University, vol. 31, 1–12), has discussed the ways in which the Kegon's cardinal paradigm of the "Four Dharma Realms" (*shihōkai* 四法界) are reflected in Zen literature and Dōgen's thought. The absence of such a discussion in most of the current work is indeed apparent.

In conclusion, *Shōbōgenzō zenbon kaidoku* is an impeccable presentation of the various fascicles of the *Shōbōgenzō* that will serve as an illuminating and useful commentary for anyone looking for a concise, well thought, and carefully analyzed investigation of Dōgen's philosophy.

Mark Ravina, *Understanding Japan: A Cultural History*. The Great Courses, Smithsonian Institution, 2015. Audio discs + 1 course guidebook #833212 (VI, illustrations), 176 pp. ISBN: 978-1629971827, \$29.95.

Reviewed by Daniel A. Métraux

Japan has a rich, complex and dynamic culture that has fascinated Western visitors for over five centuries. Many Westerners have a popular image of Japan: Mount Fuji, the hustle and bustle of Tokyo, the vibrant nightlife of its major cities, its beautiful gardens, shrines, and temples, and the magnificence of its rich food culture. At the same time, however, few people are aware of the core values that make up Japan's complex culture. We are therefore fortunate to have a masterpiece prepared by Emory University's highly respected Japanologist, Mark Ravina, *Understanding Japan: A Cultural History*, part of a series produced by The Great Courses Company.

I have long been a great fan of work of The Great Courses (TGC). TGC has created a vast quantity of intellectually stimulating "courses" covering a wide range of material. They hire a known expert in the field to give 24 thirty-minute lectures on matters pertaining to the course topic. These lectures are copied onto CDs and are available in any quality library. Over the past several years I have "taken" a good number of these "courses" centering on nineteenth century American and European history with a focus on such topics as the causes of the American Revolution and the Civil War, Victorian England, American painters in France, and so on. Therefore, when I found Ravina's course on Japanese culture in our local town library, I grabbed it with relish.

Ravina is one of the most highly regarded Japan specialists of his generation. He holds a PhD from Stanford University and is a Professor of History at Emory University where he has taught since 1991. He has been a visiting professor at Kyoto University's Institute for Research in Humanities and a research fellow at Keio University in Tokyo and the International Research Center for Japanese Studies. His books include *The Last Samurai: The Life and Battles of Saigo Takamori* and *Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan*. He proves himself to be a superb lecturer is highly qualified to teach such a TGC course, as Ravina's presentation is smooth and highly articulate. His points are clear, and he makes use of solid examples using everyday matters, which even those with limited knowledge of Japan can fully appreciate. Yet, he also provides a wealth of information and

interpretation that will inspire other Japan specialists. Ravina has his own carefully thought out theories on the flow of Japanese history that I have not fully considered before, and he has even inspired me to reorganize and restyle my next course on Japanese history and culture.

He begins his course with a look at Japan's place in world history. When a young Ito Hirobumi, later Japan's first and most famous prime minister, first visited the United States as part of a delegation of Japanese notables visiting the nation in 1871, he made special note of Japan's having just emerged from a long history of isolation. Ravina comments that Japan's relationship to the outside world goes in cycles between extensive assimilation and seclusion. There have been three periods of Japanese openness to outside influences: the inflow of Chinese and Korean culture centered before and during the Nara Period, the second period of intense globalization between 1300 and 1600 and the third period, which began with the opening of Japan in 1853–1854 and continued with the Meiji Restoration period (1868–1912). In particular, Ravina makes an interesting point that even during times of seclusion such as the reign of the Tokugawa *shogunate* (1600–1868) Japan continued to be influenced by outside forces. Late Tokugawa era painters like Hokusai, for example, may not have ever met a Western *gaijin*, but their art was greatly influenced by trends in European art that made their way into Japan, such as the use of perspective.

Ravina's lectures are arranged chronologically. He starts with a glance at primitive history and takes off with an in-depth analysis of historical myths about the founding of the imperial Japanese state over fifteen hundred years ago. Ravina comments on what these myths tell us about the way in which Japanese then and now see themselves and their unique place in the world. We then see the rise of the early Ritsuryo state, the arrival and acute political importance of early Buddhism in Japan, and the decline of the strong centered imperial state during the heyday of the effete Heian Court culture that collapsed in the twelfth century.

The most interesting and best taught part of the "course" focuses on the time between the collapse of the Heian imperial court and the end of the Tokugawa *shogunate*. Lectures here include the emergence of *samurai* in medieval Japan, the rise of *samurai* culture during the Ashikaga *shogunate* (1336-1573), and the growth of popular Buddhism in the guise of the Pure Land faith together with the emergence of Zen Buddhism. Ravina contrasts Japan's open period of globalization from the 1200s to about 1600 which included the Mongol invasions of the late 1200s and Hideyoshi's failed invasion of Korea and China at the end of the 1500s to the isolationist

tendencies of the Tokugawa shoguns who ruled Japan for two and a half centuries.

Ravina's lectures on early modern Japan include well-developed discourses on such things as Japanese gardens, Hokusai and the art of woodblock prints, Japanese theatre: *noh* and *kabuki*, and Japanese poetry and the evolution of the *haiku* poem. I am especially fond of several beautiful gardens in Kyoto, especially the gardens at the Silver Pavilion in late autumn with their wealth of woodland walks and red maples. Ravina does a fine job explaining how this and other gardens, many of them in the Kyoto area, fit as examples of Japanese aesthetics as well as expressions of Japanese religious and cultural ideals. One will also enjoy Ravina's lively comparison of *noh* and *kabuki*. *Noh* was very special in its aesthetic refinement and its appeal to Japan's educated and wealthy elite and *Kabuki*'s licentious appeal to Japan's huge commoner classes.

By far the weakest part of the "course" involves Ravina's presentation of Japanese history from the Meiji period to the present. The lecture on the Meiji Restoration period describes the many reforms and intense modernization of Japan as a synthesis of traditional Japan (such as the "restoration" of imperial rule) with new modern tendencies (such as the writing of a modern constitution). However, there is little mention of the critical leveling of social classes, which on occasion gave opportunities for children of commoner families to rise up through their own abilities without the restrictions of class – typified by Fukuzawa Yukichi's famous quote: "Heaven helps those who help themselves." There is little mention of the importance of universal education and the use of *oyatoi gaikokujin*, teachers and experts from the West, who played a key role in launching Japan's modernization. Ravina needs to mention that the Meiji experiment was a true "Revolution from Above" that forever changed Japan.

Ravina's analysis weakens in the explanation of Japan's history between the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and Pearl Harbor. There is little mention of the tensions in Japanese society in the 1920s and early 1930s as the nation's elite grew wealthier while the gap between them and the common tenant farmer and the poorly paid and abused factory worker grew greater and greater. That led to the rise of a uniquely Japanese form of fascism fashioned by such writers as Kita Ikki that influenced radical young circles among officers in the Japanese military and abetted their aborted coup in late February 1936. Kita and others in the military asserted a new form of Asian nationalism which pushed the idea that Japan should become the architect of a new order in Asia.

Ravina repeatedly describes the Japanese incursions into China and the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo in the 1930s, but he never clearly explains *why* Japan wanted to invade Manchuria and China in the first place? Why did Japan take Korea, then Manchuria, and then invade China?

His commentary on the road to Pearl Harbor also is problematical. He uses the writing of the late Japanese political scientist Maruyama Masao who stated that Japan in the 1930s and early 1940s failed to develop a coherent plan for war and conquest. The result was that Japan stumbled lamely from one crisis to another getting deeper and deeper into a quagmire in China from which it could not extricate itself. Ravina also fails to remind us that oil was the key cause of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt's oil and scrap iron embargo cut off sales of vital oil to Japan. Japan had a hard choice: capitulation and withdrawal from China and Southeast Asia or the launching of an attack to gain control of Dutch Indonesia and its huge oil reserves – with an attack on Pearl Harbor to prevent the American fleet from blocking Japan's vital ocean lanes to Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, Ravina's lectures on postwar Japan are mixed. There is virtually no mention of the importance of the Allied occupation of Japan. What is the legacy of this critical period of Japanese history? On the other hand, Ravina's explanation of Japan's rise to economic dominance in the 1970s and 1980s and the collapse of this boom period in the 1990s is excellent. Included in this section is a fascinating analysis of the Japanese family since the Heian period and a gourmet's delightful presentation on the extensive world of Japanese food. Included here is a worthy explanation of why Japan has twice or more times the restaurants the U.S. has – Japanese apartments and homes are so small and so cluttered that it is often more economical and worthwhile to eat and entertain out rather than at home. There is also a valuable analysis of Japan's two great modern movie directors – Ozu Yasujirō and Kurosawa Akira. Ravina's closing comments on Japan's progress since the economic bubble of the 1990s are very worthwhile. He suggests that Japan is today entering a period of self-imposed isolation, noting the drastic decline of Japanese traveling abroad and the decreased numbers of Japanese students studying abroad. The comment on students is especially apt – we had up to twenty Japanese students each year through the 1990s from our various sister schools in Japan, but only five or six in 2017.

Despite these criticisms, Ravina's *Understanding Japan: A Cultural History* is a remarkable resource. The course provides the teacher with only twelve hours in which to cover the full breadth and length of Japanese history. The focus of the "course," as the title suggests, is on Japanese culture, not

history, although the two are intertwined. The best lectures are on aspects of traditional culture such as gardens, Buddhism, traditional theatre, Tokugawa art, and various forms of Buddhism and their role in Japanese society. There is a fascinating but rather highbrow analysis of Japanese language that will thrill the specialist but may well lose listeners with little background in Japanese studies.

One cannot include everything in a very short “course” such as this, but I missed not hearing anything about Nichiren and Nichiren Buddhism, the only form of Buddhism native to Japan. There is no mention of the New Religions such as Soka Gakkai which are so important in contemporary Japan. Similarly, how can one describe the Meiji period without any mention of Fukuzawa Yukichi? There could be a lecture on modern Japanese literature with at least mention of Natsume Sōseki and his novel *Kokoro*, Dazai Osamu’s *Setting Sun* as well as a host of modern writers.

Overall, the visual aspect of the course is incredibly valuable. The Smithsonian Institution cooperated with the production of this course, which included beautiful and often stunning illustrations from the Smithsonian’s expansive collection of Japanese artwork and archival material. Despite these minor criticisms, Ravina’s presentation of Japanese culture and history is a very rich and perceptive view of this enigmatic nation. There is enough here to enthrall the newcomer and to energize the specialist, and Ravina should be congratulated on his masterful achievement.

Matt Goulding, *Rice, Noodle, Fish: Deep Travels through Japan’s Food Culture*. New York: HarperCollins, 2015. 352 pp. ISBN: 978-0062394033, \$37.50.

Reviewed by Steven E. Gump

What would an English-language love letter to Japanese cuisine, in monograph form, by an American food and travel writer not fluent in Japanese, look like? Might it opine on seasonality, connoisseurship, regionalism and the Japanese sense of *terroir*, the bounty of the land (ocean, waterways, forest, orchard, rice paddy), and the years of training and perfectionism that epitomize culinary practice? Might it offer mouthwatering photographs and amatory textual descriptions of both multicourse feasts and individual dishes or ingredients, sublime in their essential perfection? Might

it attempt to use Japanese culture as an explanation for all that is unique and wonderful and rhapsodic about the food and foodways of this island nation? And might it be thoughtfully designed and produced, as if embodying the depth of its affection?

If such is your idea of a *billet-doux* to Japanese cuisine, you can well imagine Matt Goulding's *Rice, Noodle, Fish: Deep Travels through Japan's Food Culture*. The first in an ongoing series of Roads & Kingdoms books endorsed by none other than the late celebrity chef, food writer, and adventurer Anthony Bourdain – the second is *Grape, Olive, Pig* (2016), Goulding's similarly indulgent take on food in Spain – as *Rice, Noodle, Fish* seems geared toward the twenty-first-century reader who craves detail about food in context and also appreciates sound bites and listicles. The language is hip, befitting an author who was formerly an editor at *Men's Health* magazine; yet the book leaves an overall pleasant impression about the power of food and foodways to serve as windows into the very soul of a people. Goulding would undoubtedly agree with epicure Jean Anthelme Brillat-Savarin (1755–1826), who wrote in his 1825 *Physiologie du goût*, “Dis-moi ce que tu manges: je te dirai ce que tu es” (Tell me what you eat: I will tell you what you are).

Seven geographically focused chapters, each approximately 45 pages, form the heart of the book: Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Fukuoka, Hiroshima, Hokkaido, and the Noto Peninsula. For readers familiar with Japanese cuisine, chapters include commentaries on the expected: Tokyo, on the Tsukiji fish market and the sheer number of restaurants (300,000 versus the mere 30,000 of New York City); Osaka, on *okonomiyaki*, *takoyaki*, and “informal” food; Kyoto, on formal *kaiseki* cuisine; Fukuoka, on *tonkotsu* (pork-broth) ramen and outdoor food stands called *yatai*; Hiroshima, on *okonomiyaki* (a different style from that in Osaka); Hokkaido, on seafood; and the Noto Peninsula, jutting into the Sea of Japan, on fermented and foraged foods. Indeed, this book is not one to be read on an empty stomach.

Each chapter goes deeper, as the subtitle accurately suggests. Throughout the book, Goulding profiles individuals – sometimes unexpected ones – in search for the essence of the *shokunin* 職人. Goulding explains: “The concept of *shokunin*, an artisan deeply and singularly dedicated to his or her craft, is at the core of Japanese culture” (6). One master of grilled chicken (yes, specialization is an important component of the *shokunin* approach) in

Tokyo, who has earned a Michelin star, “embodies the qualities that all *shokunin* share: unwavering focus, economy of motion, disarming humility, and a studied silence that never betrays the inner orchestra his life’s work inspires” (21). Goulding displays tremendous respect and even awe for the artisans he profiles, perhaps occasionally forgetting that similarly disciplined experts exist in various manifestations around the world. Unexpected profiles include those of a 101-year-old coffee shop owner in Tokyo, a Guatemalan-born *okonomiyaki* chef in Hiroshima, and an Australian-born *ryokan* (Japanese-style inn) owner and Italian-fusion chef on the Noto Peninsula.

Conspicuously absent is any substantive discussion of gender. If Goulding’s sampling is representative, rare is the female Japanese chef: men dominate the public food scene in Japan. (Conversely, though unmentioned, women dominate Japan’s domestic and institutional – think school cafeterias, for example – food world). Two of the Osakan proprietors Goulding mentions are women, and they fall at opposite ends of the spectrum: one makes dumplings, and the other hosts guests at an *ichigen-san okotowari* (invitation-only restaurant). But Osaka is more relaxed, more *real*, its own world. Wives, though, are unilaterally important; they stand by, supporting and assisting their chef-husbands, who receive the limelight and the accolades. Japanese wives, in fact, play a prominent role in Goulding’s portrayals of both the Guatemalan *okonomiyaki* chef and the Australian *ryokan* owner and chef.

In addition to the awe and respect he affords *shokunin*, Goulding demonstrates appreciation verging on wonder for the seasonality and regionalism of Japanese cuisine as well as for the concept of *mottainai*, the abhorrence of waste. But love has its ups and downs: “Not everything is so beautiful in Tokyo” or anywhere else in Japan, for that matter (25). Goulding’s chapter on Hiroshima includes feelings of regret and guilt (obligatory for Americans?); he refers to *okonomiyaki*, sometimes described in English as a “thick, savory pancake” (55), as “the second most famous thing that ever happened to Hiroshima” (188). He even expresses concern for the future – particularly the future of marine life – in his chapter on Hokkaido: “one can’t help but get the sense that if the Japanese preserved ecosystems as carefully as they preserve tradition, the future of the fishing industry might not look so grim” (252). These emotions Goulding navigates deftly,

contributing to the feeling that he realizes the essentializing that occurs throughout the book.

Less clear are certain elements of Goulding's method, particularly the original language of any of the quotations offered, although some of the Japanese individuals profiled can presumably speak English. Goulding acknowledges a frequent reliance on "guides" and "hosts," whom I imagine functioned as translators and interpreters, yet these individuals are often absent from the episodes recounted. Even in journalism one can unobtrusively articulate the filters of translation, so I would worry if undergraduate students were to replicate this linguistically ambiguous style in their academic work. Sprinkled throughout are various history lessons in miniature, most of which do no harm. Goulding shares the story of William S. Clark (1826–86) of Massachusetts, who came to Hokkaido in 1876 and established the Sapporo Agricultural College (now Hokkaido University), returning to the USA with this famous parting epigram: "Boys, be ambitious!" He describes the transfer of Japan's capital from Naniwa (Osaka) to Asuka to Nara to Heian (Kyoto) to Edo (Tokyo). He further explores the forced assimilation of the Ainu in Hokkaido without, remarkably, drawing a parallel to the plight of Native American Indians. Goulding does mistakenly refer to funerals in Japan as "Shinto ceremon[ies]" (283), offering that rationale as explanation for why funeral food on the Noto Peninsula is vegetarian. In fact, death in the Shintō worldview is polluting, so Japanese funerals are typically Buddhist affairs (hence the vegetarianism).

Chapters end with two to four highly illustrated stand-alone profiles of cultural matters (some clearly food-related, others less so) that serve as photo essays or typologies: four "rules" for eating sushi, photos of four knife-makers from Sakai, seven key regional styles of ramen, five types of fried food, photos of five famous train-station *bentō* 弁当 (to-go meals known as *ekiben* 駅弁), and so on. Although the paper is matte and the dimensions of the book are comfortable for handholding, these interludes give the book the feel of a coffee-table tome – or of a volume intended to be perused casually instead of read sequentially. These segments also contain the majority of errors with Japanese characters or Romanization (I counted eight, not including missing glottal marks or macrons, neither of which are used). Although I appreciate the inclusion of the Japanese characters – this is the

twenty-first century, after all – I also understand what Katherine Chouta of UC Berkeley’s Institute of East Asian Studies recently told a colleague of mine about the difficulty of finding copy editors who are capable of navigating Asian text. When mistakes creep in – with *izakaya* 居酒屋 (Japanese pub) rendered as *agemono* 揚げ物 (fried food); *itadakimasu* いただきます (I receive this food) rendered as *oishii* 美味しい (delicious); and *wagyū* 和牛 (Japanese beef) appearing at the head of a profile of a one-table Michelin-starred restaurant on Sado Island where beef is not otherwise mentioned – the errors suggest both that the characters themselves are mere embellishments and that individuals who cannot read Japanese form the target audience. Yet using characters as ornaments is, one could argue, befitting of a book on Japan, where Romanized foreign-language words decorate everything from apparel to *zabuton* (seat cushions).

Nevertheless, even individuals who can read Japanese or who have lived in Japan should be able to appreciate Goulding’s book. They, like I, will likely begin searching travel websites for airfare specials soon after reading Goulding’s descriptions of his food finds in the foreword. Conceivably, such readers will not be daunted by the fact that Goulding’s work, dubbed on the back cover as “not your typical travel guide” and the “first-ever guidebook for the new age of culinary tourism,” includes neither addresses nor contact information for the venues he profiles. They may note the accompanying website (<http://roadsangkingdoms.com/japan>), or they may venture out on their own, to old haunts and promising new spots, savoring the richness of the cuisine and culture to be found in Japan.

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