

BOOK REVIEWS

Nishio Kanji et al. *Atarashii rekishi kyûkasho* (A New History Textbook). Tokyo: Fusosha, 2001, pp. 336, plus 29 color pages. ISBN 4-594-03155-2. 933 Yen.

Reviewed by John Tucker, East Carolina University

For those partial to relativistic understandings of history, publication of works such as *Atarashii rekishi kyûkasho* must be among their worst nightmares. This junior high school textbook, authored by a mixed bag of intellectuals, including a few respected historians and, among others, a best-selling cartoonist, endorses with enthusiasm a multi-perspectival philosophy of history as theoretical justification for its unabashedly feel-good approach to the Japanese past. Thus the introduction to *Atarashii rekishi kyûkasho* explains that while many might think that history is studied in order to know the truth about the past (*kako no jijitsu*), the truth of history is also found in studying what people in the past thought about their times. (p. 6) While this sort of observation might seem innocuous enough, in *Atarashii rekishi no kyûkasho*, it provides the foundation for interpretations, for example, of Japan's involvement in WWII as a struggle for the liberation of Asian people from the colonial domination of their Caucasian Anglo-American oppressors. After all, was it not the case that many Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s saw things in that way? If so, then does their thinking not provide sufficient justification of such views? At decisive, internationally sensitive interpretative junctures, that seems to be the logic of this junior high school text.

Furthermore, it seems that the authors of *Atarashii rekishi kyûkasho* believe that what was not an obvious part, of the thinking of people of the past need not be entered into the record. Thus, since exceptionally few Japanese in 1937 believed that Japanese imperial forces had "raped," "massacred," or criminally violated the people of Nanjing, such judgments need not be admitted as historical fact. Rather, they can be attributed to those who most conspicuously generated them, i.e., the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, and discounted as ingredients in what some have described as "victor's justice," or historical controversy over which no final consensus has been reached. (pp. 270; 294-295) In even more egregious applications of the theory that history might be an account of what people in

the past thought about their times, the authors of *Atarashii rekishi kyûkasho* find reason to omit completely the mention of sordid, largely unrecognized, and perhaps often unknown or little understood aspects of the 1930s and 1940s such as the sexual enslavement of Korean “comfort women,” and the biological experiments conducted by the infamous Unit 731.

To be fair, it must be admitted, of course, that the kind of historical whitewashing that occurs in *Atarashii rekishi kyûkasho* is not unprecedented. In a telling example, the introduction to the text relates how George Washington, though lauded as a heroic founder of the United States, is not mentioned in some British history textbooks. Moreover, when British texts mention the American colonial military forces, they refer to it not as an army fighting for independence (*dokuritsugun*), but as a “rebel force” (*hanrangun*). No doubt, there are, and perhaps always will be, as many versions of history as there are national units. At the same time, most will probably agree that the historical accounts deemed credible and fair by a wide range of readers from diverse national backgrounds are far more honest than those whose circulation does not extend, without extreme controversy, outside the geographic bounds of the nation producing and consuming them. Given that *Atarashii rekishi kyûkasho* has elicited consistent criticism internationally, it is doubtful that its appeal to relativistic theory will convince many that its reading of the past is as valid as any other. Though this book might be discounted as little more than a failed junior high school text since it has been adopted by extremely few school districts, the fact that it was approved for possible selection by the Japanese Ministry of Education can only be considered a poor reflection on the textbook review protocol. Moreover, its instant achievement of best-seller status, with over a million copies sold in a matter of months following its public marketing in the early summer of 2001, makes the publication and popular reception of this text a disturbing intellectual event in the new millennium.

Marius B. Jansen. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001, 871 pages. ISBN 0-674-00334-9. \$35.00

Reviewed by John A. Tucker, East Carolina University

Few if any postwar Western scholars have made greater contributions to the study of Japanese history than Marius Jansen. His

pioneering work, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Harvard University Press, 1954), established him as an authority on modern Sino-Japanese relations, while his second monograph, *Sakamoto Ryūma and the Meiji Restoration* (Princeton University Press, 1961), secured his reputation as a leading figure in Tokugawa-Meiji studies. Though the first edition of *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, edited by Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary and Donald Keene (Columbia University Press, 1958), was not one of Jansen's texts as such, he contributed substantially to it, thereby making himself as an important player in the burgeoning and multifaceted field of Japanese translation-studies. In 1965, Jansen emerged as a leader in the discourse on modernization, editing the anthology *Changing Japanese Attitudes Towards Modernization* (Princeton University Press, 1965). The latter was among a series of anthologies published by Princeton, produced by the Conference on Modern Japan, and impacted by Jansen's determination to grow the field of Japanese studies vastly beyond the meager beginnings extant at the end of WWII. In another anthology, *Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan* (Princeton University Press, 1968), which Jansen co-edited with another major figure in postwar Japanese history, John Whitney Hall, he helped to pioneer the notion that Tokugawa Japan constituted the "early-modern" epoch in Japan's past. In 1975, Jansen published *Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894-1972*, further establishing his reputation as an authority on Sino-Japanese relations. In 1980, he emerged as an authority on Japanese international relations with *Japan and Its World: Two Centuries of Change* (Princeton University Press, 1980). Jansen proved himself as a translator-popularizer of Japanese scholarship with his rendition of Irokawa Daikichi's *The Culture of the Meiji Period* (Princeton University Press, 1985). The following year he reasserted himself as an authority on Tokugawa-Meiji history by editing another anthology, along with Gilbert Rozman, *Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji* (Princeton University Press, 1986). Two years later, Jansen worked with Martin Collcutt and Isao Kumakura to produce the popular text, *Cultural Atlas of Japan* (Facts on File, 1988), a richly illustrated introduction to virtually everything Japanese, from beginning to end. Most recently, Jansen has participated in the monumental, multi-volume project, the *Cambridge History of Japan*, editing the fifth volume, *The Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge University Press, 1989). In 1992, he published yet another volume on Sino-Japanese relations, *China in the Tokugawa World* (Harvard University Press, 1992), a

series of essays presented in 1988 as the *Edwin O. Reischauer Lectures at Harvard*.

While Jansen's *The Making of Modern Japan* draws upon his extensive legacy in historical writing, it most conspicuously incorporates the new scholarship in the *Cambridge History of Japan*, especially volumes four (Early Modern Japan, John Whitney Hall, editor, 1991), five, and six (The Twentieth Century, Peter Duus, editor, 1988). Readers of the *Cambridge History of Japan*, while most likely to agree with Jansen in recognizing that multi-volume text as "the most complete and authoritative survey of Japanese history ever undertaken in the West," and one "not likely to be surpassed" in terms of its "scope and quality" (p. 772), might also have regretted the absence of tighter synthesis and common understanding of the larger achievement to which each of the cutting edge scholars was contributing. While one could easily reply that readers are left to supply that synthesis on their own, for those daunted by that still exhausting project, Jansen's monumental study of modern Japan provides masterful guidance, integrating in a comprehensive, judicious manner most every noteworthy development in Japanese historical studies that has occurred in the last forty years. The result is a lengthy, often complex, but elegantly clear account of Japanese history.

Jansen's text, unlike most surveys of modern Japan, does not give the short shrift to Tokugawa developments. Instead, with what must be lauded as an admirable sense of balance, Jansen allots a full ten chapters (1: "Sekigahara"; 2: "The Tokugawa State"; 3: "Foreign Relations"; 4: "Status Groups"; 5: "Urbanization and Communications"; 6: "The Development of a Mass Culture"; 7: "Education, Thought, and Religion"; 8: "Change, Protest, and Reform"; 9: "The Opening to the World"; 10: "The Tokugawa Fall") of the twenty chapters comprising the text to Tokugawa history, thus treating that period with the respect that it deserves rather than using it, stereotypically, as a premodern foil against which to contrast Meiji and later modern unfoldings. If anything is short-changed, it is Meiji Japan, granted only four chapters (11: "The Meiji Revolution"; 12: "Building the Meiji State"; 13: "Imperial Japan"; 14: "Meiji Culture"). Two chapters are devoted to Taishō Japan (15: "Japan Between the Wars"; 16: "Taishō Culture and Society"), while the Shōwa period is allotted the remaining four chapters (17: "The China War"; 18: "The Pacific War"; 19: "The Yoshida Years"; 20: "Japan Since Independence"). In addition to the main body of the text, there is a most helpful 24-page bibliographic essay, "Further Reading," in which Jansen situates virtually every major monograph, and

many important articles, produced by Western scholars in the postwar era. All and all, Jansen's contributions have been massive, making the scope, quality, and complexity of this final volume a very natural capstone to a truly monumental scholarly career. Those teaching modern Japanese history at either the undergraduate or graduate level will find the volume a challenging yet rewarding textbook. Surely no future discussion of modern Japan will be complete without reference to it.

Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha (ed.), *Onnatachino Shizukana Kakumei: "Ko" nojidaiga Hajimaru* ["A Women's Quiet Revolution - The New Age of 'The Individual' Begins"] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1998). pp. 292.

Reviewed by Kinko Ito, University of Arkansas at Little Rock

The Japanese society today is going through a more or less radical, unprecedented social change in politics, economy, education, family, religion, and culture. It is in a flux where a phenomenon called *Nihon Byo*, or "the Japanese Disease" is taking place—the long-term recession, high unemployment rates, financial troubles of large, trustworthy companies and banks, increase in crime rates and juvenile delinquency, decrease in birth rates, and so on.

Onnatachino Shizukana Kakumei (A Women's Quiet Revolution) is a book based on the newspaper articles that appeared in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun from January to July of 1998. It features a big new wave of Japanese women emerging in a changing society: they are expected to live past age 83 (the longest longevity in the world); they have more education, independence, and economic power than ever, and they seek different ways of life, social relations, and new values.

The book contains 10 chapters with numerous case studies of Japanese women, both single and married, in different walks of life - housewives, teachers, office workers, politicians, attorneys, entrepreneurs, nurses, managers, farmers, news casters, etc. Also included are case studies of career women and statistics from abroad so that one can compare the Japanese situation with those women in the United States, Canada, Sweden, China, Thailand, Bangladesh, Indonesia, France, Iran, Israel, and South Africa.

Some chapters focus on the social issues in general that pertain to both men and women while others specifically pay attention to the status

and role of women. The book gives the reader an overall summary of the various changes that the Japanese women are going through today.

Japan is still a society dominated by men, their values, and standards. The post industrial society still tends to limit women's creativity and freedom, and the political status of women is very low as compared with other Western nations even though many women took initiative, participated, and played a very important role in the environmental, consumer, and various other social movements a few decades ago. The Japanese women of today are making strides in many arenas of their every day life, and it is obvious that they are the very source and energy of social change.

One of the issues covered is the declining birth rates and the women's role in economy. The book argues that unless Japanese society becomes a place where it is conducive to have babies and raise children for both men and women, the birth rates will keep declining. The current birth rate is below 1.5 children per couple. The Japanese immigration policy is very strict, and it seems that immigrants cannot be counted on to replace the work force entirely. The graying of Japan is taking place much faster than any other Western, industrialized nation. The Ministry of Labor reported in 1997 that the Japanese labor force is expected to decline to only 63 million workers in the year 2025.

The Japanese women will be obliged to enter the labor force in a much greater number and participate in the economy as workers as well as care takers of the elderly as the population decreases. This will give the women more economic power, self-esteem, and social status. Higher education for women will also contribute to expansion of their career choices, opportunities for self-fulfillment, and utilization of (wo)man power for economic development.

The key to the future economic success of Japan indeed lies with the women, and the government and the private industry must secure job opportunities and training for them and change or reform the current employment procedures and practices that favor men over women, which include the "life time employment" (one commits his or her career to only one company), *nenko* seniority payment system, and in-house training. Deep rooted sexism that traditionally dominated the work place needs to be dealt with more efficiently and rationally. New technologies such as computers and internet may promote advancement of women into the labor market.

The book also deals with the social reality of the modern Japanese women's intimate relations. It deals with the lack of child care facilities, lack of understanding on the part of men, including the husbands, increase in divorce, domestic violence, sexual and substance abuse, feminization of poverty.

What the book means by "a quiet revolution" is the fact that there is a new wave of Japanese women who are changing the way of the society. They are psychologically and economically more independent, seek self-fulfillment in education and careers, and give priority to their individuality first and then collectivity such as family and their work life.

Karen Kelsky. *Women on the Verge: Japanese Women, Western Dreams*. Duke University Press, 2001. pp. 294. \$18.95 paperback.

Reviewed by Jan Bardsley, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

One has only to look at the worldwide success of the novel *Memoirs of a Geisha* to see how prominently images of Japan as the land of the erotic and the exotic continue to figure in international mass culture. Within such Orientalist representations, the Japanese man, styled as the misogynistic, boorish businessman, and the Japanese woman, typed as a victimized beauty, appear with tiresome regularity. In her book *Women on the Verge*, anthropologist Karen Kelsky turns the table on these well-worn narratives and their critiques by investigating the phenomenon of Japanese women's desire for liberation in a mythic West and with a fetishized Caucasian man. Rather than simplifying and dismissing such desires as merely "Occidentalism," Kelsky considers their influence in Japanese domestic politics, their effect when re-circulated back to the West, and their weight in shaping individual women's life courses and identities.

In this study, Kelsky expertly draws on current anthropological, theoretical writing about globalization and the flows of transnational capital and culture. She also makes use of a wide variety of popular writing by and for Japanese women, and traces a "genealogy of Japanese women's internationalism" by examining the case of such early sojourners as Tsuda Umeko, Mishima Sumie and Katō Shitsue. Her study is also informed by ethnographic work that includes interviews with Japanese women in Japan and abroad. Consequently, although Kelsky is interested in large narratives,

deals with the politics of fantasy, and makes some sweeping claims herself, she is using impressive and diverse sources to launch this investigation.

As Kelsky discovered, however, turning academic attention to Japanese women's desire for the West elicited anger from many Japanese and foreigners alike. Indeed, some of the surprising moments in this book occur when Kelsky realizes that her own position as a Caucasian, academic woman married to a Japanese man antagonizes her informants. Japanese women who have rejected Japanese men as sexist and old-fashioned, and Western men in Japan who believe in their superiority over Japanese men both find Kelsky's choice of spouse odd. Others argue that internationalist fantasy should not be the topic of academic scrutiny at all or fault Kelsky as replacing old stereotypes with new ones. Thus, Kelsky reports often finding herself actively "fielding" (her word) accusatory questions about her choice of research topic, her position as an ethnographer, and her personal decision to marry a Japanese man.

This is a complex book and one not easily summarized, but its key themes can be described as follows. In *Women on the Verge*, Kelsky links contemporary Japanese women's "internationalism," as she calls it, to the nation's low birth rate, women's increasing preference to marry later in life, and women's predominance in such internationalist fields as interpreting, relief work, and employment with foreign companies. While the majority of Japanese women still hope to marry and have children, there is a significant number who are rejecting the "domestic" life. As Kelsky discovers, "domestic" not only refers to a life in the home and devotion to the family, but also to abiding by the "domestic" codes of gender roles in every sphere of Japanese public life. Seeking alternative ways of living has led many Japanese women to look for models in the West (often conflated with the U.S.), and even to escape Japan for a freer life abroad.

Yet, as Kelsky takes pains to show, this West is often more an imagined than a real place, and the process of using the West to construct one's identity and life course leads to a host of individual differences. This process can range from a shopping expedition to New York to paying for sex in Honolulu to graduate school in Chicago or a banking career in Los Angeles. Engagement with the "redemptive West" (Kelsky's phrase) can also take place in Japan through reading romance novels set in England, learning foreign languages, working for foreign companies, or going to Tokyo parties and bars where meetings between foreign men and Japanese women are actively encouraged. As this range implies and as Kelsky's informants discuss, a hierarchy of Western engagements emerges here, with

the "serious" career women distancing themselves as much as possible from the shoppers and the sex-seekers. As one might expect, the more seriously engaged the women are with the West, and the more invested they are in terms of language study or careers, the less romantic about the West they tend to become. Nevertheless, even women critical of inequities in American society, cling to the *idea* of the democratic West as a means of arguing against discrimination in Japan.

For her part, Kelsky accords respect to all the women's sense of agency, and pays attention to their ability to act on their interpretation of the West, however they see it. One theme that emerges with striking predictability among all these women, "superficial" and "serious," is their rejection of Japanese men as personal partners and as beneficiaries and gatekeepers of male privilege in Japan. However, this rejection refers only to coworkers and potential romantic partners, and does not allow any mention of fathers, brothers or sons. Why the Japanese man as "father" never comes up here, either in informants' personal histories or as a figure in Japan society, is, for me, an especially perplexing gap. I find it hard to believe that none of these ambitious women, particularly those successful in the higher echelons of international academic or business life, received encouragement from their Japanese fathers. I also wonder why they do not mention raising their own sons, in cases where they are mothers of boys, in a different fashion.

Kelsky writes that many have responded to her work with a personal sense of outrage. What seems to have angered Japanese women with international experiences and/or marriages, for example, is the sense that all their individual choices could be summarized, explained, and boxed up as mere examples of a phenomenon. Kelsky pleads that this is not her project, and strives to complicate the relationship between broad narratives of international relations and individual choices. While she sees them as mutually influential, she does hold not that one explains the other. In her Conclusion, Kelsky respects individual choices, including her own, but argues, I believe, that none is free of transnational influences. She ends with these lines:

“How much scrutiny can any of us bear of our most intimate desires, the places of the inscription of fantasy on the body, never free from capital-driven dreams but never wholly contained by them either? Fielding the constantly shifting political agendas of the national and the transnational imaginary, the intimate spaces where love and desire meet global capital

and the continuing seductions of modernity, mobile, striving subjects find themselves embroiled in unanticipated controversies, unrecognized and unrecognizable debates. On the verge of subject and object, they, and we, go on.” (p. 247)

Joseph M. Henning, *Outposts of Civilization: Race, Religion, and the Formative Years of American-Japanese Relations*. New York: New York University Press, 2000. xiv and p. 243. ISBN 0-8147-3605-x

Reviewed by Daniel A. Metraux, Mary Baldwin College

The United States has enjoyed a very close but often stormy relationship with Japan since the arrival of Commodore Perry’s “Black Ships” in 1853. The two nations have shared a mutual fascination and respect for each other, but misconceptions about the other’s identity, power and intentions have often nurtured intense levels of mistrust and conflict. The irony is that despite nearly 150 years of close contact, both nations persist in talking at rather than with each other and advance national interest over shared responsibility.

Joseph M. Henning, Assistant Professor of History at Saint Vincent College, presents a very sensitive and comprehensive account of the very fluid relationships and imagery that Americans had with Japan during the Meiji Era (1868-1912). Henning’s book, *Outposts of Civilizations: Race, Religion, and the Formative Years of American-Japanese Relations*, is a brief yet careful and highly detailed discussion of America’s ever-increasing fascination and frustration with its most important Asian partner and competitor.

Gilded Age Americans generally believed that civilization and progress were inseparable from Anglo-Saxon heritage and Christianity. Early American visitors to Japan, many of them missionaries and teachers, arrived with the preconceived notion that the United States represented the pinnacle of “civilization” because of its cultivation of “a democratic society of Christian principles, commercial wealth and technological innovation...Missionaries, scholars, and artists [who] made Japan a perennial and popular topic in Gilded-Age media...arrived in Japan convinced of white, Christian superiority.” (pp. 2 and 4)

Henning introduces us to two young graduates of Rutgers University, E. Warren Clark (1849-1907) and William E. Griffis (1843-

1928), who journeyed to Japan as teachers and lay missionaries in the early 1870s and whose later books, articles and talks on Japan greatly shaped American opinions and images of the country. They came as young idealists imbued with the optimism and certainty of progress and as self-appointed teachers from what they regarded as a superior culture. The intellectual trend of their day had given up the preoccupation of a golden age in the past. Instead, the young Victorian thinkers looked to a future that promised progress towards a better world.

Indeed, at the time that Clark and Griffis went to Japan, this idea of progress had become a firmly held conviction in the United States and northern Europe. Western thinkers and practitioners relied on science, new technology and modern machinery that vastly expanded work capacity and promised an improved well-being for many. Such material benefits were also expected to enhance moral progress as well. Living under better conditions, it was assumed that human beings would better themselves. Such thoughts were closely entwined with the religious convictions of educated people of the age like Clark and Griffis, who were convinced that Christianity held the key to human progress and must serve as the foundation of the spread of the progressive Westernization of the non-Western world.

Henning notes that there had been a heated debate between the early 1870s and late 1890s between two camps of American writers over what is needed for a society to become civilized: “those [writers] who advocated secular and scientific progress and those who championed Christianity as the indispensable prerequisite for progress.” (p. 66) Missionaries and lay missionary teachers like Clark had preached that no country could be considered civilized without Christianity and only the gospel provided the power to lift people out of the degradation. But as Japan made notable advances in technology and industrialization some secular visitors began

“to argue that Japan, now revived and open to the world, was aspiring and already advancing toward the higher level of civilization without Christianity...In the early Meiji period, several American analysts noted that Japan had an ancient, refined, and dynamic civilization quite distinct from and in some respects superior to Western civilization: they found the Japanese an industrious, quick-witted and noble people. Even though Japan was assimilating Western ideas, many Americans acknowledged that it had a civilization of his own from which the West might learn. In this view, because Japan was already civilized, its

assimilation of Western ideas was not necessarily an unadulterated improvement" (pp. 64-65).

American missionaries were concerned in 1879 when British writer Edwin Arnold published his seminal work, *The Light of Asia*. Arnold's warm introduction to Buddhism sold a half million copies and created a very favorable image of the religion. American journalist Edward House, writing in the 1870s and 1880s, painted missionaries as being "curiously unintelligent and illiterate professors of a narrow and microscopic Christianity." (p. 76) Arnold and House approached the question of civilization and progress from the perspective of morality. The West, they claimed, had little if anything to teach the East about ethical behavior. Such claims brought strong denunciations in the missionary press in Japan and the United States.

Japan's rapid and successful transition into a major world power, however, forced even American missionaries and their supporters to come to grips with the Japanese phenomenon: a successful embrace by a non-Western people of modern civilization. Religious American writers like Griffis soon developed a hearty respect for the politeness, cleanliness, intelligence, devotion to work, and high ethical standards of the Japanese. They reconciled the seeming contradiction between Japan's obvious achievements and its high degree of civilization and the fact that by the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), Japan had not transformed itself into a Christian country by saying that Japan had all of the *latent tendencies* of an Anglo-Saxon Christian country. Such ideas were especially prevalent around the time of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05).

The War represents the highpoint of favorable American attitudes towards Japan before Pearl Harbor. American missionary writers portrayed Japan as a most progressive and modern nation, which alone amongst the nations of Asia had the potential of adopting the Anglo-Saxon traditions of the West. The fact that Christianity had found few converts was not terribly disturbing in itself because Japanese had been found to possess such latent tendencies such as honesty, self-sacrifice, patience, hard work and grace. Having these qualities together with the science and technology of the West made the eventual conversion to Christianity a virtual certainty.

This enthusiastic image of Japan is best portrayed in the writing of Sidney Gulick, a Japan-based missionary, teacher and historian during the latter years of the Meiji period. Gulick's book, *The White Peril in the Far*

East,¹ which was written at the height of the Russo-Japanese War, is a blanket indictment of the Russians as an enemy of progressive Western civilization. Gulick urged Americans to support the "progressive" Japanese as they fought for their survival against the "regressive" Russian empire. Gulick comments that although few Japanese had converted to Christianity while most Russians were at least nominally Christian, the Japanese boasted such modern and Christian values as honesty, progressivism, democracy, education, and openness towards the Western church.

Gulick stressed that one must regard Japan as a most "virtuous country" because of its highly enthusiastic reception of and adaptation to Western and "Anglo-Saxon" values. The Russians, on the other hand, are regarded as a genuine menace to world peace. They are aggressive, uneducated, dishonest, and reactionary. A Russian victory over Japan would thus be a major defeat for those progressive forces in the West who sought a new world order based on reason and science.

Gulick literally saw the Russo-Japanese war as a conflict between the forces of good and evil, progress and reaction. Nominally Christian Russia represented very "unchristian" tendencies while Japan, though not in any technical sense a Christian country possessed all of the "virtues" of Christianity. Gulick warned that Japan was the West's one hope for the successful implantation of Western Christian civilization in Asia and that American support for Japan was critical for the success of this endeavor.

Japan's victory over Russia made it a world power and a presumed threat to other imperialist powers in Asia. American leaders began to ponder the weakness of their position in the Philippines and Hawaii and the hostility of white Californians to growing Japanese immigration to the West Coast. The favorable image of Japan spawned by American writers like Gulick, Griffis and Clark swiftly vanished in the mist of the growing antagonism and mistrust that eventually led to Pearl Harbor and the Pacific War of 1941-45.

Joseph Henning prepared an excellent portrait of Japanese-American relations and the fluid and often overly positive and optimistic American imagery of Japan that so greatly influenced these relations. Henning draws from a vast array of contemporary sources to successfully analyze the complexity of American feelings for and perceptions of Japan. He makes it clear that Americans a century ago had an intense interest in Japan and recognized the importance of Japanese-American relations.

¹ Sidney L. Gulick, *The White Peril in the Far East* (New York, 1905).

Henning's book also provides a fascinating glimpse at the intellectual ferment in the United States a century ago. Issues such as the supposed superiority of the white race, whether Christianity was a necessary ingredient of civilization, and whether non-white people and nations such as the Japanese can and should be treated as equals are covered in great detail in Henning's fine book.

"Outposts of Civilization" is one of those major works that cover the "big picture" of US-Japanese relations and the cultural factors influencing the conduct of international relations in the late 19th century. Henning's meticulous research and clear writing style make *"Outposts of Civilization"* an important contribution in the field of Japanese studies.

McVeigh, Brian J. *Wearing Ideology: State, Schooling and Self-Presentation in Japan*. Oxford/New York: Berg, 2000, xi, 231 pages.

Reviewed by Ann Wehmeyer, University of Florida

Brian McVeigh juxtaposes two ubiquitous modes of dress in Japan, those of uniforms and those of cuteness, and argues that they can be read in terms of the dynamics of two opposing forces within Japanese society. The uniform side represents the "official ideology" of "capitalist production," while cuteness represents the "antiofficial ideology" of "popular consumption" (p. 162). McVeigh characterizes his work as "ethnographic in spirit" (p. 4), and his approach that of cultural psychology, specifically, "the 'dramaturgical variety' of symbolic interactionism" (p. 6). While not explicitly intended by McVeigh, his work functions as a grammar of the language of clothing, and it's certain that any student of Japan will read a lot more into Japanese dress after encountering this book.

The first chapter outlines McVeigh's theoretical approach and provides definitions for the key concepts in the book. The second chapter specifies the ways in which salient Japanese cultural constructs such as *seken* ('normalizing gaze'), function under perspectives such as "scene" within the "dramaturgical approach" of Burke and others. A key perspective in the book is that of "agent," which McVeigh develops from Jaynes' ideas of self-expression. Under this perspective, the self in Japanese society has two basic modes of expression: an unregulated "true" self which one *freely expresses* in ingroup (*uchi*), private (*ura*) settings, as opposed to a

monitored “public” self which one *is socialized to perform* in outgroup (*soto*), open (*omote*) settings. As is evident here, McVeigh does indeed make use of the traditional Japanologist “sociopolitical geography,” but avoids essentializing his study by constant reference to observations made by others such as Goffman in analyzing the behavior of people in different societies.

In chapter 3, McVeigh analyzes the rationale underlying uniforming students in Japanese schools, and workers in the Japanese workplace. As suggested in the sub-title of this book, the economic nation-state schools its student populace in the appropriate modes of public self-presentation through regulated dress and group-oriented hierarchical activities. The goal is a dedicated, efficient work force. The chapter provides engaging discussion of types of uniforms, and details the items that are regulated, such as fabric and color of girls’ underwear, and length of student hair. Photos and diagrams illustrate the particular points made by McVeigh, for example, a photo of students serving lunch in an elementary school illustrates the fact that each activity may have its own uniform, and students learn to *dress into* their roles. The latter half of the chapter reports student opinion on what they think of their uniforms, with the opinions gleaned from interviews conducted by McVeigh himself, and from survey studies conducted by others in Japan. Interesting perspectives emerge, such as the acute sensitivity to quality of school and pride/shame in its associated uniform, and teen girls’ capitalization on schoolgirl uniform fetishism. Also intriguing is McVeigh’s explication of modes of resistance to uniform normalization, such as “loose socks” and crushed heels. The only area one might wish to see more developed here is the discussion of the history of school uniforms and their rationale, which is too brief.

After the short interlude of “de-uniformization” during the university years, young men and women, and women in particular, once again don regulated dress as they enter the corporate and civil workplace. Chapter 4 looks at these two phases of dress in Japanese life, and considers how various uniforms (e.g., those of construction and transportation workers; female office workers), and standardized dress (e.g., of salary men, housewives) fall out under the universal framework of uniform continuity mapped out by Joseph, that of “highly uniform” versus “anti-uniform” (p. 113). In this chapter, McVeigh also includes perspectives on what motivates companies to require their employees to wear uniforms, with, interestingly, the aesthetics of *tôitsu-bi* (‘beauty of uniformity’) emerging as a key factor.

Chapter 5 analyzes the “cult of cuteness” from the perspective of Turner’s properties of symbols, and the basic dynamic driving the adoption of cuteness is power. McVeigh argues that the reason why cuteness is so omnipresent in Japan is that it is “a form of ‘resistance,’ a daily aesthetic that counters the dominant ‘male’ productivist ideology of standardization, order, control, rationality, impersonality and labor” (pp. 135-136). In his view, cuteness is not simply a matter of fashion, but a strategy used to smooth social relations, obtain favors and indulgence, or gain control over others in a non-threatening way. His explication of “authority cuteness,” whereby official agencies adopt cute images to soften directives, yet control behavior, is particularly enlightening.

In chapter 6, McVeigh analyzes the production and consumption of cute items. He views consumption of that which is cute as an act of resistance: the cute gravitates toward the ‘loud’ (*hade*) end of the traditional aesthetic, and is associated with contexts of play and fantasy, as opposed to work and reality. In that sense it counters official ideology. McVeigh also looks at sites for the performance of cuteness, places where people display and act out their cute selves, such as Harajuku. The production of cuteness on the corporate end involves the use of animals and cartoon characters as corporate symbols or spokespersons, in addition to the production of cute commodities such as the virtual pet *tamagotchi*. Production and consumption intersect in complex ways in the world of entertainment, where new “teenage *tarento*” create their own cute look, which in turn stimulates fandom and consumption of cute fashions.

In a brief conclusion, McVeigh suggests that the “compartmentalism of social life” in Japan, wherein one dresses and presents oneself in varying ways in different contexts, implies a compartmentalism of personality as well. In closing he quotes from Miyatake and Norton, who suggest that the Japanese view of a “well-developed personality” is that of one who has many “drawers” or qualities to open or draw upon as desired. In other words, while the ideology of uniformity is powerful and dominates public life, just as public are displays of resistance.

The portion of the book devoted to cuteness is much less than that devoted to uniformity, and McVeigh’s reading of cuteness lacks the historical and critical perspectives provided by Sharon Kinsella (“Cuties in Japan,” in *Women, Media and Consumption in Japan*, edited by Lise Skov and Brian Moeran, pp. 220-254, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1995). Kinsella sees *kawaii* style as originating in the youth culture of girls,

and like McVeigh, finds cute fashions, ideas, and sentiments to be a form of rebellion. She views cuteness, however, as only one element among many in a web of popular culture that counters traditional values and daily life. Kinsella also provides criticism of the phenomena of cuteness from the perspectives of conservative and other intellectuals whom McVeigh does not draw upon to any great extent. Thus, those whose interests lie in cuteness would do well to consult Kinsella alongside McVeigh.

Wearing Ideology studies two contemporary modes of dress which are readily observed by anyone visiting Japan, and it will easily stimulate the interest of American students, who are quite aware of the ways in which fashion is driven by entertainment, and of the ways in which one can present oneself to achieve desired outcomes. It's an impressive work, and one that is likely to attract attention beyond the field of Japanese studies. Whether or not one is ultimately persuaded by McVeigh's economic nation-statist view of uniformity and its effect on behavior, the linkages and interplay McVeigh outlines between uniformity and cuteness are compelling.