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ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE SCIENCE OF NATIONAL INCOME IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY JAPAN

Scott P. O’Bryan
University of Alabama

In *A History of the Modern Fact*, Mary Poovey attempts to retrace the history of knowledge practices that from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries increasingly accepted numbers as the most appropriate representation of fact. That numerical modes of knowledge seemed to allow transparent description, immune from questions of interpretation, contributed to a near obsession by the nineteenth century with counting—that is, with assigning numbers to observed particulars. The embracing of inductive methods in the emerging disciplines of social science during that century, Poovey suggests, continued alongside careful warnings about their limits by some such as the philosopher John Herschel. But the question of how practitioners of the sciences of wealth and society sought to generate and represent their particular forms of knowledge does not end, of course, as Poovey’s account essentially does, with the nineteenth century. The discipline of economics, in particular, turned to statistical epistemologies with renewed fervor in the twentieth century, increasingly by supplementing older forms of induction with mathematical practices and modeling.

This paper attempts an initial examination of some of the statistical forms that economic knowledge took during the mid-twentieth century and the manner in which these affected institutional structures and economic practice in Japan. At the end, it considers how the new forms of economic knowledge that emerged during this period have helped condition our readings of the Japanese past. The story of nearly unprecedented economic growth in Japan during the postwar period dominates histories of the country, coloring not only the story of the post-World War II decades, but also retrospectively much of the literature on the whole span of modern and even early modern times as well. Indeed, the story of the postwar period is

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often implicitly told as if it were synonymous with the trajectory of high-speed growth. In essence, economic growth is what we know about modern Japan. Yet this narrative frame of growth is more than a simple reflection of the material fact of enlarged accumulation in itself. The paradigmatic accounts of Japanese history cast in terms of growth themselves depend on the specific forms of economic knowledge that will be examined here and that emerged contemporaneously with the growth that they set out to describe, predict, and regulate. In part, at least, we speak of growth in the ways that we do because of the rise of specific techniques that enabled the positing of these forms of growth as objects of both economic and national enquiry.

Empiricizing Economics and The Pursuit of Total War

The highly mathematical nature of the preponderance of economic research today—the dominance of statistical modeling, game theory and the like, the econometric fusion of empirical data and policy analysis—makes it easy to forget that these mathematical and statistical aspects of economics are a relatively recent phenomenon, one that has particularly dominated the field only since the end of World War II.\(^2\) The so-called “statistical revolution” in twentieth-century economics—the transition from a largely deductive and descriptive discipline to a quantitative one—got its start in the 1920s and 1930s. Antecedents, of course, had existed. Attempts to apply mathematical techniques and empirical data to economic enquiry can be traced back to the earliest history of European political economy, and the use of basic economic tallies by the state in Japan also had a long history. Yet, in the words of one prominent postwar economist, statistics everywhere until this time had remained “the poor and largely passive relation of economics.”\(^3\)

\(^2\) For a useful survey of representative changes in economics, especially the rise of quantification, statistical methodologies, and mathematical models, during the postwar half century in the United States, in many ways the metropole of economic research during that period, see the *Daedalus* issue titled “American Academic Culture in Transformation: Fifty Years, Four Disciplines,” p. 126, no. 1 (1997).

Regnant neoclassical economic theory came under attack from many quarters in the first several decades of the twentieth century for remaining too “hypothetical-deductive” and disconnected from historical experience. From around the 1920s some economists, led most visibly by members of the institutionalist school in the United States, began attempting to move their profession towards a more empirical, inductive approach by which the theories devised through traditional deductivist strategies might be statistically supported or falsified. In general, a shift was underway in industrialized countries everywhere from a view of economics based on natural laws to one based on operational theories. New empirical research was designed to gauge the effect and probability of economic phenomena through the use of large scale statistical collection and emerging procedures such as model and simulation analysis.

The linchpins in the complex of statistical projects that soon began to reorient the discipline of economics were the emerging macroeconomic measures of national income and gross national product. In fact, the post-World War I empiricizing movement that would eventually transform economics from a generally literary and descriptive discipline to a quantitative one was in large part motivated by the need to accumulate large data sets to support research into these new aggregate techniques. The idea gained strength during the 1930’s in particular that a clearer understanding of national production and expenditure was required to deal with the great worldwide economic challenges of that decade. Especially in the United States and Britain, the magnitude of the crisis of capitalism in the 1930s stimulated a new, deeper interest in improved calculation of the various components of national wealth. Diagnosing what ailed industrial capitalism seemed to demand a rigorous focus on the statistical measurement of all facets of national economic activity and a practical understanding of the aggregate components of the national economy.

The Depression, the expansion of government programs in its wake in the U.S. and Britain, and the findings emerging out of efforts to ground theory empirically all acted as spurs to national accounting research.

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by dramatically exposing the insufficiencies of prevailing neo-classical theory. Although economic orthodoxy demanded small and balanced government budgets, the increasingly important role of government expenditure in the national economy as a whole was becoming hard to deny. This new awareness was by the late 1930s greatly influenced in Anglo-American circles by a growing cadre of economists inspired by Keynesian ideas, who argued that government outlay would be required to make up the shortfall between national spending and national production. Keynesians argued that the economic stagnation of the 1930s was a result, not of insufficient production, but of insufficient demand. The national accounting techniques, devised in large part by the American economist Simon Kuznets, by which national income and its allied statistics were produced were part of new attempts to understand how economic conditions not accounted for in orthodox thinking (i.e., massive, long-term unemployment) might be explained and remedied. The statistical categories Kuznets created in GNP (and its companion calculations of national income), and his concurrent work in devising the consumption, savings, and investment components of national income, were designed as tools for measuring total aggregate demand (national purchasing power) in relation to the total value of production. Keynes himself was at the forefront of related innovations in England that allowed analysts to understand the relation of government income and expenditure to total national income and expenditure.6 These national accounting tools made it possible to indicate a dearth of demand in relation to supply. The power of these new accounting techniques thus gave a shot in the arm to emerging Keynesian arguments for counter-cyclical fiscal intervention in the economy by the government, for as John Kenneth Galbraith has felicitously explained, “it was one thing to resist Keynes’ theory; it was something else and much harder to resist the Kuznets statistics.”7

In Japan, this broad empiricizing movement gave greater weight to domestic calls by bureaucrats and scholars for statistical reform in the face

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7 Galbraith, *Economics in Perspective*, p. 246.
of rapid economic change at home in the 1910s and 1920s. A push for better quantification of economic phenomena was manifested in a variety of developments. These include the formation at the end of the Taishô period of a Central Committee on Statistics, which spearheaded the first government collection of data on labor conditions and standards of living, a revamped national population census, and more detailed industrial surveys. The efforts by Marxists to back their claims to scientism by marshalling great amounts of statistical data in their debates of the 1920s on Japanese capitalism similarly reflected growing concern with the measurement of actual economic behavior.

The history of attempts to measure economic wealth in Japan is a long one, reaching as far back in the documentary record as the land allotment surveys and population registers of the Taika Reforms in the seventh century. Numerical measures were always valued as important to the problem of statecraft, but the desire to quantify economic and social phenomenon began to increase in the mid-nineteenth century in Japan, as in other nation-states of the time, as intensifying competition within the international state system lent new urgency to measurements of national wealth and power. Calculations of production and commerce output expanded in Japan as bureaucrats and academics erected a modern statistical infrastructure during the Meiji period. Several rough attempts to calculate total national income were made as early as the turn of the twentieth

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10 See Yabuuchi, Nihon tôkei hattatsu shi kenkyû Gifu keizai daigaku kenkyû sôsho, no. 7 (Kyoto: Hôritsu Bunkasha, 1995), main text 2; Nihon Tôkei Kenkyûjo, ed., Nihon tôkei hattatsu shi, pp. 4-5, 12; and Okuno, “Nihon no tôkei jijô,” p. 56.

Sharing much with developments elsewhere, interest in national income increased in Japan, however, as the cumulative effects of the long economic crisis of the 1920s, the Wall Street Crash of 1929, and the disastrous return to the gold standard by Japan in early 1930 all seemed to demand a better grasp of the large mechanisms of the economy’s swings and a reappraisal of how government policy ought to respond to economic ills. With the inauguration of Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo’s expansionary budgets beginning in 1931, the issue of active fiscal policy became the subject of heated debate, and this also worked to focus new attention on the question of fiscal policy and, by extension, on national income research. These questions prompted official attention to turn to national income analysis for the first time, and the Cabinet Statistics Bureau made sporadic estimates in the 1920s and 1930s.\footnote{Keizai Kikakuchô, Chôsabu, Kokumin Shotokuka, \textit{Kokumin shotoku to kokumin keizai keisan}, p. 225.} The landmark work of the period, however, was \textit{Kokumin shotoku no kôsei} (The Composition of the National Income) of 1933 by the scholar Hijikata Seibi, which presented for the first time a statistical series covering more than ten years of economic performance.\footnote{Hijikata Seibi, \textit{Kokumin shotoku no kôsei} (Tokyo: Nihon Kyôronsha, 1933), preface 1 and main text 1-2; Ôkawa Kazushi, et al. \textit{Kokumin shotoku}, Kazushi Ôkawa, Miyôhei Shinohara and Mataji Unemura, series eds. \textit{Chôki keizai tôkei: suikei to bunseki}, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Tôyô Keizai Shinpôsha, 1974), introduction 1.}

It was not economic hard times, however, but war that truly propelled national income and wealth research into the policy arenas of the industrial powers. This was true in Japan, where practitioner of national

\footnote{Keizai Kikakuchô, Chôsabu, Kokumin Shotokuka, \textit{Kokumin shotoku to kokumin keizai keisan}, p. 225.}
income research became preoccupied during the 1930s with the question of whether the Japanese economy could support a protracted war.\textsuperscript{14} Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro’s New Economic System guidelines of 1941 called for the use of national income-like aggregative techniques to devise capital allocation plans (\textit{shikin keikaku}), while the Finance Ministry began an ambitious initiative to determine statistically the total of what it called National Economic Resource Strength (\textit{kokka shiryoku}).\textsuperscript{15}

Despite intensifying interest in various statistical computations of national wealth, however, the government began cutting back its economic data collection as the war dragged on in the 1940s and the fortunes of Japan turned. Civilian government and the military began to shrink or eliminate statistical institutions altogether.\textsuperscript{16} Statistical research projects were halted, and soon even basic data sources ceased to be published.\textsuperscript{17} Ôuchi Hyôe was a leftist economist who was to become one of the most influential analysts of the postwar period and who worked at the Bank of Japan at the time that it was contributing to \textit{kokka shiryoku} research. The later lamented that the lack of both resources and contact with outside developments ensured that the national wealth analysts associated with the Bank were “never able to produce the sort of research that had been hoped for.”\textsuperscript{18} By the last years of the war, statistical systems in Japan were so debilitated that national

\textsuperscript{14} See, for example, Asahi, \textit{The Economic Strength of Japan}, especially chapter III, “Increased Capacity to Bear Tax Burden” and Chapter IV, “Growth of National Income.”
\textsuperscript{15} Keizai Kikakuchô, \textit{Keizai kenkyû nijûnen}, p. 329.
\textsuperscript{17} The Japan Statistical Yearbook, for example, which had been published by the Statistics Bureau of the Office of Prime Minister every year since 1882, ended publication in 1941, while the public announcement of national income data ended in 1942. Nihon Tôkei Iinkai Jimukyoku, Sôrifu Tôkeikyoku. \textit{Nihon tôkei nenkan}, vol. 1. (Tokyo: Nihon Tôkei Kyôkai, 1949), preface 3-4; Studenski, \textit{Income of Nations}, p. 497; Nihon Tôkei Kenkyûjo, \textit{Hattatsu}, p. 32.
accounting work played little reliable role either in management of the economy in general or in the prosecution of the war.

Just as statistical systems in Japan were foundering, however, national accounting was being put to vigorous use by the governments of the U.S. and Britain. The great swell of theoretical and applied work in those countries from the early days of the Depression was now turned toward mobilization for war. The practical power of new national accounting knowledge was soon made clear to doubters, and new institutional arrangements developed under which this work began to be carried out.

GNP is an assessment of the total annual production of goods and services, a figure related to its companion, gross national income, which is the income derived from that output (minus depreciation). By applying the new forms and values for computing national accounts developed by Simon Kuznets and others, it was possible for the first time to determine the size of the war effort that might be mounted and to plan war mobilization strategy accordingly. In the U.S., these techniques were famously employed in the Victory Program of the War Production Board, in which a schedule for weapons, tank, and ship manufacture was planned and subsequently met. Although it may seem improbable that a statistical technique such as GNP accounting would be identified as a strategic wartime advantage, John Kenneth Galbraith appraises the economist most responsible for its present form, Simon Kuznets, as “one of the least recognized of the pillars of Allied power in World War II.”19 Elsewhere, it has been noted that knowledgeable opinion after the war held that “the power of national economic accounting in the war effort [in the U.S.] was greater than that of the atomic bomb.”20

The use of national accounting by the Allied powers during the war had the effect of embedding these statistical techniques in official contexts to a relatively large degree in those countries. By the end of the war, officials and their scholarly allies in the U.S. and Britain had begun to

erect mechanisms for the regularized production of national income statistics and formal systems by which these would be linked to the policy apparatus of the state. These Anglo-American economic experts, furthermore, had begun to forge a consensus on measurement criteria, term definitions, and accounting methods by which these statistics would be standardized and thus made trans-nationally commensurable for the postwar period.

**A “New State System of Statistics”**

Despite the difficulties encountered in the actual practice of planning and the controlled economy during the war in Japan, discourses on the technical manipulation of the national economy generated in the context of the colonial project and total war survived into the postwar period. Analysts and leaders trying to forge a vision of a rebuilt Japanese economy after the war quickly revived old dreams of rationalized planning and guidance. Critical to success this time, they believed, would be a vigorous, broad system of statistical research. Yet as the war ended, statistical systems in Japan had all but ground to a halt. It was clear to many that any hope for successfully rationalized management of the postwar economy would be predicated on a renovated statistical system. In a sense, these calls by business leaders, economists, officials, and not least, the Allied Occupation, for fortified statistical practices were heir to the empiricizing drive that began in the 1920s, only now more rigorously bound to the discourse on rationalization than ever before. Defeat and the prostrate condition of the nation in its wake, however, gave special significance to the old problem of statistics. Just as was the problem of planning itself, statistical production was now viewed through the prism of the wartime experience.

The immediate concern for those demanding quick reform of statistical systems was that the “vacuum” (kûhaku) of reliable economic facts imperiled recovery. 21 Japanese planners were not the only ones dismayed by the lack of data. Exasperated by the inability of government agencies to supply Occupation administrators and planners with economic

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data, GHQ forcefully demanded measures to remedy the problem.\(^{22}\) Complaints about these immediate problems were just the first points of attack in a broad critique of wartime statistical practices articulated by commentators from all quarters. The most serious problem was not simply the dearth of data, but the manipulation of statistics that critics charged had routinely taken place at all levels.\(^{23}\) The influential Statistics Commission (Tôkei linkei) created in the cabinet in 1946 to revamp statistical systems, located the crux of the problem in what it dubbed a “system of secrecy” (himitsushugi) during the war that sent statistical production into “disarray” and resulted in crippling political and economic “confusion.”\(^{24}\) If Japan’s loss in the war could be blamed on maladroit administration of the war effort, the Statistics Commission and other groups argued, then the proximate cause surely was that leaders had “ignored statistics.”\(^{25}\)

Commentators, moreover, saw fundamentally reformed statistical systems as essential not only to address the immediate emergency, but to serve as the backbone of the new “systematized” economic order they were convinced would characterize the postwar period.\(^{26}\) At the heart of the postwar pursuit of robust statistical production was increasing faith that recent technical developments improved the possibility of a truly scientific knowledge of the economy in all of its aspects. Kawashima Takahiko, director of the Cabinet Statistics Bureau argued soon after the war for a “new state system of statistics” (shin naru kokka tôkei seido). He marveled


at the pioneering use in the U.S. and the Soviet Union of what he called management statistics (keiei tôkei) for the “comprehensive management of the entire nation and all of society.”\textsuperscript{27} Yamanaka Shirô, chief of the Cabinet Deliberation Office, expressed what would become the basic assumptions of the bureaucrats and academics who would soon participate in the Statistics Commission. In 1946 he urged that postwar reconstruction be founded on “comprehensive, scientific analysis” supported by a vast statistical complex. He envisioned legions of economists pumping out research for the powerful Economic Stabilization Board and the “broad mobilization” (hiroku dôin shi) of universities and other outside research organizations in the private sector toward that effort.\textsuperscript{28}

Against this backdrop of idealized calls for statistical management of the economy, Japanese government officials and leading economists set about to create a coherent, national system of data production. The Statistics Commission set up by the government of Yoshida Shigeru in 1946 to reform the government’s official statistical institutions oversaw the creation by the early 1950s of a newly sophisticated, national statistical infrastructure and the protocols by which it operated.\textsuperscript{29} A new Statistics Law passed in March 1947 formalized the authority of the Commission to direct official statistical research; stipulate the public reporting and preservation of statistics; hold researchers and research subjects to strict standards of accuracy; and improve the quality of statistical personnel throughout the government.

The Statistics Law inaugurated two reforms in particular to impose standards and ensure a new level of comprehensiveness in statistical studies. The first was the shitei tôkei (designated statistics) system, under which the

\textsuperscript{27} Kawashima Takahiko, “Waga kuni tôkei seido kaikaku no shushi” (July 1946), in Nihon Tôkei Kenkyûjo, Nihon tôkei seido saikenshi, shiryô hen, vol. 1, p. 121.

\textsuperscript{28} Yamanaka Shirô, “Keizai antei honbu no unyô ni kansuru shiken” (March 17, 1946), in Nihon Tôkei Kenkyûjo, Nihon tôkei seido saikenshi, shiryô hen, vol 1, pp. 1-3.

Statistics Commission acted as a coordinating directorate and information clearing house for statistical research nationwide. It designated what “important” official national statistics would be regularly collected, when, and by what specific private organs or by what local or national governmental agencies. The second reform was the rapid expansion of local statistical organs, designed to create an integrated network of official statistical production that was truly nationwide in scope. The Commission, furthermore, stipulated across-the-board training requirements for official statistical researchers, sponsored education initiatives in schools, and began the transition of the government’s technical infrastructure toward a new generation of electrical calculating machines.

By the time of its succession by the Administrative Management Agency (Gyôsei Kanrichô) amidst the post-Occupation changes in the bureaucracy, the Statistics Commission had presided over the unprecedented institutionalization of many of the statistical practices so insistently called for by critics immediately after the war. The Statistics Commission and the Administrative Management Agency after it, though embattled by the ministries, exercised unequaled oversight over the operations of official statistical systems. The Cabinet Statistics Bureau was strengthened, and this along with the statistics bureaus in the ministries and the Economic Planning Agency created an institutional breadth and

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30 Tôkei hô. Law no. 18 (March 26, 1947), in Nihon Tôkei Kenkyûjo, Nihon tôkei seido saikenshi, shiryô hen, vol 2, pp. 67-71.
33 Arisawa Hiromi has characterized the Statistics Commission as wielding a “considerable amount of power” and controlling a significant budget for its operations. (Arisawa, Kataru, p. 79).
scale unseen before the end of the war. Under the Statistics Law, moreover, the official function of the state as a producer and manager of statistical knowledge was now codified, legislated as it had not been earlier. The shitei tōkei system both reflected and promoted an explosion in new fields of study as the economy came to be defined by an ever increasing variety of sophisticated, formalized statistics. By the early 1950s, Japanese planners and bureaucrats—under the watchful eye of the Occupation—had architected an elaborate new national “statistical system” (tōkei taiketsu), run by a class of expert officials who would manage the economy, and society as a whole, through the science of statistical fact.

Knowing the Postwar Economy through National Income Accounting

As the Statistics Commission created a postwar statistical infrastructure, macroeconomic statistics such as national income accounting began to emerge as governing analytical tools within the new system. American Occupation administrators were animated from the very first days of the Occupation by the belief that a dearth of statistical data threatened their success in Japan, and high on the wish list of the Economic and Scientific Section staff at GHQ were figures on national income. The rising prominence of national income in the U.S. during the war did not end when the fighting ceased. By now many American analysts believed that national accounting was a powerful tool that could be applied, not only to the special circumstances of wartime mobilization, but to the general problem of measuring and, it was hoped, regulating the broad swings of the national economy.

Regularized, official national accounting conducted according to the standards devised in wartime America and Britain began in Japan under the strong influence of the U.S. mission on statistical reform. This was led by Stuart A. Rice, deputy chief of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget and chairman of the United Nations Committee on Statistics. Easily the least recognized of the many Occupation missions to Japan, the Rice Mission began its work at the end of 1946 just as the Statistics Commission was getting under way. Rice and his team supported the work of the Commission and gave advice on institutional arrangements and new statistical techniques. The Mission “particularly” pushed gross national product and national income techniques, arguing that they were “fast
becoming one of the most vital and powerful means by which economic policies [were] instituted and measured in the major nations of the world.”34

Rice urged the Japanese government to step up their training of statisticians in the concepts and methods of national income and GNP. He argued that only the unity and consistency of statistical output would ensure the success of national income accounting, and emphasized to his Japanese colleagues the need to reform the survey statistics—such as population, wages and income, production, employment, consumer income and expenditure—that fed into income calculations. The Rice Mission also reviewed methods used in the past to calculate national income in Japan and instructed its Japanese counterparts in agencies throughout the government about the standards and definitions employed in computing national income in the United States.35

The computation of national income and product is a complex enterprise dependent upon contributing data from many sources, Rice argued, and therefore advised his Japanese counterparts to assign national accounting functions to one central authority. As a result, all national accounting work was moved in June 1947 to the young Economic Stabilization Board, which in its later incarnation as the Economic Planning Agency remains the institutional home of national accounting today. By October of that year, a National Income Research Office (Kokumin Shotoku Chōsashitsu), with 42 technical staff, had been created within the Stabilization Board exclusively devoted to the computation of the statistic.36


36 The 42 staff members included only those responsible for computing national income statistics in the Economic Stabilization Board from the basic data provided to them by many others in relevant ministries and agencies throughout the government. Keizai Kikakuchō, Sengo keizaishi: shotoku hen, pp. 16-18.
The assignment of national income accounting to the Economic Stabilization Board (hereafter ESB) came at an important moment in the history of that organization. It had begun operations in August 1946 as a fairly weak planning and coordinating organ virtually ignored by the ministries. By the next spring, however, the ESB enjoyed virtual complete control over the flow of all major commodities in Japan. This strengthening of the agency was encouraged by SCAP, which directed that it should assume all ministerial planning functions. Suddenly at the center of economic policymaking and implementation, the ESB exploded in size: by May of that year, it had 2,000 employees, up from just some 300 the year before.37 Thus the assignment of national accounting work to the ESB institutionally situated it at the heart of the government’s economic policy apparatus. The ESB began annual reporting of national income by the turn of the decade, and by 1953, the income reports had attained “white paper” status and were formally presented to the Diet. These in turn, informed both the government’s overall Economic White Papers (keizai hakusho), so influential in the 1950s and 1960s in setting the parameters of public debate on the economy, and the series of influential long-term plans produced by the Economic Planning Agency during those decades.

The orientation of statistical production around national income was reinforced well into the 1950s by the continuing interventions of foreign, overwhelmingly American, economists. This influence included the training of young Japanese scholars in the U.S. as well as frequent study missions between the U.S. and Japan and direct reviews by American economists of Japanese national income practices.38 Members of the Rice Mission also continued to shape developments. Some stayed on as advisors in the Economic and Scientific Section of SCAP after the Mission had formally ended, and Rice himself returned with a new mission in 1951. During that second trip, he continued to exhort Japanese officials to strengthen the research work of the ESB, “especially . . . the capability to


carry out national income and related forms of analysis.” In response, the Japanese government further bolstered the income unit of the ESB.39

The spate of new institutions set up to manage postwar multilateral relations, particularly the United Nations, also played a role in promoting national income accounting in Japan and in nations the world over. Economists in the national income accounting unit at the UN quickly set out after the war to standardize statistical approaches. This was in part a response to a system in which member nations paid dues to the UN according to the size of their national income. Membership thus required some kind of formal accounting system, and UN experts conducted reviews of practices in member nations. In 1954, for example, the UN released a report by Harry Oshima of its Statistics Bureau critically evaluating the ESB’s income calculation for 1951 and proposing changes to the methods used by the Japanese statisticians.40

The attempt to formulate international standards for national accounting also reflected postwar hopes that organizations such as the UN, the World Bank, and the IMF would work to stabilize the world economy and regularize its multilateral management. Soon these statistical practices were deployed more directly as well as a means of gauging and promoting the comparative development of national economies. By 1952 the UN, working with other institutions such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, completed a set of common national accounting conventions, and it was expected that nations work to meet their requirements. Japanese bureaucrats and scholars were in close contact with UN developments in national accounting and worked steadily through the 1950s to bring their practices in line with these international standards.41

40 See the synopsis of Oshima’s report in Keizai Kikakuchô, Sengo keizaishi: kokumin shotoku hen, pp. 400-416.
41 These standards were known by the name of the document in which they appeared, “A System of National Accounts,” or SNA. Other international organizations such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation also devised similar standards for their members. The OECD required entering member nations to submit formal income calculations beginning in 1953.
By the early 1950s, then, highly empirical, aggregate economic practices such as national accounting had increasingly come to form the conceptual ether in which economists and bureaucrats operated. These modes of economic analysis lay at the heart of a new international institutional order that determined national income accounting standards, promoted their use throughout the world in a host of multilateral organizations, and employed them in an assertive program of economic developmentalism across the globe. At home, the dream of a comprehensive statistical structure by which a true science of the economy might operate had necessitated the construction of newly formalized national statistical machinery. Economic measures and modes of analysis that placed a premium on manipulation of aggregate flows and structures of the national economy, particularly as represented in the statistics of national income and GNP, grew from modest roles in early recovery plans to increasingly rule many of the chief analytical activities of this state statistical system. Regularized national income accounting by the government thus came to reflect the logic of the new institutional muscle of postwar technocracy. By the late 1950s the statistic of GNP would assume an outsized place in official analysis, wider public discourse on the economy, and shared conceptions of national purpose and power.

Statistical Knowledge and the Pursuit of Post-Imperial Growth

Although originally constructed as a limited set of techniques by which to measure the long-term disequilibria of national economies, analysts eventually came to see national income accounting as a convenient yardstick to measure what was defined as the material progress of economies. Taken together with the host of related statistical tools of the new economics, national accounting offered new entrees into older questions about the determinants of material wealth and its increase over time. Thus, scholarly and official campaigns to extend and standardize national accounting and related techniques, as well as to produce the comprehensive statistical data sets they required, contributed to a sharpening focus within the field on the question of the overall expansion of national economies across time. These technocratic tools helped define the parameters by which what was now persistently spoken of in terms of “growth” (in Japanese, seichō) was known and, at the same time, served as the barometers by which it was monitored.

During the 1950s and especially the 1960s, attempts to compare the long-run economic performance of nations became a bedrock element in
the research programs of economics departments around the world. The
twentieth-century forms of this field of growth theory were fundamentally
based upon historical series of national income and product data. Simon
Kuznets, in fact, the economist with claims to being the most responsible
for devising the early national accounting rules and forms by which GNP
came to be computed, led the way in accumulating historical income
statistics and applying them to exploration of the historical dynamics of
increased macroeconomic accumulation. As researchers in major
universities across the world busied themselves identifying the morphology
of growth and the conditions for the “take-off” into modern growth, 
economists in Japan and elsewhere specifically set out to apply the
principles of growth analysis to the case of Japanese history. The massive,
two-decade project at Hitotsubashi University to compile comprehensive
and coherent series of historical data on the economy, the generation of
research projects on historical growth that sprang out of that statistical
compendia, and the innumerable studies of Japanese growth by researchers
in Europe, the United States, and in not yet industrialized nations, were all
evidence of an obsession with Japan as a developmental model by which to
test theoretical precepts on the wealth of nations.

In the powerful success story of its emerging economic miracle,
Japan appeared a particularly attractive object of scholarly enquiry. There
was the appeal of the storybook plotline: from military defeat to economic
victory; from vanquished fascist enemy to capitalist stronghold and ally.
And there was also the easy assignment to Japan of the familiar role of
earlier years, though now cast in economic terms stripped of the explicit
geo-political rivalries of the past, as the model of the successful non-
Western modern nation. The unfolding postwar story became the latest and
most dramatic chapter in the longer narrative of modern economic growth
by which economists and historians had begun to recast the previous
century of Japanese history. Indeed, the key to explaining what was by the
mid-1950s already being dubbed the “miracle” of Japan’s recovery seemed
precisely to lie in the longer record of past growth.

The increasing fetishization by the 1960s of the deceptively tidy
statistic of GNP acted at least in part to symbolically efface the many
contradictions inherent in postwar economic change and supported
totalizing representations of the national economy as a coherent macro-
ledger of accounts. In *Numbers and Nationhood*, Silvana Patriarca speaks of
the ways in which statistics served during the nineteenth century to
represent the emerging abstraction of the nation in terms of spatial unities
and coherences. The specific forms of statistical discourse and practice examined in this paper seem to have little to do with the sort of geographical anxiety about fixing boundaries that Patriarca illuminates. Provisionally, one might say, rather, that they appear to both support and to be symptomatic of a logic of power which, on the surface at least, discards spatial categories altogether to embrace an internalist logic of power founded on the domestic accumulation of material wealth expressed in terms of capital and income alone. Thus the loss of empire—and the bankruptcy of earlier conceptions of national purpose based on a territorialist logic of power—formed the seldom spoken backdrop to calls after the war for a new, scientific Japan based on statistical renovation and to the mobilization for rapid national growth that those statistical practices were eventually made to serve.


Limits to this schema about the postwar logic of power must also be acknowledged, as postwar growthism also possessed significant “external” characteristics: the Japanese economy was always particularly dependent on the circulation of international trade, and in its export-import relations with other countries significant imbalances of power favorable to Japan have often obtained.

For the suggestion that the modes of rule or logics of power pursued by nation states can be understood in terms of opposing systems of either “territorialism,” in which the extent or populousness of the domain defines power, or “capitalism,” in which territorial expansion is only an intermediate step in the further accumulation of capital, see Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times (New York: Verso, 1994), pp. 33-34.
CROSS-DRESSING AND CULTURE IN MODERN JAPAN

Ma Yuxin
University of Minnesota

In her *Vested Interests*, Marjorie Garber studies the role of cross-dressing in relation to culture, and finds that “cross-dressing is not only found in representations of the primal scene, but also itself represents a primal scene.”¹ She believes that cross-dressing is not only a constituent of culture, but also a “displacement”—the anxiety of economic or cultural dislocation, the anticipation or recognition of “otherness” as loss. In other words, she believes the phenomenon of cross-dressing demonstrates cross-dressers’ agency to both construct and deconstruct culture.

Turning my eyes to the scholarship on modern Japan, I find that although many historians of modern Japan have paid attention to the cross-dressing phenomenon in their respective researches, they all tend to regard cross-dressing as representations of something else. Donald Roden relates cross-dressing to Taisho gender ambivalence;² Mirami Silverberg takes cross-dressing for an expression of the so-called “ero-guro-nonsansu

² See Roden’s “Taisho Culture and the Problem of Gender Ambivalence.” He studyed the intentional subversion of gendered polarities, sexual ambiguity, androgyny in post-World War I Japan. He believes that in pre-industrial Japanese cultural tradition, distinctions between male and female were not nearly as clear cut as in Medieval Europe. Meiji leaderships reinforced the clear demarcation of gender by legal measures, which only put underground a culture of peep show, street carnivals and masquerades that appeared to make light of the reformulated codes of masculine and feminine etiquette. Taisho saw the rise of critics who expertiseed in psychology and sexology. These people gave positive explanations on “effeminate men” and “masculine women.” Androgyny became visible in the “high culture of Taisho Japan. Roden agrees with Oya Soichi who equated the eccentricities of the age with “a society in the late stage of capitalism”—androgenous culture was a product of passive consumerism and indolent connoisseurs of *kankaku bunka*—culture of feeling. p. 53
culture” in high modan years; Jennifer Robertson’s *Takarazuka: Sexual Politics and Popular Culture in Modern Japan* argues that cross-dressing on stage demonstrates the performativity of gender, class and ethnicity; Gregory M. Pflugfelder links cross-dressing to male-male eroticism. Most recently, in some documentary films, cross-dressing is portrayed as means to construct transgender, transsexual, and drag identities. All these studies about cross-dressing in modern Japan tend to connect cross-dressing with something else—gender, sex, sexuality, modernity, nationalism, identity etc., and the agency of cross-dresser itself in cultural construction has not been talked about very much.

Inspired by Marjorie Garber’s enlightening perspective of cross-dressing, in this paper, I will discuss the relationship between cross-dressing and culture in modern Japan in two periods—the interwar period (1918-1942), and the late stage of capitalism since the late 1980s. The organization of this paper follows this order: 1. Dressing and cross-dressing; 3. See her “Remembering Pearl Harbour, Forgetting Charlie Chaplin, and the Case of the Disappearing Western Woman: A Picture Story,” “Constructing the Japanese Ethnography of Modernity,” “The Cafe Waitress Serving Modern Japan,” “The Modern Girl as Militant,” “Advertising Every Body: Images from the Japanese Modern Years.” Silverberg has coined the term “ero-guro-nonsansu” to refer to the high modan culture of the 1930s’ Japan, which was characterized by its erotic, grotesque and nonsense features. Silverberg often uses the image of moga (modern girl), and cross-dressing women (Yamaguchi Yoshiko as Ri Ko-ran, or Mata Hari of Japan with Manchuria background), to challenge the established gender/sex hierarchy, class structure and sexual politics in her writings.


5 See his *Cartographies of Desire: Male-Male Sexuality in Japanese Discourse, 1600-1950*. Univ. of California Press. 1999. There were cases in which the sodomy was committed by an active male inserter to a passive male insertee who dressed in woman’s clothes; and cases in which the male prostitutes dressed like women to win male customers.

6 *Shinjuku Boys*, and *We Are Transgenders*.

7 Mirami Silverberg used the term interwar period to refer to the period from 1920s to the breakout of the Pearl Harbor event. In this article, I uses it to refer to the period after World War I before Pearl Harbor.
2. Cross-dressing as cultural construction in interwar period; 3. Cross-dressing as cultural deconstruction in late stage of capitalism since the late 1980s.

**Dressing and Cross-dressing**

Clothing makes us human. As a system of signification, clothing speaks in a number of registers: culture, sex/gender, class, and sexuality/erotic style. Cross-culturally speaking, dressing code varies from one culture to another, but one thing is in common—dressing has been traditionally gender-coded. In one sense, clothing is a way to reaffirm gender lines, and dressing codes are supposed to be distinctive to discern sex. However, the relationship between dressing code and sex/gender is not always fixed. Take the veil for example. Majorie Garber finds in western culture, the veil is a sign of female or the feminine. But any pre-assumptions about the gendered function of the veil—to mystify, to tantalize, to sacralize are only susceptible—in North African desert, the fierce Tuareg warriors wear veils to show their manliness. From this example we can see that particular garments have different meanings, from a cross-cultural perspective.

Within a given culture, clothing constructs and deconstructs gender and gender difference. In many cultures, sex and gender expressions are supposed to match—gender expression should match the one we were socially assigned at birth. Garber believes that as a socio-cultural construction, gender “exists only in representation.” In other words, clothing not only represents the gender difference, but also constructs and reinforces the gender difference. For instance, in the early 1920s’ Japan, on public occasions in urban scenes, western clothes and short hair were the fashionable dressing code for the privileged middle class men; most women at that time, no matter in private sphere or public sphere, still kept...

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8 *Vested Interests.* p. 338.
9 *Vested Interest.* p. 250.
10 *Moga* (modern girl) was an exception at that time. They dared to have bobbed hair, and dress in western style clothes. *Moga* image created by media was a negative one—a middle class consumer who crossed the gender line, and behaved militant and was sexually loose. In the first part of her article “The Modern Girl As Militant,” Silverberg generalizes the *moga* image created by journalism and media in the 1920s as such.
traditional hairstyle and wore kimono. If western clothing was a symbol of progress, modernity, and social status, the fact that men had earlier access to it was very telling—men enjoyed the privilege of leaping into modernity, participated in the urban public scenes, and occupied respectable working positions; yet women were left behind. Modernity did not immediately bring changes to women’s life. In public sphere, clothing makes distinct a person’s profession, class and economic status, speaks for an individual’s aesthetic taste and his relations with fashion and his time, and actively constructs the urban landscape. Yet, excluded from modern clothing and public sphere, Japanese women still lived in traditional way and engaged in doing domestic chores. It is clear that in the 1920s’ Japan, clothing not only represented the gender difference, but also actively constructed and reinforced the difference and inequality between genders.

Historically, clothing in imperial China and Tokugawa Japan also spoke for a person’s class status. In both countries, the state strictly regulated the dressing code of each class through legal reinforcement, to keep the social hierarchy and class structure distinct and unchallenged. In China, the early Ming state law clearly laid out the proper clothing for each class (fabrics, colors, designs and patterns), with the hope of binding people to their original social status and proper places, and preventing them

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11 From film “I Graduated, But...,” and the illustration in Mirami Silverberg’s “Constructing the Japanese Ethnography of Modernity,” we can perceive the material difference between man and women in entering modern era. In “I Graduated, But...,” the hero who lived in early 1920s Tokyo had short haircut, dressed in western clothes in public sphere, and had access to college education, baseball, Hollywood movies, and eventually a white collar salary job. His fiancee and mother came from countryside, dressed in kimono, and kept traditional hair style. The fiancee was supposed to stay home to do the household chores, even when a modern job—Cafe waitress was available to her. In “Constructing the Japanese Ethnography of Modernity,” Silverberg studies the different paces in entering modernity between men and women—men were prior to women in wearing western clothes, and how modernity reinforced the gender distinctions in public and private sphere—the modern items adopted by men were mainly consumption and entertainment oriented, while the modern items needed by women were mainly household cleaning staff, new cookers or kitchen wares.
from upward mobility through dressing. Merchants were prohibited to wear silk clothes despite their increasing wealth. Throughout the imperial period, satin of special colors were reserved for certain privileged classes in China—only the emperor could dress in yellow satin with dragon designs, red and purple satin were reserved for officials of different ranks, and commoners could only wear black and blue cotton fabrics. In late Ming the blurring of dressing codes among different classes (commoners dressed upward for fashion and status) corresponded to the relative social mobility and the loosening of social hierarchy. In Tokugawa Japan, eta or burakumin were not allowed to wear shoes and had to wear certain turbans to indicate their inferior social status. Generally speaking, in both countries, clothing was regulated by the state to maintain social structure, reinforce hierarchy and keep people at their proper places.

Clothing can also speak for one’s sexuality and erotic styles. In *Cartographies of Desire*, Pflugfelder finds that in Meiji popular discourse, certain dressing code was marker of certain sexual preference. He studies Mori Ogai’s novel *Vita Sexualis*, and finds “Roughnecks” and “Smoothies” as two contending styles of masculinity in late Meiji school, each had their own dressing code. “Roughnecks” tucked up their sleeves, wore dark socks, and swaggered about with menacing shoulders; “Smoothies” dandified themselves in silk kimonos and white socks to win the favor of women. It is worth mentioning that dressing code indicating one’s erotic style or sexual preference is by no means Japanese cultural specific. In *Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture and the Making of the Gay Male World, 1890-1945*, George Chauncey finds “fairies” in pre-

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13 Since late Ming, rich merchants imitated and merged with gentry officials.
14 In Mori Ogai’s novel *Vita Sexualis*, “Roughnecks” refers to Meiji school boys from Kyushu who chose male-male sexual practices.
15 Ogai, *Vita Sexualis*; “Smoothies” refers to those boys from northeast, who chose male-female sexual practices.
16 *Cartographies of Desire*, p.215.
17 “Fairies” were those males who were known as “female impersonators.” They adopted unconventional style or article of clothing to signifying their identities as “fairies”
World War I New York preferred to wear red ties, while dark brown and gray suede shoes were homosexual monopoly.\textsuperscript{18} It seems that each culture has its own special dressing code which was a secret shared by “insiders” to indicate one’s erotic style and sexual preference.

So far, I have discussed that clothing as a system of signification speaks for culture, gender/sex, class, and sexual practices. If dressing is encoded in such a way to speak in so many registers, then what does cross-dressing stand for? I would say that cross-dressing represents cross-coding, which should be understood as cross-cultural, cross-gender, and cross-class practices. Cross-dressing is fetishism\textsuperscript{19}—by choosing the fetishistic body accessories of the opposite sex/gender—hair, makeup, voice, posture, etc., one can build the identity related to those body accessories. Cross-dressing, like the copy of simulacrum, questions the “original,” and disrupt “identity,”\textsuperscript{20} makes the “original” become “a parody of the idea of the natural and the original,” and reveals the arbitrariness of convention (Bulter 1990: 31). Cross-dressing gives agency to those who practice it—it involves framing: selected components (artifacts, practices) are assembled and configured in desired ways (Robertson 1998: 40). Cross-dressing creates ambiguity and ambivalence, which can be used strategically for resolution and controlling, and at the same time betrays the artifices that uphold the status quo.\textsuperscript{21} Cross-dressing is boundary-crossing, it questions the assigned gender identities, and empowers women.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{18} Gay New York. p. 52.
\textsuperscript{19} Freud’s explanation of fetishism is “having penis as men.” Female fetishism relates to “penis-envy.” Lacan uses “phallus”—the structuring mark of desire as the fetish, and believes that the fetishistic cross-dressing by women enable them to enter the symbolic register.
\textsuperscript{20} Vested Interests. p.369 Marjorie Garber uses Walter Benjamin’s theory of mechanical reproduction (photo, film) to argue that cross-dressing has close relation to repetition.
\textsuperscript{21} Takarazuka. p.40
\textsuperscript{22} Hu Ying’s Tales of Translation studies Late Qing Chinese women’s cross-dressing in real life (Qiu Jin, a Chinese woman who received her education in Japan and returned China with a political purpose of founding a republic in China.) in late Qing fiction, and finds cross-dressing served the functions of crossing the boundaries of nation, culture, class, gender hierarchy. Cross-dressing empowered traditional Chinese women, like the
Here is an example of what cross-dressing can richly mean. In “Remembering Pearl Harbor, Forgetting Charlie Chaplin, and the Case of the Disappearing Western Woman: A Picture Story,” Silverberg gives an example of cross-dressing as cross-cultural, cross-ethnic, cross-class and cross-gender practices. In 1937 in the treaty port of Tianjin, at a lavish party attended by the Japanese elite, Yamaguchi Yoshiko met and was attracted by Kawashima Yoshiko. Yamaguchi, daughter of a Japanese colonial official and a Japanese mother, was brought up in Manchuria and Peking. In the midst of intensifying anti-Japanese sentiment, her Japanese identity was a tightly held secret, and she passed as Chinese and graduated from a Chinese girls’ high school. Later, in her film career, she was presented to her fans as an exotic Chinese sex idol—Ri Ko-ran. Like the state of Manchukuo was made “Chinese,” she was made by the hands of the Japanese into a “Chinese person.” Kawashima Yoshiko, known as the Mata Hari of the Orient, was indeed the fourteenth princess of the ended Qing dynasty. She was adopted by Japanese parents who became involved in political intrigue and spied for Japanese military authorities in Manchuria. Mata Hari of Japan appeared at the party as “the beauty dressed like a man.” On that occasion, the fact that Yamaguchi dressed in Chinese garb and passed as Chinese argued for cross-dressing as cross-cultural, cross-ethnicity/race construction of identity. The Manchurian princess Mata Hari, who doubly cross-dressed as a Japanese male, challenged the categories of culture, ethnicity, class and gender. This anecdote of cross-dressing used by Silverberg clearly demonstrates the fluidity of identity during Japan’s modern moment—between 1931 and early 1942, both gender and national identity were up for dressing; cross-dressing provides individuals agency to create and choose their identity in cross-cultural, cross-ethnicity, cross-class and cross-gender ways.

If clothing constructs (deconstructs) culture, gender, class and sexuality, then the issue of who manipulates the dressing code and whose

heroine Caiyun in Nie Haihua, and opened new possibilities of womanhood for new women like Qiu Jin, who sacrificed her life in revolutionaries’ mission of overthrowing Qing state and building a Constitutional Republic in China. Hu believes that women’s taking masculine names itself (Zhang Zhujun, a school master, used a male pen name Luo Pu) can also be read as cross-dressing, which questions one’s female identity.

pleasure or power the dressing code serves become very important. From above, we learned that clothing gives power to the dominant culture, men, the privileged class, and the straight; then cross-dressing, I would say, marks the power of the subalterns—**inclusion**—the subcultures, women, the under-presented class, and the queers. In theory, cross-dressing challenges and deconstructs the power relations within or among of culture(s), marks the fluidity of binaries and indicates the category crises. In practices, cross-dressing is deployed as a device to subvert or dis-empower the dominant culture, and to provide a critique of the possibility of “representation” itself.

To understand better what cross-dressing represents, I would like to give Marjorie Garber’s opinion on cross-dressing: “Cross-dressing is about gender confusion. Cross-dressing is about the phallus as constitutively veiled. Cross-dressing is about the power of women. Cross-dressing is about the anxiety of economic or cultural dislocation, the anticipation or recognition of ‘otherness’ as loss. All true, all partial truth, all powerful metaphors.” Here, I agree with Garber that cross-dressing is about cultural dislocation as much as I agree with her that cross-dressing is about cultural construction. I believe cross-dressing is about both, but in certain periods, its role in culture construction is more dominant, while in other periods, its role in cultural dislocation is more dominant. In Japan, when the state and its economy was expanding, and people identified themselves more with the state, cross-dressing practices mainly played the role of cultural construction. When the economy was stagnant, people had anxiety about the political and economic situation, and no longer identified themselves with the state, then cross-dressing was culturally deconstructive. In the following part, I will analyze the role of cross-dressing in relation to culture in two periods: interwar period—cross-dressing as cultural

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24 In *Female Masculinity*, Judith Halberstam uses the rhetoric of colonialism to discuss the transsexual body—she believes transsexuals were represented as “empire” and the subaltern.(p. 166) She synthetically employs Janice Raymond’s identification of transsexual body as part of a patriarchal empire intent on colonizing female bodies, and feminist souls, and Sandy Stone’s theory that “empire” can “strike back.” Here I follow her logic, and extend the “subalterns” to include people from subcultures, women, the less-presented class, and queers.

25 *Vested Interests*. p. 390
construction, and late stage of capitalism since the late 1980s—cross-dressing as cultural deconstruction.

Cross-dressing as Cultural Construction: Interwar Japan

Cross-dressing constructs/deconstructs culture. In Japan, cross-dressing in different periods, on different occasions, constructs/deconstructs culture in varied ways. The interwar (1919-1942) Japanese culture of modernity was “characterized by identity fluidity, the consumption of images, and a focus on ‘play.’” Cross-dressing as an attribute to this culture of modernity, had its own expressions and meanings. Many scholars have noticed that moga, the Japanese cultural heroine of the 1920’s, were often cross-dressers. Though the creation of mass media depicted moga as a glittering, decadent, middle-class consumers “who through her clothing, smoking and drinking, flaunts tradition in the urban playgrounds,” Silverberg’s study finds that Japanese Modern Girls were militant working class women who produced goods, services, and new habits. Cross-dressing was a distinctive marker of Modern Girls—they unanimously chose western clothes and short hair, some of them even

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26 Silverberg. “A Picture Story,” p. 255
27 In Modern Girls, Shining Stars, the Skies of Tokyo, Five Japanese Women, Birnbaum constructs the lives of five iconoclastic Japanese modern girls (one writer, one film star). All of them subverted the “good wife, wise mother” ideal promoted by Japanese state since Meiji restoration. The writer and film star were both cross-dressers.
28 Sally Taylor Lieberman’s The Mother & Narrative Politics in Modern China finds that in modern Chinese literature, modern girls are also depicted as urban consumers. Girl students are also modern girls, and they are depicted by female writers Ding Ling and Lu Yin as extremely sentimental beings, and even with a homosexual tone.
29 “Modern Girl as Militant,” and “The Cafe Waitress Serving Modern Japan.”
30 In “Modern Girl as Militant,” Silverberg purposely distinguishes moga and “modern girl.” The former was an negative image of modern women created by journalism, and the latter refers to working class women who experienced modernity as factory workers, cafe waitresses, etc.
By cross-dressing (in western, or men’s clothes), modern girls rejected their gender and sexual roles assigned by Japanese tradition, walked out of households into the open, working and playing alongside men. Cross-dressing empowers women and opens opportunities of men’s domain to them —once dressed in western or men’s clothes, Modern Girls entered the whole realm of the society, and enjoyed certain privileges of men, e.g., the western lifestyle. To a large degree, the modern girls’ cross-dressing was an expression of female self-assertion in the era of socio-cultural transformation.

Modern Girls were not the only cross-dressers in Japanese high modern period. In “Taisho Culture and the Problem of Gender Ambivalence,” Roden pays attention to the “effeminate man,” whose femininity was expressed in clothing, language, and etiquette. Although Roden’s discussion of “effeminate man” emphasizes their feminine manner and disposition, he does indicate that changes of clothes played a role in creating “effeminate man.” Effeminate men represented the intentional subversion of gendered polarities, sexual ambiguity, androgyny in post-World War I Japan. Roden agrees with Oya Soichi that there was an evolutionary pattern from masculine civilization of the late nineteenth century to a more androgynous culture of the twentieth century “wherein men and women could freely experience each other’s emotions.”

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31 Mata Hari, Uno Chiyo, and the fictional figure Naomi all had dressed in men’s clothes.
32 Some modern girls (girl students and women workers especially) in Japan had homosexual relations with each other. See Pflugfelder’s “‘S’ is for Sister,” and Tsurumi’s *Factory Girls*. Ono Kazuko finds homosexual relations among Chinese women workers too in her *Chinese Women in a Century of Revolution, 1850-1950*.
33 See “Taisho Culture and the Problem of gender Ambivalence”, his discussion on Hasegawa Kazuo, the effeminate male star. p. 49.
34 Ibid. See his discussion on Nitobe Inazo, the eminent educator and diplomat. p.51.
35 Ibid. He mentions that in the novella *Asakusa kurenaidan* Yomiko epitomize the gender ambivalence by playing both a “masculine” young woman and a “feminine” young man, through changes of clothes, language, gestures and even names.
Roden finds the historical reasons which can explain the appearance of “effeminate man” in pre-industrial Japan, gender demarcation was not as clear-cut as in Medieval Europe. Meiji leaderships reinforced the clear demarcation of gender by legal measures, which only started an underground culture of peep shows, street carnivals and masquerades that appeared to make light of the reformulated codes of masculine and feminine etiquette. Taisho saw the rise of critics whose expertise was in psychology and sexology; these people used their knowledge to justify “effeminate men” and “masculine women,” and made androgyny become visible in the “high culture” of Taisho Japan. Roden seems to be impressed by Oya Soichi who equated the eccentricities of the age with “a society in the late stage of capitalism.” Oya takes androgenous culture for a product of passive consumerism and indolent connoisseurs of kankaku bunka — culture of feeling. Here I can not agree with Roden and Oya at all. To say Taisho Japan was the late stage of capitalism characterized by passive consumerism is serious anachronism—I believe Taisho Japanese capitalism was still in its rising period, and industrial productivity and expansion rather than consumption and stagnation were the major economic trend.

I prefer to think of cross-dressing as an expression of the so-called high modern and “ero-guro-nansensu” culture. The reason is that in cultural study field, some scholars classified modernity into two categories: historical/industrial modernity, and aesthetic/cultural modernity. Historical modernity relates to the industrialization, the rising of the bourgeois and the corresponding social cultural changes. Aesthetic modernity occurs later at the high stage of capitalism. As a cultural modernity, it has an anti-bourgeois taste. If industrial society worships the bourgeois value of masculinity, then the “effeminate man” is the product of the aesthetic modernity at the high stage of capitalism.

Noticeably, Japanese culture of modernity was inseparable from Japanese nationalism, imperialism and colonialism. Cross-dressing in culture marked the fluidity of the binary distinction between masculinity/femininity, Naichi/Gaichi (interior/exterior). If clothing

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36 In “A Picture Story,” Silverberg uses high modern period to refer to the years immediately before the Pacific War.
37 Leo-ou-fan Lee. *Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of New Urban Culture in China.* Walter Benjamin is another one who discusses the categories of modernity.
reinforces the hierarchy of Japanese empire, then cross-dressing creates the ambiguity of the hierarchy, and can be manipulated to reach out to Japanese colonies and control the minds within the empire.38

Silverberg notices that there was a transition in Japanese culture from the polymorphous/modern into the masculine/militarist from late 1930s to early 1940s.39 Robertson’s Takarazuka provides rich sources to prove such transition in popular culture through Takarazuka Revue’s performance. Takarazuka, a invented form of modern popular culture in Japan, was constantly shaped by the dynamic interplay of the capitalist commercial interest and state politics. The most distinctive stage image of Takarazuka Revue is otokoyaku—female actors perform as men. By choosing fetishistic body accessories—male voice, male hairstyle and dress, male body movements and postures, otokoyaku on stage (in some cases, even in their real life) enter the symbolic register of patriarchal order. In the video Dream Girls, an otokoyaku tells the interviewer that she feels free in acting as a man, while a musumeyaku40 says that she feels unnatural to act the female role. This not only supports Halberstam’s contention that femininity is more performative than masculinity, but also shows that women understand masculinity—because the culture they live in is constructed by masculine principles. Yet “woman” and “femininity” on stage are already impersonations of man’s image about woman (as the foe of man and masculinity). To perform womanliness is mimicry and masquerade for musumeyaku. In this sense, otokoyaku reverse the assumption that only men understand women—woman can understand man’s feelings better and play the ideal man.

Why did the Revue choose female actors to perform men? Was it simply because women understand men better? Did the Revue design otokoyaku simply for commercial purpose or for the “resocialization of (bourgeois) girls and women” with unconventional aspiration?41 I do not

38 Here, I used “empire” to refer to both the literal Japanese empire, and the patriarchal empire which colonized women.
40 Musumeyaku are female actors who perform as females on stage.
41 That is Kobayashi’ explanation. He believes Takarazuka girls make good wives because they are taught to be quiet, and obedient. Otokoyaku are to make especially good wives, because they are supposed to understand men’s feelings.
think so. Founded by a railway entrepreneur Kobayashi, Takarazuka Revue faithfully carried out its mission of boosting national railway industry, cultivating national mind, staging Japanese imperialism, and culturally building Japanese empire. I believe Takarazuka’s cross-dressed *otokoyaku* is a symbol of Japanese nationalism and imperialism in relation to the west.

After World War I, Japan rose to be a major industrial power in the world. Yet, in international affairs, Japan was still perceived by the Western world as an inferior state. Western imperial eye looked at Japan through its Orientalism lens, and found itself as the masculine, and Japan as the feminized oriental other. If the masculine power of the west was from its big guns, big industry and big money, the Japanese state was also able to claim its masculinity then because of its industrial power and advanced weaponry. How to change its feminized image in international affairs then? If cross-dressing can challenge “easy notion of binarity,” and put into question the categories of female and male, then to create Japanese masculinity on stage through cross-dressing symbolizes Japan’s ability to subvert Western Orientalism model (Garber 1992:10). As an entrepreneur of the most important national industry—the railway, and a person who had close ties with the state, Kobayashi, the founder of Takarazuka Revue inevitably realized the dilemma of staging Japanese national identity. The invention of *otokoyaku* in Takarazuka performance was a clever solution of this dilemma —though Japan was assigned to be “woman” in international affairs, this “woman” (like *otokoyaku*) could perform the paragon of man and the idealized masculinity. In this sense, *otokoyaku* marked the superiority of Japanese “masculinity” in relation to the West, and her success on stage and popularity among Japanese people had direct relationship to Japanese nationalist sentiment. The cross-dressed body of *otokoyaku* spoke for the superiority of Japan, and performed for the Japanese empire.42

Staging cross-dressing in Takarazuka performance also had a lot to do with Japanese imperialism. Takarazuka Revue’s reliance on the railway capital foretold its inseparable relation to Japanese imperialism. As a metaphor of the nation, the empire and progress, the railway absorbed the local interest into the state, and linked domestic strategies of wartime mobilization with imperialist expansion. During the wartime, Kobayashi’s

42 Tamanoi’s “Knowledge, Power and Racial Classification: The ‘Japanese’ in Manchuria” raise the idea of body as an empire.
profit-oriented interest in organizing and rationalizing leisure and entertainment overlapped with the state’s interest in controlling people’s minds, so the state employed Takarazuka as state-sanctioned corporate theater to counter the leftist theaters, popularize imperialism, and Japanize Asia. Takarazuka was a useful device of Japanese imperialism for disseminating and enacting a pan-Asia vision of co-prosperity.

Cross-dressing in the form of cross-culture and cross-ethnicity/race on stage was an important strategy of Takarazuka to represent the Japanese empire. Constructing the hybridity of Japanese cultural identity, Japanizing Asian people and assimilating them into the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and creating the embodiment of the gaijin (outsiders) by Japanese, were all stage tactics employed by Takarazuka Revue, to serve the interests of the Japanese empire. In the late 1930s, mobile troupes of Takarasienennes were dispatched to war fronts throughout China, Korea, and Manchuria to symbolically weave together the disparate parts of the Japanese empire. Radio broadcasts of Takarazuka were transmitted to Mongolia, China, Thailand, India, and Burma with the aim of “introducing Japanese theater culture to people living within the area of the Co-prosperity Sphere.” From above we can see that cross-dressing in Takarazuka theater not only demonstrated the performativity of categories such as gender, ethnicity and national identity, but also served the goal of Japanese nationalism and imperialism by creating the ambiguity of masculinity/femininity, Naichi/Gaichi (interior/exterior).

To generalize the role of cross-dressing in interwar period as a whole, it is not difficult to see that cross-dressing played an active role in constructing the culture of modernity of the 1920s-30s, and the culture of military nationalism and imperialism in late 1930s and early 1940s. If we agree with Marjorie Garber that cross-dressing both plays a role in cultural construction and represents cultural dislocation, then why during the interwar period was cross-dressing more about cultural construction rather than cultural dislocation? The answer has to do with both the Japanese economy during this period and the state’s role in cultivating nationalism. During this period, Japanese capitalism was still in its rising phase. The growth of industrial productivity and military expansion made the state more attractive to people’s eyes, so people were more willing to identify

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43 Takarazuka. p. 114.
44 Takarazuka. p. 129
their interests with the ever-increasingly powerful state. Besides, the
Japanese state made great efforts to cultivate people’s national
consciousness by using mass media and state-organized associations to
reach people living in the most remote and backward places, e.g., Suye
Mura. The state’s ambition to catch up with the West was so intense and
so pervasive that it drove people with single-minded determination. As a
result of both factors, domestically, there were no major political and social
conflicts among different interest groups during this period. That is why
cross-dressing, as one of the cultural constitute, mainly participated in
constructing the dominant cultures in interwar period—culture of modernity
in the 1920-30s, and culture of military nationalism in the 1930s-40s.

Cross-dressing As Cultural Deconstruction: Japan Since Late 1980s

After half a century of oblivion, in late 1980s, cross-dressing became
socially visible again in Japan. Since the late 1980s, cross-dressing as a
device has been employed by various groups of people in their daily life—
transsexual, transgender, and Drag queens. From films We Are
Transgenders, and Shinjuku Boys, one can see the presence of transgender,
transsexual and Drag communities in contemporary Japanese society. Their
existence to a certain degree, is tolerated by the mainstream, and even gets
representation in mass media. It is worth mentioning that all these three
groups of people can be called “cross-dressers” in a sense. The most
distinctive feature of such “cross-dressers” during this period is that they
cross-dress to claim certain kinds of identity.

Though some scholars believe that transsexual, transgender and Drag
mark the fluidity of gender and sexuality, Judith Halberstam holds a
different opinion. She argues that gender and sexuality “tend to be
remarkably rigid.” She believes that many gender and sexual identities
“involve some degree of movement (not free-flowing but very scripted)
between bodies, desires, transgressions and conformities;” people do not
necessarily shuttle back and forth between gender roles and sexual practices
at will, but do “tend to adjust, accommodate, change, reverse, slide, and
move in general between moods and modes of desire.” If Halberstam is

45 In The Women of Suye Mura, Smith and Wiswell talk about how the state
created women’s associations to integrate rural women living in the
agricultural backwaters like Suye Mura into official nationalism.
46 Female Masculinity. p.147.
right, then what role does cross-dressing play in adjusting one’s role and identity then? According to Marjorie Garber, cross-dressing can express the anxiety of economic or cultural dislocation, and challenge the possibility of representation itself. Then since the late 1980s, has cross-dressing in Japan represented an alternative representation or an adjusted new identity? To answer this question, I feel it necessary here to analyze the identity of each group—transsexual, transgender, and Drag, and how they relate to cross-dressing.

Transsexual, despite its misleading name, is indeed about gender/sex, not sexuality. Gender and sexuality are two categories of identity, and one’s sexual preference should not make difference to one’s gender identity. According to Judith Halberstam, medical descriptions of transsexuals have been preoccupied with a discourse of “the wrong body.” The technological availabilities of surgeries to reassign gender have made the option of gender transition available to those who understand themselves to be at odds with their bodies. Halberstam does not believe that the aspiration for mobility within a gender hierarchy is the reason for surgical transition, but she does admit that medical gender reassignment has social and political consequences. Marjorie Garber believes that transsexual is not a surgical product, “but a social, cultural, and psychological zone” (Garber 1992: 106). I think Garber also believes in “the wrong body” theory about transsexual, but she tries to say it in a different way—it was the social, cultural and psychological factors that makes one feel that he /she is in a wrong body. Therefore it is safe to say that a transsexual is a person whose body is surgically altered to correspond with the gender they identify with. But even prior to surgery, they are already transsexuals.

What is the relationship between transsexuals and cross-dressing then? Garber believes that transsexual is the twentieth century’s manifestation of cross-dressing—the anxiety of gender binarity is inscribed on the body (rather than clothes). If transsexual can be understood as a special way of

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47 Vested Interests. p. 390.
48 Vested Interests. p.353
49 Here I used “sex” to refer to the biological differences between man and woman.
50 Female Masculinity. p.143.
51 Vested Interests. This is one of the points about which Garber is most frequently criticized. p. 15.
cross-dressing, given that cross-dressing constructs/deconstructs culture, what does transsexual construct/deconstruct then? Why did late twentieth century’s gender politics move from clothing to body then? Let us look at female to male transition for example. If a woman cross-dresses as a man, she is only the parody of man at most—she still does not have the penis, and her integration into the male world is only incomplete. The only way to be a true man for her is to have a penis. Transsexual surgery makes this possible for her in the late twentieth century.

Transsexual is one of the subaltern groups. If patriarchal society is a metaphor of an empire, then this patriarchal empire intends on colonizing female bodies and feminist souls. Female to male transsexual surgery symbolizes colonial mimicry in body politics. The female to male transsexual body is part of the patriarchal empire, and it has the potential to “strike back”—Sandy Stone calls for a “counter-discourse” within which the transsexual might speak as transsexual (not as man or woman). Though F2M transsexuals employ the colonizers’ structure (male bodies), they are able to create their own discourse. From this analysis, we can see that transsexual deconstructs the hegemonic notion of fixed gender identity, and gives the marginal existence/discourse an equal footing in representation.

Transgender originally refers to people who live as the opposite gender in appearance and behaviors without going to surgical transition, although the boundaries between transgender and transsexual are increasingly unclear recently. Like transsexual, transgender identity says nothing about one’s sexual orientation. Obviously, cross-dressing is an important attribute to the transgender identity, but a transgender is more than a transvestite—a transgender lives a life of the other gender (rather than simply dressed as the other gender). Theoretically, it is possible to tell a transvestite from a transgender. For example, some otokoyaku of Takarazuka Revue only dress in male garb for performance, in real life, they are normal and feminine women—they are transvestites on stage. Some otokoyaku prefer to wear masculine clothes in their daily life, yet they behave quite feminine—they are transvestites in real life. Some otokoyaku

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52 Janice Raymond’s idea used by Halberstam in her Feminine Masculinity. p.165.
53 Homi Bhabha’s term, which often refers to the practice of colony to develop a structure similar to the colonizer’s, yet still different from it. Culture of the colony is the colonial mimicry of the colonizer’s.
in daily life not only dress in male garments, but also behave manly— they are transgenders. Yet I have to admit that the difference between transvestite and transgender never is black and white in practice, because clothing itself constructs gender.

What is the relationship between transgender and culture then? Like transsexual, transgender also provides a counter-discourse to the mainstream culture. Since in most societies, gender and sex are “supposed” to match, those whose gender expression do not match the one they are socially assigned at birth inevitably become gender-benders. Transgender practices subvert the rigid model of gender-sex correspondence, and fight for the diversity of gender identity in cultural expressions.

Drag identity has a lot to do with gender performance. Drag performance demonstrates the theatricality of gender. Drag queens are often male professional entertainers who perform in feminine costume and makeup, despite their unmistakably male bodies. But noticeably, Drag queens have been the subject of mainstream movies for some time, its counterpart Drag kings only appeared much later and have remained highly controversial. The reason for such difference is that man can easily show the theatricality of femininity by performing Drag queens, but women performing masculinity invades the authentic property of adult male bodies. Garber believes that drag is a de-constructive social practice, which analyzes the gender structure from within, and questions the naturalness of gender roles through the discourse of clothing and body parts. Doubling, mimicry, impropriety and undecidability are the common theatrical performance mode as Drag. In other words, the purpose of cross-dressing in Drag performance is not to pass, but to show the theatricality of gender, to arouse gender ambiguity, and to create a postmodern gender pastiche.

From the above, we can see that transsexuals, transgenders, and Drag are all about gender identity, and they either rely on cross-dressing to construct their gender identity, or can be read as a kind of cross-dressing themselves. However, their cross-dressing play a role of cultural

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54 Halberstam. Female Masculinity. p.231.
55 Drag kings are different from male impersonators. The male impersonator attempts to produce a plausible performance of maleness as the whole of her act, Drag king makes the exposure of theatricality of masculinity into the mainstay of her act.
56 Vested Interests. p. 151.
deconstruction—transsexual challenges the assigned gender identity of one’s body, transgender questions the rigid gender-sex correspondence, and Drag queen/ king demonstrates the theatricality of gender. These three groups of people all subvert the orthodox gender identity in their respective approaches.

So far, I have discussed the transsexual, transgender, and Drag identity. Let us turn back to Japanese films *We Are Transgenders*, and *Shinjuku Boys*. If transsexual, transgender, and Drag all deconstruct gender identity in one way or another, what do these film representations tell us about contemporary Japan?

The bubble economy in the mid 1980s made Japan one of the richest countries in the world. Its material affluence, mass middle class, rising consumerism, and economic stagnation all marked Japan as having had entered the late stage of capitalism. Many of the forces that had shaped modern Japanese history have been fundamentally transformed. Japan need not only rethink the values, policies, and institutions that had guided national life since Meiji period, but also need to reassess its future goals and reorient its national purpose. The political corruption and scandals caused political turmoil in Japan since the summer of 1993; the failed economic reform could not save its economy from stagnation. The major issues reshaping the political scene are the issues of internationalization, but Japan is still inward-looking—while clinging to the past order and discipline of its national life, it becomes less hospitable to reform, and less tolerant of new ways.

Suffice it to say that contemporary Japan is in an age of political and economic transformation. The visibility of transsexual, transgender, and Drag communities just proves what Marjorie Garber believes about cross-dressing, as cultural “displacement—the anxiety of economic or cultural dislocation, the anticipation or recognition of ‘otherness’ as loss.” The political and economic dislocations in contemporary Japan inevitably affect people who live there. Identity ambiguity is a cultural reflection of the political and economic dislocations in Japan. When talking about Taisho culture, Roden believes that in Japan there was an evolutionary pattern from masculine civilization of the late nineteenth century to a more androgenous culture of the early twentieth century. Here I want to point out that from the

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58 *Vested Interests* p. 390.
late 1980s to the 1990s, Japan evolved from a high capitalist state with increasing productivity, economic expansion, and a dominant state culture and ideology, to a society in the late stage of capitalism characterized by economic stagnation and consumption, and polymorphous culture. This polymorphous culture can be observed from the multiplicity, ambiguity and ambivalence of people’s identities.

In *Shinjuku Boys*, all the transgenders have suffered gender identity crisis, and their gender identities are very ambiguous and ambivalent. Gaish, a handsome transgender waiter at Club Marilyn\(^9\) said, “I do not think I am a girl. I do not want to be a real man either. I am in between.” Coming from a broken family, Gaish used to feel that life was meaningless, it would be better if she was never born. Feeling the image of a girl is too weak and helpless in the society, she/he develops masculine personality and adopts a transgender way of living by providing services to her/his female “business” customers. Now she/he finds the meaning of her/his life—“they (customers) need me.” Gaish is neither a transsexual nor a lesbian. She/he lives in her/his natural body, and dresses and lives like a man. She/he never allows her/his customers to see her/his body, and does not want to be touched by them either. Tatsu, another waiter, is more complicated in her/his gender and sexual identity. Although she/he takes hormone to change her/his physical features, she/he never goes through transsexual surgery. She/he might be called a stonebutch in the sense that she/he looks very masculine in appearance though she/he has no penis. Besides, she/he has sex with her/his girl friend Tomoe, and they live together like husband and wife—Tomoe does not care that Tatsu has no penis. Kazuki, the third transgender waiter at Club Marilyn, is not as masculine in her/his private life as in her/his public life. In her/his private life, she/he even wears clothes with lace. She/he lives with Kumi, a male-to-female transsexual, and they even plan to get married. Kumi used to be a Drag queen in a nightclub. He/she recently received a M2F transsexual surgery. Given Kumi’s unusual gender, our present language is not enough to define Kumi and Kazuki’s sexual identity.

In *We Are Transgenders*, transsexuals in contemporary Japanese society are represented. In contrast to transgenders who form a community in Club Marilyn, transsexuals in this film are all male-to-female individuals.

\(^9\) Club Marilyn is a Cafe club in Tokyo. Waiters at that club are women who dress in man’s clothes to serve their female customers.
All of them feel they were born in the wrong bodies, and went through surgeries to be changed into women. Yet to be a transsexual in Japan, one has to live under huge social pressure, and even at the risk of their career opportunities. The M2F graduate student eventually comes to the USA to study, and the nineteen year old M2F, despite his/her wish of being an OL (office lady), cannot find jobs other than being a female impersonator at a nightclub.

Both Shinjuku Boys and We Are Transgenders show the diversity of gender and sexual identity in contemporary Japan, and their richness in cultural practices and expressions. Oftentimes, such identity and practices can even cause a crisis of language—the limitation of our present language cannot exhaust the rich repertoire of gender and sexual identity and practices.60 In the 1930s-40s, the Japanese state was able to cultivate people’s national consciousness to pursue the common national interest—to catch up with the West; people were also willing to sacrifice their own diversified interests to serve the state’s goal. That is why the diversity of gender and sexual identity at that time did not surface up and cause language crisis. In the late 1980s, Japanese economy trend shifted from industrial productivity and expansion to consumption and stagnation, which marked Japan entering the late stage of capitalism.61 Japan had already achieved its national goal of catching up with the West, and risen to be the economic leader of the world. People were no longer attracted by the outmoded official ideology and culture,62 and even the state itself was not

60 For example, in Shinjuku Boys, Kumi’s sexual identity and gender identity are both beyond the scope of our present language.
61 A term used by Oya Soichi. Frederic Jameson uses the term “post industrial society” to refer to the late capitalist economic trend of consumption and stagnation.
62 In Japan, since Meiji restoration, for more than a century, the slogan to “catch up with the west” had been an important constitute of Japanese nationalism, and had unified Japanese people together to build a strong modern nation state. By the 1980s, Japan had not only caught up with the west, but also surpassed the west in many senses. The patriotic cohesion which bound people together for more than a century lost its luster in the 1980s, and could not attract people any more. The political turmoil and economic stagnation since late 1980s further disillusioned people. Instead
certain about the national interest of Japan in the future. In an age of political turmoil and economic stagnation since the late 1980s, Japanese people, who used to live under the unified official ideology and identify their own interests with that of the Japanese nation, now became more and more unsatisfied and disillusioned with the state. Searching and asserting individual identities replaced nationalist sentiment in the 1980s' Japan—those identities and practices which had been long-subjugated by the state culture/ideology now surfaced up and struggled for their own discourses and cultural expressions. Such identities constantly deconstructed the categories of the dominant language and the official cultural expression, and created their own discourses and cultural expressions. In the late stage of capitalism, cultural deconstruction and reconstruction in Japan goes side by side with the political and economic transformation.

Conclusion

Though Marjorie Garber points out that cross-dressing can construct and deconstruct culture, this study of cross-dressing in two different periods in modern Japan suggests that cross-dressing does not both construct and deconstruct culture at any given time. Under certain political and economic situation, when the state is able to integrate different interests and bind people together to serve the goal of the state, the diversified cultural discourses will be subjugated to the state culture and ideology, and rendered silent. When the goal of the state can no longer hold people together for a common national interest, different groups will each struggle for their own discourses and interests. In this process, they deconstruct the present rigid cultural structure, and try to write their own histories into the History.
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**Visual Materials:**
*I Graduated, But...* (film) Directed by Ozu Yasujiro, 1929.
*We Are Transgenders.* Directed by Ogawa Lulu, 1997.
Overview

Since World War II, Japan has emerged as a global economic and political power. One relatively unrecognized feature of this globalization is the spread of Japanese “new religions” or shin shukyo throughout the world. These Japanese new religions began to emerge in the nineteenth century as a response to dramatic social changes. Newer still are the “new new religions” (shin shinshûkyô), of which Mahikari is a leading example, having been adopted in many parts of the world, including the Caribbean, Africa, Latin America, Australia, Asia, Europe, and the United States. In Mahikari we see Japanese religious and cultural ideas and values are becoming important aspects of foreign religious landscapes. The main

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2 Estimates of Mahikari’s demographics indicate the following numbers of Japanese members: Sekai Mahikari (Bunmei Kyôdan) branch–97,838; and the Sûkyô Mahikari branch–501,328; this totals almost 600,000 members. While mainly an urban religion, the movement does have some rural followers in certain countries; mainly in Japan, with substantial followers in Brazil, Belgium, France, Italy, Switzerland, Morocco, and the United States. Sûkyô Mahikari maintains its world headquarters in Takayama City, Japan, and has regional offices in North America, Europe, Australia, Asia and Latin America. SMBK maintains its headquarters in Shizuoka, Japan and has centers in France, Germany, the Philippines, Indonesia, Uruguay and the United States.

Overall, Mahikari’s main constituency is women who are in their forties to fifties and have moderate incomes. There is, however, a strong youth movement in the group called the Mahikaritai. There are social and
appeal for many people is the physical and emotional healing achieved through *okiyome*. Mahikari doctrine asserts that most daily problems are the result of improper relations with the spirit realm; this belief allows for emotional relief through externalization of problems and provides explanations for why things happen as they do.

This paper focuses on syncretism in Mahikari to explain these and other reasons behind its cross-cultural popularity, with especial focus on the movement in Martinique and reflections on my fieldwork there. Among other issues, I explain how Mahikari continues to syncretize as it spreads throughout the world, with emphasis on regional variations that spring from indigenous ecstatic and/or esoteric practices in both the sending and host country, such as Japan and Brazil, respectively. In regions such as Europe and North America, divergence from patterns of syncretism in Japan and Brazil are due in large part to the longstanding monotheistic stronghold in Western religious cultures. Being something of a combination of these two currents, Martinique is unique in that the main influence is French Catholicism, but there is also a legacy of Vodou. Since historical analysis suggests that Mahikari’s success is due to its emphasis on spirit possession and exorcistic and healing rites, the wearing of amulets, the prominence of miracles, and the popular religious needs to which these forms of religious practice/expression respond, these forms of belief and practice are given careful attention in this essay.

The present consideration of syncretism refers to *Gestalt* psychology,3 which suggests that as a religion spreads, certain practices become foregrounded and/or backgrounded, depending on the new cultural contexts. Since spirit possession/purification forms the core religious practice of the group, I examine how spirit possession is transformed in various contexts. Prior to its globalization, in Japan, as with virtually all religions there, Mahikari already exhibited an impressive degree of economic benefits in joining the group, but these are only gained through “networking.” For further discussion on Mahikari’s demographics see Winston Davis, *Dojo: Magic and Exorcism in Japan*, (Stanford, CA: University of California Press, 1980) pp. 7-8, 228, 256-257.

syncretism, thus predisposing the movement to adapt abroad in syncretistic ways key to its survival and growth. Since syncretism is not unidirectional, I also discuss how the religion affects the new culture’s religious landscape as well.

The initial research on Mahikari in Martinique, conducted ten to fifteen years ago, is trenchant yet either questionable or dated on the central question of the movement’s appeal there. Laennec Hurbon has asserted that Mahikari’s focus on the spirit realm, healing, and exorcism functioned well in the Caribbean since it helped members to connect with the spirit realm and “provides new legitimation for the legacy of the ancestral spirits from African and slave societies.” 4 As will be demonstrated below, Hurbon’s explanation is only a partial one since it largely overlooks the role of popular Catholicism in Mahikari’s success in Martinique.

**Origins, Belief, and Rituals of Mahikari**

Sûkyô Mahikari was founded by Okada Yoshikazu in 1960 and was called the “Lucky and Healthy Sunshine Children” and later “Church of the World True-Light Civilization.” Born in Tokyo in 1901, Okada joined the military as a young man and was injured during the Pacific War. When doctors found that he had tuberculosis of the spine, he was given only three years to live, and so he vowed to serve God and mankind. Toward this end, Okada invested in several Tokyo factories that were later firebombed, leaving him financially ruined. Destitute, he turned to religion and became a staunch supporter of the Church of World Messianity, another of the Japanese “new religions.”

The teachings of Messianity clearly played an important role in Okada’s new religion. He received a vision in 1959 while unconscious from a fever, which was later interpreted as an omen of his mission to aid in the spiritual cleansing of humanity. This vision, and the ensuing experiences, led Okada to found Mahikari. “Five days after the vision, on his birthday, Okada was awakened at five o’clock by a divine voice, saying ‘Get up. Change your name to Kôtama (Jewel of Light). Raise your hand. Trials and Tribulations are coming!’” 5 Thus was Mahikari born.

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5 Davis, *Dojo*, pp. 4-5.
The possession/healing experience is arguably the most important aspect of Mahikari. The Lord Savior, Okada, asserted that up to eighty percent of the problems that one experiences in his/her life are due to malevolent spirits. A great deal of the mioshe focuses on possession, its elimination, and the pantheon of spirits. When an individual enters Mahikari she/he learns that she/he is defiled and thus requires purification. This purification process is known as okiyome (purification), mahikari no waza (the Mahikari Technique) or tekazashi (raising of the hand). Ancestral and deceased human spirits account for most possession experiences; however, according to Davis' research twenty-six percent were possessed “by the spirits of foxes, cats, badgers, bears and other animals.” Animal spirits have gained a reputation for being more violent in their possessions than their human counterparts. Davis noted that the animal spirits mainly possessed younger members, thus it is possible that the vigor of youth causes the more violent reactions. Possession by a warrior is also common. Such possessions provide a sense of status and feeling of power that the individual may not have within his/her everyday life. On the contrary, it is understood that one’s ancestors, especially those with power, were likely corrupt, thus explaining their liminal state. In any case, spirit possession and its negotiation, along with miracles—which are reported by the majority of members—form the backbone of Mahikari practice.

Kotama spread his message locally and gained converts, but the real expansion of the religion came after he had demonstrated his purification technique on a television show, the “Afternoon Show,” in November 1968. From then on the movement grew so rapidly that he was forced to allow some of his followers to oversee the initiation of newcomers, who came to view him as a living god. Kôtama died in July 1974 of natural causes, provoking a period of schism and struggle in the movement, but not to the detriment of the rich mythology that would develop around him.

Much earlier Mahikari mythology is attributed to the Kojiki, Records of Ancient Matters, which was written circa 712 CE. Though the Kojiki is a depository of Shinto myths, it is well known to scholars as a “late compilation in which political considerations and specifically Chinese

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6 Davis, Dojo, p. 121.
7 Davis, Dojo, p. 124.
conceptions intrude themselves almost everywhere.”

Mahikari utilizes many of the mythological deities found in the *Kojiki* but focuses on the Su-god who personally chose Okada as his savior. Eschatologically Mahikari seeks to overcome cosmic imbalance through *mahikari no waza* (the Mahikari Treatment) in an attempt to stave off a “Baptism of Fire,” or the Su-God’s incineration of the world. The purification ritual directly aids this social change in this realm, in addition to restoring the spirits to their correct places in the astral realm. *Okiyome*, Mahikari’s central exorcistic rite, is regularly performed toward this rebalancing by members on physical objects, food, and the world at large.

The *omitama* is a sacred amulet that serves many functions within the group. One receives the *omitama* amulet upon completion of the Basic Seminar and thus it marks full initiation into the group. Receiving the *omitama* also allows one to do *okiyome* and perform miracles. The amulet itself contains a small piece of parchment on which is written the symbol *chon*, which symbolizes the Su-god. This amulet is said to protect members against evil and negative vibrations, allowing the “True Light” to reach them without harming them through its intensity, as well as empowering the member to perform *okiyome*.

*Okiyome* consists of two main parts: giving light to the primary soul for ten minutes, followed by thirty minutes (as needed) of giving light to the twenty-eight vital points located throughout the body. The ritual concludes with prayers thanking the Su-God, your partner for giving/receiving light, and an admonition to the spirits, “*Oshizumari!*” (Peace! Be still!).

**Syncretism and Religious Needs in Mahikari’s Globalization**

In Japan and Brazil, most Mahikari members are Japanese, though many non-Japanese Brazilians have joined in recent years. There is a mix of Japanese and non-Japanese followers in California, Hawaii, and other places with significant Japanese immigrant populations. However, in Europe, Africa and the Caribbean, the majority of members are not of Japanese descent, and thus it is there that we find the greatest

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9 Young, “Magic and Morality,” p. 245. Some believers expected this apocalyptic event to occur in 2000.
syncretization. Clearly part of the allure for non-Japanese members is Mahikari’s this-worldly focus, in addition to some degree of exoticism. However, I also argue that similarities between the Japanese and Catholic worldviews play a dynamic role in Europe, Brazil and the Caribbean, with Catholic elements there becoming more foregrounded10 than elsewhere in the Mahikari world. This paper argues that contrary to Hurbon’s argument, which would place African spirituality at the background of the Gestalt model of understanding syncretism, it is actually Catholicism that overshadows ancestral African traditions in this case.

In its native form, Mahikari is a syncretic tradition that combines elements of Shinto, Buddhism, Christianity and New Age spirituality. It incorporates several Buddhist ideas, primarily that of karma, the ultimate, impersonal causal relationship of the universe; avidya, the perception that ignorance is the root of our suffering; and the importance of compassion. Shinto plays a dynamic role in Mahikari as well, providing the mythological basis as found in the Kojiki scripture.

The overarching theme in Mahikari East and West is purity.11 Ultimately this concept of purity derives from the Shinto background of the religion. However, the notion of purity vs. impurity becomes syncretized with the Christian notion of evil in the West. “The concept of evil thus moves from the traditional Christian moral or spiritual notion of sin to a more or less physical or mechanistic notion of defilement.”12 This does not mean, however, that there is no retributive aspect: “[e]verything is perfectly arranged so that we reap our rewards and atone for our misdeeds. It is therefore important to express gratitude for all kinds of purification, pleasant or unpleasant, as they would not happen if they were not

10 No research has been published on Mahikari in Africa in English to my knowledge. I spoke with a member who practiced in Benin and asserted that “Mahikari was the same in Benin as Martinique” though their leaders were African, and the members were considerably poorer.


All things of this universe follow a predictable cycle where they were once pure, became defiled, became enlightened and purified through mahikari no waza, and will be reintegrated into their proper place in the cosmos.

Indisputably, health concerns constitute the single main reason why people join Mahikari. Kuniko Miyanaga’s research found that over seventy percent of those surveyed cited health issues as their motivation for joining Mahikari. In Davis’ survey, over one half of the members surveyed said that they joined the group due to their own personal or family member’s illness. My own research indicates that in Martinique members were more often attracted by the claims for psychological health as well as social benefits offered by the religion. Members in Miami emphasized the psychological benefits as well.

Besides illness, “bad luck” also drives people to Mahikari. In cultures like that of Martinique, where ancestral worship is prevalent, it is not uncommon to blame recurring relationship, health or financial problems on a family curse. Mahikari promises to heal the relationship with one’s ancestor and thus create harmony in one’s daily life. Upon receiving mahikari no waza or tekazashi, kamikumite may be healed, become harmonious with others, become better off financially, or stop being prone to traffic accidents.

The Nature, Scope, and Trajectory of Martinican Mahikari

Mahikari was introduced to the Caribbean in 1975-76 and quickly gained many followers. It is popular in Martinique and Guadeloupe, but can also be seen in smaller numbers in Puerto Rico, Haiti, Trinidad,

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16 Davis, Dojo, pp. 105-106.
17 SMBK Pamphlet, pp. 14-15. Mahikari utilizes very aggressive proselytizing and advanced marketing tools. They have glossy booklets which shows people from many different countries giving their testimonials.
Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. Mahikari has made a considerable impact in the Caribbean. This case study is based on fieldwork conducted during October 1999, which included multiple visits to the main Sûkyô Mahikari dojo in Redoute, Ft. de France, Martinique, interviews with members on location and in separate locales, and participant observation.

The island of Martinique is a French dependency in the Western Antilles. Colonized by France in 1635, it is today home to about 371,000 people, the vast majority of African descent. Local income is generated through tourism and exporting rum, sugar, and bananas, but the overall economy is subsidized by France. With limited employment opportunities, drug use has become an increasing problem for the island, which is exacerbated by the socialized living allowances that allow one to live comfortably with little effort. Historically, Catholicism has maintained a religious dominion over the island though some forms of Vodou and other African-based religions are practiced. Compared to other Caribbean islands, however, African-based religions like Vodou and Santería play a relatively small role in Martinican religious life.

Hurbon asserts that Mahikari entered the Caribbean via France, where it spread among the immigrants from the Antilles, who then used their family relations to assure the implantation and expansion of the sect on the islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique. Richard Fox Young’s portrayal of the religion’s spread to the Caribbean differs from Hurbon’s: “French, Swiss, and Belgian missionaries first introduced Mahikari to the

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20 I interviewed with many initiates there, including several “responsables” and long term members. I also observed their monthly thanksgiving ritual and received okiyome several times. I was given a very positive reception and found the members to be very pleasant though they often avoided my direct questions until I obtained proper permission from the correct “responsible.” I was told by a member that I contacted outside of the dojo that this was due to the “small island” mentality that everyone would know what they said and due to respect for the leader, rather than fear. Another member said, “I don’t know if I am allowed.” I came across a similar problem with the “responsables” when I asked to have my consent forms signed.

Ivory Coast, the Congo, and Zaire, from which it spread to the French Caribbean Islands such as Martinique and Guadeloupe where African slave-culture and spiritism continue to flourish.\textsuperscript{22} Knowing which path the religion took is important for addressing the question of what external elements have been appropriated by Mahikari in various contexts. Based on my fieldwork, I would agree with Hurbon that Mahikari was brought to the island via France; contrary to Hurbon, however, I contend that the Euro-Catholic background is stronger than the indigenous African influence in the spirit of Martinican Mahikari.

According to Hurbon, by 1986, ten years into its development, there were 10,000 followers (or \textit{kumites}) and 7,000 members in Guadeloupe.\textsuperscript{23} There was “constant growth in the movement on the islands between 1976 and 1980,” with members in Martinique and Guadeloupe mainly comprised of the \textit{petits bourgeois} (i.e., teachers, minor functionaries).\textsuperscript{24} My own fieldwork indicates that the group in Martinique peaked during the mid-1980s with 5,000 to 7,000 initiates, but maintains 800 to 1,000 active members today, with approximately the same number in Guadeloupe. Young does not give exact figures in his research but asserts that Mahikari is embraced by many people,

> who see themselves as victims of colonial ideologies, who in private adhere to the beliefs and practices of African primal religions but in public profess abhorrence of them in order to secure educational and occupational privileges….\textsuperscript{25}

In my fieldwork, I was told in no uncertain terms that although there is an anti-colonial movement on the island, Mahikari is not it. Martinique maintains more of a French cultural habitus than African, and Vodou is discussed as a thing of the past. Most of the island is Catholic and many of the Mahikari members still consider themselves to be Catholic. When asked when he left the church for Mahikari one member of fourteen years asserted that he “didn’t leave the church.” However, not all Catholics accept Mahikari, and I was told that there was significant opposition from the Catholic Church especially after Mahikari’s initial explosion on the

\textsuperscript{22} Young, “Magic and Morality,” p. 254.
\textsuperscript{24} Hurbon, “Mahikari in the Caribbean,” p. 243.
\textsuperscript{25} Young, “Magic and Morality,” p. 254.
island, and some opposition from the French government. Mahikari views itself as a universal teaching beyond religion and accepts people of all classes and races, “but especially all religions.” According, members believe the style of Martinican Mahikari to be the same as in Japan or anywhere else, although during the Thanksgiving ritual part of the liturgy is embellished “in the style of the Martinique dojo.”

In Martinique there are similarities between Mahikari and Catholicism. Members routinely perform particular rituals, e.g., bowing, and praying in front of the altar. As in Catholicism, exorcisms are performed (through okiyome), and Mahikari’s understanding of the spirit realm resembles Catholic ideas on purgatory. Furthermore, only Mahikari officials can conduct “spirit investigations,” which resonates with Catholic doctrine’s limit of the performance of exorcisms to high-ranking bishops. The miraculous healing that can occur in Mahikari is achieved through purification. The sacred treatment of the omitama in many ways mirrors the popular use of the rosary as a protective amulet. Recitation of prayers in a foreign tongue bears resemblance to pre-Vatican II Catholicism, where members understood little of the Latin liturgy. This form of religious practice adds an element of mystery for individuals who are predisposed to esoteria. Thus the Catholic environment of Martinique provides the background against which these particular elements of Mahikari become foregrounded.

One particularly Caribbean element that I observed in Martinique was an emphasis on song. The Thanksgiving ritual included a very impressive choir led by a popular Caribbean singer. These songs were sung in French and expressed the joys of having Mahikari in one’s life. They were very exuberant and distinctively Caribbean in rhythm and style. When members recited the Japanese prayers they did so in a very melodic fashion, and some members sang Japanese hymns while giving okiyome.

I found the members to be very particular and fastidious in their actions, evoking a Japanese atmosphere. After signing in, members take off their shoes and either enter the sacred space barefoot or in socks; approximately one half of the members wore special knit socks.26 The threshold of sacred space was clearly marked by a Chinese runner rug,

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26 When I inquired about these socks and where I could purchase them, I was informed that they were made by members and given as gifts but were not sold anywhere and were not “official” garments.
which was positioned sideways to arrest one’s attention. Members walk up to the rug and take off their shoes on the rug, being careful not to traverse into either realm without the proper foot covering. There was a large shoe room with shelves where members stored their footwear for longer stays at the dojo. Inside the dojo, a wide strip of mauve carpeting ran directly to the main altar while the rest was covered in teal carpet. Walking any style was permitted on the teal carpet, but while in front of the altar on the mauve carpet walking sideways or even backwards was demanded “out of respect to the creator God.” Even when members would open the drapes covering the altar they would meticulously fold them into place. Though the mood was less than solemn while performing these tasks, members were joyous overall and maintained humor even during serious moments. For example, members often talked amongst themselves while performing okiyome.

Hurbon asserts that Mahikari came to the islands during a critical period when people were ripe for a new social paradigm. Sickness is still the main route by which most members enter the religion. Here people are primed to accept that the root of their illness, both individually and socially, is poor relations with the ancestors and other spirits. “‘Social Evil’ is not a product of an economic system of exploitation; it has its roots in the forgetting of the spiritual world.”27 But many members understand their social problems to be in part due to increased contact between Martinique and other countries and blame foreign countries as the source of the island’s recent crack cocaine epidemic. As with Mahikari in other contexts, however, the evil or problems do not fall squarely on the victim’s shoulders either. The religion walks a fine line between maintaining responsibility, accountability and control, while simultaneously externalizing guilt.

It seems as though the Caribbean members have more money than European initiates do (or at least are willing to contribute more). In Europe donations run the dojo; however, major expenditures such as new buildings are funded from Japan, while in the Caribbean members have funded the building of several large dojos.28 In fact, it was made clear to me that the Redoute dojo was created solely with Martinican money and labor. Members seemed to be of the upper and upper middle class in general.

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28 Dojos can be found in Fort-de-France, Pointe-a-Pitre, Basse-Terre, LeMoule Saint Martin, and Marie-Galante. Hurbon, “Mahikari in the Caribbean,” pp. 242-243.
They were better dressed than the average person and many own cars, which are significantly more expensive in the Caribbean than in the US. Although I was told that there was no “real” poverty in Martinique due to socialized living allowances for those who do not work, I found the members to be significantly better off than the masses of Fort-de-France and its outlying areas. Receiving okiyome is always free; however, the initiation costs about $125.00 and members understand their donations to be material manifestations of their gratitude to the divine Su-God and thus give freely, although the monthly donation is usually only around 20FF ($4).

Despite the scorn of some local Catholics, one long-term member asserted that there were certain social privileges to be gained through membership in Mahikari. Initiates “network” and often help one another socially and financially. This can occur because many of the initiates maintain steady employment, often in civil jobs, which provide opportunities to help other members. Still, the main reason people joined Mahikari was emotional and physical health, as well as both curiosity about the teachings and desire for the ability to give light.

Like many of its European counterparts, the dojo in Martinique is also headed by a Japanese leader; however, the regional director of the French Antilles is Martinican, though he is married to a Japanese woman. In Martinique, members are mainly people of color and vary in age, with slightly more women than men in my observation. During the weekdays many older women could be found at the dojo giving and receiving light, but during the monthly festival the ratio balanced out, with men and women of all ages.

While doing my fieldwork I was able to observe the initiation of the Mahikaritai, or the youth group of Mahikari. They were paraded on the stage and there received a certificate (which was written in Japanese) and a pin. These youths, from sixteen to thirty-five years old, asserted their desire to obey their parents and were very neatly dressed in all white with rust-colored ties, an image which created an interesting juxtaposition to the ordinary youth of the island, who were often disheveled and interested in American fads such as Nike. For many of Mahikari youths, the religion

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29 Martinique’s unemployment rate is extremely high, causing many other social problems including drug addiction.
functions as a way out of the emotional and mental poverty found on the island due to lack of job opportunity or even a work ethic.\footnote{One teacher told me that some of her young students refused to take their schooling seriously since they could make more money with odd jobs and the social living allowance than with a career.}

The millenarian aspects play an important role in the Caribbean context as well as in Japan. The ideas of the fall and the coming paradise are key here:

A new frame of reference is offered to the social challenge: the framework of millenarianism, the promise of a paradise on earth... The doctrine of Mahikari speaks precisely of a garden of Eden that is very near, and this permits the believer to put up with the present social problems, as if these problems lose all consistency and disappear before this phantasm of a reconciled and harmonious world in the near future.\footnote{Hurbon, “Mahikari in the Caribbean,” p. 255.}

Members believe they will play an exalted role in the future society and are partly responsible for its creation. “According to Revelations received by the founder, after the time of purification mankind will enter an age when, through the combination of Divine Power and human effort, a great and holy civilization will be established.” Having people initiated and “giving light” is deemed as more important than whether they subscribe to all the doctrines of Mahikari; in fact, members here and abroad expressed their own theories on different phenomena and even expressed their skepticisms openly. \textit{Kamikumite} plays a critical role in the coming paradise, since it is they who can administer the light needed to purify the world of humans as well as spirits. Towards the end of the monthly ceremony, approximately 1,000 members recited in unison the prayers in Japanese while giving light to the four directions. Giving light, nonetheless, carries an enormous amount of responsibility, and some ex-members complain that the teachings made them into neurotics obsessed with purifying everyone and everything, feeling extraordinary guilt and responsibility when bad things occurred, believing that they somehow had not purified enough. It is understandable that these apocalyptic tendencies would be foregrounded in an environment rife with natural disasters due to tornadoes, volcanoes, and hurricanes.\footnote{Hurbon, “Mahikari in the Caribbean,” p. 261.}
fact, Martinique faces the same types of island disasters that often plague Japan. One difference is that Japanese Mahikari maintains more elements of nationalism than does Martinican Mahikari. However, in general, the group aims at helping all nations become purified and even in the Caribbean context there were definite subtle commands for group members to clean up society. During the Thanksgiving ritual, for example, a message was read from the master Oshienushisama, who contextualized the recent earthquake disasters in Greece, Turkey, Mexico, et al., for the members by asserting that these were indeed signs and warnings of the spiritual ebb that global society is facing and that the Earth was purifying herself of man’s spiritual ineptitude.

At the same time that these disasters are viewed as warnings from Su-God, they are sometimes interpreted as signs of purification; just as the body releases various fluids and toxins so does the earth in response to the mass purification being conducted by kamikumite. Natural disasters are viewed as changes in the earth, which occur due to the okiyome done by initiates. Each nation has its own social structures and environmental policies, which help to create their collective karma. Nations that are most respectful of nature and natural laws with strong environmental movements are believed to fare better due to their purity.

Hurbon argues that “Mahikari, is a way of renewing links with the traditional cultural heritage: at the same time it is an instrument for criticizing modernity, and it can rid the individual of his inferiority complexes. It also provides a reassuring explanation of all the global problems and conflicts.” In other words, Mahikari serves as an important link between those who view themselves as modern and still desire to maintain a link with their African spiritual heritage in the guise of Mahikari’s ancestor cult, without suffering from the kind of social stigmatization that Vodou does. While there are indications that at its peak in the mid-1980s the movement in Martinique counted 5,000 to 7,000 initiates, today there are only 800 to 1,000 active members. I was told that when the movement first came to the island people joined to try something new, especially since the few other spiritual alternatives were

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34 This can be traced back to the group’s belief that only nature fully obeys Su-God in our current time.
predominantly Christian. In the early days, there were many more possessions or “spirit movements,” but now the “spirits are more cunning and resist moving so as not to be discovered.” As in Europe, it is only the *dojochō* who has the authority to speak with the spirits, since it is he who knows the mioshe well enough to tell whether the spirits are lying or not.36

Many Caribbean members admit that prior to their involvement with Mahikari they had little concrete understanding and control over their spirit world. Becoming connected and having proper relations with one’s ancestors is crucial in countries where since the era of plantation slavery many members of the underclasses have died young. Caribbean *kamikumite* understand that their ancestors have good reasons to be stuck in the liminal realms and thus the possession experience becomes understood in a negative way, which is contradictory to the traditional African view [but similar to the Catholic view].37 One member told Hurbon, “the problem is that people do not respect the world of the spirits. Here in the Antilles, because of all the dead in slavery, there are all kinds of spirits that come to disturb us.”38 *Mahikari no waza* provides a way to purify not only the individual but the society as well, giving the spirits their due and healing the rift between the realm of the living and the realm of the dead.

Many believe *okiyome* to be more powerful than other forms of exorcism precisely because of its healing effect. Whereas other forms of exorcism cast out the malevolent spirit, allowing it to harm again, *okiyome* heals the spirit, sending it to its proper realm. I also suggest that the Mahikari-based belief system in Martinique is much subtler than generally described. Much that has been written about the group continues to portray it with a high degree of sensationalism, despite its recent tendency to background the more violent forms of spirit possession. As in Europe, in Martinique Mahikari members are warned against openly giving light in public, even though this was the norm during the early years in Martinique and is still the norm in Japan. Simply put, the mundane realm is a manifestation of the spiritual realm and all spiritual dis-ease trickles down into our daily lives and must be purified through *mahikari no waza*. Long-

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36 This point was elucidated by a story where a member in France was conned by a spirit into digging multiple holes in his living room floor in search of treasure.


time members “witness” in front of the group describing their spiritual evolution due to okiyome and Mahikari.39

As already noted, it has been asserted by Hurbon that the relatively widespread acceptance of spirit possession for Caribbean kamikumite is only possible due to the longstanding influence of African traditions and the fact that those born in the islands are intimately familiar with possession cults. However, there are many other social factors being played out here. One could assert that Mahikari gains power not only from reconfiguring traditional ideas about ancestors and spirits and crafting them into something new while also connecting to Japan’s economic and technological power. Membership also offers certain material and social benefits such as the establishment of useful contacts professional, political and social contacts. Nonetheless most members asserted that it was primarily health concerns (physical health in Japan, and emotional health in Martinique) that brought them into Mahikari. Because Mahikari is one of the few alternatives to Christianity on the island, people have responded positively to the hands-on healing practice, focus on gratitude and spirits, foreign chants, spiritual knowledge and the increased self-esteem found in Mahikari. Even though the religion is essentially a Japanese import, it has effectively acclimated itself to a predominantly Catholic religious culture. In fact, it seems to be the Catholic environment that provides the backdrop to Mahikari’s success.

**Conclusion**

Clearly one key element that makes Mahikari prosper is its attitude of inclusiveness. One need not abandon his/her previous religious attachments to enjoy the fruits of Mahikari; s/he must only be able to justify it in regard to the other religion. The inclusive, non-judgmental (at least initially) nature of the group attracts people, especially those who have not been completely satisfied with their former religion. The beliefs allow members to externalize their problems while simultaneously maintaining some sense of control. Mahikari’s teachings also appeal to people who have difficulty feeling at ease in the industrialized modern society, by

39 These “testimonies” are read from carefully reviewed sheets by the individual when possible.
offering a magical worldview which provides explanations for experiences and phenomena that science cannot explain.

The nationalist elements do not disappear completely when Mahikari relocates but they do adjust to their new environment. The social ills of any region become understood as part of their collective karma and responsibility. Even though Mahikari claims to be a universal religion, Japan and Japanese culture play a dominant role, regardless of the locale. However, what it means to be Japanese changes. For example, many members believe that they lived in Japan in a former life, effectively tracing their “spiritual lineage” as Japanese. The terms “Japan” and “Japanese” become somewhat synonymous with “true” and “universal”; this is especially elucidated when we look at the kotodama. In short, “Japan” becomes symbolic, a metaphor rather than a literal place or people, allowing Mahikari members, whether they be African, European, Martinican, or other, to identify with the group’s ideology. Once this transformation has occurred, initiates can be fully involved with Mahikari, using the mioshe to help their own nation.

There is a global trend in Mahikari towards less violent spirit movements, which is theorized in various ways. Interestingly enough, not one of the members whom I interviewed credited the practice of giving okiyome as a reason for the decrease in spirit manifestations. From this one could surmise some sort of desire to keep the approaching golden age just out of reach from members, thereby legitimating the ideas and practices as necessary. For if the mioshe allowed other forms of purification and light healing to be as effective as okiyome, then certainly some members would opt to leave the group. Even though the African influences on Mahikari in Martinique have lessened, it will be interesting to see what will occur now that Mahikari has reached the shores of Haiti, where African spiritism and Vodou really flourish. Possibly the Vodou Iwas will syncretize with the Japanese spirits, combining, for example, Ogun with the samurai spirit or Ezili Danto with a spurned mistress.40 Or in another ten years we may find Japanese scrolls in Vodou shrines.

Thus far, it appears that Mahikari has become successful in regions where Catholicism has maintained a religious stronghold. This trend may

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40 Sexual karma is probably the strongest link between the spirits and humans according to Mahikari since it creates the most powerful forms of attachment.
be attributed to the similarities in ritual and focus on the spirit realm. Even though Mahikari membership has decreased in Martinique, it is still possible that religion will become popular and continue to syncretize in other Catholic areas. Mahikari may attract Catholics who have never really accepted the changes in liturgy since Vatican II and desire to commune with the mysterious side of religion. On the other hand, in many cases Mahikari’s initial growth spurt has plateaued, leaving many first-level initiates who may continue to perform okiyome for personal and practical reasons but who are no longer actively involved with the group.
PLANNING, ORGANIZING, AND EXECUTING A SHORT-TERM FIELD STUDY COURSE IN JAPAN FOR BUSINESS STUDENTS

Troy Festervand and Kiyoshi Kawahito
Middle Tennessee State University

Introduction
Reflecting business and academic leaders’ beliefs that U.S. students need greater exposure to the international business environment, accreditation standards of the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business (ASCSB) identify the improvement of this area as one of the key missions of education for both undergraduate and graduate students. This mandate applies to all current and prospective member institutions. The academic community, working in concert with the private sector, must accept and satisfy the responsibility for preparing students for the increasing challenges and opportunities found in the global marketplace.

Academic institutions have been doing various efforts to meet this responsibility, such as frequent references to international topics in lectures and discussions in traditional courses, creation and addition of international business courses, utilization of international culture and business videos, and invitations of international project managers as guest speakers. Some have introduced “semester-abroad” programs. They have also been encouraging their faculty members to acquire international knowledge and experience themselves through participation in workshops and seminars.

Most of them, however, have not introduced the most effective approach, namely direct exposure of students and faculty to international culture and business through participation in short-term field studies abroad. This paper is intended to assist the diverse academic community facing the challenge of introducing such programs.

Middle Tennessee State University has developed and implemented a 15-day “Japan Field Study” program over the past four years. Five years ago, we were fearful of undertaking the program and primarily concerned with avoidance of major blunders. Since then, we have acquired much experience in planning, organizing, and executing it. Still we need to improve several areas, but we are now confident that our program is one of the very best, in terms of both quality and cost.

Our program takes 10-15 students to Japan for two weeks as a summer session undergraduate-graduate combination course, typically in the month of May. Although the itinerary somewhat varies every year, its
theme generally is “Japanese Culture, Economy, and Business.” Geographically, the program covers a long stretch of Japan, including Hiroshima, Osaka, Kyoto, Nara, Tokyo, and Fukushima. It includes visitation of more than 30 cultural and economic/business sites or organizations. It contains not only presentations by Japanese business executives, university professors, and government officials but also interactions with Japanese people through discussions, parties, and a home-stay. The itinerary is action-packed every day, from early morning through evening. Depending on the dollar-yen exchange rate, the total program costs ranges from $1850 to $2150 per person. Incredible as it may appear this amount covers all expenses, including air and ground transportation, lodging, meals, and museum admission fees.

As an academic course, the program starts with several hours of orientation and training over the two-month period preceding the departure. It ends when the participating students write and submit three reports upon their return to the U.S. Certainly, the supervising faculty member must grade these reports, settle accounting matters, and send out numerous thank-you letters to collaborators in Japan. Two typical summary comments by program participants have been “the best trip I have ever had” and “the trip I will cherish all my life.”

Because each institution has a unique set of parameters, the program explained in this paper cannot be reproduced precisely elsewhere. But we are sure that it will serve as a good benchmark and provide many ideas and suggestions that can readily be adopted by others.

Rationale of the Short-Term International Field Study

To materialize a two-week field study abroad program, administrators, faculty, and prospective students at the institution must first be persuaded about benefits of the program. The following points can be advanced as rationale.

First, the short-term field study helps the students learn, through the traveling process, such basics of international business as passports, visas, customs clearances, import duties, foreign exchanges rates and its impact, international telephone cards and other instruments of communication, and language barriers. They acquire the knowledge naturally and intuitively, and therefore retain it for a long time, as compared with the short-lived knowledge learned from books and lectures.

Second, similarly the program helps the students witness and experience the international differences in doing business and learn
principles of cultural adaptation needed for international business. For instance, with respect to service business, our students realize that franchises in Japan of such American firms as McDonalds, KFC, and Pizza Hut operate differently from their American counterparts, in terms of product lines, displays and advertisements, and customer relations. With respect to merchandise business, they realize that Japanese consumers prefer fewer but more reliable, high-quality products of smaller size, as compared with Americans, be they automobiles, furniture, televisions, computers, or cellular phones.

Third, throughout the program students learn intuitively the link between institutional framework and business culture. For instance, visitations of schools in Japan and interaction with students and teachers provide our students with much insight into the group orientation, discipline, and quality consciousness of Japanese people and organizations. Transportation on trains, subways, and buses in Japan offers much insight into the life styles of businessmen, advertising methods of firms, and communication modes of people in Japan.

Fourth, students who participated in the field study abroad tend to become motivated to study more about the country and the world on their own, through literature reading, video viewing, language-tape listening, and other means. In other words, their global education tends to be perpetuated, which is difficult to expect from students who have merely attended a conventional international business course.

Fifth, the study abroad, or any international travel for that matter, provides a great opportunity for the participants to reflect on themselves, their community, and their country. They may undergo a humbling experience of realizing how little they know about their own country and the world. They may also become accustomed to thinking of ways to improve themselves and their homeland, while appreciating what they have.

Finally, interactions with people abroad through home-stay and other formats may help the students to grow as international citizens without cultural bias or racial prejudice. This process is a critical ingredient in promoting world peace.

It should be added that “semester-abroad” and “year-abroad” programs, which many American universities arrange for interested students in collaboration with institutions abroad, are also recommendable vehicles of international education. They are particularly effective in acquisition of language skills and in cultivation of international friends. However, unlike our field study program, they typically keep the students at a specific
location (e.g., campus of the host institution) and are centered around lectures and discussions. Moreover, they are less affordable to students, in terms of money and time.

**Key Components of a Successful Program**

There are several key areas that must be managed well to make the program successful. They include the following:

1. Pre-departure administration of the program as an academic course, including setting it up as a special course for credit, recruiting of participants, and orientation/training.

2. Arrangement of a 15-day itinerary, defining all specific visits and activities, their day-by-day and hour-by-hour sequence, modes of transportation, locations of lodging, and meals, among others.

3. Minimization of the cost of program participation for students, particularly by paying attention to transportation, administrative services, lodging, meals, home-stays, and financial aid.

4. Post-return administration of the program, including reading and evaluation of reports submitted by students, settling all accounting matters with the relevant offices, and sending out thank-you letters to all collaborators and supporters in Japan and in the U.S.

Of the list above, Items (2) and (3) are the most challenging. They are also inter-related. Thus, they are discussed first. Items (1) and (4), particularly the former, are by no means easy. But they can be taken care of substantially by application of common sense and hard work.

**Strategy for a High-Quality Itinerary**

Suppose the theme of the program is “Japanese Culture, Economy, and Business.” The program should take the participating students to cultural and historical sites, schools and colleges, mass media, manufacturing industry firms, service industry firms, financial institutions, trade associations, and government offices, among others. It should provide them with opportunities to hear from, and discuss with, corporate executives, university professors, and other opinion leaders. The program
should also make them participate in cultural activities and interact with Japanese students, families, and businessmen. Many approaches are possible to incorporate these elements in the two-week schedule.

If prospective Japanese hosts feel that you are a close friend, a family member, or a trusted business partner, they will go to extra efforts to provide meaningful and enjoyable tours and/or presentations for you. Whether the content of the field study is excellent or just above average is essentially determined by how many such hosts you have in Japan.

For such close friends or contacts, think of Japanese professors with whom you worked on research projects, Japanese students for whom you were a mentor, Japanese businessmen with whom you worked on community projects, Japanese neighbors whose adaptation to American life you helped, Japanese artists for whom you held reception parties, Japanese bankers with whom you served on conference panels, Japanese politicians who were your collegiate classmates, and Japanese government officers who did their home-stay at your place. They themselves, as well as their close friends and relatives, may be well-connected to firms and organizations you wish to visit in Japan. The more they appreciated what you did for them, the more direct and indirect resources they will mobilize to assist your program. In our case, a majority of visits and activities are arranged through such connections.

Next think of Japanese firms which have a subsidiary in your state, preferably near your university. They may feel an attachment to your university, faculty, and students, because of collaboration in recruiting and training of their employees, research, community projects, and the like. Their home office and sister facilities in Japan would also like to promote a good relationship; moreover, some executives lived in your state and have fond memories. Our visits of manufacturing plants and/or head offices of Bridgestone, Nissan, Toshiba, and Mitsui, as well as Bridgestone Museum of Arts, are arranged through such connections.

While some cultural visits and activities in our program are arranged through the above-mentioned routes, others are added by ourselves. Most shrines, temples, museums, gardens, theaters, and other attractions are open to the public. Many of them can be visited without reservation. These additions fill weekends and a few-leftover time slots in the daytime and evenings of weekdays.

It may be added that the Gion Center in Kyoto stages a seven-part series of traditional performing arts of Japan (including tea ceremony, koto music, and puppet drama) in an hour, twice every evening, providing busy
foreign travelers in Japan with a convenient opportunity to experience such arts. It may also be added that early evening strolls in the Ginza district in Tokyo and the Shinsaibashi-Dotonbori district in Osaka, as well as a daytime stroll in the Imperial Palace between appointments in the Marunouchi business district, are excellent, low-cost group activities.

As mentioned earlier, our program is action-packed from early morning through mid-evening, although we keep a few free activity evenings. In general, with the exception of a more relaxed 2-day home-stay, we try to avoid wasting of even 15 minutes. Interestingly, students tend to get tired, bored, and even get lost, when much time lapse exist between specific activities.

It should be noted at this point that home-stays, visitations of elementary and high schools, and partying with Japanese people (e.g., college student clubs, civic organizations, and hobby groups), are consistently rated the most memorable part of the program every year. Inclusion of them in the itinerary is highly recommended.

As also mentioned earlier, our program covers a considerable stretch of Japan, enabling visits of the Peace Park in Hiroshima, temples and shrines in Kyoto and Nara, business district and entertainment districts in Osaka and Tokyo, manufacturing plants in the Kanto region, and countryside towns and schools in Fukushima. Starting from a youth hostel in Osaka, we change the place of lodging four times during the two-week period. We also use JR trains for most transportation needs, as the students carry a two-week pass. These features distinguish our short-term field study program from most “semester-in-Japan” programs, which are largely confined to a particular geographical site and incorporate only occasional excursions with buses.

Those institutions which attempt to introduce a short-term Japan field study program for the first time may find it difficult to duplicate our type of itinerary from the first year. Our suggestion is to settle for an “above average,” instead of being too ambitious. To the extent they do not have our type of connections for the arrangement of visits of business and economic organizations, as well as cultural interactions. They may ask for assistance from the Japan National Tourist Organization, the Japan Business Information Center (Keizai Koho Center), and similar organizations which have offices in the U.S. They may also settle for two places of lodging, one in the Osaka-Kyoto area and one in the Tokyo area, and make excursions from these bases. They are also advised not to fill everyday with
appointments and activities as we have done, and prepare somewhat more time for moving from one place to another.

**Strategy for a Low-Cost Program**

Since our Japan Field Study is offered as a 3-credit hour course, all participants must pay the same regular tuition that they would pay for any other 3-credit hour summer course. The tuition varies according to the status of the student, undergraduate or graduate, and in-state or out-of-state. When we say “program (participation) cost,” it does not include this regular course tuition. But it does include payment for all expenses associated with the trip, including air and ground transportation, lodging, meals, admission charges (for temples, museums, and theatres), and program administration. It may also be noted that the “actual cost” was considerably less than the program cost, as we were able to find financial aid of at least $500 for each student.

As stated earlier, our program cost has been between $1850 and $2150, depending on the prevailing foreign exchange rate. Incredible as it may appear, these are correct figures. There are several factors that explain the low cost.

First, we do not maintain or employ any agent in Japan to organize the itinerary or to supply escort and translation services. The course instructor himself makes all arrangements working with his friends, associates, and relatives. He becomes an escort interpreter when the tour group lands in Japan.

Second, while our lodging in Japan is comfortable and convenient, we pay very little for it. We stay at a regular hotel for only one night, at the rate of about 7500 yen. (The exchange rate has varied between $1=Y106 and $1=Y130.) We do two days of home-stay, where lodging is free. We stay the rest of the two-week period at youth hostels in Osaka and Tokyo where the lodging charge is only 2600-3100 yen per night, and breakfast, only 400-500 yen. In retrospect, discovering a nice youth hostel in Tokyo and a “temple lodge” in Kyoto, both conveniently located near a JR railway station, was the deciding factor for our first year program to be implemented.

Third, we make a very effective use of the two-week JR railway pass to take care of ground transportation in Japan. As implied, with the pass (for which a voucher can only be purchased outside Japan), the program participants can use JR-group trains (as well as buses and ships) as much as they want for a fixed price. Moreover, we located our lodging sites
very close to a JR station, so that we do not need to take a taxi or bus from the station. Furthermore, we generally avoided inclusion in our itinerary of visits of cultural sites and business organizations, which are not located close to a JR station, although we did not compromise regarding the quality of the over-all program.

Fourth, although this was in our calculation from the beginning, many host firms, particularly those which had a subsidiary in Tennessee, treated our group to lunch, and some host groups, particularly those headed by a personal friend or relative of the course instructor, treated them to dinner. Needless to say, during the period of the two-day home-stay, meals were provided by the host families. In addition, the students were given guidance regarding how to select restaurants and how to buy food at convenience stores and supermarkets. Thus, the average cost of daily meals was very reasonable.

Finally, we acquired air tickets between Nashville and Japan, as well as the JR pass vouchers, from a Japan-specialized travel agency in the U.S., which would match any lower price quoted by competitors and provide reliable services. Thus, we made a maximum saving in the airfare also. It should be noted that there exist more than ten Japan-specialized “consolidators” in the U.S., mostly operating in big cities and offering attractive discounts.

Notes Concerning Pre-Departure Orientation and Training

Our program holds pre-departure orientation and training meetings of 6-8 hours altogether over a two-month period, on two or three separate days. Additional 2-4 hours is used for homework assignment. As part of travel preparation for the 15-day period, the following are done, among others:

(1) Compilation of a list of all participants, with a profile of each. The list was not only used for internal purposes but also advanced to prospective hosts in Japan.

(2) Confirmation that they have valid passport and current health insurance, and have purchased air tickets and railway pass vouchers, as instructed.
(3) Distribution of maps of Japan, Osaka, Tokyo, Kyoto, and other places to visit. They can be obtained from the Japan National Tourist Organization in the U.S., free of charge.

(4) Distribution of the 15-day itinerary, and explanation of day-by-day activities, pointing out, with the above-mentioned maps, where we will be on each day.

(5) Viewing 3 travel videos, which refer to geography, climate, points of interest, and modes of transportation, among others. Those who do not have a collection of such videos can readily borrow them from neighborhood video rental stores and such organizations as the JNTO and Japanese consulates in U.S.

(6) Discussion of things that should be taken to Japan, including footwear, clothes, toiletries, and camera. Reference is made to the weather, dress customs, and facilities available at the major places of lodging (e.g., washer & dryer, hair-dryer, iron board, and iron). An emphasis is placed on “travel light.”

(7) Discussion of how to prepare for the home-stay with the Japanese family. Preparation of gifts is an important topic (e.g., selecting items that reminds the host of the student’s university, hometown, and family). Another is how to start a conversation with those Japanese who have limited experience in English conversation and are very shy (e.g., taking a family album and showing pictures as ice breaker).

(8) Discussion of ways to exchange dollars into yen (e.g., cash, traveler’s checks, etc.). Included in the discussion is when and where exchange transactions should be made.

(9) Discussion of various ways to make telephone calls from Japan (e.g., Japanese and American telephone cards, credit cards, and collect calls).

As for pre-departure academic training and post-trip evaluation, the following points are noteworthy:

(1) Viewing of several videos on manners and customs in Japan and on Japanese business and economy. Those who do not have a collection
of their own may borrow them from the JNTO, KKC, JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization), and Japanese consulates.

(2) Study of literature on Japanese economy, business, and culture. The literature consists of publications contributed by the above organizations, Japan-focused pages in the web site of the Department of State and the CIA in the U.S., and handouts prepared by the instructor. Care is taken not to make the reading too demanding.

(3) Introduction of major Internet sources of information on Japan, such as the Japan Information Network, and exercises to find information specifically relevant to the field study trip, such as weather, foreign exchange rates, and firms and organizations to visit.

(4) Explanation of the basis of course grade determination, namely participation in all phases of the trip and three reports. Two of the three report-writing assignments are common to all students. One is a diary (or a day-by-day “journal”). The other is an annotated list of Japanese systems and practices, learned through their own observations and experiences (not through literature and videos), that they would like to transplant in the U.S. The third writing assignment, which is adjusted to the background of each student, deals with a depth report of one to five places of visit; here the expectation is higher for graduate students.

(5) Explanation of the timing of the course grade determination. All participants are given the grade of “incomplete” at the end of the trip. When they complete the assignments over the next 30 days.

A Sample of the Itinerary

A day-by-day itinerary of the “Japan Field Study 2000 of MTSU” is given below as a sample. This program was titled “Japanese Culture and Economy” and participated in by 13 students (5 undergraduate and 8 graduate students, and 7 male students and 6 female students). The group left Nashville, Tennessee, in the morning of May 16, and returned there in the evening of May 30, 2000.

Several notes should be added. First, two faculty members, other than the course instructor, were to participate in this program as part of their training and development, but dropped out, at an early stage, for family-related reasons. No replacement was made in consideration of timing-
related reasons. Second, the group entered Japan at Kansai (Osaka) airport and left at Narita (Tokyo) airport. This arrangement, as compared with a Narita/Narita combination, saves 1/2 day of activity time in Japan, with the same airfare. Third, weekdays were chosen for our air travel, as fares are lower than on weekends. Fourth, on the other hand, a Sunday was used for moving from Osaka to Tokyo with large luggage, as trains are much less crowded. Fifth, lockers and storage services at train stations were used whenever possible, to avoid carrying around of heavy and/or large items.

Sixth, a scheduled visitation, on the last day, of the headquarters of the Liberal Democratic Party and the Diet, which incorporated a lecture/discussion with a diet member, was canceled because of critical developments within the LDP as well as election campaigns. This part was replaced, nicely, with a visit to the Rainbow Town (Odaiba), a futuristic, dreamlike urban development. Finally, names and telephone numbers of contact persons, many of whom are personal friends of the course instructor, are erased in the itinerary given below for privacy reasons.

* Be at the Nashville Airport (at least) one hour before the departure time.
* More reading assignments in the plane.

5/17 (W) 15:15: AR Osaka-Kansai Airport. Customs clearance, money exchange, and JR voucher conversion to JR railway pass. Move to Nagai Youth Hostel (Tel 06-6699-5631, Fax 06-6699-5644) in Osaka City via Hanwa (Railway) Line. 17:30: Check-in at NYH. 18:30: Strolling around Namba and Shinsai-bashi (--several subway stations away), participation optional. 21:00: Back at NYH.
*Japanese time is 14 hours ahead of Nashville time.

17:57: AR Kyoto Station. Walk to Nishi Honganji Temple. Walk to Shijo-dori and Kawara-machi. 19:40: Gion Corner (a glimpse of Japanese performing arts, including Kyoto-style dance, puppet play, koto music, tea ceremony, and flower arrangement). 22:45: Back at NYH.

5/19 (F) 8:00: Leave NYH. (Local train.) 9:00-10:00: Kansai Economic Federation (Subway, Sakaisuji-Line. Get off at the Honmachi Station and take Exit 17.) 10:30-11:30: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) Osaka head office. (Subway and private Nankai-Line train.) 12:30: Kishiwada High School and vicinity (sandwich lunch at the Gofuso Japanese garden, class observation and participation, and discussions). 15:10: LV Kishiwada High School. (Walk.) 15:23 take train at Takojizo Station, change trains at Kishiwada, do so one more time at Sakai, and get off at Sumiyoshi Taisha). 16:00: AR Sumiyoshi Shrine. Stroll through the shrine complex and observation of aiki-jujutsu martial art practices. 16:30-17:30: Tea ceremony participation. 17:45-20:00: Welcome-to-Japan dinner party at the Martial Art Hall, hosted by Daitoryu Takuma-Kai members. (Taxi.) 21:45: Back at NYH.

5/20 (Sa) 8:00: LV NYH. 9:15: AR Kyoto Station. Visit of Rokuonji Temple (Golden Pavillion), Ryuanji, Kiyomizu Temple, and Nijo Castle. *For the above, we plan to purchase and use an all-you-can-ride bus/subway coupon at the Kyoto Station. * Be prepared to pay for admission charges at each site. 17:30-20:00: Welcome-to-Kyoto snack/drink/singing party, hosted by the “Kenji Nagatomi and the Tennessee Five,” at the Kenny’s, a live house of the band, near Kitaoji bus or subway stop. (Take trains.) 22:00: Back at NYH.

5/21 (S) 8:00: Checkout and LV NYH. (Train.) 9:30-11:30: Nara (visiting Todaiji Temple and its vicinity only, while keeping luggage near the Nara Station). 11:45: LV Nara. (Local train to Kyoto, and then bullet train to Tokyo.) 16:00: AR Tokyo Station. (Change to a local train.) 16:30: AR Iidabashi Station and Tokyo International Youth Hostel (TYH, Tel 03-3235-1107, Fax for in-Japan use 03-3267-4000). (Check-in.) 17:30: Welcome-to-Tokyo greetings, by a few MTSU alumni and friends, dinner at TYH
together, and possible outing with them or free activities.

5/22 (M) 8:00-9:15 (Meeting Room, TYH): Robert Callahan Lecture & Discussion: Personal Introduction to Japanese Economy and Business Practices. *Mr. Callahan is an MTSU MBA alumnus. 9:30: LV TYH. (Trains). 10:00: Marunouchi business district stroll, while meeting needs for money exchange, post office, and the like. 11:00-12:30: Mitsui & Co. Presentation by Mr. Katsuhiko Kamazawa (Director, International Research), followed by a Japanese style luncheon. (Taxi or subway.) 13:00 -14:30: Bank of Japan (Tour, lecture, and Q&A.) (Subway or taxi.) 15:00-16:30: Dentsu (video and powerpoint presentations on the company, recent CFs, and mass media in Japan). 17:00: Stroll the world-famous Ginza, and find ways to return to TYH, with trains and subways.

5/23 (T) 7:30: LV TYH. (Trains. Go to Iidabashi to Yotsuya Station. Get off and take a Chuo Line train to Kokubunji. Get off at Kokubunji and take a Seibu-Kokubunji Line train to Ogawacho). 9:00-12:30: Bridgestone Tokyo Plant (including lunch). (Trains.) 13:30: AR Ozaku Station. 14:00-16:00: Toshiba Oume Plant (presentation, lap-top-computer plant tour, and Q&A.) 16:30: Walk to the station. (Train.) 17:45: Back at TYH. Free evening activities. (Suggestions: Asakusa Temple arcade and/or Akihabara electronics district.)

5/24 (W) 7:10: LV TYH. (Train.) 7:30: LV Tokyo Station. (Trains-Yokosuka and Keihin Kyuko Lines.) Walk from Oppama Station. 9:30-11:30: Nissan Oppama Plant. (Nissan bus, and trains.) 12:50-13:45: Bridgestone Art Museum (*The above period includes a brief sandwich break at 13:30.) (Taxi or walk.) 14:15-15:30: Nissan Head Office. Meeting with Mr. Philippe Cline, Vice President (Chief of COO Office). (Trains or subways.) 16:00-17:15: Toshiba Head Office. Presentations by managers on the company, industry, and outlook). 17:30: Free activities. (Suggestion: Shinjuku.)

5/25 (Th) 7:50: Checkout and LV TYH. *Keep heavy/big items in the storage room of TYH, as we will return to the place three days
later. (Local train.) 9:00: LV Tokyo Station (Yamabiko #35).  
(Bullet train.) 10:23: AR Koriyama Station. (Chartered mini bus,  
30-40 minutes.) 11:00 -12:00: Asahi Beer Plant tour. 12:00-  
13:15: Luncheon (all-you-can-eat “Jingiskan-nabe” and all-you-  
can-drink). (Mini bus.) 14:41: LV Koriyama Station (Yamabiko  
#131). 14:56: AR Fukushima Station. Check-in at the Fukushima  
View Hotel across the station (Tel 0245-31-1111, major U.S.  
credit card accepted). 15:40: LV Fukushima Station. (Local  
train.) 16:00: AR Fukushima University. (Campus tour, including  
President Yoshihara’s office. 17:00: Welcome-To-FU Reception  
Party.) 20:00 (?): LV Fukushima University for the hotel.  
5/26 (F) 8:00: Hotel checkout 8:30: Leave by a special bus arranged by  
FU. 9:00: AR Fukushima University. (Campus tour.) 11:30: AR  
Obama Elementary School. (School tour, class observation,  
lunch with children, and discussions with the principal and  
teachers). 14:00: AR Tour of the MOLDEC, a high-tech,  
precision-machine plant in the country-side producing plastic and  
othermolds exported to the U.S. 16:00: AR Sugita Station. (Get  
off the bus and take a local train.) 16:30: AR Koriyama  
Station.16:48: LV Koriyama. (Suigun Line JR train.) 17:47:  
Ishikawa Station. Home-stay.  
5/27 (Sa) All day with the home-stay family.  
5/28 (S) Home-stay continues through the morning. 10:06: LV Ishikawa.  
(Local train.) 10:54: AR Koriyama Station. (Train change.) 11:22:  
LV Koriyama. (Lunch in the train.) 12:52: AR Tokyo Station.  
*Those who have personal friends and relatives may plan to meet  
them here (--your train car and seat numbers will be known ahead  
of time), spend the afternoon together, and report to the Tokyo  
International Youth Hostel in the evening. *Others will do a few  
errands (letter mailing, money exchange, book-store visit, etc.) at  
or near the Tokyo station. (Trains.) 15:00: Check-in at TYH. Free  
evening activity. (Suggestions: Tokyo Dome, only several blocks  
away from TYH, to see a Japanese professional baseball, or  
Kabuki Theater near Ginza, or Meiji Shrine and Shinjuku.)  
*A major league baseball at the Tokyo Dome, Giants vs.  
Dragons, starting at 18:00. All tickets are sold out, but get there  
3 innings later and buy your ticket from a desperate scalper.
*Note that there will be more shopping opportunities later. Odaiba (“Rainbow Town”) to be visited on the last day is excellent. The Narita Airport also has a good shopping area, with a variety of reasonably-priced souvenir items; you can count on this place for a last-minute shopping.

5/29 (M) 8:00: LV TYH. 9:00: Japan Development Bank (Presentations by noted economists.) 10:15: Tour of the Imperial Palace. 12:00: Lunch at the Hibiya Park. 14:00-15:15: Keizai Koho Center (Japan Business Information Center)—discussions with Mr. Tashiro, chief, North America Division. 16:00-17:50: Nikkei (Nihon Keizai Shimbun)—tour of facilities and discussions with executives. Evening: dinner at THY, and a possible Sayonara-Japan karaoke party.


Conclusions

It is essential for collegiate students of business today to visit at least one foreign country and experience its culture, economic structure, and business practices. Educators should prepare for them opportunities for low-cost-high-quality, short-term study-abroad programs. This paper was prepared to contribute to the achievement of such educational goals. We are hopeful that the information will provide theoretical and pragmatic insight into the challenge.
Mission of the Project

The Asian Globalization and Latin America Project (AGLA) is a unique, integrative trans-regional program at Florida International University (FIU) that enhances Asian studies through collaborations with other area studies programs. It has been funded in part by a Department of Education Title VI grant (1999-2002) for the development of curriculum supporting a new certificate program and the enhancement of language instruction and study abroad opportunities for FIU students. The seed for the project was the visit of Ronan Pereira, formerly of the University of Brasilia, in October 1999 for lectures on Japanese Cults in Brazil and the role of Asian Studies in Latin American universities in fall 1998.

AGLA at FIU aims to strengthen the interaction between area studies in order to address new challenges in international programs by linking two major regional studies centers: the Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC), which has long been designated a National Resource Center, and the rapidly growing Institute for Asian Studies (IAS) that has implemented a new BA program. The project has focused on establishing or examining points of intersection between the regions of Asia and Latin America by analyzing issues such as: diaspora and migration patterns, cultural and national identity, trade and political economy, systems of education and reform, environmental and labor issues, and internet commerce and technology, with an emphasis on contemporary society as part of a comprehensive investigation of the significance of globalization.

The AGLA project has promoted the integration of a variety of disciplines focusing on trans-regionality, such as International Relations, Economics, History and Religious Studies. This has been particularly important for the creation of the AGLA certificate program, which has provided students with the opportunity to learn about the two regions
through diverse approaches. Also, lectures and workshops sponsored by the Project have enabled faculty and students at FIU to deepen their knowledge about Asia and Latin America through the experience and knowledge of recognized scholars and professionals.

Some of the high points have been workshops on comparative literature, global economics, Asian ethnicity, social development, and inter-regional commerce; in addition to events ranging from the performance of Japanese-Brazilian dance, the participation of Asian Studies in the Tigers of Asian trade show in Miami Beach and a symposium on China’s relations with Latin American countries sponsored by LACC. The presence of visiting scholars Masaru Tamamoto and Andre Gunder Frank as well as lectures by Peter Smith, Karen Yamashita, and Ivan Schulman, among others, have been particularly stimulating. In addition, Dale Olsen gave a fascinating demonstration of shakuhachi in comparison with flutes indigenous to Latin America. In November 2001, we had a demonstration of Butoh dance by a performer from Nicaragua and a lecture by a speaker from Brazil—even as another Brazilian expert on Japanese dance had to cancel her travel plans.

**Methodological Question**

The intriguing question of “Why must Area Studies be So Darn Interdisciplinary?” became the theme for several workshops and research efforts, and is an important topic as IAS develops, largely through interdisciplinary and other kinds of collaborative programming. The appeal of “area studies” is that it enables scholars and students to look beyond the horizons of their discipline and engage in broader kinds of inquiry. Interdisciplinarity allows specialists to deepen their understanding of the larger cultural and economic context of the region on which their work focuses.

But the question arises, Can we, or do we really want, to forego our disciplinary base? The FIU trans-regional Asian/Latin America Project demonstrates that specialists seeking to cross borders can explore other options for accomplishing this goal. These include transcending barriers of region and culture while remaining within a disciplinary method. Prime examples are studies of Chinese and Japanese ethnicity in Latin American cultures, social and economic development issues in a comparative or global context, and Asian influences on Latin American literature, film, religion, and thought.
One way of looking at this issue is to consider the following global situation. For many decades there was a saying that when the U.S. sneezed (or had an economic or political crisis) Latin America caught a cold. For the past couple of decades the same analogy was used in the case of Japan and its regional neighbors in Southeast Asia. By the 1990s it became clear that there was a broader context, because when Japan sneezed mightily in 1997 the cold was caught as far away as Brazil.

**Project Themes**

The AGLA Project has focused on several main themes in developing new curriculum and supporting faculty research that reflect a comparison of the relation between increasingly interactive regions in the context of globalization:

1) **Ethnic Identity**, including the function of the Japanese communities in Brazil and Peru and the Chinese in Cuba and Panama, as well as Japanese-Latin Americans (*Nikkei*) returning to the homeland as laborers (*dekasegi*).
2) **Comparative Literature and Thought**, such as the influence of Asian culture on Latin American literature, philosophy, and film, especially figures like Octavio Paz, Jorge Borges, and Jose Marti, and comparisons of "magical realism" in the respective literary traditions.

"Guided by his pale hand a silkworm is his brush, that formed upon the paper the black chrysalis of a mysterious hieroglyph whence, like flower, sprung a magnificent thought with wings of flying gold: subtle and mysterious flame in the lamp of the ideogram."

-Jose Juan Tablada, 1920
3) **Linguistics and Bilingualism**, how languages and styles of language pedagogy and heritage language retention reflect issues of cultural interaction and social identity.

4) **Social and Political Issues**, including development, security, governance, labor, drug trafficking, medical ethics, environmental concerns, human rights, and related topics dealing with China in Latin America.

5) **Trade and Economics**, such as the effect of a global economy on both regions and, in particular, the impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on Latin American economic development.

6) **Area Studies**, including studies of world regions and international issues as conducted in universities and institutes in Asian and Latin American countries, in order to understand how the academic leaders of each area understand the other.

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Maps appearing in a Japanese textbook about Latin American Studies

**Faculty Development**

The Faculty Development portion of AGLA has been especially successful in supporting the research projects and course planning of numerous faculty members. The project has, for example, led Steven Heine, director of the Institute for Asian Studies as well as the AGLA project, to travel to Mexico, Panama, and Brazil for research on Chinese and Japanese ethnic communities. He has also become familiar with the
status of Latin American studies in Japanese universities, and interdisciplinary area studies in the context of worldwide academics. At the same time, Eduardo Gamarra, director of LACC, attended a conference in Japan for the first time and presented a paper dealing with “Asians and the Andes.”

Several other Asianists had an opportunity to learn about Latin America. For example, Alan Gummerson of the department of Economics, traveled to a Mercosur conference and workshop sponsored in part by the FIU Center for International Business Education and Research. More significantly, a number of Latin Americanists became involved with Asian Studies. For example, Theodore Young, associate director of AGLA, infused a course on Brazilian Film with examples of cinema created to reflect Japanese cultural identity. He also helped organize workshops led by Jeff Lesser on Asian identity issues in Brazil, and by Dain Borges representing the University of California at San Diego project on Pacific Rim-Latin American studies.

Erik Camayd-Freixas in the department of Modern Languages gave two lectures related to the AGLA program. One was on "Magical Realism: A Trans-Pacific Perspective" and the other was on "The Tao of Mexican Poetry." Camayd is presently editing a collection of essays entitled "Orientalism and Identity in Latin America." He defines Orientalism as “influences and perceptions of primarily the Far East, but also the Middle East, in the Latin American tradition.”

Alfred Lopez of the English department received an invitation from two prestigious literary organizations in India to visit their country for the purpose of presenting papers at their annual conference. AGLA support helped him develop his current book project, an edited collection of essays to be entitled “Postcolonial Whiteness: A Critical Reader.”

Tori Arpad of Visual Arts has traveled to Japan and Korea for exhibitions, and has organized a major exhibit of East Asian artists in venues throughout Miami that has stirred the entire arts community.

For several years Maida Watson of Modern Languages has contributed to the AGLA Project by organizing the Annual Seminar on Asian Influences on the Hispanic Canon. The Seminar helps faculty and students analyze the literary and cultural relationship between Asia and Latin America. She also helped organize the first study abroad program to Japan in summer 2001 that was directed by Japanese instructor Asuka Haraguchi and Randall Martin of the Business School. Watson traveled to Peru to explore contacts between universities from that country and FIU,
and to Panama to plan a joint course on relations between Asia and the Hispanic world.

Catherine Marsicek, the Latin America and Caribbean Information Center Librarian, supported the Asian Globalization and Latin America initiative by developing a research guide to selected library resources, entitled “Asians in Latin America: A Guide to Resources.” This annotated finding aid guides users to key works regarding the field, including reference works, books, journal articles, electronic databases, government documents and Internet Resources. With over 1000 entries of major works and articles discussing the history and the influences of Asians in Latin America, this is a major contribution to facilitate research in the field. Visit this website at: http://www.fiu.edu/~asian/global/index.htm.

**Curriculum Enhancement**

One of the main aims of the AGLA project has been to create and infuse courses with Asian and Latin America material. The Project stimulated faculty in the field of Latin America to infuse courses with Asian content.

Alfred Lopez, English, developed an infused course combining Latin American and Asian studies. The course is a survey of literatures known collectively as “magical realism.”

Damian Fernandez, International Relations, infused the course “Development and Third World”. The empirical basis for the course is a comparative study of Latin America and Asia on specific issues of development.

Erik Camayd-Freixas, Modern Languages, created a new course, “Eastern Thought and Latin American Literature: The Age of Octavio Paz.” He also infused one course, “Introduction to Spanish American Literature,” which is a survey course of Spanish American literature from its origins to the contemporary period. Ana Roca, Modern Languages, created a course on “Bilingualism and Heritage Language Learning” in Asian and Spanish ethnic communities, and Joan Torres-Pou, Modern Languages, has developed a new course that focuses on Asian-Hispanic literature, especially in the context of the Philippines.

Orlando Garcia, School of Music, infused the course “Music of the Americas” with information regarding Asian cultures in different parts of Latin America, including Brazil and Colombia.

Douglas Kincaid, Sociology and Anthropology Department and Vice Provost for International Studies, infused the course “Comparative
Sociology” that is organized around comparisons of cultures, societies, and nation states. Using the core sub-fields of sociology—including socialization, deviance, race and ethnicity, gender, religion, and social change—the course emphasizes contrasts and similarities among Latin American and Asian countries to illustrate the insights to be gained from careful comparison. Another theme of the course is the contemporary impact of globalization. Guillermo Grenier, Sociology and Anthropology Department, also infused the course on “Comparative Sociology” which is organized around three interrelated themes: the historical development of societies, comparison of cultures and world regions, and the impact of globalization on societies.

As for the Asian faculty, Steven Heine, Religious Studies and History, infused a course on “Meditation and Mystical Traditions” with material on Octavio Paz and Jorge Borges, and Umbandah and Mayan ritual, and also created a course on Asian Religions in the Americas; Alan Gummerson, Economics, infused the course “Comparative Economic Systems,” which compares the development policies in East Asia and Latin America; and Anjana Mishra, International Relations, infused the course “World Prospects and Issues” with Latin America content.

The following is a complete list of courses that were created for the AGLA project in humanities, social sciences and professions that are part of the new AGLA certificate program.

**Modern Languages:** “Eastern Thought and Latin American Literature,” on the influence of Asian philosophy and culture on magical realism in Latin America.

**Modern Languages:** “Japanese Culture and Calligraphy,” on the history and practice of Japanese calligraphy in comparative context.

**Modern Languages:** “Asia in 19th Century Hispanic Literature,” on Asian influences in Hispanic writers, especially in the Philippines.

**Modern Languages:** "Eastern Thought and Latin American Literature: The Age of Octavio Paz,” on Asian influences on Latin American literature and thought.

**Modern Languages:** “Bilingualism and Heritage Language,” Asian and Latin American influences on North American pedagogy.

**Religious Studies:** “Asian Religions in the Americas,” Asian religious movements in North and South America.

**Religious Studies:** “Sacred Space, Sacred Travels,” on pilgrimage sites and practices in Asian and Latin American locales.
Sociology: “Globalization and Society,” on how developing countries in both regions are affected by globalization.
Sociology/Anthropology: “Labor Movements in Developing Countries,” the history of labor movements in the development of Asia and Latin America.

The infused courses include:

Education: “Art Education,” how this field is conducted in Asia and Latin America.
English: “Literature and International Relations,” deals with classic examples of fiction that highlights issues in Asian comparative politics and society.
English: “Comparative Post-colonialism,” comparison of literature in Asian countries with Latin America literature.
History: “Special Topics: International Drug Control,” theories and policies related to drug control.
International Relations: “Japan and the US,” discusses the relations between the two countries.
International Relations: “Development and the Third World,” compares Latin America and Asia on issues of development.
International Relations: “World Prospects and Issues,” deals with political and economic issues if East Asia in comparative perspectives.
Modern Languages: “Spanish American Culture,” to include Asian influences.
Modern Languages: “Brazilian Film,” to focus on the impact of the Japanese ethnic community.
Music: “Music of Asia,” deals with different varieties of rhythms and styles of Asia.
Music: “Music of the Americas,” deals with Asian music in Latin America cultures.
Religious Studies: “World Religions,” Examines the origins, teachings, and practices of selected world religions.
Religious Studies: “Meditation and Mystical Traditions,” deals with the mystics of different religions in both regions.
Sociology/Anthropology: “Comparative Sociology,” on the effects of regional integration programs.
Lectures and Workshops

The following is a brief description of some of the main workshops supported by the Project.

**LASA 2000**

In a collaboration with the Japan Consul General’s Office and the FIU Latin America and Caribbean Center, the Institute for Asian Studies sponsored a panel at the meeting of the Latin American Studies Association held in Miami in March 2000. Professors Shoji Nishijima, Nobuaki Haraguchi, and Neantro Saavedra-Rivano came from Japan as featured speakers dealing with the way Japanese economists study the region of Latin America. The discussants were Peter Smith of University of California at San Diego and FIU’s Eduardo Gamarra, director of LACC.

**Global Ethics**

A major event of the AGLA Project dealt with comparative medical ethics. Professor William LaFleur of the University of Pennsylvania, discussed the ethical implications of abortion and organ transplants in Japan. LaFleur presented the Asian perspective, and Chris Gudorf of FIU, who specializes in Latin American perspectives, developed comparative themes. Both speakers examined the view of ethical choices in medical technology in countries where medical techniques are influenced by indigenous, non-Western sources as well as Western medicine.

**Area Studies**

Several of the main speakers examined the role of area studies and trans-regional programs in relation to the process of globalization. Dain Borges and Peter Smith, both of University of California at San Diego, spoke on the four-year program at UCSD on studies of the Pacific Rim in relation to Latin America. Richard Baum of UCLA described Asian and Asian-American studies on his campus, and also gave a lecture on relations between China and Taiwan.

**Latin America Area Studies in Japan**

In another conjunction with the office of the Japanese Consul in Miami, Professor Akio Hosono of Tsubuka University in Japan led a faculty workshop on trans-regional studies. Hosono is the leading Japanese scholar of Latin American studies, particularly economics and trade relations. He examined trends both before and after the Asian economic crisis of 1997.

**Asian Literary Influences**

One of the main AGLA events are the Panels on Asian Influences on the Hispanic Canon. There have been already a total of five Panels. In
the Panels, there were lectures and workshops in Spanish and in English, dealing with Asian influences in Latin American Literature.

The III Annual Panel featured a workshop by Linda Ehrlich, who discussed the image of Orpheus in film as a symbol of transcendence. Also, Chiyoko Kawakami lectured on the image of ghosts in Japanese literature and modern urbanization.

The IV Annual Panel on Asian Influences on the Hispanic Literary Canon featured Karen Yamashita of the University of California at Santa Cruz, doing a reading from her latest book on Japanese-Brazilians (Nikkei) entitled *Circle K Cycles*. Yamashita is the noted author of *Through the Arc of the Rain Forest* and *Brazil Maru*. Other speakers included Ivan Schulman, emeritus at the University of Florida, who is a specialist on Cuban literature, and Maria Carmen Simon Palmer of the Universidad Nacional a la Distancia who deals with Orientalist themes. The V Annual Panel on Asian Influences on the Hispanic Canon also featured Maria Carmen Simon Palmer "17th Century Spanish Perceptions of Japanese Eating Habits."

**Oxford University Conference**

An Oxford University Symposium was held on Asian and Latin American trade, economic and political relations. This featured FIU faculty members Mohammed Farouk, Paul Kowert, Mohiaddin Mesbahi, and William Walker.

**China and Latin America**

This panel was sponsored in conjunction with the Latin American and Caribbean Center. It dealt with the international trade and politics between China and Latin America, which has attracted increasing attention. Feature guest speakers included: Bud Cole, National Defense University; Dave Finkelstein, Center for Naval Intelligence; Linda Robinson, Harvard University; Jack Sweeney, Strategic Forecasting; Cynthia Watson, National Defense University.

**Visitors from Kanda University**

Several visitors from FIU student exchange partner, Kanda University of International Studies located just outside Tokyo, came to FIU to present lectures. Kazuei Tokado, a specialist in Spanish and Latin America political economy, was among the visitors and gave a workshop for FIU faculty.

**Asian Ethnicities**

Several lecturers discussed the role of Asian ethnicity and ethnic identity in the Latin America social context. Kathleen Lopez of the
University of Michigan discussed her sociological research on the Chinese community in Cuba, and Jeff Lesser of Emory University examined Japanese as well as Jewish and Arab identity issues in Brazil.

**Music Festival**

Orlando Garcia produced the New Music Miami Festival in spring 2002, which contained a representation of composers from Japan as well as other parts of Asia and Latin America. The event featured contemporary chamber, solo, and electro-acoustic music and included concerts, panels, and forums. Fredrick Kaufman, Director of the School of Music, presented a world premiere of “Kaminarimon” (“Thundergate”), which consisted of a composition for Taiko drums and Flamenco dance.

**Ongoing Research Activities**

The AGLA Project has spawned a variety of ongoing research activities conducted by FIU faculty.

**Bilingualism and Heritage Languages:** based on Ana Roca’s studies of Asian languages in comparison to Spanish.

**“Magical Realism” in Asian and Latin America Literature:** Erik Camayd-Freixas is editing a book on the subject.

**Asian Ethnic Identity in Latin America.** Maida Watson is developing a faculty development trip to Panama, in connection with the College of Business.

**Trans-Regional Political Economy.** This project involves a combination of faculty in International Relations, Economics and Business.

**Asian and Latin America Musicology.** Fred Kaufman, director of the School of Music, is composing a Taiko and Flamenco piece to be previewed at the FIU Music Festival in November 2002.

**Asian influence on Spanish-American writers.** Juan Torres-Pou is researching the influence of Asia in 19th century Spanish and Spanish-American writers and pre-independence Spanish-Philippine literature.

Furthermore, several graduate students have developed research projects. These include Tatiana Mackliff in the field of International Development Education. She is working on ethnicity studies, with a particular focus on Japanese-Peruvians dating back to 1899. In this period, the first group of Japanese immigrants arrived in Callao to work as contract laborers on sugar plantations in the coastal region of Peru. Interestingly, after a period of 100 years, history reversed itself and Peruvians of Japanese descent became the source of low-cost labor in the flourishing economy of
Asia. Mackliff conducted a complete study in the city of Miami. For complete transcripts of revealing interviews visit: www.fiu.edu/~mackliff.”

Also, Erin Westin completed a MA thesis on the spread of Mahikari, a recent Japanese New Religions movement, to the island of Martinique and the questions of adaptation in the Caribbean setting. Isabel Morales, as part of her MA research on Cuban religiosity, did fieldwork in the Chinese and Japanese communities in Havana.

Future Prospects

By the completion of the AGLA Project grant cycle the Institute for Asian Studies housed two flourishing certificate programs and implemented a new B.A. degree. The program also entered into collaboration with Florida Atlantic University and Miami-Dade Community College for a Title VI funded project, the South Florida Consortium for Asian Arts and Culture. Another partner in the Consortium is the prestigious Morikami Japanese Museum and Gardens in Delray Beach. Asian Studies and the Morikami are involved in several joint efforts including establishing a new database on Japanese migration to the Americas, developing new interlibrary loan policies, and most importantly, working toward the creation of a Japanese garden and culture center on the FIU campus.

These linkages are part of a larger network of statewide institutional connections called “JapaNet.” To launch this network in November 2002 a meeting of the Southern Japan Seminar will be held at FIU to coincide with Japan Night at the Music Festival. This event will feature the composition by Fred Kaufman, who did research during his first trip to Japan, along with other performances. The weekend will include a workshop at the Morikami Museum and Japanese Gardens.
EVIL, SIN, FALSITY AND THE DYNAMICS OF FAITH

Masao Abe

I

The apparently similar concepts of evil, sin, and falsity, when considered from our subjective standpoint, are somehow mutually distinct and yet at the same time somehow related. This essay examines these concepts in relation to the dynamics of the awakening of faith.

What is called evil opposes the rules of morality dictated by reason, even if it knows well what they are. The awareness of such an opposition exists because there is evil as evil. In contrast to this kind of evil, there is also what is called the awareness of the root evil. The awareness of the root evil means the awareness of a high degree of evil. This is the kind of evil that exists when the standpoint of reason itself, which activates a persistent obedience to the rules of morality that should be able to overcome the kind of evil discussed in the previous sense (i.e. evil as evil), realizes clearly the anti-moral quality of the self. This quality involves an unconscious attachment to the self itself in that, by emphasizing the rules of morality and actually adhering to these rules, it comes to be attached to the rules. The thoroughness of the principle of good that the standpoint of morality necessarily requires—in other words, the absolutization of the autonomy of reason—is aware of the self-contradictory nature within the standpoint of morality, which is that the self cannot avoid or evade the so-called Pharisaical hypocrisy (of attachment to the rules).

Therefore, in its awareness of the root evil, the morality of the self is made to become aware of its own limits and encounters nothingness when realizing these limits. At the extreme point of this tendency, the awareness of evil necessarily becomes one with the awareness of nothingness. Therefore, in spite of the excellent insight into the awareness of evil in Kant’s philosophy, we must say that the awareness of evil that is not yet connected with the awareness of nothingness is a level of understanding that is not yet thoroughgoing.

In the midst of bottomless nothingness that fully encounters the consequences of the thoroughgoingness of the standpoint of such a morality, when seeing the light of God transcending in the direction of the self or when hearing Buddha’s voice the self enters anew, through the
awareness of nothingness, into a relation with God. When illuminated by this light of God, “the absolute autonomy of human reason” is already being realized, again, not simply as evil, but as sin, that is, as an opposition to the will of God that is hardly to be forgiven. In other words, the way of being of the self that has been realized as a self-opposition to immanent human reason is here realized again as the opposition to the will of the transcendent God. Therefore, this means that the “fundamental subject” is an axis that mediates the awareness of sin and transforms itself from the human being to God. In entrusting everything to God’s will as such a fundamental subject, one takes God’s will for its will, and when one discovers the basis of subjectivity through the subjectivity of God an awareness of salvation is realized.

Within the standpoint of such a belief, nothingness related to the awareness of evil is overcome, and the self revitalizes as a new self, or a true selfhood that can rather bear the true nature of God. But, in this case, the true nature of God and the subjectivity of the human being are not completely identical. The subjectivity of the human being is actually cut apart from God and the human being is seen as something that does not possibly escape its own sinful nature, while at the same time the true nature of God appears to human reason as an absolute absurdity that is in the final analysis impossible to fathom. But the unity of subjectivity and the ordinary nature of truth is realized only when the subjectivity of the human being transcends the ordinary self through the awareness of sin and makes a decision based on faith to choose to adhere to the true nature of God. Moreover, such a transcendence of the self is possible only when God loses a sense of manifesting the self-transcendence of God by surpassing and crossing over the gap from the other world.

In contrast to the transcendent function of the moral self that is not the transcendence of the actual self but is simply the transcendence toward a standard self established objectively within the self trying in this way to seize such a self objectively, the transcending function of the standpoint of faith breaks through the whole realm of immanency. It is the entire self-transcendence that leaps into a relation with the transcending God, and in this case the objectification of the self as something that seizes the self objectively is entirely sublated. That is, within the standpoint of faith, along with the fact that the self of the human being is realized subjectively to the last end and, moreover, is realized as a complete self that has entered into an absolute relation with God, at the same time God appears not as God in a general sense but as a subjective, humanistic God. That is, God appears as
the “Thou” who voluntarily activates the will to save and tries to completely save the self of the human being. This is the very subjective, humanistic God that calls on this very subjective human “I.” The God of the philosophers is a God that has a common name, but the God of the religious believers must be a God that has a proper or personal name. This is a God that has a proper name and saves this “I” that has a proper name.

However, even if we say that the religious self is subjective, through the attitude of faith in such a God that sees Him as a “Thou,” it is a subjectivity that stands only as an object that receives the action of God as the fundamental subject. It rather entrusts everything to God because of the awareness of groundlessness (Grundlosigkeit), which indicates that by no means are we humans able through our own power to be subjective. By becoming the object of God’s salvation, we participate in the subjectivity of God and in this way we regain our own subjectivity. At this point, for the first time, the absolute actual self that, indeed, cannot be achieved through its own power becomes a true self because of God’s subjectivity.

Yet, only in the standpoint of faith is there the possibility that absolute reality, which is itself truth, mediates between the awareness of sin and salvation. In this process there is a split or divide that can be surpassed only by God, as well as a twofoldness that can become a oneness only based on God. After all, along with the fact that the self that stands on faith realizes itself as being a sinful self that rebels against God with the whole existence of the self, the self returns to God with the whole of such self-existence and realizes itself as a self that believes in salvation by God. This is based on the fact that the self that thus stands on faith is endlessly divided and consists of an opposition between the side of self that is completely sinful and the side of the self that is completely saved. That this self can actually exist as a complete self is based on nothing other than the reason that the self leaps into a relation with God in the midst of this division, and it becomes the container of the will of God through faith.

Therefore, the fact that there is a self that becomes one—even if the complete self as it is in itself is split transcendentally into an opposition, as indicated above, and is not split immanently into an opposition as in the case of morality—is nothing other than the manifesting of a situation that is completely the same situation as the oneness of God and the self, which are split transcendentally into an opposition. That is, on the one hand, even if the self is a faithless self that is contrary to God, on the other hand, because of the awareness of sin it returns to God as the faithful self that obeys the will of God. Then, the very thing that mediates the twofold split into an
opposition between the fundamental gap between such a self itself and God is the awareness of sin and salvation as being the will of God that penetrates the self through or the action of God’s love.

Consequently, the reason for which it is said that the standpoint of faith has absolutely other-power-oriented existentiality lies in the action of God’s love—which affirms and absorbs the sinful self that disbelievingly contradicts the will of God to offer salvation—as the manifestation of the absolute that the human self has difficulty evading. The very thing that surpasses the twofold split into an opposition previously discussed, and that unifies this from the direction of the transcendence, is nothing other than the action of the love of such a God. Within the standpoint of faith, the twofold that is split into an opposition to the end becomes one just because it is split in that way; but the one is not simply one, it is one just because it encompasses the twofold. The self is one with God because it is dichotomized from God and God is dichotomized from the self, and that is exactly why God absorbs the self and becomes one with it.

Along with the mystery of faith, we must wonder whether this standpoint of the twofoldness encompassed by oneness is also a problematic feature of faith.

II

Even if from the standpoint of faith the absolute split between the self and God is realized, it is ceaselessly surpassed through the transcendence from God, overturned, and elevated to a subjectivity that becomes one. But it must be said that there is some function of objectification to the extent that the oneness is not a pure oneness, but a oneness that includes the twofold. Nevertheless, even if we speak about a function of objectification here, it is not a function of objectification like the one found previously in the standpoint of morality that tries to grasp objectively the normative self and is transcendentally established in the inner side of the self. This not being the case, the standpoint of faith completely sublates such an objectification and breaks through the immanency, and the complete self that stands before the transcendent God is a subjective standpoint to the end. Nevertheless, this subjective standpoint participates in the subjectivity of God by realizing the Grundlosigkeit of the self and completely becoming the object of the salvation of God as the fundamental subject.

From the standpoint of subjectivity that thus recovers from groundlessness and can be well founded, at this point is there not an objectification of God based on the self that is made in the form in which
the self becomes entirely the object of the salvation of God? This is the function of objectification that cannot be realized as an objectification that is not objectifiable. Then, the objective grasping of such a meaning of God is nothing other than the objective grasping of the self that is accomplished when grasping, in this way and at the same time, God objectively. The self grasps the self itself objectively in grasping God objectively. If we explain this more concretely, even in the standpoint of faith that has transcended the entire self, is there not left over a tinge of the shadow of the self in the very action of the confirmation that further takes faith as properly faith? Or, in the very process that absolutely negates self and world while transcending towards God or, further, establishing the self by facing God, is there not a self-affirmation that is turned inside out?

When this process tries to penetrate subjectively the standpoint of faith, does it not necessarily actualize itself and try to break up the very thing called faith? We should say that this involves a kind of antinomy in the standpoint of faith, in that the thoroughness of the standpoint of faith is in and of itself the biggest anti-faith act. Yet, at this point, we should pay attention to the fact that, even if we say that the self-affirmation that is turned inside out is actualized, this does not mean that there is a deepening of the awareness of the sin. Believing firmly in the certainty of salvation that appears more and more when accompanying a deepening of the awareness of sin is the standpoint of faith. For this reason, in the standpoint of faith, the deepening of the awareness of sin as egotism that rebels against God becomes the very proof of faith and by no means does it mean the dissolution of faith. That is the very paradox of faith, rather than the antinomy of faith.

The antinomy of faith that we are trying to define here is an antinomy that is lapsed into because of an objectification of God that is not brought to an appropriate level of self-awareness. In this way, a self-attachment that is only partially brought to an awareness, which lies hidden in the root of the standpoint of such a paradoxical faith, is nothing other than the revelation of self-affirmation that creeps into the very fact of emphasizing the paradox of such a faith. The repetition of the succession of faith, and of religious decision-making—and generally, the very fact of emphasizing the paradox of faith—is based on the persistence of faith, and as a result is there not a self-attachment that penetrates to what is called “faith”?

Such an awareness necessarily leads to the awareness of falsity as if keenly splitting oneself or to the awareness of the falsehood of the
fundamental self, such that the self that can bear religious truth does not completely free itself from the standpoint of self-attachment and love of self. The self that stands on faith, at the ultimate conclusion of the subjective thoroughness of that standpoint, realizes the root falsity that still lurks at the basis of that religious truth, breaks off relations with God within the awareness of this falsity, and for one moment is made to return to the absolutely real self. Therefore, at this point, we must say that it is not that absolute reality is itself directly the truth, but that the absolute reality is a matter of certainty itself certainty. One way or another, this means that even faith as self-negation is again realized as the activity of the transparent self, or as the radical self deeply refracted within itself—the most certain level of selfhood that cannot be negated by any other thing. That is the absolute self as the self, which as a self that has once been made transparent by negation from faith, finally negates again faith and is completed so that it takes “faith” for being a falsity. Moreover, this self is a self that does not transcend falsity within the awareness of falsity, but is more and more aware of the certainty of falsity within the awareness of falsity. It is a self that stands on a reliable sense of falsity simply without having any faith in truth, or a self that stands on a simple certainty of falsity without believing in any kind of truth.

By entering into a relation with God, however, the self overcomes nothingness encountered in the failure of morality and becomes the religious self, but at this moment it is drawn again into the dark abyss of groundlessness or nothingness because of the inevitable failure of faith to transcend falsity. Therefore, we must say that the awareness of falsity, along with being unified with the awareness of nothingness in and of itself, is an awareness in which the falsity that is surpassed by faith is thus made opposite to itself and is transformed into a twofoldness by being directly aware of itself once again. Now, if we call the awareness of nothingness due to the failure of morality a kind of nihilism based on the awareness of evil, this would imply the possibility of the self being overcome by believing in a transcendental divinity mediating within the human being as the nothingness faced in the very moment of the failure of immanent human reason.

Nevertheless, we must say that the nihilism implicit in the awareness of the falsity that we are now discussing, as the awareness of nothingness directly faced because of the failure of such a transcendental divine faith, is nihilistic in the most original sense of nihilism that cannot be overcome even through the transcendental God, not to mention the
immanent function of reason inside the human being. Then, if we suppose the existence of that which is called “true religion,” this must refer to an experience of faith that which is able to overcome nihilism caused by such a profound awareness of falsity.

Reviewed by John Tucker, East Carolina University

For those partial to relativistic understandings of history, publication of works such as *Atarashii rekishi kyūkasho* must be among their worst nightmares. This junior high school textbook, authored by a mixed bag of intellectuals, including a few respected historians and, among others, a best-selling cartoonist, endorses with enthusiasm a multi-perspectival philosophy of history as theoretical justification for its unabashedly feel-good approach to the Japanese past. Thus the introduction to *Atarashii rekishi kyūkasho* explains that while many might think that history is studied in order to know the truth about the past (kako no jijitsu), the truth of history is also found in studying what people in the past thought about their times. (p. 6) While this sort of observation might seem innocuous enough, in *Atarashii rekishi no kyūkasho*, it provides the foundation for interpretations, for example, of Japan’s involvement in WWII as a struggle for the liberation of Asian people from the colonial domination of their Caucasian Anglo-American oppressors. After all, was it not the case that many Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s saw things in that way? If so, then does their thinking not provide sufficient justification of such views? At decisive, internationally sensitive interpretative junctures, that seems to be the logic of this junior high school text.

Furthermore, it seems that the authors of *Atarashii rekishi kyūkasho* believe that what was not an obvious part, of the thinking of people of the past need not be entered into the record. Thus, since exceptionally few Japanese in 1937 believed that Japanese imperial forces had “raped,” “massacred,” or criminally violated the people of Nanjing, such judgments need not be admitted as historical fact. Rather, they can be attributed to those who most conspicuously generated them, i.e., the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, and discounted as ingredients in what some have described as “victor’s justice,” or historical controversy over which no final consensus has been reached. (pp. 270; 294-295) In even more egregious applications of the theory that history might be an account of what people in
the past thought about their times, the authors of *Atarashii rekishi kyûkasho* find reason to omit completely the mention of sordid, largely unrecognized, and perhaps often unknown or little understood aspects of the 1930s and 1940s such as the sexual enslavement of Korean “comfort women,” and the biological experiments conducted by the infamous Unit 731.

To be fair, it must be admitted, of course, that the kind of historical whitewashing that occurs in *Atarashii rekishi kyûkasho* is not unprecedented. In a telling example, the introduction to the text relates how George Washington, though lauded as a heroic founder of the United States, is not mentioned in some British history textbooks. Moreover, when British texts mention the American colonial military forces, they refer to it not as an army fighting for independence (dokuritsugun), but as a “rebel force” (hanrangun). No doubt, there are, and perhaps always will be, as many versions of history as there are national units. At the same time, most will probably agree that the historical accounts deemed credible and fair by a wide range of readers from diverse national backgrounds are far more honest than those whose circulation does not extend, without extreme controversy, outside the geographic bounds of the nation producing and consuming them. Given that *Atarashii rekishi kyûkasho* has elicited consistent criticism internationally, it is doubtful that its appeal to relativistic theory will convince many that its reading of the past is as valid as any other. Though this book might be discounted as little more than a failed junior high school text since it has been adopted by extremely few school districts, the fact that it was approved for possible selection by the Japanese Ministry of Education can only be considered a poor reflection on the textbook review protocol. Moreover, its instant achievement of best-seller status, with over a million copies sold in a matter of months following its public marketing in the early summer of 2001, makes the publication and popular reception of this text a disturbing intellectual event in the new millennium.


Reviewed by John A. Tucker, East Carolina University

Few if any postwar Western scholars have made greater contributions to the study of Japanese history than Marius Jansen. His
series of essays presented in 1988 as the Edwin O. Reischauer Lectures at Harvard.

While Jansen’s The Making of Modern Japan draws upon his extensive legacy in historical writing, it most conspicuously incorporates the new scholarship in the Cambridge History of Japan, especially volumes four (Early Modern Japan, John Whitney Hall, editor, 1991), five, and six (The Twentieth Century, Peter Duus, editor, 1988). Readers of the Cambridge History of Japan, while most likely to agree with Jansen in recognizing that multi-volume text as “the most complete and authoritative survey of Japanese history ever undertaken in the West,” and one “not likely to be surpassed” in terms of its “scope and quality” (p. 772), might also have regretted the absence of tighter synthesis and common understanding of the larger achievement to which each of the cutting edge scholars was contributing. While one could easily reply that readers are left to supply that synthesis on their own, for those daunted by that still exhausting project, Jansen’s monumental study of modern Japan provides masterful guidance, integrating in a comprehensive, judicial manner most every noteworthy development in Japanese historical studies that has occurred in the last forty years. The result is a lengthy, often complex, but elegantly clear account of Japanese history.

Jansen’s text, unlike most surveys of modern Japan, does not give the short shrift to Tokugawa developments. Instead, with what must be lauded as an admirable sense of balance, Jansen allots a full ten chapters (1: “Sekigahara”; 2: “The Tokugawa State”; 3: “Foreign Relations”; 4: “Status Groups”; 5: “Urbanization and Communications”; 6: “The Development of a Mass Culture”; 7: “Education, Thought, and Religion”; 8: “Change, Protest, and Reform”; 9: “The Opening to the World”; 10: “The Tokugawa Fall”) of the twenty chapters comprising the text to Tokugawa history, thus treating that period with the respect that it deserves rather than using it, stereotypically, as a premodern foil against which to contrast Meiji and later modern unfoldings. If anything is short-changed, it is Meiji Japan, granted only four chapters (11: “The Meiji Revolution”; 12: “Building the Meiji State”; 13: “Imperial Japan”; 14: “Meiji Culture”). Two chapters are devoted to Taishō Japan (15: “Japan Between the Wars”; 16: “Taishō Culture and Society”), while the Shōwa period is allotted the remaining four chapters (17: “The China War”; 18: “The Pacific War”; 19: “The Yoshida Years”; 20: “Japan Since Independence”). In addition to the main body of the text, there is a most helpful 24-page bibliographic essay, “Further Reading,” in which Jansen situates virtually every major monograph, and
many important articles, produced by Western scholars in the postwar era. All and all, Jansen’s contributions have been massive, making the scope, quality, and complexity of this final volume a very natural capstone to a truly monumental scholarly career. Those teaching modern Japanese history at either the undergraduate or graduate level will find the volume a challenging yet rewarding textbook. Surely no future discussion of modern Japan will be complete without reference to it.


Reviewed by Kinko Ito, University of Arkansas at Little Rock

The Japanese society today is going through a more or less radical, unprecedented social change in politics, economy, education, family, religion, and culture. It is in a flux where a phenomenon called *Nihon Byo*, or "the Japanese Disease" is taking place—the long-term recession, high unemployment rates, financial troubles of large, trustworthy companies and banks, increase in crime rates and juvenile delinquency, decrease in birth rates, and so on.

*Onnatachino Shizukana Kakumei* (A Women's Quiet Revolution) is a book based on the newspaper articles that appeared in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun from January to July of 1998. It features a big new wave of Japanese women emerging in a changing society: they are expected to live past age 83 (the longest longevity in the world); they have more education, independence, and economic power than ever, and they seek different ways of life, social relations, and new values.

The book contains 10 chapters with numerous case studies of Japanese women, both single and married, in different walks of life—housewives, teachers, office workers, politicians, attorneys, entrepreneurs, nurses, managers, farmers, news casters, etc. Also included are case studies of career women and statistics from abroad so that one can compare the Japanese situation with those women in the United States, Canada, Sweden, China, Thailand, Bangladesh, Indonesia, France, Iran, Israel, and South Africa.

Some chapters focus on the social issues in general that pertain to both men and women while others specifically pay attention to the status
and role of women. The book gives the reader an overall summary of the various changes that the Japanese women are going through today.

Japan is still a society dominated by men, their values, and standards. The post industrial society still tends to limit women's creativity and freedom, and the political status of women is very low as compared with other Western nations even though many women took initiative, participated, and played a very important role in the environmental, consumer, and various other social movements a few decades ago. The Japanese women of today are making strides in many arenas of their everyday life, and it is obvious that they are the very source and energy of social change.

One of the issues covered is the declining birth rates and the women's role in economy. The book argues that unless Japanese society becomes a place where it is conducive to have babies and raise children for both men and women, the birth rates will keep declining. The current birth rate is below 1.5 children per couple. The Japanese immigration policy is very strict, and it seems that immigrants cannot be counted on to replace the work force entirely. The graying of Japan is taking place much faster than any other Western, industrialized nation. The Ministry of Labor reported in 1997 that the Japanese labor force is expected to decline to only 63 million workers in the year 2025.

The Japanese women will be obliged to enter the labor force in a much greater number and participate in the economy as workers as well as caretakers of the elderly as the population decreases. This will give the women more economic power, self-esteem, and social status. Higher education for women will also contribute to expansion of their career choices, opportunities for self-fulfillment, and utilization of (wo)man power for economic development.

The key to the future economic success of Japan indeed lies with the women, and the government and the private industry must secure job opportunities and training for them and change or reform the current employment procedures and practices that favor men over women, which include the "life time employment" (one commits his or her career to only one company), nenko seniority payment system, and in-house training. Deep rooted sexism that traditionally dominated the work place needs to be dealt with more efficiently and rationally. New technologies such as computers and internet may promote advancement of women into the labor market.
The book also deals with the social reality of the modern Japanese women's intimate relations. It deals with the lack of child care facilities, lack of understanding on the part of men, including the husbands, increase in divorce, domestic violence, sexual and substance abuse, feminization of poverty.

What the book means by "a quiet revolution" is the fact that there is a new wave of Japanese women who are changing the way of the society. They are psychologically and economically more independent, seek self-fulfillment in education and careers, and give priority to their individuality first and then collectivity such as family and their work life.


Reviewed by Jan Bardsley, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

One has only to look at the worldwide success of the novel *Memoirs of a Geisha* to see how prominently images of Japan as the land of the erotic and the exotic continue to figure in international mass culture. Within such Orientalist representations, the Japanese man, styled as the misogynistic, boorish businessman, and the Japanese woman, typed as a victimized beauty, appear with tiresome regularity. In her book *Women on the Verge*, anthropologist Karen Kelsky turns the table on these well-worn narratives and their critiques by investigating the phenomenon of Japanese women's desire for liberation in a mythic West and with a fetishized Caucasian man. Rather than simplifying and dismissing such desires as merely "Occidentalist," Kelsky considers their influence in Japanese domestic politics, their effect when re-circulated back to the West, and their weight in shaping individual women's life courses and identities.

In this study, Kelsky expertly draws on current anthropological, theoretical writing about globalization and the flows of transnational capital and culture. She also makes use of a wide variety of popular writing by and for Japanese women, and traces a "genealogy of Japanese women's internationalism" by examining the case of such early sojourners as Tsuda Umeko, Mishima Sumie and Kaō Shitsue. Her study is also informed by ethnographic work that includes interviews with Japanese women in Japan and abroad. Consequently, although Kelsky is interested in large narratives,
deals with the politics of fantasy, and makes some sweeping claims herself, she is using impressive and diverse sources to launch this investigation.

As Kelsky discovered, however, turning academic attention to Japanese women's desire for the West elicited anger from many Japanese and foreigners alike. Indeed, some of the surprising moments in this book occur when Kelsky realizes that her own position as a Caucasian, academic woman married to a Japanese man antagonizes her informants. Japanese women who have rejected Japanese men as sexist and old-fashioned, and Western men in Japan who believe in their superiority over Japanese men both find Kelsky's choice of spouse odd. Others argue that internationalist fantasy should not be the topic of academic scrutiny at all or fault Kelsky as replacing old stereotypes with new ones. Thus, Kelsky reports often finding herself actively “fielding” (her word) accusatory questions about her choice of research topic, her position as an ethnographer, and her personal decision to marry a Japanese man.

This is a complex book and one not easily summarized, but its key themes can be described as follows. In *Women on the Verge*, Kelsky links contemporary Japanese women's "internationalism," as she calls it, to the nation's low birth rate, women's increasing preference to marry later in life, and women's predominance in such internationalist fields as interpreting, relief work, and employment with foreign companies. While the majority of Japanese women still hope to marry and have children, there is a significant number who are rejecting the "domestic" life. As Kelsky discovers, "domestic" not only refers to a life in the home and devotion to the family, but also to abiding by the "domestic" codes of gender roles in every sphere of Japanese public life. Seeking alternative ways of living has led many Japanese women to look for models in the West (often conflated with the U.S.), and even to escape Japan for a freer life abroad.

Yet, as Kelsky takes pains to show, this West is often more an imagined than a real place, and the process of using the West to construct one's identity and life course leads to a host of individual differences. This process can range from a shopping expedition to New York to paying for sex in Honolulu to graduate school in Chicago or a banking career in Los Angeles. Engagement with the "redemptive West" (Kelsky's phrase) can also take place in Japan through reading romance novels set in England, learning foreign languages, working for foreign companies, or going to Tokyo parties and bars where meetings between foreign men and Japanese women are actively encouraged. As this range implies and as Kelsky's informants discuss, a hierarchy of Western engagements emerges here, with
the "serious" career women distancing themselves as much as possible from the shoppers and the sex-seekers. As one might expect, the more seriously engaged the women are with the West, and the more invested they are in terms of language study or careers, the less romantic about the West they tend to become. Nevertheless, even women critical of inequities in American society, cling to the idea of the democratic West as a means of arguing against discrimination in Japan.

For her part, Kelsky accords respect to all the women's sense of agency, and pays attention to their ability to act on their interpretation of the West, however they see it. One theme that emerges with striking predictability among all these women, "superficial" and "serious," is their rejection of Japanese men as personal partners and as beneficiaries and gatekeepers of male privilege in Japan. However, this rejection refers only to coworkers and potential romantic partners, and does not allow any mention of fathers, brothers or sons. Why the Japanese man as "father" never comes up here, either in informants' personal histories or as a figure in Japan society, is, for me, an especially perplexing gap. I find it hard to believe that none of these ambitious women, particularly those successful in the higher echelons of international academic or business life, received encouragement from their Japanese fathers. I also wonder why they do not mention raising their own sons, in cases where they are mothers of boys, in a different fashion.

Kelsky writes that many have responded to her work with a personal sense of outrage. What seems to have angered Japanese women with international experiences and/or marriages, for example, is the sense that all their individual choices could be summarized, explained, and boxed up as mere examples of a phenomenon. Kelsky pleads that this is not her project, and strives to complicate the relationship between broad narratives of international relations and individual choices. While she sees them as mutually influential, she does hold not that one explains the other. In her Conclusion, Kelsky respects individual choices, including her own, but argues, I believe, that none is free of transnational influences. She ends with these lines:

“How much scrutiny can any of us bear of our most intimate desires, the places of the inscription of fantasy on the body, never free from capital-driven dreams but never wholly contained by them either? Fielding the constantly shifting political agendas of the national and the transnational imaginary, the intimate spaces where love and desire meet global capital

Reviewed by Daniel A. Metraux, Mary Baldwin College

The United States has enjoyed a very close but often stormy relationship with Japan since the arrival of Commodore Perry’s “Black Ships” in 1853. The two nations have shared a mutual fascination and respect for each other, but misconceptions about the other’s identity, power and intentions have often nurtured intense levels of mistrust and conflict. The irony is that despite nearly 150 years of close contact, both nations persist in talking at rather than with each other and advance national interest over shared responsibility.

Joseph M. Henning, Assistant Professor of History at Saint Vincent College, presents a very sensitive and comprehensive account of the very fluid relationships and imagery that Americans had with Japan during the Meiji Era (1868-1912). Henning’s book, *Outposts of Civilizations: Race, Religion, and the Formative Years of American-Japanese Relations,* is a brief yet careful and highly detailed discussion of America’s ever-increasing fascination and frustration with its most important Asian partner and competitor.

Gilded Age Americans generally believed that civilization and progress were inseparable from Anglo-Saxon heritage and Christianity. Early American visitors to Japan, many of them missionaries and teachers, arrived with the preconceived notion that the United States represented the pinnacle of “civilization” because of its cultivation of “a democratic society of Christian principles, commercial wealth and technological innovation...Missionaries, scholars, and artists [who] made Japan a perennial and popular topic in Gilded-Age media...arrived in Japan convinced of white, Christian superiority.” (pp. 2 and 4)

Henning introduces us to two young graduates of Rutgers University, E. Warren Clark (1849-1907) and William E. Griffis (1843-
1928), who journeyed to Japan as teachers and lay missionaries in the early 1870s and whose later books, articles and talks on Japan greatly shaped American opinions and images of the country. They came as young idealists imbued with the optimism and certainty of progress and as self-appointed teachers from what they regarded as a superior culture. The intellectual trend of their day had given up the preoccupation of a golden age in the past. Instead, the young Victorian thinkers looked to a future that promised progress towards a better world.

Indeed, at the time that Clark and Griffis went to Japan, this idea of progress had become a firmly held conviction in the United States and northern Europe. Western thinkers and practitioners relied on science, new technology and modern machinery that vastly expanded work capacity and promised an improved well-being for many. Such material benefits were also expected to enhance moral progress as well. Living under better conditions, it was assumed that human beings would better themselves. Such thoughts were closely entwined with the religious convictions of educated people of the age like Clark and Griffis, who were convinced that Christianity held the key to human progress and must serve as the foundation of the spread of the progressive Westernization of the non-Western world.

Henning notes that there had been a heated debate between the early 1870s and late 1890s between two camps of American writers over what is needed for a society to become civilized: “those [writers] who advocated secular and scientific progress and those who championed Christianity as the indispensable prerequisite for progress.” (p. 66) Missionaries and lay missionary teachers like Clark had preached that no country could be considered civilized without Christianity and only the gospel provided the power to lift people out of the degradation. But as Japan made notable advances in technology and industrialization some secular visitors began

“to argue that Japan, now revived and open to the world, was aspiring and already advancing toward the higher level of civilization without Christianity…In the early Meiji period, several American analysts noted that Japan had an ancient, refined, and dynamic civilization quite distinct from and in some respects superior to Western civilization: they found the Japanese an industrious, quick-witted and noble people. Even though Japan was assimilating Western ideas, many Americans acknowledged that it had a civilization of its own from which the West might learn. In this view, because Japan was already civilized, its
assimilation of Western ideas was not necessarily an unadulterated improvement” (pp. 64-65).

American missionaries were concerned in 1879 when British writer Edwin Arnold published his seminal work, *The Light of Asia*. Arnold’s warm introduction to Buddhism sold a half million copies and created a very favorable image of the religion. American journalist Edward House, writing in the 1870s and 1880s, painted missionaries as being “curiously unintelligent and illiterate professors of a narrow and microscopic Christianity.” (p. 76) Arnold and House approached the question of civilization and progress from the perspective of morality. The West, they claimed, had little if anything to teach the East about ethical behavior. Such claims brought strong denunciations in the missionary press in Japan and the United States.

Japan’s rapid and successful transition into a major world power, however, forced even American missionaries and their supporters to come to grips with the Japanese phenomenon: a successful embrace by a non-Western people of modern civilization. Religious American writers like Griffis soon developed a hearty respect for the politeness, cleanliness, intelligence, devotion to work, and high ethical standards of the Japanese. They reconciled the seeming contradiction between Japan’s obvious achievements and its high degree of civilization and the fact that by the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), Japan had not transformed itself into a Christian country by saying that Japan had all of the _latent tendencies_ of an Anglo-Saxon Christian country. Such ideas were especially prevalent around the time of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05).

The War represents the highpoint of favorable American attitudes towards Japan before Pearl Harbor. American missionary writers portrayed Japan as a most progressive and modern nation, which alone amongst the nations of Asia had the potential of adopting the Anglo-Saxon traditions of the West. The fact that Christianity had found few converts was not terribly disturbing in itself because Japanese had been found to possess such latent tendencies such as honesty, self-sacrifice, patience, hard work and grace. Having these qualities together with the science and technology of the West made the eventual conversion to Christianity a virtual certainty.

This enthusiastic image of Japan is best portrayed in the writing of Sidney Gulick, a Japan-based missionary, teacher and historian during the latter years of the Meiji period. Gulick's book, *The White Peril in the Far
East, which was written at the height of the Russo-Japanese War, is a blanket indictment of the Russians as an enemy of progressive Western civilization. Gulick urged Americans to support the "progressive" Japanese as they fought for their survival against the "regressive" Russian empire. Gulick comments that although few Japanese had converted to Christianity while most Russians were at least nominally Christian, the Japanese boasted such modern and Christian values as honesty, progressivism, democracy, education, and openness towards the Western church.

Gulick stressed that one must regard Japan as a most "virtuous country" because of its highly enthusiastic reception of and adaptation to Western and "Anglo-Saxon" values. The Russians, on the other hand, are regarded as a genuine menace to world peace. They are aggressive, uneducated, dishonest, and reactionary. A Russian victory over Japan would thus be a major defeat for those progressive forces in the West who sought a new world order based on reason and science.

Gulick literally saw the Russo-Japanese war as a conflict between the forces of good and evil, progress and reaction. Nominally Christian Russia represented very "unchristian" tendencies while Japan, though not in any technical sense a Christian country possessed all of the "virtues" of Christianity. Gulick warned that Japan was the West's one hope for the successful implantation of Western Christian civilization in Asia and that American support for Japan was critical for the success of this endeavor.

Japan's victory over Russia made it a world power and a presumed threat to other imperialist powers in Asia. American leaders began to ponder the weakness of their position in the Philippines and Hawaii and the hostility of white Californians to growing Japanese immigration to the West Coast. The favorable image of Japan spawned by American writers like Gulick, Griffis and Clark swiftly vanished in the mist of the growing antagonism and mistrust that eventually led to Pearl Harbor and the Pacific War of 1941-45.

Joseph Henning prepared an excellent portrait of Japanese-American relations and the fluid and often overly positive and optimistic American imagery of Japan that so greatly influenced these relations. Henning draws from a vast array of contemporary sources to successfully analyze the complexity of American feelings for and perceptions of Japan. He makes it clear that Americans a century ago had an intense interest in Japan and recognized the importance of Japanese-American relations.

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Henning’s book also provides a fascinating glimpse at the intellectual ferment in the United States a century ago. Issues such as the supposed superiority of the white race, whether Christianity was a necessary ingredient of civilization, and whether non-white people and nations such as the Japanese can and should be treated as equals are covered in great detail in Henning’s fine book.

“Outposts of Civilization” is one of those major works that cover the “big picture” of US-Japanese relations and the cultural factors influencing the conduct of international relations in the late 19th century. Henning’s meticulous research and clear writing style make “Outposts of Civilization” an important contribution in the field of Japanese studies.


Reviewed by Ann Wehmeyer, University of Florida

Brian McVeigh juxtaposes two ubiquitous modes of dress in Japan, those of uniforms and those of cuteness, and argues that they can be read in terms of the dynamics of two opposing forces within Japanese society. The uniform side represents the “official ideology” of “capitalist production,” while cuteness represents the “antiofficial ideology” of “popular consumption” (p. 162). McVeigh characterizes his work as “ethnographic in spirit” (p. 4), and his approach that of cultural psychology, specifically, “the ‘dramaturgical variety’ of symbolic interactionism” (p. 6). While not explicitly intended by McVeigh, his work functions as a grammar of the language of clothing, and it’s certain that any student of Japan will read a lot more into Japanese dress after encountering this book.

The first chapter outlines McVeigh’s theoretical approach and provides definitions for the key concepts in the book. The second chapter specifies the ways in which salient Japanese cultural constructs such as sekien (‘normalizing gaze’), function under perspectives such as “scene” within the “dramaturgical approach” of Burke and others. A key perspective in the book is that of “agent,” which McVeigh develops from Jaynes’ ideas of self-expression. Under this perspective, the self in Japanese society has two basic modes of expression: an unregulated “true” self which one freely expresses in ingroup (uchi), private (ura) settings, as opposed to a
monitored “public” self which one is socialized to perform in outgroup (soto), open (omote) settings. As is evident here, McVeigh does indeed make use of the traditional Japanologist “sociopolitical geography,” but avoids essentializing his study by constant reference to observations made by others such as Goffman in analyzing the behavior of people in different societies.

In chapter 3, McVeigh analyzes the rationale underlying uniforming students in Japanese schools, and workers in the Japanese workplace. As suggested in the sub-title of this book, the economic nation-state schools its student populace in the appropriate modes of public self-presentation through regulated dress and group-oriented hierarchical activities. The goal is a dedicated, efficient work force. The chapter provides engaging discussion of types of uniforms, and details the items that are regulated, such as fabric and color of girls’ underwear, and length of student hair. Photos and diagrams illustrate the particular points made by McVeigh, for example, a photo of students serving lunch in an elementary school illustrates the fact that each activity may have its own uniform, and students learn to dress into their roles. The latter half of the chapter reports student opinion on what they think of their uniforms, with the opinions gleaned from interviews conducted by McVeigh himself, and from survey studies conducted by others in Japan. Interesting perspectives emerge, such as the acute sensitivity to quality of school and pride/shame in its associated uniform, and teen girls’ capitalization on schoolgirl uniform fetishism. Also intriguing is McVeigh’s explication of modes of resistance to uniform normalization, such as “loose socks” and crushed heels. The only area one might wish to see more developed here is the discussion of the history of school uniforms and their rationale, which is too brief.

After the short interlude of “de-uniformization” during the university years, young men and women, and women in particular, once again don regulated dress as they enter the corporate and civil workplace. Chapter 4 looks at these two phases of dress in Japanese life, and considers how various uniforms (e.g., those of construction and transportation workers; female office workers), and standardized dress (e.g., of salary men, housewives) fall out under the universal framework of uniform continuity mapped out by Joseph, that of “highly uniform” versus “anti-uniform” (p. 113). In this chapter, McVeigh also includes perspectives on what motivates companies to require their employees to wear uniforms, with, interestingly, the aesthetics of tōitsu-bi (‘beauty of uniformity’) emerging as a key factor.
Chapter 5 analyzes the “cult of cuteness” from the perspective of Turner’s properties of symbols, and the basic dynamic driving the adoption of cuteness is power. McVeigh argues that the reason why cuteness is so omnipresent in Japan is that it is “a form of ‘resistance,’ a daily aesthetic that counters the dominant ‘male’ productivist ideology of standardization, order, control, rationality, impersonality and labor” (pp. 135-136). In his view, cuteness is not simply a matter of fashion, but a strategy used to smooth social relations, obtain favors and indulgence, or gain control over others in a non-threatening way. His explication of “authority cuteness,” whereby official agencies adopt cute images to soften directives, yet control behavior, is particularly enlightening.

In chapter 6, McVeigh analyzes the production and consumption of cute items. He views consumption of that which is cute as an act of resistance: the cute gravitates toward the ‘loud’ (hade) end of the traditional aesthetic, and is associated with contexts of play and fantasy, as opposed to work and reality. In that sense it counters official ideology. McVeigh also looks at sites for the performance of cuteness, places where people display and act out their cute selves, such as Harajuku. The production of cuteness on the corporate end involves the use of animals and cartoon characters as corporate symbols or spokespersons, in addition to the production of cute commodities such as the virtual pet tamagotchi. Production and consumption intersect in complex ways in the world of entertainment, where new “teenage tarento” create their own cute look, which in turn stimulates fandom and consumption of cute fashions.

In a brief conclusion, McVeigh suggests that the “compartmentalism of social life” in Japan, wherein one dresses and presents oneself in varying ways in different contexts, implies a compartmentalism of personality as well. In closing he quotes from Miyatake and Norton, who suggest that the Japanese view of a “well-developed personality” is that of one who has many “drawers” or qualities to open or draw upon as desired. In other words, while the ideology of uniformity is powerful and dominates public life, just as public are displays of resistance.

The portion of the book devoted to cuteness is much less than that devoted to uniformity, and McVeigh’s reading of cuteness lacks the historical and critical perspectives provided by Sharon Kinsella (“Cuties in Japan,” in Women, Media and Consumption in Japan, edited by Lise Skov and Brian Moeran, pp. 220-254, Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1995). Kinsella sees kawaii style as originating in the youth culture of girls,
and like McVeigh, finds cute fashions, ideas, and sentiments to be a form of rebellion. She views cuteness, however, as only one element among many in a web of popular culture that counters traditional values and daily life. Kinsella also provides criticism of the phenomena of cuteness from the perspectives of conservative and other intellectuals whom McVeigh does not draw upon to any great extent. Thus, those whose interests lie in cuteness would do well to consult Kinsella alongside McVeigh.

Wearing Ideology studies two contemporary modes of dress which are readily observed by anyone visiting Japan, and it will easily stimulate the interest of American students, who are quite aware of the ways in which fashion is driven by entertainment, and of the ways in which one can present oneself to achieve desired outcomes. It’s an impressive work, and one that is likely to attract attention beyond the field of Japanese studies. Whether or not one is ultimately persuaded by McVeigh’s economic nation-statist view of uniformity and its effect on behavior, the linkages and interplay McVeigh outlines between uniformity and cuteness are compelling.